what constitutes an 'object' is entirely a matter of language/convention. There's no physical basis for it. I can talk about the blue gutter and that, by convention, identifies an object distinct from the red gutter despite them both being parts of a greater (not separated) pipe. — noAxioms

Some objects are socially constructed and exist only by conventions, other objects are physical and exist regardless of conventions. Talk of a gutter is conventional, but what it refers to consists of physical parts bound by fields of force into a recognizable whole.

It's more the latter though, right? — Count Timothy von Icarus

Sure.

I think this is an area where information theory gives us a very good set of tools for understanding this sort of thing. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I agree. "RRBGGGRWW" gives a neat compression of the image.

Provided one has the context in which to unpack it. Provided one knows that the letters represent colours on a grid that is three by three. Without the context, the information may as well be noise.

But that is not given by "RRBGGGRWW".

...even in the physical science the "differences that make a difference" are context dependent. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yep.

If I call a ball an object — Philosophim

Then you've used language to invoke a convention. I can't do that with any of tools I mentioned. I cannot explain to my device what my intent is when using it.

Some objects are socially constructed and exist only by conventions, other objects are physical and exist regardless of conventions. — jkop

I contest this.

Talk of a gutter is conventional, but what it refers to consists of physical parts bound by fields of force into a recognizable whole.

All particles anywhere are parts, bound by fields of force and such. Earth's mass pulls on planets in the Andromeda galaxy Does that mean that Earth and some other planet are one object? Where does the influence end?

Sure, it's pretty intuitive for a human to consider a pipe section in isolation to be an 'object', but that's the convention doing its thing. Consider the railing mentioned in the OP. I've already used a convention by calling it a railing. I've strapped a tool to it, and it needs to move 'this'. What does it move? What does it leave behind? The tool has no easier time doing the task for a pipe section or a ball. There's no reason beyond human convention as to where 'that thing' is delimited.

I would argue that there are no real objects in the world. It is just a matter of how our brains carve things up, some of this determined by our evolutionary history, some by cultural practices. — petrichor

You say no "real" objects, but for most of us, reality is also just how our brains carve things up too. The idea of objective reality is a much a human construct as everything else.

Dinosaurs have intent. Predator and prey both need to recognize each other as distinct objects/threats/kin etc. Their convention is sufficiently pragmatic for their needs. — noAxioms

How about a microorganism that recognizes it's prey by chemical signals, then moves in that direction and engulfs it. Does it have intent? Does it recognize it's prey?

other objects are physical and exist regardless of conventions. — jkop

So, perhaps a tree is an object. Is a forest?

Is love real? The United States of America? One of my dreams? Is anything that's real an object?

I contest this. — noAxioms

A molecule is a compound of atoms bound by physical fields of force. The relations and structures that these words refer to exist regardless of the words or the social habits of natural scientists.

Money, however, is a social construct that exists only as long as we believe in and comply to conventions of an economic system. Without the conventions money doesn't exist.


A forest is a recognizable object that consists of trees. Neither is a random swarm of unrecognizable gunk from which we construct recognizable objects.

Well, we do have machines that do this sort of thing, e.g., autonomous spotter drones that can distinguish tanks and IFVs from other objects. Less excitingly, there are license plate readers with can distinguish discrete characters on a moving vehicle.

They work similarly to eyes on a basic level. From the semiotic view, you have signs generated by the interaction between the object and the ambient enviornment, reflected light waves in the examples above, which are in turn picked up by photoreceptors. The similarity starts to fall apart there, since in the animal example there is an experience of the discreteness of the objects, whereas in the machine example there is just a pattern recognition algorithm (although perhaps a dynamic "learning/evolutionary" one).

Both appear to work not by demarcating any discrete boundary for objects in terms of ensembles of fundamental parts (the way modern philosophy has generally thought of this problem) but rather by seeking to identify signs consistent with a given form. For example, license plate readers can handle hand written temporary license plates even though the exact form and material varies from the standard because it is simply looking at an overall level of structure.

The Problem of the Many is, to my mind, a problem that only shows up if we accept the starting presuppositions of a substance metaphysics, where objects properties inhere in their constituent parts—a building block view where "things are what they are made of." On such a view, it's a serious problem that objects can't be identified in terms of discrete ensembles of building blocks.

Process views, which are often inspired by information theory or semiotics, or the marriage of the two (Shannon's model helpfully recreated the Augustine/Piercean semiotic triad) don't have this issue. The demarcation, "if a thing is a cloud" can be defined in terms of some sort of morphism that is substrate independent, which in turn seems to make the issue of "hazy boundaries" less relevant. Boundaries can be hazy because a given morphism might be realizable in very many ways.

Ultimately, I do think Locke's view of "real essences" having to be defined in terms of "mental essences" gets something right here. Without minds, without the plurality of phenomenological horizons, you have a world of complete unity. Cause, energy, and information flow across all "discrete" boundaries as if they didn't truly exist. But mental does not mean arbitrary, and so forms, as they appear in the world, are mutually self-constituting in terms of "mental" and "real" essence (with both only existing apart in abstraction anyhow). Hegel's conception of concepts unfolding in time is perhaps helpful here. When we rethink a concept, e.g. when we learn that "water is H2O," this is a real change in water's physical relations. How a thing is known is not a subordinate, "less real" sort of relationship, but at least as real as anything else (and arguably more real since things most "are what they are," when known.)

The substance view, aside from introducing the problem of superveniance, also has a tendency to make mental relations "less real." Since fundemental building blocks lack intentionality, intentionality must be in a way illusory, or else the sui generis creation of mind. But this separation of mind and nature IMO makes the demarcation problem insoluble.

A forest is a recognizable object that consists of trees. Neither is a random swarm of unrecognizable gunk from which we construct recognizable objects. — jkop

Humans can name, make an object or thing out of, anything. There is no such thing as a random swarm of unrecognizable gunk if it holds any interest for us. There's a good definition - a thing is a phenomenon that holds interest for people.

A number of people seem to have conceded my point that the demarcation of an object is strictly an ideal, a mental convention. — noAxioms

We never sense an “object”. We sense a “this object” like for example a “tree” and an “apple” and we abstract the idea “object” as either of those, and so neither of those as “object” So “object” lives on the mental side of the demarcation you made. “Matter” is like that too. No one has ever seen a bucket full of matter. It’s full of something particular.

But then there is the question of the particular. You are saying “tree” is just as conventional as “object”. And the difference between “tree” and “apple” is just as conventional as the difference between “object” and “thing” or “ideal”.

If there was nothing there until we perform the convention of constructing an object, our objects would be in total disarray, incommunicable, unspeakable to another object-maker. There is a medium, an objective, convention independent world of objects. We are all usually wrong about what these objects are and wrong about how we talk about them, and wrong about what we think others are saying, but unless there is a world of objects, communication is both impossible and pointless.

So my answer is, I accept that there are many objects so that we can communicate and maybe somehow triangulate on a definition of one of them someday. And the fact that you were able to read this far in my post here means you accept that there are separate objects too. Whether we want to admit it or not. Once we accept they are there, we can agree to start setting the demarcations.

Another fictional example to add to my list, an older one this time: The Midas touch.
King Midas touches a twig. No convention/intention is conveyed. Does the bark change to gold? The twig/branch/tree/forest? How does the curse know where to demark the effect?

Well, we do have machines that do this sort of thing, e.g., autonomous spotter drones that can distinguish tanks and IFVs from other objects. Less excitingly, there are license plate readers with can distinguish discrete characters on a moving vehicle. — Count Timothy von Icarus

All examples of something for which intent has been conveyed by some sort of language. These things aren't required to 'do your function to' 'that', all without language. The function is clear enough, but the 'that' part isn't if the 'object' in question hasn't in any way been described. A license plate reader cannot function if it doesn't know to only process 'license platey' sorts of portions of images.
I worked on a early version of such software, implementing a bin-picking algorithm to have a robot arm pull objects out of a 3D jumble in a bin, always grasping it at certain places regardless of how it was in there. At some point you've pulled all the easy ones and have to either reach too deep, or reorient the remaining ones around in order to get ones with the correct side up, which takes longer. But at least the device knew the bounds of the object in question, and pretty much how to recognize its orientation from any presented angle. We didn't get it working with all types. We had these water pumps that defied the ability of the machine doing the picking.

Your license plate reader likely needs to recognize 'vehicle' and know where to look for the plates. I live by a toll road and all the toll booths have now been replaced by plate and/or transponder readers. It gets really hard in winter weather when the plates (front and back) can become unreadable. I have a transponder, so it isn't an issue with me.
Three different toll rates: Transponder is cheapest. Pay proactively on the web is next cheapest. If they have to bill you, that is considerably more.

The Problem of the Many is, to my mind, a problem that only shows up if we accept the starting presuppositions of a substance metaphysics, where objects properties inhere in their constituent parts—a building block view where "things are what they are made of." — Count Timothy von Icarus

This is more in line with the topic. A part is indicated. The question is, is it a part, or is it the 'object' in question? It might be part of something larger, and that larger thing may itself be designated to be part of something even larger, with no obvious end to the game. Hence, the convention is needed. There is no physical way to resolve this without the convention, and the convention isn't physical.

The article you linked used a cloud as its example. Two statements said that there was one and only one cloud. That convention, having been stated, left all the other premises (eight in all) consistent with each other despite the article saying that they were mutually exclusive. I didn't understand that.

On such a view, it's a serious problem that objects can't be identified in terms of discrete ensembles of building blocks.

Yes, which is why the discussion of the problem is relevant.

Process views, which are often inspired by information theory or semiotics, or the marriage of the two (Shannon's model helpfully recreated the Augustine/Piercean semiotic triad) don't have this issue.[/quote]How would it solve some of the problems I've used in examples? I have a device that yields the mass of whatever I indicate. I indicate the ground. Does it give the mass of a molecule, pebble, hill, tectonic plate? Does it include the moon since the moon is matter "bound to Earth by physical fields of force" as @jkop puts it.

Ultimately, I do think Locke's view of "real essences" having to be defined in terms of "mental essences" gets something right here. Without minds, without the plurality of phenomenological horizons, you have a world of complete unity.

Agree, so long as 'minds' is not anthropocentrically defined.

There's a good definition - a thing is a phenomenon that holds interest for people. — T Clark

So since there's no people holding interest in my examples, you seem to agree with my views? There is no 'thing' outside of intent/convention.

If there was nothing there until we perform the convention of constructing an object, our objects would be in total disarray, incommunicable, unspeakable to another object-maker — Fire Ologist

Same comment. In the absence of the convention, there is only disarray, no objects. My topic is about the absence of convention, not how the convention might come to be by that which finds use for it.

So since there's no people holding interest in my examples, you seem to agree with my views? There is no 'thing' outside of intent/convention. — noAxioms

Yes, we do agree. I have a strong interest in Taoist philosophy as expressed in the Tao Te Ching and Chuang Tzu. This is from Stephen Mitchell's translation of Verse 1 of the Tao Te Ching.

The tao that can be told
is not the eternal Tao
The name that can be named
is not the eternal Name.

The unnamable is the eternally real.
Naming is the origin
of all particular things. — Lao Tzu

And this from Verse 40.

Return is the movement of the Tao.
Yielding is the way of the Tao.

All things are born of being.
Being is born of non-being. — Lao Tzu

In Taoism, being is associated with the everyday world we live in. Non-being, or the Tao, is the unformed, unconceptualized state before things are brought into being by naming them.

Dinosaurs have intent. Predator and prey both need to recognize each other as distinct objects/threats/kin etc. Their convention is sufficiently pragmatic for their needs. — noAxioms

I meant in the sense that for humans, there existed objects - stuff, placeholders, particulars, whatevs you wanna call it - prior to our purposes and conceptualisations. Thus it can't all be us. I could make the same remark about plants, for dinosaurs.

Hope that helps.

Regardless I think you're making a distinction between purposive/normative and physical, whereas there's other graduations - like you might think of chemical, biological, systemic, ecological, intentional etc strata as other strata of existence in which nonarbitrarily individuated objects may exist. IE there could very well be an organic, but non-normative or mental, basis for the existence of objects. Or a social one. There's a tendency to go from physics to language without thinking about it.

Though you might want to say that such things still have a physical basis, because they relate to distinctions in physical processes. Bodies stuff is still star stuff. But then the ascription of a physical basis to a distinction means nothing other than a distinction. If you think everything's physical anyway. In other words, if there is a distinction drawable between two terms, in that analysis, it must be done in terms of physical properties since all properties would be stipulated to be physical.

If instead there are other flavours of properties - which are distinct from but not necessarily opposed to what you might call physical - then asking whether a flavour of distinction has a physical basis makes sense. But if other flavours of properties which could serve as a basis for distinctions are in play you're in @Banno's and @SophistiCat's comments' territory. In which the distinctions you make are informed by the use context, and you may need to clarify what you would pre-theoretically count as an object. Since in the OP it's an unexamined term and its relationship to generic physical properties isn't spelled out.

My pet theory is that what counts as an object depends upon the context. And a process can count as a context. Like sucrose counts as an object for amylase, and populations of amylase enzymes count as an object for the evolution of digestive systems. You might want to call those physical, I'd suspect they aren't best described as physical 'cos the standard model doesn't care if I've got candy in my mouth.

And yes @Wayfarer it's an arche-fossil argument. With some assemblage nonsense to taste. The usual fdrake breakfast.

My topic is about the absence of convention — noAxioms

Then you need to use a chalk baord that doesn’t need chalk. Or a board. Or somrthing we can talk about together.

since I am trying to find object in the absence of language.
— noAxioms

Dinosaurs. — fdrake

Quinton Meillassoux introduced the concept of the "arche-fossil" in his book *After Finitude: An Essay on the Necessity of Contingency*. The term refers to objects or evidence, such as fossils, that indicate the existence of objects prior to human consciousness. Meillassoux uses this concept to challenge the correlationist position, which holds that we can only know the correlation between thought and being, rather than being itself independently of thought. The arche-fossil serves as the linch-pin for Meillassoux to assert that there is a reality independent of human perception and cognition. He argues that such objects, which existed long before humans and consciousness, demonstrate that the universe has a history that is not contingent on human observation. This challenges the idea that being is always tied to our experience.

A counter-argument to that, is that any meaningful conception of existence just is a human conception. That while it is empirically the case that dinosaurs and many other things pre-dated the evolution of h. Sapiens, the statement that ‘dinosaurs existed’ is only meaningful within the conceptual framework provided by an observing mind - with 'prior to' being part of that framework. Transcendental idealism, a target of Mellaissoux’ critique, holds that while we can have reliable empirical knowledge of phenomena (the world as we experience it), the world as it might be in the absence of any observation is unknowable as a matter of definition. Meaning that our understanding of existence, including the existence of dinosaurs, is implicitly dependent on the human conceptual framework. This doesn't mean that dinosaurs didn't exist or that an unbeheld object ceases to exist, which is another mental construction (namely, its imagined non-existence). It doesn't over-rule or invalidate empirical observation, but it serves to remind that empirical observations are made by humans. Whereas the speculative realism of Mellaissoux seems to want to 'reach beyond' human cognition.

sucrose counts as an object for amylase, and populations of amylase enzymes count as an object for the evolution of digestive systems. You might want to call those physical... — fdrake

I think this is where biosemiosis becomes relevant, isn't it? Biosemiotics provides a framework to understand such interactions not just as physical processes but involving the interpretation of signs and the generation of meaning within biological contexts. In this example, sucrose can be seen as a 'sign' that the amylase enzyme 'interprets' and acts upon. The amylase enzyme breaks down sucrose, 'recognizing it' as a specific substrate. This interaction involves a signaling process where the presence of sucrose triggers a specific biochemical response in the enzyme.

I think we are meandering away from the question in the OP.

The question is:

Is there any physical basis for what constitutes a 'thing' or 'object'? — noAxioms

Object, of course, here, is the "thing" that philosophical theories have been trying to explain. And if the OP's definition of "object" is a philosophical one, the answer is yes.

Yes, there is a physical basis for what constitute a thing: it has to be finite, it is complete in our conception of it, and we have a coherent idea of what this thing is.
That is why we will never call the universe a thing.
We don't call consciousness or the mind a thing, but we call the brain a thing.
We call the planets, things.
We call the trees things.
We call a triangle a mathematical object.

So, in response to :

He argues that such objects, which existed long before humans and consciousness, demonstrate that the universe has a history that is not contingent on human observation. — Wayfarer

While this is tenable and I believe in this, this is not what's being asked.

We call a triangle a mathematical object. — L'éléphant

But it's not a physical thing. It's an idea.

But it's not a physical thing. It's an idea. — Wayfarer

Something that has a shape and measurement is a physical thing.

It is finite and complete.

What if the phaser hits a bug on the guy's shirt? Does just the bug disappear or does the guy (the intended target) go as well? — noAxioms

This would be a violation of the prime directive, so the phaser has to have AI directed activation. The AI doesn't know anything about physicality. That's a philosophical category that's completely useless to a robot.

Something that has a shape and measurement is a physical thing.

↪Wayfarer It (triangle) is finite and complete. — L'éléphant

But is it a physical thing? Certainly the picture of a triangle is physical, but the definition is a concept.

This is more in line with the topic. A part is indicated. The question is, is it a part, or is it the 'object' in question? It might be part of something larger, and that larger thing may itself be designated to be part of something even larger, with no obvious end to the game. Hence, the convention is needed. There is no physical way to resolve this without the convention, and the convention isn't physical.

Well, my take here would be that people are physical entities, and cultures are just groups of people, their (physical) artefacts, etc. So their delineations of objects do have physical existence. Granted it is an "incorporeal" (without body) physical existence (i.e., distributed across many brains, books, machines, art work, etc.). This sort of existence, which crosses so many substrates and seems essentially substrate independent, is why I think information theoretic approaches work so well here. "Economic recessions," would be another example of physical phenomena that are "incorporeal" in just this sort of way. The signs used to signify these things are also natural in a way, and their relationship is a natural one.

But there is an important sense in which an information based definition of objects or forms is non-physical, in that it can seemingly be encoded in all sorts of media and also has an abstract, purely mathematical sort of existence in the same way the natural numbers or shapes might.

The sci-fi examples or the Midas Touch I think are unanswerable. There is no one canonical dividing line for entities to refer to when dividing objects. Real world examples here might be instructive. If we want to delineate the boundaries of something for a machine using ultrasound, radar, etc., we might have it calibrated "just-so" as to have returns only come on the sort of thing we want to delineate. So it's an interaction that defines the thing. Another good example might be using a specific sort of solvent so that only the thing you wish to dissolve ends up being washed away. Draino, for instance, is going to interact with hair, soap scum, etc. in a way different from how it interacts with a metal pipe, and this difference essentially delineates between "pipe" and "clog." But if you pick something magical then is seemingly would have no real reason to every stop at one type of thing or another. That said, you could probably still define suspended solid objects in terms of continuous density of matter.

But it's not a physical thing. It's an idea.

Well, supposing that the world can be adequately described with mathematics, there would be a big difference between the mathematical entities consistent with "triangle" and those consistent with "any being having a first person subjective experience of a triangle or triangularity," right? But the second seems like it would be fantastically more complex, even if it could perhaps be realized in an infinite number of ways.

One of the interesting things about supposing that what underpins conciousness can be described mathematically is that it seems to suppose an entire set of second order entities, "mathematical entities as cognized by some thinker."

And whereas one can locate simple entities seemingly everywhere, overlapping each other in different ensembles, it would seem that the latter sort of entity only shows up in terms of humanity's fathoming of mathematics (at least in our neck of the cosmos). I'm not sure if this is a useful way to think of it, but it perhaps answers the concern about "infinite varieties of forms." For, when it comes to forms that entail cognizing minds, it seems like the actual should have particular precedence over the potential.

The form of "the exact shape of that lump of mud over there," is not even clearly cognized by the person who uses it as an example of the overabundance of forms and ideas, whereas the idea of "triangle" or "dog" is known by almost every toddler.

Well, supposing that the world can be adequately described with mathematics, there would be a big difference between the mathematical entities consistent with "triangle" and those consistent with "any being having a first person subjective experience of a triangle or triangularity," right? — Count Timothy von Icarus

I think you’re conflating, or confusing, several separate points. My question about the triangle was simply ‘is it a physical object?’ - to which I say the answer is ‘plainly not’. ‘Physical things’ include - well, pretty well anything you can lay your hands, or eyes on. But geometric forms, numbers, rules, principles, and the like, are not physically existent in the same sense that physical objects are. They are what were called in classical philosophy ‘intelligible objects’. It is germane to the discussion ‘what is an object’, insofar as it requires consideration of whether such entities are or are not objects.

Whether the world can be adequately described with mathematics is a different question.

But neither of those points are directly entailed by my post about the sense in which knowledge implies or requires an observing intelligence. They can be connected to that, but at this point I haven’t tried to connect them.

I have to admit my perplexity towards the question you are asking. Am I understanding you to be saying that you are unsure of whether trees are "things" or "objects?" Or that rocks may not be "things" or "objects." Is that your view noAxioms? Because I think the physical basis for the object "this tree" would just be the tree itself. Or is your view that trees are only trees by convention?

Meaning that our understanding of existence, including the existence of dinosaurs, is implicitly dependent on the human conceptual framework. — Wayfarer

Sapiens, the statement that ‘dinosaurs existed’ is only meaningful within the conceptual framework provided by an observing mind - with 'prior to' being part of that framework. — Wayfarer

I generally skip the details of the arche fossil because it's technical. But its fundamental target is what you've said. You'd get something out of reading it I think.

Is love real? The United States of America? One of my dreams? — T Clark

A feeling, a country, and a state of mind. Clarky, I assume those exist by common convention, but I'm not sure how 'real' they are. Yes, the United States has a specified territory, but isn't this acknowledged as convention rather than reality?

Humans can name, make an object or thing out of, anything. — T Clark

Only Chuck Norris can do that. :cool: For example, make a fire out of ice, or make wood by rubbing two fires against each other.

There's a good definition - a thing is a phenomenon that holds interest for people. — T Clark

What then is an uninteresting phenomena?

You'd get something out of reading it I think. — fdrake

Although the book is written with clarity and consistency, it presupposes a familiarity not only with dogmatic metaphysics, post-Kantian critical philosophy, phenomenology and post-Heideggerian philosophy, but also and above all with Alain Badiou's materialist ontology, and more specifically, with his ontological re-formulation of post-Cantorean set theory, as well as his conception of the event as what exceeds the grasp of an ontology of being qua being

I think the price of entry is a little steep :yikes: .

Serves me right for bringing it up.

I think the price of entry is a little steep :yikes: . — Wayfarer

The Badiou stuff appears past the arche fossil argument. That's in the first bit. It's Locke, Descartes and the post Kantians. His vocabulary kinda of lets you treat dependence upon discourse, dependence upon a conditioning subject, dependence upon a dialectical mediation, dependence upon an intellect etc as the same phenomenon. The sights are on reciprocal co-constitution in all its forms.