A proposition in some sense contains a thought, but a thought is not identical with a proposition............................Wittgenstein says it is becoming clear to him why he thought that thinking and language were the same. He didn't say that its become clear that they are the same — 013zen
I don't believe that an isomorphism necessarily suggests a certain independence between each structure, but in practice I admit it is used to talk about independent structures. — 013zen
Wittgenstein writes in unequivocal terms that we cannot think what we cannot think and therefore what we cannot think we cannot say either. It means what cannot be thought cannot possibly be spoken about either. These entries suggest that thinking and language (speaking) are coextensive.
First of all...why did you say grass is red and not green? xD Secondly, I don't take "Grass is red" or "Grass is green" or anything of the sort to be representative of an elementary proposition for Witt. These are examples of propositions. — 013zen
He complicates this by using the term 'object' in both cases without always making the distinction clear.
— Fooloso4
I don't think that this is necessarily a bug, as much as a feature. Part of the work seems to be dealing with the idea that the meaning of a word or proposition is dependent upon how its being used. — 013zen
(4.112)Philosophy aims at the logical clarification of thoughts ...
Philosophy does not result in ‘philosophical propositions’, but rather in the clarification of propositions.
Without philosophy thoughts are, as it were, cloudy and indistinct: its task is to make them clear and to give them sharp boundaries.
In contemporary mereology, a simple is any thing that has no proper parts. Sometimes the term "atom" is used, although in recent years the term "simple" has become the standard.
What does it mean to say that an object is simple? One thing Wittgenstein seems to mean is that it cannot be analyzed as a complex of other objects. This seems to indicate that if objects are simple, they cannot have any parts; for, if they did, they would be analyzable as a complex of those parts.
Logic as the term is used in the Tractatus, is not primarily a human activity. Logic is not propositional. Propositions are logical. Logic deals with what is necessary rather than contingent. — Fooloso4
I don't know if anyone has mentioned this, but the idea bears resemblance to the classical conception of substance (ouisia). — Wayfarer
The term ‘substance’ has a long and varied history. For this reason, none of them will serve as a reliable starting point for determining what Wittgenstein means by the term. — Fooloso4
It all depends on whether, in the Tractatus, for Wittgenstein, language and thought are the same thing. — RussellA
The elementary propositions "grass is red" "grass is green" "not grass is red" and "not grass is green" may be true or false — RussellA
I can't make a huge amount from those passages. I realise Frege is who he is in the history of Phil and particularly language use. So, may i despair a little... — AmadeusD
Logic as the term is used in the Tractatus, is not primarily a human activity. Logic is not propositional. Propositions are logical. Logic deals with what is necessary rather than contingent.
That is a pivotal matter in the question of how much this work presents an epistemology or not.
— Paine
Good point. Objects are not treated as things to be known. To the extent there is knowledge of the world it comes from science not logic. — Fooloso4
Every world, real or imagined, must have a logical form in common. However different and changeable they are, their shared logical form subsists. This form consists of unchangeable objects. Their configuration is what is changeable. That substance is form and content means that it is logical and consists of unchangeable objects. — Fooloso4
How we are to understand "form" and "content" exactly, however, is still somewhat unclear, but I think you're on the right track by tying it to logic. — 013zen
Here Wittgenstein draws an analogy between "clothes" and "a body" with "language" being the clothing and "thought" being the body that is clothed. So, there is a distinction that is made between the two — 013zen
These are examples of propositions, not elementary propositions, though. — 013zen
4.002 may be correct that language disguises thought, but is not inconsistent with the idea that language is thought. — RussellA
(Emphasis added.)Language disguises thought. So much so, that from the outward form of the clothing it is impossible to infer the form of the thought beneath it, because the outward form of the clothing is not designed to reveal the form of the body, but for entirely different purposes.
As I understand it, for the Tractatus:
The world is a logical space in which can only exist logical objects in logical configurations. — RussellA
(2.0121)Just as we are quite unable to imagine spatial objects outside space or temporal objects outside time, so too there is no object that we can imagine excluded from the possibility of combining with others.
(1.13)The facts in logical space are the world.
From the outward form, how the thought is expressed, we do not see the logical form that underlies it. — Fooloso4
1.13 - The facts in logical space are the world — Fooloso4
It is clearly the case that from the outward form of clothing we can infer the form of the body beneath it. — RussellA
It is also clearly the case that from the outward form of language we can infer the form of the thought beneath it, otherwise language would be meaningless. — RussellA
What use would language be if when someone said "please pass the sugar", no-one knew the thought behind these words. — RussellA
From the outward form of language we clearly do know the form of thought beneath it. — RussellA
Wittgenstein in the Tractatus does away with universals in favour of particulars, — RussellA
Objects are particulars. A universal property of objects is to combine with other objects. — Fooloso4
Objects are necessarily linked to atomic facts, as atomic facts are about the objects in the world and their possibilities. — schopenhauer1
That is to say, if Wittgenstein forfeits defining what objects are beyond vague notions, then the tower of babel is simply axiomatic and self-referential and points to nothing. — schopenhauer1
And yet, the meaning is often not understood. Your reading of Wittgenstein is a case in point. If we must infer what is meant then it is not evident from the outward form. — Fooloso4
Objects are particulars. A universal property of objects is to combine with other objects. — Fooloso4
However, one feature of the Tractatus is Wittgenstein's removal of relations and properties from his ontology. — RussellA
In a certain sense we can talk about formal properties of objects and states of affairs, or, in the case of facts, about structural properties: and in the same sense about formal relations and structural relations.
(Instead of ‘structural property’ I also say ‘internal property’; instead of ‘structural relation’, ‘internal relation’.
I introduce these expressions in order to indicate the source of the confusion between
internal relations and relations proper (external relations), which is very widespread among philosophers.)
It is impossible, however, to assert by means of propositions that such internal properties and relations obtain: rather, this makes itself manifest in the propositions that represent the relevant states of affairs and are concerned with the relevant objects.
For the Tractatus, objects combine as particulars not as universals. — RussellA
(6.13)Logic is not a body of doctrine, but a mirror image of the world. Logic is transcendental.
(1.13)The facts in logical space are the world.
(2.0121)Just as we are quite unable to imagine spatial objects outside space or temporal objects outside time, so too there is no object that we can imagine excluded from the possibility of combining with others.
If I can imagine objects combined in states of affairs, I cannot imagine them excluded from
the possibility of such combinations.
(2.012)In logic nothing is accidental: if a thing can occur in a state of affairs, the possibility of the
state of affairs must be written into the thing itself.
Simple or elementary objects, which are what this thread is about, are not objects in the world. — Fooloso4
I included a link to this thread thinking you might read it before posting. — Fooloso4
The world is about some logical space consisting of "the facts" (whence facts? What are facts?.. All of this kind of thing Kant tried to tackle... The operative word is he tried, whether or not he succeeded.. It's called epistemology and metaphysics, not mere assertion of claims of reality without basis).“The facts in logical space are the world” (1.13 ). — 013zen
“An atomic fact is a combination of objects (entities, things)” (2.01).
and
“In the atomic fact objects hang one in another, like the members of a chain” (2.03). — 013zen
His definition is like one in computer programming it seems — schopenhauer1
Logic as the term is used in the Tractatus, is not primarily a human activity. Logic is not propositional. Propositions are logical. Logic deals with what is necessary rather than contingent. — Fooloso4
You mine [might?] as well just start with atomic facts.. — schopenhauer1
As I mentioned in a prior post:
Logic as the term is used in the Tractatus, is not primarily a human activity. Logic is not propositional. Propositions are logical. Logic deals with what is necessary rather than contingent.
— Fooloso4
You mine [might?] as well just start with atomic facts..
— schopenhauer1
Might :up:
Facts are contingent. It is not necessary that these elementary facts and not others exist. Objects are the answer to your question "whence facts" — Fooloso4
...all muddle... — schopenhauer1
Yep. Folk hereabouts have missed Tractatus 1.1. They are trying to understand of the Tractatus as founded on objects, when it is founded on facts. — Banno
That is to say, if Wittgenstein forfeits defining what objects are beyond vague notions, then the tower of babel is simply axiomatic and self-referential and points to nothing. That is to say, objects are a gesture to science, but really a pseudo-version of atomic facts. It's "atomic facts in drag". There is no "there" there. It's atomic facts all the way down. No object to be found. — schopenhauer1
That is to say, it is a logical marker, a name. But then what's the use of distinguishing objects and atomic facts if you leave objects so undefined? You mine as well just start with atomic facts.. — schopenhauer1
Get involved in philosophical discussions about knowledge, truth, language, consciousness, science, politics, religion, logic and mathematics, art, history, and lots more. No ads, no clutter, and very little agreement — just fascinating conversations.