Any hegemony in a field like philosophy is due to simply better ideas. — Lionino

:rofl:

It’s just free market principles at play. :wink:

so you back away from your defence of Descartes only to be oddly antagonistic towards Midgley. — Banno

This really is quite strange. I am not defending or backing away from defending Descartes. I am defending an interpretation that is at odds with the standard textbook interpretation Midgley perpetuates.

At the least, there might be some philosophical merit in considering the place of those who are not reclusive white bachelors. — Banno

Why a philosopher or anyone else is a recluse may have little or nothing to do with philosophy.

This is Midgley's analysis:

Because independent thought is so difficult, the philosophic adolescent (even more than other adolescents) withdraws himself from the influences around him to develop ideas in harmony with his own personality. This is necessary if the personality is to be formed at all. But once it is formed, most people recoil towards experience, and attempt to bring their strengthened self to terms with the rich confusion from which it fled. Marriage, which is a willing acceptance of the genuinely and lastingly strange, is typical of this revulsion. The great philosophers did not return. Their thoughts, unlike yours and mine, had powers enough to keep them gazing into the pool of solitude.

I do not think this story tracks the lives of "the philosophical adolescent", but I have not done an empirical investigation. Did she? Rather than withdraw in order to develop ideas in harmony with their own personality, it may be a trait of their personality and/or neurology that leads them to withdraw. Rather than their thoughts having power enough to keep them gazing into the pool of solitude, it may have more to do with neurodivergence.

I will leave it to you and others to sort philosophers along the lines of their marital status. I prefer to pay attention to what they say.

Sure, but what is at stake is not some bizarre or implausible interpretation. — Leontiskos

And yet there is in the history of philosophy many examples. The most infamous in Western Philosophy is Christianity's appropriation of Plato, but I suspect that you might not see it as either bizarre or implausible.

It's as if you first concede that Midgley is right and then, unaccountably, assert that she is confused, again without a supporting argument. — Leontiskos

I did not say that Midgley is confused.

Your rebuttal? "Philosophy has moved past this — Leontiskos

The story of the subjective turn is well known, but our discussion is not a talk on the BBC. We should be able and willing to look back at what Descartes said and not simply accept the story as if that is the end of the matter.

There is a book that investigates whether the God-elements in Descartes' meditations are fully sincere. — Lionino

There are several books and articles that address this. Years ago I read Hiram Caton's "The Origin of Subjectivity", which led me to look past the standard story to read him again more carefully.

In the thread "Descartes Reading Group" I argued that he was not sincere. We went through the Meditations one by one, starting with the Dedication, Preface, and Synopsis. To sum it up in a sentence, he displaces God with the "I'.

Rather than withdraw in order to develop ideas in harmony with their own personality, it may be a trait of their personality and/or neurology that leads them to withdraw. Rather than their thoughts having power enough to keep them gazing into the pool of solitude, it may have more to do with neurodivergence. — Fooloso4

:up:

There are several books and articles that address this. — Fooloso4

That is true. I think the book specifically I was thinking of was by Walter Soffer.

To sum it up in a sentence, he displaces God with the "I'. — Fooloso4

About that, this section of the SEP is very important https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/descartes-epistemology/#DoesCogiCounAtheAvaiPerfKnow

Something interesting is seen in the Third Meditation:

And we cannot say that this idea of God is perhaps materially false and that consequently I can derive it from nought [i.e. that possibly it exists in me because I am imperfect], as I have just said is the case with ideas of heat, cold and other such things; for, on the contrary, as this idea is very clear and distinct and contains within it more objective reality than any other, there can be none which is of itself more true, nor any in which there can be less suspicion of falsehood.

He argues that the idea of God he has is not materially false (does not represent something real) because its objective reality is greater than any other (represents an infinite substance). I think we see the issue with this argument by just thinking of Anselm. But then he says:

for although, perhaps, we can imagine that such a Being does not exist, we cannot nevertheless imagine that His idea represents nothing real to me, as I have said of the idea of cold

The rest of the paragraph is even more iffy, appealing to the idea of God being "clear and distinct" and whatnot.

I think bringing Spinoza into this is the right move.

He says in the Principles 1.54:

We can also possess a clear and distinct idea of an uncreated substance that thinks and is independent, that is, of a God, as long as we do not think that such an idea represents everything that is in Him and that we do not add any fiction of our understanding[;...]

It seems that church dogma could be framed as fiction of our understanding — it is possible that Descartes actual understanding of God is more along Spinoza's line. He talks a lot about god, but little of Jesus. He said in a letter to a protestant priest: "My faith is my king's faith". His loyalty to Catholicism seems significantly cultural, instead of truly theological.

In any case in the Second Meditation we have:

Is there not some God, or some other being by whatever name we call it, who puts these reflections into my mind? That is not necessary

And also at the end of the Fourth:

And it is easy for me to understand that, in so far as I consider myself alone, and as if there were only myself in the world, I should have been much more perfect than I am, if God had created me so that I could never err.

All in all, Descartes is constrained by his times. What we can do read him critically and learn all we can, and carry on without the constraints.

For anyone who had some doubt (clearly many were convinced by drivel), here is the confirmation:

https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/81402A555B9BBDC8988B3DDE881E3A58/S0031819100050580a.pdf/in-defence-of-selfish-genes.pdf

The first four pages of this article are enough, but what follows is also good — Mary Midgely is quite the Mental Midget.

She doesn't only misunderstand Descartes, but a field that she claims to be a scholar of — ethology. Again, her education stopped short of a PhD, though her intelligence much shorter than that. She is not a specialist in anything. In fact, she became a professor at the same university as where her husband had been lecturing for 13 years then. Nepotism?

Perhaps.

:rofl: — Banno

I guess Wittgenstein would be counterevidence to that. But then again, he is not that popular outside of his own school.

Their thoughts, unlike yours and mine, had powers enough to keep them gazing into the pool of solitude.

I would say, it's not the power of one's own thoughts which is the subject here, but the power of the divinity which the contemplative mind comes into contact with. Since the divinity is a real "other" for that mind, to portray this as solitude is a false representation.

I was thinking of was by Walter Soffer. — Lionino

A quick look at his list of publications led me to suspect that he knows Caton. Looking a little further I found on the publisher's blurb for "From Science to Subjectivity" that he agrees with Caton "the most outspoken proponent of the minority stance".

Mary Midgely is quite the Mental Midget. — Lionino

A brief overview of what she attempted would have gleaned this apparent fact. Her protestations just make her points all the more poor, given that they are actually points which can be well-argued in the right places.
Her conceptualisation of Philosophy in general as 'the plumbing beneath ideas' is hilariously applicable to most of her views. They are bad, and when you pull up the floorboards, they aren't even sensible.

This is Midgley's analysis: — Fooloso4

Well, part of it; right after she mentions how the great philosophers were kind to their cats. Perhaps her facetiousness jokes were missed.

Mental Midget — Lionino

Not so small as some denizens of this forum, as is evident. Not new. There's a thread about Midgley and Dawkins somewhere hereabouts:

Genes cannot be selfish or unselfish, any more than atoms can be jealous,
elephants abstract or biscuits teleological. — Gene-juggling

Isn't it wonderful that a dead, diminutive elderly woman can cause so much angst! I thought this thread would be lucky to reach a page!

It’s just free market principles at play. :wink: — Mikie

:up: . Neoliberalism explains everything... for mental midgets.

What is outstanding, and ongoing, is that over eight pages these three men have managed to say so little about what Midgley actually wrote.

There's a short bio in Philosophy Now.

The (women) are presently receiving quite a bit of attention:

...the key idea shared by the members of the Quartet is to place the concept of life at the centre of philosophical attention. This commitment has at least four dimensions: (i) an interest in the ordinary; (ii) a focus on virtue, goodness and human flourishing; (iii) an affirmation of our animal nature; (iv) recognition of the normative landscape that structures our lives. — Bakhurst, David (2022). Education for metaphysical animals. Journal of Philosophy of Education 56 (6):812–826.

...a worthy antithesis to the crap that occupies some folk on this forum.

these three men have managed to say so little about what Midgley actually wrote. — Banno

Haven’t read it. Maybe they’re thinking of the freon guy.

They are bad, and when you pull up the floorboards, they aren't even sensible. — AmadeusD

Are you implying that one has to "pull up the floorboards" to access the plumbing? Can't we just go into the basement?

substitute whatever metaphor you’d like :) the idea being merely “below the surface; oft ignored”

You are just making it up as you go. You did not include this in the OP, not in the second page, not in the third. And the endeavor "place the concept of life at the centre of philosophical attention" is completely unrelated to Descartes and therefore the "argument" the unpublished "article" presents.

But bro... what if you know we are like literally the universe like experiencing itself. You feel me?

Isn't it wonderful that a dead, diminutive elderly woman can cause so much angst! — Banno

It is more that your trolling is seen as tiresome. When someone says something is garbage, nobody is getting angry, they are just saying is garbage because quite possibly it is. Your "u mad bro" is boyish.

As a point of attention, Midgley's argument is about lonesome, unmarried men, not about white males. You are trying to ragebait by LARPing as a SJW.

she may not be wrong about how the hegemony of the solitary white male has mislead philosophy. — Banno

Riddle me this, you claim to be enlightened, and that a particular group dominates philosophy (cuz oppression), and yet all you ever quote, all you ever bring up, and it seems that all you ever read are philosophers with English names. I don't see you quoting Italian names, or Polish names. Don't you think the hegemony of Anglos in your life has misled your philosophy?

In another post, you even went as far as claiming some irrelevant British academic from 60 years ago, called Ryle, had solved the problem of mind-body dualism.

...the key idea shared by the members of the Quartet is to place the concept of life at the centre of philosophical attention. This commitment has at least four dimensions: (i) an interest in the ordinary; (ii) a focus on virtue, goodness and human flourishing; (iii) an affirmation of our animal nature; (iv) recognition of the normative landscape that structures our lives. — Bakhurst, David (2022). Education for metaphysical animals. Journal of Philosophy of Education 56 (6):812–826.

...a worthy antithesis to the crap that occupies some folk on this forum. — Banno

Agreed. Philosophers are often the butt of jokes, "those who have spent years trying to decide whether their dining room table exists." I think there is a place in philosophy for flighty ruminations, but the current state of affairs has gotten out of hand.

I've always been curious about philosophers in particular and academics in general. They make great play with the idea that dispassionate evaluation of ideas and civilized open debate about them is core to their way of life, and crucially important to the project of understanding the world. Yet academia in general and philosophy in particular are riven with highly emotional debates. There seems to be a dissonance between the presentation and the practice. What is that about?

Midgley's piece has faults and it isn't an an immortal contribution to philosophy. It seems to aim at contributing to the project of the Quartet, as Bakhurst outlines it above . But it fails to do so, or misinterprets what the project might be about. Understanding those mistakes would be worth something and these exchanges just get in the way of that.

Could we get back to reading the text carefully and analyzing thoroughly? It may be less exciting, but it would surely be more illuminating.

I think there is a place in philosophy for flighty ruminations, but the current state of affairs has gotten out of hand. — Leontiskos

There's a practicality to Midgley's writing that is endearing. Her rejection of scientism is especially needed at a time when engineers and physicist take to doing philosophy, often very poorly.

It's a brief piece; a pot-boiler. There is more, most of it produced much later in her life. Her work is somewhat aggravating, determinedly, wilfully not dispassionate. Worth some attention. This thread has attracted trivial critique, but there is some value in her writing.

It is more that your trolling is seen as tiresome. — Lionino

Of course, you do not have to be here. At over 200 posts, I'm not at all displeased with this thread. So thanks for your contribution.

Could we get back to reading the text carefully and analyzing thoroughly? It may be less exciting, but it would surely be more illuminating. — Ludwig V

One thing I appreciated was what I interpreted as Midgely pointing towards the importance of diversity in life experience to having well informed intuitions. (Regardless of whether Midgely might agree with that way of saying it. And regardless of how myopic and unfair she may have been in doing so.)

...the key idea shared by the members of the Quartet is to place the concept of life at the centre of philosophical attention. This commitment has at least four dimensions: (i) an interest in the ordinary; (ii) a focus on virtue, goodness and human flourishing; (iii) an affirmation of our animal nature; (iv) recognition of the normative landscape that structures our lives. — Bakhurst, David (2022). Education for metaphysical animals. Journal of Philosophy of Education 56 (6):812–826.

What do you find here that cannot be found in Aristotle?

It's all footnotes to Aristotle.

As for Aristotle, not only was he married, but it seems quite likely that he loved his wife. She was the daughter of a friend of his, a philosophic despot, and Aristotle when he died, many years after her, asked in his will that they should be buried in the same grave. And his opinions, if one may mention such a point, are often married opinions. Man, he says, differs from other animals in being syndyasticon zōon, an animal that goes in pairs, not only for procreation, but for all the business of life. There is profound division of labour between men and women. They supplement each other, and as their functions are different, so is their goodness. Certainly Aristotle on the whole thinks men’s functions much more important, men’s virtue greater. But he has grasped the point that natures can differ, that the pursuit of virtue is not a scurry up a single narrow ladder with the devil taking the hindmost. He is not logically compelled to think women inferior, as Plato is, and Spinoza, and every other moralist who grounds virtue on the power of abstract thought. Aristotle’s ideas here have by contrast all the free movement of maturity. He always suspected, and did so still more the further he grew away from Plato, that there were other lives and other virtues besides those of the scholar; that perhaps it did really take all sorts to make a world. Plato on the other hand, right up to his death, always kept the irritable sensibility of the adolescent in resisting the claims of temperaments alien to his own. — Rings and Books

It seems she agrees with you.

The story of the subjective turn is well known... — Fooloso4

A well-known truth is not worse for wear. There are many in these parts who fall short for being enamored of novelty.

We should be able and willing to look back at what Descartes said and not simply accept the story as if that is the end of the matter. — Fooloso4

Midgley seems to be leveraging one part of the story for her argument, and I don't think there's anything wrong with this. Perhaps if her piece was entirely about Descartes then she should have offered a fuller analysis of his philosophy, but Descartes was just one of the dots she was connecting, if a notable one.

It will be clear that I have not, just now, taken up the topic of philosophic celibacy to point out its glories. Justice, I think, has been done to them." — Rings and Books

Midgley does try to give a balanced view. The difficulty is that it is quite hard to see her diagnosis as less than sweeping.

The great philosophers did not return (sc from the withdrawal of adolescence). Their thoughts, unlike yours and mine, had powers enough to keep them gazing into the pool of solitude. — Rings and Books

What isn't recognized here is that specialization can always be seen as a distortion, and implying that the distortion is any kind of immaturity, rather than just part of the all sorts that it takes to make a world, sets us off down the wrong track. I would have thought that solitary thought and dialogue and a domestic life, (which, surely, everyone has, in one form or another) are all appropriate parts of life as a philosopher. I think that other people have made the point that Descartes certainly lived in the community of his time, and must have had some kind of domestic life. The problem is his choice to present solitary meditation as the whole, or at least the heart, of philosophic life.

In this frame of mind, philosophers since Descartes have spent their profoundest thoughts on the Problem of Knowledge in the strict sense—not just problems connected with knowledge but the problem, how it is possible for us to know what we undoubtedly do know. Now nobody wants to deny that this enquiry has born magnificent fruit. — Rings and Books

I suppose this means that the Problem of Knowledge is a magnificent failure. I do believe that it is well worth while to be wrong in interesting ways, but this doesn't help me to see what Midgley thinks is interesting about the failure. On the contrary, I get the impression that, for her, it is just a failure.

All I am saying is, that the results have been delayed, and much of the lesser work entirely vitiated, by a want of good faith in approaching the question. Philosophers did not want the human soul to be mixed up in the world of objects, as it must be to make knowledge possible. — Rings and Books

I find it very hard to understand what this diagnosis means. On the face of it, philosophers really believed that "the human soul was not mixed up in the world of objects". One can say that they were wrong without questioning their "good faith".

There is more, most of it produced much later in her life. Her work is somewhat aggravating, determinedly, wilfully not dispassionate. — Banno

Yes, I have even read some of the more, but long, long ago. As a result of this thread, I'm inclined to look at it again.
She certainly succeeded in annoying Dawkins. But then, he is annoying as well.
But sometimes I think that it is the annoying texts that make me work hardest. I admit that it can be quite difficult not to indulge the feelings.

A well-known truth is not worse for wear. — Leontiskos

A well-known opinion, although not as well-known as you might expect, is certainly a
useful measure against the prevailing academic opinions of her time.

There are many in these parts who fall short for being enamored of novelty. — Leontiskos

It was the novelty and promise of 20th century analytic philosophy to which many at Oxford and elsewhere were enamored. A disregard for the history of philosophy at its root. A return to Aristotle was a response to this novelty.

Perhaps if her piece was entirely about Descartes ... — Leontiskos

My criticism is not about her misrepresentation of Descartes, it is about her misrepresentation of the history of philosophy.

As Aristotle reminds his readers, Heraclitus said to some visitors who were surprised to see him by the oven warming himself:

Here too there are gods.

Cicero said:

Socrates was the first to call philosophy down from the heavens… and compel it to ask questions about life and morality.

(Tusculan Disputations V 10–11).

Xenophon wrote the Oeconomicus, a Socratic dialogue about household management.

The Stoics and Epicureans did not disregard daily life or human attachments either.

Descartes' "provisional morality" was about how to live a good life with others, not apart from them.

The examined life is not the married life. They are not mutually exclusive but one does not entail the other.

At over 200 posts, I'm not at all displeased with this thread — Banno

Of course you are not displeased that your trolling has garnered traffick.

She certainly succeeded in annoying Dawkins. — Ludwig V

Making a clown of herself in a field she claims to be a scholar of is far from "succeeding".



You are wasting your time. Some person's motivation to defend Midgley's confused nonsense is very apparent, as to the others', I can't imagine why they insist on defending such contrived rubbish.

You are wasting your time. — Lionino

I don't think so. I like to think that there are others reading but not commenting. I think of the written exchange as only part of it. I do occasionally get a PM from someone appreciating something I said.

And if someone does not agree with something I said I am okay with that. I will defend my position, but if someone does not agree I don't take it personally. That is the nature of philosophical discussion.