So anyhow, I think Locke's arguments fail, even though I am not big on "innate" or "a priori" ideas myself. But in particular, I think they fail in a way that demonstrates how telos is still mighty helpful for any sort of anthropology, or even biology. — Count Timothy von Icarus
Yet surely leaves are an "innate property of oaks," no? — Count Timothy von Icarus
Here's a place where we can see that what seems innate is just what fits the pre-fab construction. Babies may show they are aware-ing their natural environment. A smile triggers a smile naturally. That response is innate. There is no understanding using concept/idea. There is no idea. But as for once babies start understanding idea, my guess would be they have already assimilated very basic constructions. That is understanding.we might say that even babies show they understand some seemingly "innate" ideas. — Count Timothy von Icarus
If the type of enviornment that allows a human being to survive (or perhaps "develop normally") is of the type that it always produces certain ideas, then it would seem fair to call those ideas innate. — Count Timothy von Icarus
I guess if I had to sum up I'd say the issue is that describing organisms traits seems to require speaking to an additional sort of potency over and above the potency that exists in "all matter." I would tend to trace this to form not just because Aristotle does, but because form seems to explain how it is that matter within an ecosystem can be transformed into different organisms. — Count Timothy von Icarus
In his "An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding," Locke makes an argument against the "innate ideas" of the rationalists.
[...]
However, here he differs from Aristotle quite a bit. — Count Timothy von Icarus
I will mostly deal with the second argument since the issues with first one would be better dealt with as its own thread. Suffice to say, I don't think it makes sense to speak of "innate" human qualities as somehow being those qualities that rely on "no context at all." Human beings never exist outside a context. Indeed, they can only survive in a quite narrow range of environments. If the type of enviornment that allows a human being to survive (or perhaps "develop normally") is of the type that it always produces certain ideas, then it would seem fair to call those ideas innate. That is, if any context that produces a healthy human adult also produces x idea in that adult, then x idea is innate. — Count Timothy von Icarus
This is why i brought up the weirdness of your specifics earlier, "any context that produces a healthy human adult (weirdly specific- I am guessing this is because an active conscious required in your case/example?)" see aboveHowever, recall that Locke's project here is really a sort of philosophical anthropology tied to epistemology. If we're talking about the "innate properties of human beings" we have speak to something that can reasonably be called a human being, as opposed to say, "a mass of liver tissue." Organisms' potential to develop into the mature form of the organism is special in terms of potential. — Count Timothy von Icarus
Organisms' potential to develop into the mature form of the organism is special in terms of potential. It differs from their ability to be heated, dissolved, etc. This seems like it has to be the case if we're to speak meaningfully about the properties belonging to organisms at all. If we just speak in terms of the potential related to the matter that makes up an organism, then it seems like we should be able to say something like "any animal has the potential to become any other animal." After all, if you rearrange all the constituent matter in a cat's body "just so," it seems you should be able to make a mouse or two (more realistically, matter is recycled through ecosystems in this way). Yet clearly caterpillars have the potential for wings in a way cats do not. To say otherwise in an appeal to reduction seems to bring up a host of issues. And where is this difference in potential located? If would seem to be in the form as best I can tell. — Count Timothy von Icarus
Perhaps it is located where it can be tested...potential has to do with availability, which is time constrained. The difference is between the parents and can be tested, I think even from/in the womb. Its in the parents but not the parents as individuals, but as parents that came (literally) together to give a new life - 2 that make 1! The combination of 2 AND FROM THAT is 1 new. The new offspring from the two parents at possibly even earliest stages of conception, located where? In the womb**** or in the world outside of the egg? Both places, though very different as far as functioning, can be used to test its potential. In womb- consider also, mothers health, experiences, and environmental circumstances, and her choices with timing. Consider the Fathers genes and lineage and traits it carries in sperm.And where is this difference in potential located? If would seem to be in the form as best I can tell. — Count Timothy von Icarus
In The Blank Slate, Steven Pinker argues against the Empiricist belief that ideas only derive from personal experience. However, his examples of "innate ideas" consist mostly of knee-jerk emotions, such as fear of snakes, that seem to be programmed into human genes via transpersonal evolutionary experiences. I'm not sure that's what Plato had in mind though. And Aristotle argued that humans do not inherit knowledge of First Principles (e.g non-contradiction), which must be derived by rational methods.In his "An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding," Locke makes an argument against the "innate ideas" of the rationalists. He is essentially trying to rebut the claim that all people have, by nature, certain ideas (e.g., an understanding of the principle of non-contradiction). — Count Timothy von Icarus
Get involved in philosophical discussions about knowledge, truth, language, consciousness, science, politics, religion, logic and mathematics, art, history, and lots more. No ads, no clutter, and very little agreement — just fascinating conversations.