Is that what you were saying? It all got a bit muddled.[ — Banno

It is what I said, explicitly and clearly:

Midgley is wrong when he says that other people's existence had to be inferred. — Fooloso4

If in your reading it got muddled that your difficulty.

How does Descartes conclude that others exist, without making an inference? — Banno

It is no more necessary for him to conclude that others exist than it is for a child to exist others do.

Will you be defending substance dualism? — Banno

I won't, but pointing out what Midgley gets wrong does not require defending everything Descartes said.

What did Descartes get wrong, and what right? — Banno

See this thread.

The pop story of Descartes — Banno

Or, you could read and quote Descartes.

And it is this story that the aggravating Grandmother is using, — Banno

In that case, she too should have read Descartes rather than rely on what others get wrong.

The truth is, this is a serious and persistent problem in certain areas of academic philosophy.

Rings and Books reads now as a precursor to more recent streams in philosophical thinking such as enactivism and embodied cognition. — Banno

She is a bit late to the party. See, for example, Husserl and Merleau-Ponty.

This is at odds with the views offered by Descartes — Banno

Husserl would not agree. See his Cartesian Meditations.

we should extend to our predecessors the sympathy and charity that we must all hope our successors will extend to us when their turn comes to assess what we have done or not done. — Ludwig V

Based on the link to Midgley's Rings and Books, this does not appear to be advice she follows.

- if philosophy is to be a practice based on human life, — Ludwig V

I recommend Pierre Hadot's "Philosophy as a Way of Life". It is a far more scholarly, insightful, and influential work. Although it may be somewhat unfair to compare his work to a radio talk.

there is no problem conceiving something immaterial that exists by itself unless you are a close-minded physicalist. — Lionino

What kind of 'something'? That's the rub. I'm sure the majority view is expressed by Janus here:

If the physical is naturally understood to have substantial or substantive existence, and it is upon that idea of substance that the notion of reality is founded, and the idea of a mental substance is untenable, then what justification would we have for saying that anything non-physical is real? — Janus

The notion is - mind is the product of the brain, which in turn is the product of evolutionary biology over many aeons of time. Rational sentient beings such as ourselves are therefore a very late arrival in the grand scheme, which is otherwise mindless. Isn't that what practically any sound person believes?

I recommend Pierre Hadot's "Philosophy as a Way of Life" — Fooloso4

From which:

Philosophy in antiquity was an exercise practiced in each instant. It invites us to concentrate on each instant of life, to become aware of the infinite value of each present moment, once we have replaced it with the perspective of the cosmos. The exercise of wisdom entails a cosmic dimension. Whereas the average person has lost touched with the world, and does not see the world qua world, but rather treats the world as a means of satisfying his desires, the sage never ceases to have the whole constantly present to mind. He thinks and acts within a cosmic perspective. He has the feeling of belonging to a whole which goes beyond the limits of his individuality. In antiquity, this cosmic consciousness was situated in a different perspective from that of scientific knowledge of the universe... . Scientific knowledge was objective and mathematical, whereas cosmic consciousness was the result of spiritual exercise. — Pierre Hadot, PWL, pa 273

(Incidentally just prior to this passage, Hadot says Descartes and Spinoza remained faithful to philosophy as 'the practice of wisdom'. Spinoza, in particular, despite being claimed as the harbinger of secular naturalism, was still within the current of Judaic mysticism, and his 'intellectual love of God' very much in keeping with Hadot's depiction of cosmic consciousness.)

Compare also Thomas Nagel:

Plato was clearly concerned not only with the state of his soul, but also with his relation to the universe at the deepest level. Plato’s metaphysics was not intended to produce merely a detached understanding of reality. His motivation in philosophy was in part to achieve a kind of understanding that would connect him (and therefore every human being) to the whole of reality – intelligibly and if possible satisfyingly. — Secular Philosophy and the Religious Temperament

If the physical is naturally understood to have substantial or substantive existence, and it is upon that idea of substance that the notion of reality is founded, and the idea of a mental substance is untenable, then what justification would we have for saying that anything non-physical is real? — Janus

Something needs to give. For my money, it is the neglect of the elementary point that both "substantial" and "real" do not have a determinate sense outside the context of their use. The philosophical search for them does not define a context in which it could ever be successful.
A good example here would be the well-known fact that that physics reveals a physical world that is almost completely insubstantial. "Substantial" and "real" have a meaning in the context of physics, but not one that meets the demands of this philosophical wild-goose chase. Berkeley was wrong about many things, but about this, he was right.

The alternative to eliminative physicalism would be to say that mental phenomena are real functions of some physical existents, and that the only sense in which they are not physical is that they do not (obviously) appear as objects of the senses. — Janus

This is an alternative to eliminative physicalism, but not to physicalism. We need something more inclusive. Ryle's categories seem to me to offer a way of articulating what needs to be accepted here, without prioritizing the physical.

Based on the link to Midgley's Rings and Books, this does not appear to be advice she follows. — Fooloso4

So?

One has to be very careful here. "Granny Midgley" does capture something about her approach. But it risks being ageist and sexist at the same time. But then, one's reaction may be affected by whether one is a grand-child or a grandparent and by the character of the individuals in one's family. (Grannies can be wise and helpful in ways that are very difficult for parents - or so I'm told.)

There are two rather different approaches exemplified in this piece. One is the impact of the author's actual life as a context in which to read it. Midgley introduces actual life via the question of marriage and celibacy; for us, these are two different questions, but it was conventional at the time to treat them as linked.

You can see the other approach in her critique of Descartes. This is based on the model or image of philosophical practice that Descartes presents in his text. I don't think anyone is much bothered by whether Descartes actually ever settled down beside his oven in order to cook up his exercise; it is a presentation - a literary or rhetorical device to introduce us to his thought experiment - and whether it is fictional or not does not matter. What does matter is the model of philosophy that is presented.

Midgley does acknowledge the benefits of solitary thinking but too quickly turns this into a requirement for celibacy/being unmarried. Whether she is deadly serious about this (which would be a problem - Wittgenstein was never married, but yet manages to acknowledge that we are embedded in our human life) or just using the facts as a lever for introducing the philosophical point is hard to discern. What matters most is the philosophical point.

For the record, my view is that each of us needs both solitary thinking and dialogue and disagreement in our practice. There's no one right balance; it's a question of what is helpful and productive for each of us. Boring, but true.

That's just an example of my approach. I hope it is helpful.

Although it may be somewhat unfair to compare his work to a radio talk. — Fooloso4

Yes, an interesting reference. Though I find the title more than a little off-putting. It manages to be both portentous and trivializing in two words. But I'm sure that not everyone would be affected in the same way. When I read it, I will try to take it seriously (which includes criticizing it) but sympathetically, which means looking for the good bits.

Midgley is wrong when he says that other people's existence had to be inferred. — Fooloso4

I had to read that twice, eventually deciding that "he" must be Descartes - Midgley is, infamously, of the female persuasion.

It is no more necessary for him to conclude that others exist than it is for a child to exist others do. — Fooloso4

Mmm. Perhaps not as clear as was thought. :wink:


, I find it curious that folk are so defensive of Descartes. Granny Midgley is obviously using him as a rhetorical device.

I mentioned Descartes was wrong: ‘a person is a person through other persons’ before. Have a quick look and tell me what you think. It's an argument that seems to me to have some merit.

Latin has a perfectly good equivalent for ousia, "being" in "esse" — Ludwig V

I imagine you are referring to essentia. That is also one of the translations of usia. It is in fact the literal translation of usia to Latin, coined by Cicero. Substantia is in fact a post-classical translation of hypostasis, but later it came to be often used to translate usia. This comment might be of interest:

But in fact the Latins (generally but not uniformly at first, but eventually universally) used "substantia" to translate "ousia" and such terms, and "suppositum" or "persona" to translate "hypostasis" or "prosopon". So sometimes the Greeks were confused when looking at Latin works which used "substantia" and thought it meant "hypostasis", and suspected the Latins of error. — https://lyfaber.blogspot.com/2010/01/substance-and-hypostasis-in-trinity.html

and has its roots in the medieval Latin term ex(s)istere, which means to stand forth, to appear, and to arise." — Ludwig V

That does not seem to be the case. Exsisto with the meaning of being is registered since republican times, before Christ:

ut in corporibus magnae dissimilitudines sunt, sic in animis exsistunt majores etiam varietates — Cicero

«As in body the differences are great, even greater differences exist when it comes to character»

si exstitisset in rege fides[...] — Cicero

«If there had been faith in the king...»

All of which reinforces the point that medieval Latin is a dialect of Latin and very different from the language of ancient Rome. — Ludwig V

The idea that it is a "dialect" is not quite accurate, but I am not going to be uncharitable. In any case, I recommend the Master thesis dissertation "One, two, many Latins" by Kevin R Roth. The content of the thesis holds some (non-central) controversial statements because it bases itself considerably on the research of a scholar with some controversial claims, besides not telling the whole picture of some historical events eg giving more credit to some figures than it is due and none to some that deserve it, but besides it is a good and informative read.

But yes, Medieval Church Latin is quite different from Classical Latin. I can read many Classical texts with little help, but I have visited tens of churches in Rome, and I very often find myself cracking my head to figure out what some inscriptions say, especially when they put several nouns or adjectives one after the other with the same endings, not to speak of the numerous abbreviations.

I find it curious that folk are so defensive of Descartes. — Banno

The same people might be curious as to why it is Descartes that is put under unreasonable scrutinity so often around here, but not Plato or Hegel.

Granny Midgley is obviously using him as a rhetorical device. — Banno

She could have made the same point without dedicating more than a whole paragraph pretending to put on an obviously failed counterargument to Descartes.

Isn't that what practically any sound person believes? — Wayfarer

Many sound people believe and believed in an immaterial soul. You seem to be objecting that there is "something" immaterial, something beyond just matter, but I know that is not your persuasion, you are not an emergentist.

...a whole paragraph... — Lionino

That much.

I sadly revisited the article and it actually goes on for four fairly long paragraphs.

Her point is ultimately about empathy and motherhood. You say in the OP "Here is a critique of Descartes' Cogito, amongst other things". Is this a rhetorical device too?
If so, you must be making the same point as Midgely about motherhood. Are you pregnant?

This OP is another episode of you trolling.

Sure.

The idea that it is a "dialect" is not quite accurate, but I am not going to be uncharitable. — Lionino

You don't need to be charitable. I knew it was not quite right when I wrote it. But I couldn't think of anything better. Still can't, for that matter. "Dialect" and "language" are very slippery, unless one relies on a gun-boat.

If there had been faith in the king... — Lionino

Clearly, I put my faith in the wrong king. Thanks for the corrections. All very interesting.

I imagine you are referring to essentia. That is also one of the translations of usia. It is in fact the literal translation of usia to Latin, coined by Cicero. Substantia is in fact a post-classical translation of hypostasis, but later it came to be often used to translate usia. This comment might be of interest: — Lionino

It certainly is of interest. One might as well try to organize a herd of ferrets.

I find it curious that folk are so defensive of Descartes. Granny Midgley is obviously using him as a rhetorical device. — Banno

It isn't so curious. Philosophers are great parricides, and often resurrect their grandfathers - or great-grandfathers, if they want to be especially rebellious. It's because philosophy thrives on disagreement and is most at home in chaos.
Yes. Everything, especially in philosophy, including the arguments, is about persuasion. Logic is simply the most effective rhetorical device. She pulls much the same trick in her discussion of pregnancy.

If so, you must be making the same point as Midgely about motherhood. Are you pregnant? — Lionino

This move is really very problematic. With one breath I am reminded of an experience that is not available to me; with the next breath, I am faced with a universal conclusion. The only solution must be that the presentation of the experience is in fact supposed to convey what it is like. Midgley's discussion works well to establish her conclusion, but whether her description is "correct" or not is another question. It would be easy to suggest that perhaps not all mothers experience their pregnancy in the same way. But I'm not sure whether that's enough to refute the argument.

But I'm not sure whether that's enough to refute the argument. — Ludwig V

Banno himself said Midgely is using Descartes as a rhetorical device. If that is the case, there isn't really an argument.

This thread would not have come to be had the lenghty discussion about Descartes in the "100% centainty" thread not taken place — that thread motivated at least two other threads in the last two weeks in fact. I can only imagine by what mechanism one thread motivated the other, but the connection is evident. It is a sarcastic OP, as we can see from the poll that was added at the end and this comment.

This thread would not have come to be had the lenghty discussion about Descartes in the "100% centainty" thread not taken place. — Lionino

Well, thank you for your continuing contribution.

Until the next game.

But I'm not sure whether that's enough to refute the argument.
— Ludwig V

Banno himself said Midgely is using Descartes as a rhetorical device. If that is the case, there isn't really an argument. — Lionino

H'm. It depends on what you count as an argument. I probably have a more relaxed view of what constitutes an argument than you.

But there is a tricky issue here. Descartes invites us to approach his problem (winnowing out what he does really know from what he just thinks he knows) in a certain way. Midgley is suggesting a different way. Descartes offers us the model of a solitary thinker, withdrawn from the world and at peace. Midgely recognizes some good reasons for choosing Descartes' model, but thinks that a different model will avoid some big issues with Descartes' solution of the problem he sets himself. It's not really a simple question of fact. Proof and refutation are probably not available here. But that doesn't mean that the choice doesn't matter or that there cannot be good and bad grounds for making it. (Compare the existentialists' shift to focus on the human condition - the world as we are thrown into it - as opposed to Descartes' search for a clean sheet and an indubitable foundation - probably modelled on Euclid.)

I'm afraid I didn't take that comment - or the poll - at all seriously.

It's not really a simple question of fact. Proof and refutation are probably not available here. But that doesn't mean that the choice doesn't matter or that there cannot be good and bad grounds for making it. — Ludwig V

:up:

Midgely recognizes some good reasons for choosing Descartes' model, but thinks that a different model will avoid some big issues with Descartes' solution of the problem he sets himself — Ludwig V

I think you are making out more than there truly is in this article. It is a silly, poorly-written article. It is not a treatise, nevermind philosophy, the editor is correct. It does not offer in any way an alternative to Descartes' six Meditations, or to his Principles, or to his Discource. It is not rigorous.
Even after Descartes' extensive writings on his method and replies to objections, people still try to find fault within him. It would be fine if they happened to find actual faults. Let's apply that amount of scrutinity to Mary's article then.

Compare the existentialists' shift to focus on the human condition - the world as we are thrown into it - as opposed to Descartes' search for a clean sheet and an indubitable foundation - probably modelled on Euclid. — Ludwig V

Those are naturally different topics. Afaik, existentialists are not arguing against Descartes, Descartes not against what would be the existentialists.

I'm afraid I didn't take that comment - or the poll - at all seriously. — Ludwig V

They are not supposed to be.

Not to speak of that horrible last paragraph in the article. Whatever college it was she lectured at, I will be far away from it and its professors.

But it risks being ageist and sexist at the same time. — Ludwig V

My concern is that it advocates for a one size fits all standard - a mature person will marry. There are various reasons why someone does not marry, most of them having little or nothing to do with philosophy.

In case you wonder way I stray from the op, it's because, based on what I've read here, I totally agree that this is “trivial, irrelevant intrusion of domestic matters into intellectual life". Therefore nothing more needs to be said.

I find the discussion on celibacy to be similar to old school thoughts on celibacy in male athletes. It was commonly thought that male athletes ought to practise celibacy to improve performance. That sort of nonsense has been thoroughly debunked and we could call it a "trivial, irrelevant intrusion of domestic matters into [athletic] life".

Thanks for the overview of Aristotle. It does make sense overall, doesn't it?

Your version makes him seem much closer to Plato than some others that I have seen. — Ludwig V

What I find is that Plato provided a very thorough analysis of Pythagorean idealism. In doing this, he exposed its faults. Aristotle paid close attention to this, and took Plato as rejecting this form of idealism. The Neo-Platonists on the other hand seem to represent Plato as accepting Pythagorean idealism. That forms the principal difference between Aristotle's school and the Neo-Platonist school.

In numerous places, Aristotle criticized those who would represent Forms which were supposed to be incorporeal, with images that could not be conceived of, as other than corporeal. Aristotle insisted that the first principle, which is necessarily immaterial, must be truly immaterial. There's a section in Metaphysics for example, where he criticizes Pythagorean/Neo-Platonist ideas through an analysis of the different senses of "one", or "unity", showing how this conception cannot be derived from anything other than material principles, therefore cannot form a proper immaterial conception.

Ok? — Lionino

The point now, is that for Aristotle, "to subsist", therefore to be substance, is to have form. And, form does not require matter, so this validates the substantial existence of immaterial forms, i.e. the subsistence of immaterial forms. However, the separate, independent, subsistent forms reveal themselves to us, or are evident to us, through sensation, as material things, particulars, or individuals, and so there is the appearance that their substance is material.

But critical analysis of the intellectual experience shows that "matter" is something added by the sensing subject, a condition of the subject, not proper to the thing itself, in a similar way to how Kant describes space and time as added by the sensing subject. This necessitates dualism, because independent forms are real and subsistent, yet matter is also real as inherent within the intellectual, sentient being. This perspective just inverts the common notion of dualism which puts the immaterial as internal and the material as external. It puts the material as internal and the immaterial as external.

A good example here would be the well-known fact that that physics reveals a physical world that is almost completely insubstantial. "Substantial" and "real" have a meaning in the context of physics, but not one that meets the demands of this philosophical wild-goose chase. Berkeley was wrong about many things, but about this, he was right. — Ludwig V

Consider what I wrote in reply to Lionino above. Physics, as science in general, can only know the forms of the world. And, as Berkeley demonstrated, there is no need to assume that there is any material aspect to the supposed independent world. This, it appears, ought to make physics capable of apprehending and comprehending the entirety of the independent world. However, there is a fundamental problem, science understands through sense observation, and sense observation instills "matter" into the phenomena. This produces what @Wayfarer likes to call the blind spot of science.

I had to read that twice, eventually deciding that "he" must be Descartes — Banno

She. My proof-reader took the day off.

It is no more necessary for him to conclude that others exist than it is for a child to exist others do.
— Fooloso4
Mmm. Perhaps not as clear as was thought. — Banno

I should fire my proof-reader. It is no more necessary for him to conclude that others exist than it is for a child to conclude that others exist. The question of the existence of others does not arise for Descartes unless one takes his rhetorical device literally.

I think you are making out more than there truly is in this article. It is a silly, poorly-written article. It is not a treatise, nevermind philosophy, the editor is correct. It does not offer in any way an alternative to Descartes' six Meditations, or to his Principles, or to his Discource. It is not rigorous. — Lionino

I may be making too much of it. However, I'm sure that Midgley did not think that this piece was in any way a replacement for Descartes' writings.

Even after Descartes' extensive writings on his method and replies to objections, people still try to find fault within him. It would be fine if they happened to find actual faults. Let's apply that amount of scrutinity to Mary's article then. — Lionino

Well, people try to find fault with everybody else. Why would Descartes be an exception?

Afaik, existentialists are not arguing against Descartes, Descartes not against what would be the existentialists. — Lionino

That's probably right. Perhaps it would be better to say that they were changing the subject. Though I suspect that Sartre was unduly influenced by him.

Not to speak of that horrible last paragraph in the article. Whatever college it was she lectured at, I will be far away from it and its professors. — Lionino

Expect no logic from a pregnant woman.

is certainly horrible. But Midgley is quoting someone else and expects us to find it horrible. She worked at Reading University 1949 - 1962 and then Newcastle University 1962 - 1980 but I would think that there has been considerable staff turnover since then.

My concern is that it advocates for a one size fits all standard - a mature person will marry. There are various reasons why someone does not marry, most of them having little or nothing to do with philosophy. — Fooloso4

Yes. That's valid. Her idea of adolescence is not much to write home about, either.

I find the discussion on celibacy to be similar to old school thoughts on celibacy in male athletes. It was commonly thought that male athletes ought to practise celibacy to improve performance. That sort of nonsense has been thoroughly debunked and we could call it a "trivial, irrelevant intrusion of domestic matters into [athletic] life". — Metaphysician Undercover

You are right about celibacy in athletics, and I wouldn't think that it was particularly important in philosophy either. For me, Midgley's argument is reminiscent of the argument that priests need to practice celibacy. What she may be trying to express, though rather badly, is that philosophers, however transcendent their thought, ought not to disengage from the mess and muddle of ordinary human life. I think that's true and important.
There is something very odd about the thought that organizing appropriate meals and providing and washing the kit are trivial irrelevant intrusions into athletic life, rather than the bedrock of athletic life. It suggests the speaker has the privilege of being able to get other people to do those things for him (or her).

However, there is a fundamental problem, science understands through sense observation, and sense observation instills "matter" into the phenomena. This produces what Wayfarer likes to call the blind spot of science. — Metaphysician Undercover

So Berkeley was wrong to think that sense observation doesn't imply the existence of matter?

What she may be trying to express, though rather badly, is that philosophers, however transcendent their thought, ought not to disengage from the mess and muddle of ordinary human life. I think that's true and important. — Ludwig V

Yeah, and when philosophers disengage from ordinary human life, that's when their own lives become a real mess and muddle.

So Berkeley was wrong to think that sense observation doesn't imply the existence of matter? — Ludwig V

That's not what I' saying. There is a very fine line to understand here. I believe that Berkeley did not claim that sense observation doesn't imply the existence of matter, he showed that the concept of "matter" is not required to understand the reality of independent things. This puts "matter" in a peculiar position. It is required to understand sense observations, but not required to understand the reality of independent existence. Therefore we can infer that matter is a feature the human system which makes sense observations, just like Kant says space and time are.

My proof-reader took the day off. — Fooloso4

...happens to the beast of us.

A good example here would be the well-known fact that that physics reveals a physical world that is almost completely insubstantial. "Substantial" and "real" have a meaning in the context of physics, but not one that meets the demands of this philosophical wild-goose chase. — Ludwig V

It depends on what you mean by 'substantial'; if you mean something like "tangible' then sure. Is mass fundamental in physics, specifically in QM?

If what is is fundamentally energetic, then that is what I would mean by "physical". Is there an alternative view to this?

Yeah, and when philosophers disengage from ordinary human life, that's when their own lives become a real mess and muddle. — Metaphysician Undercover

Perhaps mess and muddle is an inescapable part of human life? And then, the attempt to escape also becomes an inescapable part of human life. Perhaps the best thing to do is to embrace mess and muddle - but then, what would become of philosophy?

I believe that Berkeley did not claim that sense observation doesn't imply the existence of matter, he showed that the concept of "matter" is not required to understand the reality of independent things. — Metaphysician Undercover

Well, the first half of that is a bit unorthodox. But the second half is at least defensible. It's just that his understanding of the reality of independent things doesn't involve the concept of matter. Right?

Therefore we can infer that matter is a feature the human system which makes sense observations, just like Kant says space and time are. — Metaphysician Undercover

Perhaps so. However, I've always thought that Kant essentially accepts Berkeley, especially his argument that the distinction between primary and secondary qualities doesn't hold up, so that time and space are mind-dependent, as well as colour, etc. Including matter in that argument makes sense. Once you have accepted the distinction between reality and appearance, ideas and things, phenomena and noumena, that conclusion is more or less inevitable. The only way out is to reject, or at least recast, the distinction.

It depends on what you mean by 'substantial'; if you mean something like "tangible' then sure. Is mass fundamental in physics, specifically in QM? — Janus

I avoid commenting on QM. I'm not qualified to do so.
In some contexts, substantial does mean something like tangible or solid. In others, not so much.

If what is is fundamentally energetic, then that is what I would mean by "physical". Is there an alternative view to this? — Janus

I take it that you mean by "energetic" the concept of energy that is defined by physics? Which, by definition, studies what is physical?
Perhaps St. Augustine's remark about time applies to matter, as well.

My concern is that it advocates for a one size fits all standard - a mature person will marry. There are various reasons why someone does not marry, most of them having little or nothing to do with philosophy. — Fooloso4

In the end, this takes us back to the issue about what it means for a human being to flourish and the desire to let a thousand flowers bloom. The issue is, which of them, if any, count as weeds? It would be easy to talk about balance and proportionality, but we all make choices (subject to certain basic needs, such as food and shelter) and so we all specialize, so that doesn't help very much.
Returning to the specific issue, about the model of the solitary thinker as the paradigm of philosophy, I would want to say:-
1) that there is room for more than one model - and Socrates provides a different one.
2) A philosophical life that doesn't include both risks losing touch with philosophy or losing the focus and intensity that it requires - and Midgley does recognize this. The point that Descartes was not in fact a solitary thinker, but was deeply rooted in the philosophical and ordinary life of his time has already been made in this thread.
3) On this specific issue, it is important not to over-generalize; Wittgenstein certainly prioritized solitary thinking in his practice and even, I gather, went to some trouble to give the impression that he didn't read the work of other philosophers.
Isn't there a letter written when he was living on his own in order to focus on philosophy, in which he rails against the distractions of doing his own house-keeping? (But, one notices, he is doing his own house-keeping.) Yet he managed to understand the need to ground philosophy in human life.

I've always thought that Kant essentially accepts Berkeley, — Ludwig V

I have read that Kant was infuriated by those critics of his first edition who accused him of basically re-cycling Berkeley's idealism, to which end he included a lengthy section in the second edition, 'A Refutation of Idealism' (see e.g. this reference.)

I have read that Kant was infuriated by those critics of his first edition who accused him of basically re-cycling Berkeley's idealism, — Wayfarer

Perhaps I wrote that sentence a bit carelessly. I would have to read up to respond to your point properly. Thanks for the reference.
Quite what Berkeley did deny is a bit moot, but a common way of putting it is that he denied the existence of any mind-independent things, that is, of anything that is not perceived or perceiving. Kant did not deny that, except that if he did deny that the noumena are perceivable or (knowable?), then he is very close to Berkeley.

Oh yes, I perfectly agree. I'm a staunch advocate for one or another form of idealism on this forum, see The Mind-Created World which I think I posted before you joined (and most enjoying your contributions, by the way.)