Only if we must always have a maxim in order to make a decision -- but given that Kant believes we usually follow our inclination, rather than a moral maxim, we could just admit that there's no maxim here to making a choice. — Moliere
Sure. But if you're asking "How do we make a choice?" then it seems obvious -- we don't always make choices based on maxims, but upon inclination. — Moliere
Go on. — Moliere
That's the crux of it. There can be a lot more:
Don't cause harm, and justify it by mitigating harm if you didn't have to.
Don't assume for others what is good for them, and worth suffering for, especially without consent.
All this comes down to the second formulation of not using people.
Don't use people, disrespecting their dignity, by putting them in harmful conditions because you have positive-ethical project you would like to see carried out. — schopenhauer1
One thing that comes to mind is that I think of it as not merely using people. — Moliere
when, in your heart of hearts, you ask yourself if you're using people, even if you do not want to use people, you'll admit that you go to the shop keeper not because you're following a duty, but because you want to buy something for yourself. (EDIT: That is, you are using the shopkeeper, but you don't need to use him merely as a means to an end -- you can still respect his humanity) — Moliere
So going along with anti-natalism: if the reason you're creating a child is to use the child as a means to an end, and there is nothing more to it than that, then sure. But I think many parents feel a deeper attachment than that: they can recognize the biological inclination to continue on the species while at the same time treat their children as more than means to satisfying that biological inclination.
There are many maxims, after all. — Moliere
I think Kant is rightly interpreted as prohibiting using others as a mere means, and I think it is a social impossibility to try to remove that word, "mere." If we remove that word then we cannot buy goods from the shopkeeper at all. — Leontiskos
I responded that “mere” should not be an excuse to cause harm, by use of it as justification to do so. — schopenhauer1
The claim that such a purchase is an "excuse to cause harm," is highly implausible — Leontiskos
At the very least it is an undue imputation of motive. (And if you insist on the idea that the shopkeeper consents, then consider the tourist who asks a native for directions. It's not as though every time we "burden" someone consent is involved.) — Leontiskos
The key problem with your reliance on consent is that it is moot for Kant. For Kant you cannot use someone as a mere means even if they consent to being used as a mere means. Consent is irrelevant to the second formulation of the Categorical Imperative. — Leontiskos
The first problem is that this is invalid: even if antinatalism were true there could still be true moral principles that do not prohibit procreation. Not every moral principle will justify every moral conclusion. — Leontiskos
The second problem is that this is more a dispute over antinatalism than a dispute over Kant. Your argument has no force for anyone who doesn't already agree with you on antinatalism, and antinatalism is a highly controversial thesis. As I said, we already have a thread on antinatalism. — Leontiskos
Am I disrespecting the dignity of the native by asking for directions? — schopenhauer1
Again, I am allowing "merely" but if it is not being an excuse to actually violate dignity... — schopenhauer1
I mean, Kant himself is highly controversial and I am trying to keep this at the level of Kant. Kant thought that lying is technically wrong no matter what, including about where your friend is when people are out to kill him, so if you think AN is controversial... — schopenhauer1
So going along with anti-natalism: if the reason you're creating a child is to use the child as a means to an end, and there is nothing more to it than that, then sure. — Moliere
I'd say that this society violates the second formulation while maintaining the first: it's consistent, they continue on, and yet by relegating people before they are born to certain hierarchies -- even though everyone is happy -- it does not respect the humanity of people. — Moliere
If you think it violates the second formulation, then who is being treated as a mere means? I don't quite see it, and I am thinking of the analogous situation of an arranged marriage. If parents arrange a marriage for their child, or if someone pre-selects an infant for a hierarchical role, does it follow that they are being treated as a mere means? — Leontiskos
Well, I'd say so, yeah. I don't believe in arranged marriages or pre-destined roles for children, because I believe autonomy is more important than that. — Moliere
The difficulty is that the second formulation pertains to intention, and material acts only rarely have necessarily intentional implications of the kind that Kant is thinking of. — Leontiskos
Even if they would, in fact, be better, we wouldn't be respecting them as end-makers... — Moliere
For Kant you cannot use someone as a mere means even if they consent to being used as a mere means. — Leontiskos
I have all along been uncomfortable with this language of "respecting them as ends-makers," because this is a reduction of the second formulation to autonomy. Obviously that is part of the second formulation, but I want to say that it is not the entirety of it. If it were entirely a matter of respecting them as ends-makers then I really would have to place their autonomy on a very high pedestal. This would be a rather significant, albeit interesting, deviation from Christianity. Is there textual warrant in Kant that the second formulation should be interpreted this way? — Leontiskos
Again, the invalidity of your argument lies in confusing a prohibition with an allowance. Kant is saying, "You cannot use others as a mere means." This does not mean, "If you are not using others as a mere means, then whatever you are doing to them must necessarily be okay." It is logically impossible to use the second formulation as an excuse to act. The second formulation prohibits actions, it does not greenlight actions. I think you would see this more easily were not the planet of antinatalism exercising an undue gravitational pull on your thought. — Leontiskos
But Kant's position on lying follows even from the "merely." When you call into question the legitimacy of the "merely" you do not soften the prohibition on lying, you significantly strengthen it. So if you think Kant's position on lying is incorrect, then a position which calls "merely" into question would be all the more incorrect. — Leontiskos
That, however, is a far cry from having children at all schopenhauer1 -- I think utilitarianism, and psychological hedonism would be better friends to you than deontology, at least if you want to universalize anti-natalism (I did admit some conditions where I could, and even in my own life I can see, where having children isn't a good choice -- but the universal program is a bit much for me) — Moliere
Well, if they are a slave and the apple is merely meant to nourish them to better serve me, then yes. But if the apple is intended for their own intrinsic good, then no. I don't have to ask them if they desire nourishment before I can legitimately give the apple. As long as I think it will serve them in themselves apart from any motive on my part, it is not treating them as a mere means. — Leontiskos
In one sense treating others to become better, for instance, is to treat them as means to an end: to the end of virtue. Even if they would, in fact, be better, we wouldn't be respecting them as end-makers if we manipulated them into being good, regardless. — Moliere
Also, something Rawls points out, deontology is a literal lack of a goal: so to treat someone so that they fulfill a goal would be to violate them. — Moliere
Individuals will maxims…. — Moliere
The will is the faculty of right action, or, volition. I can see acting on a principle, or in accordance with a principle, but I don’t see the willing of one. — Mww
And in any case, while AN isn't self-contradictory, if you're to respect the autonomy of other human beings you have to let them make their own choices under deontology, which would include having children. (it's not like that's self-contradictory... ) — Moliere
There are circumstances where I can imagine having a child violates the 2nd formulation -- say that you decide to have a child to save a marriage. That would be something where I can see how the child isn't being thought of at all, but is a solution to a problem: a marriage. That seems to violate the second formulation.
But I'm not seeing it for all birth. Sometimes people have children because they want their child to have a better life than they had, for instance -- they care about the child as an individual. In those circumstances I'm just not seeing how you could make the case. — Moliere
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