Thanks. Something I've suspected for a while is that we live in a time when there is enough knowledge about the brain floating around that solutions to the problems of understanding conscious are likely to appear from multiple sources simultaneously. In the same way that historically we've had a few people invent the same ideas in parallel without knowing about each other. I think Leibniz' and Newton's version of calculus is an example of what I'm getting at. — Malcolm Lett
for context, I've been working on my theory for about 10 years, so it's not that I've ripped off Humphrey — Malcolm Lett
Great question. MMT is effectively a functionalist theory (though some recent reading has taught me that "functionalism" can have some pretty nasty connotations depending on its definition, so let me be clear that I'm not defining what kind of functionalism I'm talking about). In that sense, if MMT is correct, then consciousness is multi-realizable. More specifically, MMT says that any system with the described structure (feedback loop, cognitive sense, modelling, etc) would create conscious contents and thus (hand-wavy step) would also experience phenomenal consciousness.What does your theory have to say about computer consciousness? Are conscious computers possible? Are there any conscious computers right now? How would you test for computer consciousness? — RogueAI
The biggest problem I've had this whole time is getting anyone to bother to read my ideas enough to actually give any real feedback. — Malcolm Lett
my body is part of my self, — Malcolm Lett
I recommend checking out Pierre-Normand's thread on Claude 3 Opus. I haven't bit the bullet to pay for it to have access to advanced features that Pierre has demonstrated, but I've been impressed with the results of Pierre providing meta-management for Claude. — wonderer1
It seems like the entire "process" described, every level and aspect is the Organic functionings of the Organic brain? All, therefore, autonomously? Is there ever a point in the process--in deliberation, at the end, at decision, intention, or otherwise--where anything resembling a "being" other than the Organic, steps in? — ENOAH
Absolutely. I think that's a key component of how a mere feedback loop could result in anything more than just more computation. Starting from the mechanistic end of things, for the brain to do anything appropriate with the different sensory inputs that it it receives, it needs to identify where they come from. The predictive perception approach is to model the causal structure that creates those sensory inputs. For senses that inform us about the outside world, we thus model the outside world. For senses that inform us about ourselves, we thus model ourselves. The distinction between the two is once-again a causal one - whether individual discovers that they have a strong causal power to influence the state of the thing being modeled (here I use "causal" in the sense that the individual thinks they're doing the causing, not the ontological sense).is the concept of self a mental model? — ENOAH
referring to the difference between the known physical laws vs something additional, like panpsychism or the cartesian dualist idea of a mind/soul existing metaphysically. My personal belief is that no such extra-physical being is required. — Malcolm Lett
can't say that MMT achieves that aim — Malcolm Lett
For senses that inform us about the outside world, we thus model the outside world. For senses that inform us about ourselves, we thus model ourselves — Malcolm Lett
:up:here I use "causal" in the sense that the individual thinks they're doing the causing, not the ontological sense — Malcolm Lett
Yes, I hope someone's done a thorough review of that from a psychological point of view, because it would be a very interesting read. Anyone has any good links?I believe there are reasonable, plus probably cultural, psychological, bases for "wanting" there to be more than physical — ENOAH
the question of why people might rationally conclude that consciousness depends on more than physical (beyond just "wanting" that outcome) is the topic of the so-called "Meta-problem of Consciousness" — Malcolm Lett
I've read some of that discussion but not all of it. I haven't seen any examples of meta-management in there. Can you link to a specific entry where Pierre-Normand provides meta-management capabilities? — Malcolm Lett
Selves are a very interesting and vivid and robust element of conscious experience in some animals. This is a conscious experience of selfhood, something philosophers call a phenomenal self, and is entirely determined by local processes in the brain at every instant. Ultimately, it’s a physical process. — Thomas Metzinger
So a biological brain, a silicon brain, or a computer simulation of a biological or silicon brain, would all experience consciousness. — Malcolm Lett
I'm not competent to critique your theory, much less to "roast" it. So, I'll just mention a few other attempts at computer analogies to human sentience.The Meta-management Theory of Consciousness uses the computational metaphor of cognition to provide an explanation for access consciousness, and by doing so explains some aspects of the phenomenology of consciousness. For example, it provides explanations for:
1) intentionality of consciousness - why consciousness "looks through" to first-order perceptions etc.
2) causality - that consciousness is "post-causal" - having no causal power over the event to which we are conscious, but having direct causal effect on subsequent events.
3) limited access - why we only have conscious experience associated with certain aspects of brain processing. — Malcolm Lett
Maybe you missed the link posted by @ "wonderer1" ...the counterintuitive phenomenon of "blindsight", in which patients behave as-if they see something, but report that they were not consciously aware of the object — Gnomon
Thanks for the link. https://aeon.co/essays/how-blindsight-answers-the-hard-problem-of-consciousnessthe counterintuitive phenomenon of "blindsight", in which patients behave as-if they see something, but report that they were not consciously aware of the object — Gnomon
Maybe you missed the link posted by "wonderer1" ... — 180 Proof
*3. "In attempting to answer these questions, we’re up against the so-called ‘hard problem of consciousness’: how a physical brain could underwrite the extra-physical properties of phenomenal experience."
Note --- What he calls "extra physical" I'm calling Meta-physical, in the sense that Ideas are not Real. — Gnomon
Yes*1. Physical substances are made of Matter, but what is matter made of?*2 Einstein postulated that mathematical Mass (the essence of matter) is a form of Energy. And modern physicists --- going beyond Shannon's engineering definition --- have begun to equate Energy with Information. In that case, Causal Information is equivalent to Energy as the power to transform : some forms are Physical (matter + energy) and other forms are Meta-Physical (mental-ideal).*3. "In attempting to answer these questions, we’re up against the so-called ‘hard problem of consciousness’: how a physical brain could underwrite the extra-physical properties of phenomenal experience."
Note --- What he calls "extra physical" I'm calling Meta-physical, in the sense that Ideas are not Real. — Gnomon
And yet ideas obviously exist. If they're not physical, what are they? Are you a substance dualist? — RogueAI
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