This interpretation seems to me both the most evidence-based and consistent with human experience.Growing Block Universe: This theory is similar to the block universe theory but adds the idea that time is "growing" or expanding as new events come into existence. The past and present exist, but the future does not yet exist. — Truth Seeker
Growing Block Universe: This theory is similar to the block universe theory but adds the idea that time is "growing" or expanding as new events come into existence. The past and present exist, but the future does not yet exist.
— Truth Seeker
This interpretation seems to me both the most evidence-based and consistent with human experience. — 180 Proof
It is. I say as much in my prior post. I've just never heard it called Block Time 'theory' before. The view cannot be logically argued for since it is epiphenomenal.I thought Moving Spotlight was the same as Block Time Theory. — Truth Seeker
Because it's the only one that allows relativity of simultaneity, something that derives directly from the premises of special relativity. Black holes don't exist except in eternalism and moving spotlight, and the latter is kind of a solipsistic view.Apparently, Einstein subscribed to Eternalism/Block Universe Theory. Why would he do that?
You can visit it. If you look at last year, you'll find yourself there. Of course the same goes for 2025, except that a view of that is not available in 2024.If the past still exists, why can't we visit it and change it? — Truth Seeker
You acknowlege that they're interpretations, which is means there cannot be evidence. Perhaps you feel otherwise. I know at least one that does, and cannot conceive of any other view.This interpretation seems to me both the most evidence-based and consistent with human experience. — 180 Proof
Black holes don't exist except in eternalism and moving spotlight, and the latter is kind of a solipsistic view. — noAxioms
You can visit it. If you look at last year, you'll find yourself there. — noAxioms
No you have not. Light cannot escape from one, so they cannot be photographed. What you see is probably X-ray radiation coming from the accretion disk.I have seen photos of black holes online — Truth Seeker
You're already there.How do I visit last year?
We do it all the time – the "visits and changes" are our memories.If the past still exists, why can't we visit it and change it? — Truth Seeker
agree with you. If the past still exists, why can't we visit it and change it? — Truth Seeker
How do I visit last year?
You're already there. — noAxioms
If the past still exists, why can't we visit it and change it?
— Truth Seeker
We do it all the time – the "visits and changes" are our memories. — 180 Proof
Like I said in my previous post ...I am talking about physically visiting another point in the past — Truth Seeker
:nerd:travel faster-than-light (backwards in time according to Einstein's GR) in order to reach [the] past ... — 180 Proof
Well, I suspect that that sort of 'temporal change' would branch-off into another timeline (i.e. 'parallel' version of this universe) in which JL lived at least one more day ... but in y/our native (original) timeline JL would still have been murdered.e.g. going back in time and preventing the murder of John Lennon.
Which theory of time is the most evidence-based? — Truth Seeker
OK, you are a presentist then. Under raw presentism, the past doesn't exist, and you can't 'change' what is nonexistent.I am in the present continuously, not in the past. — Truth Seeker
Much of this topic seems to have revolved around the concept of 'time travel', which is defined differently from one interpretation to the next. In presentism, there is no past to go to. Under growing block, if you go to a place that isn't the present, how can you 'do' anything since you are no longer at the present? Do you bring the present with you? Such travel is very incoherent in growing block.A problem I see here is what would we call “evidence” to either confirm or deny one of these theories. What would that look like? When I go “back to change” something existing in the past, when I get there, am I changing something which is presently in front me that is supposedly in the past. Is this evidence of presentism or block theory? — Richard B
Classical physics does not allow reverse causality. No physics allows non-local information transfer, and saving John would very much constitute non-local information transfer.preventing the murder of John Lennon. Can we do that? — Truth Seeker
Case in point. No known physics supports that. It again would constitute non-local information transfer. The branching is allowed under some interpretations of QM. The cause of it coming from subsequent events is not.Well, I suspect that that sort of 'temporal change' would branch-off into another timeline (i.e. 'parallel' version of this universe) in which JL lived at least one more day — 180 Proof
The phenomenological experience of time is identical for every interpretation. That's why they're called interpretations.What is missing is the phenomenological experience of time — Joshs
What is missing is the phenomenological experience of time
— Joshs
The phenomenological experience of time is identical for every interpretation. That's why they're called interpretations. — noAxioms
I looked up the SEP article on this, and I don't think I used the term incorrectly. It doesn't seem to presume any particular interpretation of mind. It says:By phenomenological I meant phenomenological philosophy — Joshs
I already acknowledged your stated opinion in this matter.I am experiencing the present continuously. — Truth Seeker
SEP says otherwise, but I agree here. What most people think of as time travel is impossible. SEP for instance considers time dilation to be time travel, meaning all of us do it just by crossing the street and back. I disagree with this qualifying as much as you probably do.None of us can time travel to the past or the distant future.
They're all interpretations. By definition you can't know this. Only one view (spotlight) says the future exists, and its proponents cannot run a test to confirm the premise.how do we know that the past and the future exist? — Truth Seeker
By phenomenological I meant phenomenological
philosophy ( Husserl, Mwrleau-Ponty.) This does not mean mere introspection, but a method of
reflection on experience that brings out structures unavailable to empirical third person models. — Joshs
What is missing is the phenomenological experience of time , which involves a different notion of evidence than empirical naturalism makes use of. — Joshs
By phenomenological I meant phenomenological philosophy
— Joshs
I looked up the SEP article on this, and I don't think I used the term incorrectly. It doesn't seem to presume any particular interpretation of mind. It says:
"In its root meaning, then, phenomenology is the study of phenomena: literally, appearances as opposed to reality."
This is what I am talking about. The phenomenal experience of say a person does not vary depending on which interpretation of time is 'reality'. The experience is the same, and has to be, else there very much would be an empirical test to falsify some of them. — noAxioms
Husserl believed that every experience for intentional conscious has a temporal character or background. We experience spatial objects, both successive (e.g., a passing automobile) and stationary (e.g., a house), as temporal. We do not, on the other hand, experience all temporal objects (e.g., an imagined sequence or spoken sentence) as spatial. For the phenomenologist, even non-temporal objects (e.g., geometrical postulates) presuppose time because we experience their timeless character over time; for example, it takes time for me to count from one to five although these numbers themselves remain timeless, and it takes some a long time to understand and appreciate the force of timeless geometrical postulates.
To this point, common sense views of time may find Husserl agreeable. Such agreement ceases, however, for those who expect Husserl to proclaim that time resembles an indefinite series of nows (like seconds) passing from the future through the present into the past (as a river flows from the top of a mountain into a lake). This common sense conception of time understands the future as not-yet-now, the past as no-longer-now, and the present as what now-is, a thin, ephemeral slice of time. Such is the natural attitude’s view of time, the time of the world, of measurement, of clocks, calendars, science, management, calculation, cultural and anthropological history, etc. This common sense view is not the phenomenologist’s, who suspends all naïve presuppositions through the reduction.
Phenomenology’s fundamental methodological device, the “phenomenological reduction,” involves the philosopher’s bracketing of her natural belief about the world, much like in mathematics when we bracket questions about whether numbers are mind-independent objects. This natural belief Husserl terms the “natural attitude,” under which label he includes dogmatic scientific and philosophical beliefs, as well as uncritical, every-day, common sense assumptions.
Relativity does give a strong suggestion, but it is going too far to assert full incompatibility.According to this, "many philosophers have argued that relativity implies eternalism. Philosopher of science Dean Rickles says that, "the consensus among philosophers seems to be that special and general relativity are incompatible with presentism." — Michael
There are three kinds of time, and those that ask "what is time" never seem to realize it.Do you mean that time is also an aspect of consciousness and therefore located in our cognitive apparatus (but that may be closer to Kant?). — Tom Storm
I read it all, and while I think it fairly clearly conveys what the common sense view is, it then declares itself to not be that, and what it is (the last paragraph) kind of lost me. I could not, from that, summarize what Husserl is trying to get at.This IEP snippet may give you a sense of what I mean — Joshs
I read it all, and while I think it fairly clearly conveys what the common sense view is, it then declares itself to not be that, and what it is (the last paragraph) kind of lost me. I could not, from that, summarize what Husserl is trying to get at — noAxioms
Can you say some more in simple terms about what this might be? Do you mean that time is also an aspect of consciousness and therefore located in our cognitive apparatus (but that may be closer to Kant?). — Tom Storm
What is time? In daily life time is spoken of in a variety of ways. The universe is said to have existed for many billions of years. In geology one can say that the Permian period, the most recent period of the Paleozoic period, lasted around 41 million years. One can also speak of the medieval age; one can refer to the German occupation of Denmark which began on April 9, 1940; and one can announce that the train will leave in twenty-two min-utes. In other words, in daily life it is taken for granted that there is a dat-able, measurable, historical, and cosmic time. Husserl's analysis, however, is not primarily concerned with these forms of time, though by no means is he denying that one can speak of an objective time.
Rather he claims that it is philosophically unacceptable simply to assume that time possesses such an objective status. The phenomenologically pertinent question is how time can appear with such a validity, that is, how it is constituted with such a validity: In order to begin this analysis, it is, however, necessary to perform an epoche. We will have to suspend our naive beliefs regarding the existence and nature of objective time, and, instead, take our point of departure in the type of time we are directly acquainted with. We have to turn to experienced or lived time.
The central question is: How can I experience such objects as melodies? Husserls fundamental claim is that our experience of a temporal object (as well as our experience of change and succession) would be impossible if our consciousness were only conscious of that which is given in a punctual now, and if the stream of consciousness consequently consisted in a series of isolated now-points, like a line of pearls. If this were the case, were we only able to experience that which is given right now, we would, in fact, be unable to experience anything with a temporal extension, that is, anything that endured. This is obviously not the case, so consequently we are forced to acknowledge that our consciousness, one way or the other, can encompass more than that which is given right now. We can be co-conscious of that which has just been, and that which is just about to occur.
However, the crucial question still remains, how can we be conscious of that which is no longer or not yet present to our consciousness? According to Brentano, it is our imagination that enables us to tran-scend the punctual now. We perceive that which occurs right now, and imagine that which is no longer or which has not yet occurred. Husserl, however, rejects this proposal since he considers it to imply a counterintuitive claim: We cannot perceive objects with temporal extension, we can only imagine them. Thus, Brentanos theory seems unable to account for the fact that we are apparently able to hear, and not simply imagine, a piece of music or an entire conversation.
Husserls own alternative is to insist on the width of presence. Let us imagine that we are hearing a triad consisting of the tones C, D, and E. If we focus on the last part of this perception, the one that occurs when the tone E sounds, we do not find a consciousness that is exclusively conscious of the tone E, but a consciousness that is still conscious of the two former notes D and C. And not only that, we find a consciousness that still hears the first two notes (it neither imagines nor remembers them). This does not mean that there is no difference between our consciousness of the present tone E and our consciousness of the tones D and C. D and C are not simultaneous with E, but, on the contrary, we are experiencing a temporal succession. D and C are tones that have been and are perceived as past, for which reason we can actually experience the triad in its temporal duration, rather than simply as iso-lated tones that replace each other abruptly.l We can perceive temporal objects because consciousness is not caught in the now. We do not merely perceive the now-phase of the triad, but also its past and future phases.
According to this, "many philosophers have argued that relativity implies eternalism. Philosopher of science Dean Rickles says that, "the consensus among philosophers seems to be that special and general relativity are incompatible with presentism."
— Tom Storm
Relativity does give a strong suggestion, but it is going too far to assert full incompatibility.
The two premises of SR is where the trouble is. I googled "premises of special relativity" — noAxioms
There are three kinds of time, and those that ask "what is time" never seem to realize it. — noAxioms
This is obviously not the case, so consequently we are forced to acknowledge that our consciousness, one way or the other, can encompass more than that which is given right now. We can be co-conscious of that which has just been, and that which is just about to occur.
We can perceive temporal objects because consciousness is not caught in the now. We do not merely perceive the now-phase of the triad, but also its past and future phases.
That comment (the verb 'exist for', not to mention the tense, implies a universe contained by time. Physicist probably say this all the time, but accepted physics doesn't word it that way. Most people don't reach for B series speak except for explicit need. But the prevalence of A-series in common language goes a long way toward reinforcing the A view.The universe is said to have existed for many billions of years. — Zahavi
OK, but none of this seems revolutionary. Yes, being conscious of what has just been is what short term memory is for. Being conscious of what is about to occur is the ability to predict, a critical ability if one is to be more fit. The quote calls it imagination, not memory. 'Imagination' probably better describes the predicting end and not so much the direct perception of temporal objects. I suppose imagination is a term that can be used to describe the recall of some immediate memory.Husserls fundamental claim is that our experience of a temporal object (as well as our experience of change and succession) would be impossible if our consciousness were only conscious of that which is given in a punctual now, and if the stream of consciousness consequently consisted in a series of isolated now-points, like a line of pearls. If this were the case, were we only able to experience that which is given right now, we would, in fact, be unable to experience anything with a temporal extension, that is, anything that endured. This is obviously not the case, so consequently we are forced to acknowledge that our consciousness, one way or the other, can encompass more than that which is given right now. We can be co-conscious of that which has just been, and that which is just about to occur.
Good example. I don't see the difference between the 'this' and the 'not that'. It seems like being nitpicky about the words to describe the psychological experience of temporal things. None of the article seems to in any way be relevant to this experience being different from one interpretation of time vs another, which is why I thought the topic was brought up.And not only that, we find a consciousness that still hears the first two notes (it neither imagines nor remembers them).
So I have. Fixed, sort of. Sorry about that.You have accidentally quoted Michael as me. — Tom Storm
, "many philosophers have argued that relativity implies eternalism. Philosopher of science Dean Rickles says that, "the consensus among philosophers seems to be that special and general relativity are incompatible with presentism." Christian Wüthrich argues that supporters of presentism can salvage absolute simultaneity only if they reject either empiricism or relativity."
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