Compatibility does not require total chaotic indeterminism, but only a few short-cuts on the road to destiny. — Gnomon
I get the first half of the sentence. But the meaning of the second half is not at all clear to me. Your diagram in your "Small world model" doesn't help. — Ludwig V

Sorry. I'm currently reading a book that gets into Small World math & physics. I didn't really expect you to grasp the concept of "short-cuts" without a long digression. But I liked the neatness of the concept, in the context of this thread. So I wrote it down.

The "small world" Wiki link mentions "short-cuts", but not in detail. The most well-known example of Small World networks is the "six degrees of Kevin Bacon" meme from the 1990s. A 'degree of separation' is a measure of social distance between people. In the WWW diagram below, the long lines between clusters are the "short-cuts" that reduce the number of steps between any two nodes. And their arbitrary placement can be spontaneous & indeterminate

Suffice it to say : in a Small World network, like the World Wide Web, most interconnections are to neighboring nodes (necessary & deterministic). But a few (optional) long-distance connections between major nodes reduce the number of links (degrees) required to connect to any other node (arbitrary & in-deterministic). Philosophically, just a few "short-cuts" convert a deterministic-but-chaotic tangle, into a freer and more accessible system. This ad hoc interpretation might make a good Phd thesis for some mathematical philosopher ; but it's too-much-too-late for me. :smile:

Are you suggesting that an imagined freedom is any substitute for the real thing? Seems like a very poor exchange to me. — Ludwig V

As Daniel Dennett, in Freedom Evolves, concluded : "… although in the strict physical sense our actions might be determined, we can still be free in all the ways that matter, because of the abilities we evolved". The example I gave before is the Panama Canal, which was only an imaginary dream for over a century, until many people, motivated by that dream, devised ways to move mountains. That small-world social mind-meld (inter-communication of motivation) is one of the "abilities" that Dennett noted. I think it's a pretty good trade-off as a substitute for non-human impotence or super-natural magic. :wink:

In case, the freedom to "roam the world of ideas" is no substitute for the freedom to go home to you partner and kids. — Ludwig V

It's not the heavenly ideal, but a free-roaming mind is better than being a sentient mind trapped in an imprisoned body. N'cest pas? In a Matter-only world, "it is what it is" ; but in a Mind & Matter world, what is imagined might also become realized. As one writer put it : "I feel that as human beings with free will, the mind tends to limit itself from living to the fullest when we become prisoners of our own mind." Is your mind locked-in? :chin:

Imagination becoming reality :
Creativity and Invention: Imagination often precedes innovation and creation. Many of the inventions and creations that shape our world start as ideas in someone's imagination. When these ideas are acted upon and brought into the physical world through effort, experimentation, and implementation, they can become a reality. This process involves turning abstract thoughts into tangible products, technologies, or works of art.
https://www.quora.com/When-does-imagination-become-reality-for-humans

3)the causes of voluntary behaviour are certain states, events, or conditions within the agent: acts of will or volitions, choices, decisions, desires etc... — The Chapter you cited entitled Compatibilism
So an action is free if its causes are inside the agent.If the causes of those causes are outside the agent, can we conclude that his acts of will, etc are not free? — Ludwig V

Perhaps, but the "cause" of willful action --- as contrasted with physical actions --- is presumed to be within the agent. That's why we call it "Will Power". Otherwise, the action would be pre-determined instead of free-will. :cool:


SIX DEGREES OF SEPARATION
Note the few long lines between clusters of short lines.

I'm afraid I don't see that the Small Worlds model affects the issue at all. Sorry.

… although in the strict physical sense our actions might be determined, we can still be free in all the ways that matter, because of the abilities we evolved". — Gnomon

I have a lot of time for Dennett. But that doesn't mean I agree with everything that he says. This is just throwing in the towel. We all have limitations - things we cannot do. But doesn't really affect the issue.

It's not the heavenly ideal, but a free-roaming mind is better than being a sentient mind trapped in an imprisoned body. — Gnomon

But I'm not a sentient mind trapped in an imprisoned body. I'm a person, as free as anyone is.

In a Matter-only world, "it is what it is" ; but in a Mind & Matter world, what is imagined might also become realized. — Gnomon

I wouldn't know. I don't live in a mind-and-matter world, nor in a matter-only world, not, for that matter, in and ideas-only world. On Mondays, Wednesdays and Fridays, I'm a monist. On Tuesdays, Thursdays, and Saturdays, I'm a uncountable pluralist. On Sundays, I don't do philosophy.

"I feel that as human beings with free will, the mind tends to limit itself from living to the fullest when we become prisoners of our own mind." Is your mind locked-in? :chin: — Gnomon

Well, I suppose I can make some sort of sense of that. But not enough to add up to a philosophical position.

Creativity and Invention: Imagination often precedes innovation and creation. Many of the inventions and creations that shape our world start as ideas in someone's imagination. When these ideas are acted upon and brought into the physical world through effort, experimentation, and implementation, they can become a reality. This process involves turning abstract thoughts into tangible products, technologies, or works of art. — Gnomon

Either we are free all day and every day, or we are not free. It is entirely mundane, not special in any way. But perhaps you just want to change the subject.

Perhaps, but the "cause" of willful action --- as contrasted with physical actions --- is presumed to be within the agent. Otherwise, the action would be pre-determined instead of free-will. :cool: — Gnomon

What is wilful action as contrasted with physical action? In what way is a cause "within" me any different from a cause "without" me? How can an internal cause not determine the action unless it is not a cause or it is in some way special? What reason is there to suppose that an internal cause is in any way special - apart from the fact that it is inside me? (We have opened people up and not found any special causes.)

It's about whether or not I can actually choose one path or another.
— Patterner
That little word actually is interesting. What does it mean? Either I have a choice, or I do not. — Ludwig V

I wasn't crazy about writing it. :grin: I don't always know how to express myself in these matters. And sometimes it's not even my fault, As ssu just pointed out regarding the definitions of cause and reason.

I'm just saying that you can't have no ability to choose any but one of multiple equally possible paths and have free will in the matter.
— Patterner
In one way, you are right. But there are some kinds of coercion that are compatible with the capacity to choose. Determinism eliminates the capacity to choose, and so eliminates the possibility of coercion.

When the cop arrests me and asks me to hold out my hands for the cuffs, do I have a choice? When I drag myself in to work on a Monday morning, do I go because I have chosen to go? When my opponent forces me to take his rook (castle) in order to get my queen, what choices do I have? When I pay my taxes, what choice do I have? Assume in all these cases that I have a normal capacity to choose. — Ludwig V

In any scenario, let's just take the cop, there are numerous things it is possible for a human to do.
-Hold your hands out as requested.
-Punch the cop.
-Run away.
-Beg and plead.
-Etc.

Even within each of those, there are numerous variations. If you hold your hands out as requested, you can:
-Simply hold your hands out.
-Say "Yes, officer" and hold your hands out.
-Say "Does this makes you feel like a big man?" and hold your hands out.
-Roll your eyes and hold your hands out.
-Many many other things, and many many combinations.

If I roll my eyes and hold my hands out, and, because of physical determinism - because the trillions of physical events in my brain play out and resolve in the one-and-only way they could have given the initial conditions (just as the pool balls settle into one-and-only configuration they could have given the initial conditions when the cue hits them) - there is no possibility of me doing anything else, despite all the possibilities available to a person in that situation, then I do not have free will. I'm not "actually choosing" if physical determinism literally prevents any other possibility. A couple pages ago, to Relativist, I said it's not a "meaningful choice".

If this is correct, then coercion is just another physical factor that goes into the mix. We experience it as coercion, but it's all reducible to physical events in our brains.

It also means our subjective experience of everything is epiphenomenal. If I'm aware of all the possibilities, but I have no possibility of "choosing" from the myriad options, and can do only the one that the physical factors determine, then awareness is only watching the show.

I'm afraid I don't see that the Small Worlds model affects the issue at all. Sorry. — Ludwig V

That's OK. As I said, I wrote that for me, just to express the aha! idea in words, as it occurred to me.

But I'm not a sentient mind trapped in an imprisoned body. I'm a person, as free as anyone is. — Ludwig V

Come on. It's a metaphor. You seem to have a problem with both Metaphors and Metaphysics. Do you remember how I define "meta-physics", not as religious doctrine, but as philosophical reasoning?

Well, I suppose I can make some sort of sense of that. But not enough to add up to a philosophical position. — Ludwig V

I'm getting the impression that you don't do philosophy. I'm not sure what you think this forum is all about, if not attempts to construct or destruct a "philosophical position". Do you have a "position" on the Freewill question, other than "I just don't get it"? Maybe everyday is Sunday for you. FWIW, my philosophical position is Both-FreeWill-and-Determinism Compatibilism .

Either we are free all day and every day, or we are not free. It is entirely mundane, not special in any way. But perhaps you just want to change the subject. — Ludwig V

But this thread is about how free-effective-willful-mental (meta-physical) choices can Cause changes in the real world outside the imagining mind, despite the dominance of linear physical Determinism. Is that a "special", perhaps supernatural power for you. Or is it simply a normal "ability" of the human mind to reach-out and to exert influence on (affect) the non-self world? FreeWill : the ability to make choices that affect, not just the body, but other minds, and the physical world. Are you a "free person" in that sense, are you an Agent in the world, or just an object? Or do you want to change the OP subject : Freedom and Determinism?

What is wilful action as contrasted with physical action? In what way is a cause "within" me any different from a cause "without" me? — Ludwig V

The June 2024 issue of Scientific American magazine has an article on how human babies learn that they can control material objects with their power of Agency : their WillPower. It's what the article calls "ability". The causal ability "within me" is different from physical causation, in that it would never happen in a million years without Purpose (goal setting) within me. Intellectual Purposes may be difficult to achieve, but not denied by Destiny, and not chosen by Determinism.

As I have repeatedly insisted, there's nothing magical or supernatural or "special" about FreeWill. But it seems to be a talent (ability) that is expressed most fully in homo sapiens. What essentially distinguishes Sapiens from apes, and other animals is in degree of control : Agency : the ability to impose our Will upon the world : as illustrated in Culture and Technology. That internal Causation (willpower) is different from external Determinism (energy) in the sense that a meta-physical Mind is different from a physical Rock. Even a willful ape can break a nut with a rock ; just not very efficiently.

FreeWill is not a physical (empirical) question, it's a metaphysical (theoretical) inquiry. My compatibility position is ultimately a Monism : Causation comes in many forms. :smile:

Quotes from SciAm :
"How humans develop the ability to willfully make things happen still remains a mystery . . . the act of discovering their ability to influence the world." . . . . "origins of agency" . . . . "birth of agency is a dynamic, self organizing process" . . . . "Goal-directed action emerges spontaneously when the organism realizes that its movement cause the world to change" . . . . "Historically, the entire issue of purpose and agency in living things --- and dare one say "freewill" --- has been clouded in philosophical debate and controversy."

Come on. It's a metaphor. You seem to have a problem with both Metaphors and Metaphysics. Do you remember how I define "meta-physics", not as religious doctrine, but as philosophical reasoning? — Gnomon

The difficulty is to understand metaphors. If one takes them literally, they are usually false or meaningless. They can have a meaning, and even a truth, of their own.

But soft, what light through yonder window breaks?
It is the east and Juliet is the sun!
(William Shakespeare, Romeo and Juliet, 2. 2. 2–3)
Of course, Juliet is not the sun. But, at the least, the comparison expresses how Romeo feels about her, and so tells us a truth about the place of Juliet in his life.

—History, Stephen said, is a nightmare from which I am trying to awake.
(James Joyce, Ulysses, chap. 2)
This takes a simple metaphor which states a perspective on history. (Since we often apply "nightmare" to anything disastrous or upsetting that happens to us, it is perhaps not even a metaphor.) One could reply, calmly, that there are good bits as well as bad bits. But do the good bits outweight the bad bits? Stephen thinks not, but that the bad bits far outweigh the good bits and maybe even that the good bits aren't really good at all. Adding "from which I am trying to awake" makes it into a metaphor, and tells us that he thinks it may be possible to see things differently.
How would you feel if I said that Determinism is a nightmare from which I am trying to awake?

I do have a problem with metaphysics. I had forgotten your definition of it. I can work with that, although there are still problems.

I'm getting the impression that you don't do philosophy. I'm not sure what you think this forum is all about, if not attempts to construct or destruct a "philosophical position". — Gnomon

It depends what you think doing philosophy is. Does Heidegger or Derrida do philosophy. Many people (including most analytic philosophers) think not? Did Wittgenstein or Ryle do philosophy? Many people (including many analytic philosophers) think not. That's how it works.
I usually find it very difficult to construct or destruct philosophical positions. So I improvise. Jazz philosophy? A metaphor! Too pompous, certainly if I reference Wittgenstein.

FreeWill is not a physical (empirical) question, it's a metaphysical (theoretical) inquiry. My compatibility position is ultimately a Monism : Causation comes in many forms. — Gnomon

This changes everything. But let me ask whether you think that determinism is not a physical (empirical) question? I'll tell you now that I don't think it is. It is a way of thinking about the world and science. Whether it would count as metaphysical inquiry, I wouldn't know. But I certainly think it is a theoretical enquiry. Freedom (Free Will) is a way of thinking about certain parts (components - people) of the world. Understanding these two as ways of thinking, especially whether and how far they are compatible, not deciding between them, is (should be) the project.

My compatibility position is ultimately a Monism : Causation comes in many forms. — Gnomon

Well, we can talk about that.

That internal Causation (willpower) is different from external Determinism (energy) in the sense that a meta-physical Mind is different from a physical Rock. — Gnomon

There are some specialized causal processes that seem to be crucial to our functioning. They are not often found outside living things, so we may be fairly close to each other.

FreeWill is not a physical (empirical) question, it's a metaphysical (theoretical) inquiry. My compatibility position is ultimately a Monism : Causation comes in many forms. — Gnomon
This changes everything. But let me ask whether you think that determinism is not a physical (empirical) question? I'll tell you now that I don't think it is. It is a way of thinking about the world and science. . . .
Well, we can talk about that. — Ludwig V

Determinism is a necessary assumption in order to do practical Science. But it may be optional to do theoretical Philosophy. In any case, Determinism is a metaphysical (philosophical) generalization, based on incomplete evidence.

If you want to talk about "Causation comes in many forms", I have a thesis and blog with numerous examples and interpretations. For example, Terrence Deacon's "Power of Absence" is Causation in Absentia. You may, or may not agree with my unconventional interpretation of Causation, beginning with a hypothetical First Cause. But that kind of unorthodox thinking might lead us off-topic, and down the rabbit hole of holistic thinking. :smile:

I wasn't crazy about writing it. :grin: I don't always know how to express myself in these matters. And sometimes it's not even my fault, As ssu just pointed out regarding the definitions of cause and reason. — Patterner

We all have our idiosyncracies and few of us come up with the perfect phrase every time. I tend to be a bit cautious, if you like, and perhaps scrutinize the text more closely than I need to. The reason is that one of the ways I come to understand meaning is by asking what the opposite would be and what would make it apply. (See below). The dictionary definitions of cause and reason were a bit of a blow. The philosophical use of "cause" and hence of "reason" is, if you like, specialized.

I'm not "actually choosing" if physical determinism literally prevents any other possibility. — Patterner

That start me wondering what it would mean if physical determinism only metaphorically prevented any other possibility. But I'm not arguing that we are not prevented from some choices in one way or another. The question is whether this is always the case or just sometimes and what the factors are that can prevent choices. See?

If I'm aware of all the possibilities, but I have no possibility of "choosing" from the myriad options, and can do only the one that the physical factors determine, then awareness is only watching the show. — Patterner

The question is whether you have no possibility of choosing from the options. But determinism effectively says that you have no options, because an option is by definition something you could choose to take.

That start me wondering what it would mean if physical determinism only metaphorically prevented any other possibility. — Ludwig V

I don't know what you mean.

But I'm not arguing that we are not prevented from some choices in one way or another. The question is whether this is always the case or just sometimes and what the factors are that can prevent choices. See? — Ludwig V

Certainly it is impossible to do anything and everything we can think of. I can't jump up and fly to the moon. I can't walk through the earth to find lost treasures or mine diamonds. And sure, coercion happens. But even if coercion prevents me from accomplishing a particular goal, it doesn't prevent me from taking all but one exact action.

The question is whether you have no possibility of choosing from the options. But determinism effectively says that you have no options, because an option is by definition something you could choose to take. — Ludwig V

Right. What are the words for this kinds of ideas? "Numerous things it is possible for a humsn to do in a given situation" is not the same as "choices" if, despite being actions that it is known humans can perform, determinism only allows one. But, to my knowledge, we don't have a word that expresses that, because our languages were developed by beings who thought we could have done other than we did.

If freedom is defined in terms of potency, as "the potential to do anything," then determinism is a grave threat to freedom. Such definitions often define freedom as "the ability to have done otherwise," and in a deterministic frame this seems impossible. Locke would be a good early example here. He has human freedom ensured by a sort of sui generis "veto power" on action, one that seems to be absolute and unconditioned.

But the difficulty here is that the proponent of such a definition of freedom still wants to say that the world in some way determines our actions. We can't be free to "jump into a river to save a child," unless the child's being in the river can condition our actions in at least some way. Likewise, we preexist our individual choices and we'd like to say that "who we are" and "who we have chosen to become" in some ways affects our actions. Our memories are prior to actions, yet we would like to think they affect our actions. If they didn't, our actions would be arbitrary.

To my mind, this is just a spurious definition of freedom. If one takes the classical view of freedom as the "self-determining and self-governing capacity to actualize the good," a host of thorny issues dissolve. Yet this view is often rejected precisely because people are already committed to the idea of freedom as potency. They claim that the good must be thought of as completely unconditioned, something we are free to define however we want, as an act of pure will, precisely because this is what ensures freedom. So the thinking goes, if the good is already in some way definite, then our pursuit of the good (practical reason, pragmatic concerns) ends up being determined, and in turn this makes us unfree because freedom is the ability to "do anything." Taken to an extreme, this view makes all government, all human relationships, marriage, parenthood, all moral teaching, etc. a constraint on freedom, rather than its perfection.

Nagel's view on the absurd can even be taken in this light. Seeing everything as comical, and in a way ridiculous, allows us to avoid the constraints of caring too much about anything. Imagine Gandalf hitting a pipe as he watches the armies of Mordor set to bring darkness upon the world and quipping his Hobbit companion, "do not worry, for nothing really matters and nothing is truly dark or evil."

(Note: you could obviously take Nagel differently. I vastly prefer his take to Camus or Sartre at any rate)