You appear to have a third category; the essence(?) of which you have yet to make clear. — tim wood

What do you mean i haven't made clear the essence of this third category. I've stated it over and over, it is the relations between things, what one thing has to do with another. Like ideas, relations are immaterial, unlike ideas, relations are independent of human minds.

So its up to you to make clear how they exist, as non-material, non-mind-based what-evers. — tim wood

There's a lot of unknowns in the world, and this is one of them.

To keep it simple, you say they're related, I say they are not, on two causes, 1) that relations are ideas and things don't have ideas, and 2) the "relationship" of earth and moon is a convenient fiction and artifact of ideas, and that the two have actually nothing to do with each other. — tim wood

Ok, that's what you think. I think you are in denial. You've already told me how you think that the moon and earth have something to do with each other, here:

What the moon and earth actually do in terms of these descriptions is that both revolve around a common moving center as they cork-screw their way along curved geodesics in space-time - or at least I think that's the most recent and accurate description. — tim wood

So now you are just contradicting yourself, to uphold your denial. Why are you afraid to admit that the reality of the immaterial extends far beyond the reality of human ideas.

Why are you afraid to admit that the reality of the immaterial extends far beyond the reality of human ideas. — Metaphysician Undercover

Because I only have evidence that some people think and believe so, and that it can be useful to think so. Neither of which establishes the kind of existence it seems to me you're insisting on. The nature of which you characterize as

There's a lot of unknowns in the world, and this is one of them. — Metaphysician Undercover

I mentioned the "corkscrewing through spacetime" only as against your idea/relation/model of the moon "orbiting" the earth. Now, take a moment and try to think through exactly what the earth is doing and what the moon is doing. I think you will see that any "relation" between them is an idea that comes from you.

I mentioned the "corkscrewing through spacetime" only as against your idea/relation/model of the moon "orbiting" the earth. Now, take a moment and try to think through exactly what the earth is doing and what the moon is doing. I think you will see that any "relation" between them is an idea that comes from you. — tim wood

No, I recognize that the earth and the moon are doing things, and that their activities are related. You apparently recognize this to, by describing it as a 'corkscrewing" activity. You, however refuse to separate the description "corkscrewing", which is an idea, from the reality of what the relation actually is, which is not an idea. So you keep insisting that the map, (model, or description, which is an idea) is the territory, (the relation itself). Then you contradict yourself by claiming that the earth and the moon which are engaged in this interrelated activity exist independently of human ideas, yet the interrelated activity which locks them together as an essential aspect of the existence which they have, is just a human idea.

It’s often said – not in so many words – that there exists an X such that 1) X provides purpose in the world, and 2) if there be no X, then there is no purpose, that the world is without purpose. By purpose I tentatively mean, subject to adjustment, that which gives ultimate underlying meaning and significance. — tim wood

"X provides purpose" is about X, where all subsequent qualification of "X" is bound by/limited to that which is capable of providing purpose. If X provides purpose, it must be the sort of thing that it makes sense to say is capable of doing so(providing purpose). For example, we could not substitute "potato chips" for 'X' and make any sense at all. Potato chips are not the sort of thing capable of providing purpose. They could help provide a feeling of satisfaction/contentment. Even then without eating them, that purported 'purpose' is left empty, unfilled, unmet, unsatisfied, unrealized. So, potato chips alone are not enough, nor are potato chips the sort of thing capable of providing purpose.

What thing(s) is(are)?

Seems to me that purpose presupposes agency. All things purposeful are so in strict relation to one's(the presupposed agents') aim, goal, prediction, and/or expectations.


The last claim in the quote at the top of the post asks the reader's acceptance of the author's potential future equivocation of the term "purpose". It also invokes "meaning" and "significance". All three presuppose agency.

Meaning and significance are not limited to providing purpose. They provide (mis)understanding. They provide a worldview. They provide the necessary preconditions for agency and hence help lay the groundwork needed for purposes to emerge. Purpose is nonexistent is complete absence of meaning and significance. Seems to me that meaning/significance is necessary but insufficient for purpose.

Thinking processes 'give' meaning and significance. The scare-quotes are intentional. By my lights, meaning and significance are not the sorts of things that can be given to another like a physical object. We could be said to 'give away' meaning and significance to another by virtue of helping them to draw correlations between the same sorts of things that we are/do.

Teaching a child how to use "tree" is a prima facie example. Teaching a child how pick oranges helps them to draw many of their own correlations between oranges and other things.

While both meaning and significance play a role in the child's mind/thought/worldview prior to learning how to pick oranges and/or call trees by name, there's no argumentative ground for attributing much along the lines of purpose to the child, as if they have one, or they've found other things useful.

Let X be at least one(although there are countless ones) creature capable of drawing correlations between different things, where at least one of those things is want/desire/aims/goals of the agent and another is a means to that end.

Without that, there is no purpose.

No, I recognize that the earth and the moon are doing things, and that their activities are related. You apparently recognize this to, by describing it as a 'corkscrewing" activity. You, however refuse to separate the description "corkscrewing", which is an idea, from the reality of what the relation actually is, — Metaphysician Undercover

Great, what is relation? I keep asking and you keep not answering. I ask what they do, and you answer that they do things and their activities are related. All you're telling me is that your not very good - or no good at all - at reflectively questioning your own thinking. This the state of a naive thinker who has taken certain things for granted and having done so, is incapable of further testing them or thinking about them. If relations are real in your sense please provide an example, which of course cannot be an idea.

Let X be at least one(although there are countless ones) creature capable of drawing correlations between different things, where at least one of those things is want/desire/aims/goals of the agent and another is a means to that end.

Without that, there is no purpose. — creativesoul

Purpose then emergent, requiring person, desire, goal, means? In this your "agent," the person, necessary, desire as catalyst. It looks to me like ends and means are unnecessary. As with a person said to be ambitious, that is, a person with purpose but not (yet, presumably) with a goal or means to achieve it.

Great, what is relation? — tim wood

I told you numerous times, "relation" is what one thing has to do with another. Please quit accusing me of not answering.

Great, what is relation? I keep asking and you keep not answering. I ask what they do, and you answer that they do things and their activities are related. All you're telling me is that your not very good - or no good at all - at reflectively questioning your own thinking. This the state of a naive thinker who has taken certain things for granted and having done so, is incapable of further testing them or thinking about them. If relations are real in your sense please provide an example, which of course cannot be an idea. — tim wood

I don't see any reason for this assessment. Each relation between individual things is distinct and unique. You asked me for the general, "what is relation" and I answered. I also gave you an example of a distinct and particular relation, that between the earth and the moon, and you criticized me for not describing this relation properly. That does not mean that I did not give you a particular example, it only means that I did not describe the relation, which served as my example, to your satisfaction. And, as much as the earth and moon are not ideas, neither is the relation between them an idea.

We're corkscrewing around each other in circles, because you have a mental block which prevents you from understanding the meaning of "relation". You force an unwarranted restriction on the meaning of this word, 'a relation is necessarily an idea'. This is the mental disability of a closed mind, a disorder which you willfully inflict upon yourself.

We agree the E and the M are things. "Relation" being an abstract term is nothing other than an idea. What is it, then, that the relation refers to that might be real. Well, the E and M are describable in themselves, these descriptions ideas more or less corresponding to what they are describing - the thing described real, the description the expression of an idea. The E and M also in apparent motion in and through spacetime. E, a thing, moving through spacetime, also a thing. and the M likewise. And the E and the M apparently alter spacetime. The alterations apparently effecting the exact path of both through spacetime. All of this a description, and no mention of relation or the existence or causative efficacy of any relation. It all apears to be things thinging with things, that we do our best to describe in terms meaningful to us.

But who talks this way? No one, unless they're trying be careful about what they say and what they mean. That is, it can be useful to talk as if relations were real, independently-existing thing, but as you can see, they're not.

What is it, then, that the relation refers to that might be real. — tim wood

"Relation" refers to what the one has to do with the other, what I described as orbiting and you described as corkscrewing. If the things (E&M) are real, don't you think that their motions are also real? And since their motions involve each other, isn't this a real relation?

And the E and the M apparently alter spacetime. The alterations apparently effecting the exact path of both through spacetime. — tim wood

That looks like a relation (what one has to do with the other) to me. Why deny that it's real?

All of this a description, and no mention of relation or the existence or causative efficacy of any relation. — tim wood

Of course we can describe a relation without mention of the word "relation". But don't you recognize that when you say the E and M alter spacetime, and this effects the path of both, that you are speaking of "causative efficacy"?

Anyway, that's an unnecessary point because "relation" does not necessarily imply causative efficacy. When two things are doing something together (as in your description of the E and M) there is a relation, regardless of causation.

Why are you so hellbent on denial, that you describe the relation between the earth and moon in such an extraordinarily strange way, trying to be careful about what you say, and what you mean, intent on hiding the fact that you actually believe there is a real relation between the earth and moon?

intent on hiding the fact that you actually believe there is a real relation between the earth and moon? — Metaphysician Undercover

^sigh* That is exactly what I do not do. The question is the nature of the existence of that relationship. You as an independent-of-mind separately existing you-don't-know-what, and me as an idea. And of course if relations exist in your way, there are an uncountably infinite number of them. They wouldn't fit in the universe - on the assumption they take up space, however small!

The question is the nature of the existence of that relationship. — tim wood

See, you actually do believe in the reality of such relations, you just do not understand the nature of the existence of that relationship. As I said, it is one of the many things which are unknown. Here is the mother of all such relationships, the relation between space and time. You seem to like describing relations in terms of spacetime, and within those descriptions is assumed a relation between space and time. But in reality the nature of the existence of that specific relationship itself, is the biggest of all the unknowns.

They wouldn't fit in the universe - on the assumption they take up space, however small! — tim wood

Like ideas, they are immaterial. Why would they take up space? Then again, maybe what we call "matter" is simply the manifestation of a particular type of relations, which do take up space. Since the nature of the existence of relations is unknown, we really cannot exclude anything, can we?

Like ideas, they are immaterial. — Metaphysician Undercover

You win. And the queen is a biscuit.

Let X be at least one(although there are countless ones) creature capable of drawing correlations between different things, where at least one of those things is want/desire/aims/goals of the agent and another is a means to that end.

Without that, there is no purpose.
— creativesoul

Purpose then emergent, requiring person, desire, goal, means? In this your "agent," the person, necessary, desire as catalyst. It looks to me like ends and means are unnecessary. As with a person said to be ambitious, that is, a person with purpose but not (yet, presumably) with a goal or means to achieve it. — tim wood

Means are purposeful. The purpose of means is to reach, attain, and/or acquire a goal/end.

Ambition without goals? What's that consist of?

However, I do agree that one can be ambitious without yet having, arriving at, and/or being capable of articulating a means to the desired end. Good call, but I can make no sense whatsoever out of ambition absent any goal, and/or desired outcome. General ones suffice. Being a good person, for example. One can be ambitious about life in general as well. So, there is little need for specificity, however there is most certainly a need for some sort of desired outcome/expectation. There's always something that one is ambitious about regardless of the complexity of the desired outcome.



I do feel compelled to admit/note that I wrote something earlier that I have come to disagree with in recent years. I misspoke. While I do hold that purpose presupposes agency, I do not hold that meaning and significance do as well. That is not my position, despite stating otherwise. Mea culpa.

X has purpose in strict relation to a creature capable of intentionally, deliberately, and/or knowingly putting things to use. Whereas all things meaningful and/or significant are meaningful/significant to a creature capable of drawing correlations between different things. Purpose requires that and more. A simple/rudimentary thinking creature is all that's needed to attribute meaning and/or for things to become significant to them by virtue of drawing correlations between different things. However, "agency/agent" imply deliberate contemplation, abstract thinking, moral culpability, volition, a creature that 'cares', etc.

All that to say that I retract the claim that meaning and significance presuppose agency. Best to do that now, so as to avoid any confusion it will certainly cause otherwise, should this discussion continue.

There's always something that one is ambitious about regardless of the complexity of the desired outcome. — creativesoul

I accept the correction. A person can be hungry without knowing what he wants, but at least he's hungry.

X has purpose in strict relation to a creature — creativesoul

Imho best to limit this to people because, so far as I know, there is no adequate language for making clear just what exactly animals are doing. As to your distinction between purpose on one side and meaning and significance on the other, l don't quite get it. But I have no reason to think I would disagree with you. I assume you mean that a dim bulb can illuminate meaning and significance, but that it takes something brighter to execute purpose. In any case I think none of it exists absent an agent in which it is thought/supposed.

A person can be hungry without knowing what he wants, but at least he's hungry. — tim wood

Sure, but being hungry without knowing what one wants to eat is more akin to being ambitious without knowing how to achieve the desired outcome. That is ambition without clear means. It is not ambition without desired outcome/goal.

X has purpose in strict relation to a creature capable of intentionally, deliberately, and/or knowingly putting things to use...
— creativesoul

Imho best to limit this to people because, so far as I know, there is no adequate language for making clear just what exactly animals are doing. — tim wood

Hmmm. People are not the only creatures capable of intentionally, deliberately, and/or knowingly putting things to use. If a creature learns to use a stick to fetch termites out from deep inside of a nest, we can rest quite easy in claiming that the creature uses that stick for a specific purpose. The stick is a tool. The stick has purpose in strict relation to the creature intentionally, deliberately, and/or knowingly putting it to use. The purpose is 'given' to the stick by the creature under consideration.

Is that not adequate enough?

As to your distinction between purpose on one side and meaning and significance on the other, l don't quite get it.

All purpose is meaningful/significant to a creature capable of 'giving' purposes to things. All purpose presupposes meaning and/or significance. Not all meaning and/or significance presupposes purpose.

But I have no reason to think I would disagree with you. I assume you mean that a dim bulb can illuminate meaning and significance, but that it takes something brighter to execute purpose. In any case I think none of it exists absent an agent in which it is thought/supposed. — tim wood

You may be getting hung up on my distinction between a capable creature and an agent. I think "agency" is fraught with historical baggage. The more I think about it, I'm not so sure I agree that all purpose presupposes agency either. Chimps. Crows. I'm hesitate to attribute agency to them, but I've no issue clearly explaining how they give purpose to rudimentary tools; how those tools become meaningful/significant to them.

I'm actively working this out as well. :blush: I'm not well rehearsed in the subject matter of purpose/teleology. I'm more seeing where my prior commitments leave/lead me on the matter.

You win. — tim wood

Hooray! I'm going to go celebrate. Care to join me for a glass of champagne? Fuck the queen, or the biscuit, or whatever you're talking about, let's just celebrate!

we can rest quite easy in claiming — creativesoul

We can always rest easy claiming - but that all the more reason to remember it's just a claim. And good claims work - but none of that makes them true. It's not easy to describe any animal action in terms that do not tend either to anthropomorphize or make hasty assumptions. My cat meows at the door; obviously it wants to go out. The evidence being that it goes out - except when it doesn't. Cat owners all share the experience of their cat, once the door opens, standing in the doorway, or lying down in the doorway, for an extended sampling of the day, no matter the weather. So what is the cat about? Who knows? All we get is the probability/possibility of certain behaviours.