No I don't think someone else influencing my choice makes it no longer mine.

But to your core question of how this could be an issue, let's return to the example I gave before of saving one person's life or several persons' sight. In both cases someone's freedom over those choices that belong to them will be violated, and we are seeking to choose the better option. The question is, how do we decide? How do we determine how many people's sight is worth one person's life. This is comparitively a fairly simple example, but I think it demonstrates the issue quite well. How do we well how many persons' choice to continue seeing is worth one person's choice to continue living.

A choice that belongs to someone can be thought of as a choice of what to do with something that belongs to that person, specifically their mind, body, and property.

Let me ask you this. How does that choice, in your example "belong" to the person in the example? The choice which belongs to the person, is one which concerns what belongs to the person. But the choice in the example concerns the life and sight of other people. Therefore by your principles the person in the example is not free to make that choice.

This is the problem of basing freedom in choices which belong to the individual. You say that this restricts freedom to choices which are morally relevant, but in reality it does the opposite. By already restricting "freedom" through the application of moral principles, such that a free choice is a correct choice by those principles (a choice which belongs to the person), you have placed "moral relevance" as logically prior to freedom. Now you want to apply a second level of moral relevance as posterior to your defined sense of "freedom" which is already restricted by a moral principle.

However, your primary restriction, which restricts a free choice to one which belongs to the person, disallows any real moral relevance for such a "free" choice. "Moral relevance" refers to choices which one makes concerning others, and the property of others (should I steal your car?). But you've already excluded the possibility of any moral relevance from any free choice by defining a free choice as "a choice of what to do with something that belongs to that person, specifically their mind, body, and property". Now, by the terms of your conditions, a person is not free to make a choice concerning the life or sight of others. And your example is of a choice which the person is not free to make.

A person's eyes are something that belong to them, as is a person's life. Of course neither belong to the person making the decision, though I think you may have misunderstood when you say that they therefore aren't "free to make the decision". Assuming that the people all want to keep their sight and their life, then the person making the decision is faced with a choice between protecting the freedom of some people to make one kind of choice, or protecting the freedom of some other people to make a different kind of choice, and they must decide which they should protect.

Again, I haven't said that a free choice is the right choice. I have said that only the freedom to make certain choices ought to be protected. You seem to keep getting caught on words that you insist I am using in ways that I'm just not. In this case, the person's choice between people dying and people losing their eyesight isn't something that belongs to the person making it, so them being able to make that choice is not inherently valuable. If they weren't able to make that choice (say, because no one's sight or life was in danger) then that wouldn't be a bad thing. But none of that means they can't or shouldn't make it or that such a choice is not morally relevant in the sense that you are using the term. When I was saying that someone's ability to understand and make a certain choice wasn't "morally relevant" I meant that their ability to understand and make that choice did not have inherent moral value, not that the choice did not have moral content and could not be good, bad, right, wrong. I'm fairly sure I explained this earlier.

You seem to keep getting caught on words that you insist I am using in ways that I'm just not. In this case, the person's choice between people dying and people losing their eyesight isn't something that belongs to the person making it, so them being able to make that choice is not inherently valuable. — Dan

OK, the choice is not the type of choice which ought to be protected, nor is it inherently valuable, so why care about it? The example is a ruse. You are asking how to evaluate a choice which inherently has no value. That's illogical.

If they weren't able to make that choice (say, because no one's sight or life was in danger) then that wouldn't be a bad thing. But none of that means they can't or shouldn't make it or that such a choice is not morally relevant in the sense that you are using the term. — Dan

We cannot switch to my sense of "morally relevant", that would be equivocation. If we adhere to your principles, the choice has no moral value, it need not be protected, therefore we do not care about it. The person can choose to do anything in that situation, or even nothing, and it really does not matter to us. We would be wasting our time considering this example, thinking about a choice which by the conditions of your principles, has no value. Likewise, if a person was actually in that situation, they could choose whatever they want, even nothing, because the options cannot be evaluated from moral principles, inherently having no moral value.

If you want to create a system for evaluating this type of choice, you need to propose other principles, and a completely different system. That's what I mean when I said that you have made morality prior to freedom, by using moral principles to determine "free choices", now you want another system posterior to freedom to judge choices which have now been excluded from the class of "free choices". But we cannot use "morally relevant" here, or any of those terms, "rights" etc., which have been used in the system of prior logic, because then there would be ambiguity and equivocation.

I meant that their ability to understand and make that choice did not have inherent moral value, — Dan

See what I mean? If the choice has no inherent moral value, then we cannot evaluate it using moral principles. Moral principles apply to situations which have moral value. Now that you've removed the moral value from that type of situation, if you want a system for evaluating it, we need a system other than a moral system. What should we propose?

I'm not quite sure where to begin with your first question. Imagine asking the same question of a utilitarian only pointing out that making the choice itself doesn't make them happy, so why should they care. What you are doing is much the same thing. The choice to continue using one's own eyes, or to continue living, are both valuable, and we are faced with a choice between protecting one or the other. Choosing between one set of consequences and another, both of which will result in some people being negatively impacted in a morally relevant way. This is not a ruse, it is exactly the kind of thing moral theories deal with.

Your second point is again, completely misunderstanding everything I have said up until this point. I do wonder whether it is intentional. First, me explaining how I was using morally relevant in a specific context and pointing out that it is not the same way you were using it in your objection is quite the opposite of equivocation. Second, and more importantly, you are conflating the measure of value and the moral decision. Again,it is as if you are claiming that a utilitarian shouldn't care about a decision (no matter how important) if it doesn't make them happy. That is beside the point. There are other people in the world. In this case, it the freedom of the people whose eyesight and/or life is in the balance that is important, but the decision is important because it leads to one of them being protected or not.

To your third point, it is completely and obviously not true that if a choice as no inherent moral value, we cannot evaluate it using moral principles. First, determining that it has no inherent moral value requires evaluation using moral principles. Second, it might have instrumental value. Third, it might have disvalue. Fourth, under most consequentialist theories, moral decisions don't themselves have inherent value, but they can still be evaluated inasmuch as they lead to consequences which have moral value (this isn't really the same as having instrumental value in terms of being able to make the decision being instrumentally valuable). Also, there is a lot of moral value at issue here, specifically value of persons to decide whether they want to continue seeing/living that we are deciding between.

The choice to continue using one's own eyes, or to continue living, are both valuable, and we are faced with a choice between protecting one or the other. — Dan

That's not true though. The choice is not about one's own eyes, or one's own life, That's why the choice does not belong to the person, it's about what belongs to others.

Your second point is again, completely misunderstanding everything I have said up until this point. I do wonder whether it is intentional. First, me explaining how I was using morally relevant in a specific context and pointing out that it is not the same way you were using it in your objection is quite the opposite of equivocation. Second, and more importantly, you are conflating the measure of value and the moral decision. Again,it is as if you are claiming that a utilitarian shouldn't care about a decision (no matter how important) if it doesn't make them happy. That is beside the point. — Dan

We are not talking about utilitarian principles, we are talking about the principles you have presented in your freedom consequentialism primer. You very explicitly stated that a person only has freedom to make decisions which belong to the person. This did not make sense to me, so when I questioned this principle, you said that a person is actually free to make those decisions concerning things not belonging to oneself, but such decisions are not morally relevant, they have no moral value, and therefore this is not the type of freedom that you are interested in protecting.

Now, you've turned everything around, and you seem to be arguing that decisions which do not belong to the person, decisions about the belongings of others, do have moral relevance, and ought to be valued, so that certain decisions would be valued over others. I'm sorry to have to bring this to your attention, but you just do not have the principles required to answer the question of the example. In fact, your principles actually exclude the possibility of there being an answer. You have explicitly excluded moral value from choices not concerning what belongs to the decision maker.

There are other people in the world. In this case, it the freedom of the people whose eyesight and/or life is in the balance that is important, but the decision is important because it leads to one of them being protected or not. — Dan

I can't believe you are actually saying this now. You have very clearly stated that decisions which do not belong to oneself have no moral value, and are therefore excluded from the type of freedom of choice which is relevant. Now you are trying to say that this type of decision can be important. I think you need to go back to the drawing board And please take my advice. You need to allow that choices which do not "belong" to the person are morally valuable, morally relevant, and also constitute a part of a person's freedom of choice which needs to be protected.

First, determining that it has no inherent moral value requires evaluation using moral principles. — Dan

This is not true at all. Prior to evaluating something through the use of a value scale, we must judge the type of scale which is applicable. This is a different sort of judgement, a judgement of category, and once the category is decided, the scale which is suited to the category can be applied. So the judgement that something has no inherent moral value is a judgement that the moral scale is not applicable, it is not a judgement derived from the application of a moral scale. When the scale is applied, what is returned is a value, unless it is found out that the scale is not applicable. But when the scale is found to be not applicable, this cannot be said to be an application of the scale.

Second, it might have instrumental value. Third, it might have disvalue. — Dan

These two do not seem relevant.

Fourth, under most consequentialist theories, moral decisions don't themselves have inherent value, but they can still be evaluated inasmuch as they lead to consequences which have moral value (this isn't really the same as having instrumental value in terms of being able to make the decision being instrumentally valuable). — Dan

This is the issue with consequentialism which I brought up, way back. This issue points to the incompatibility between a freedom based morality and a consequence based morality. One bases its principles in the act of choosing, while the other bases its principles in the observed effects of choices. The act of choosing is a view toward the future, while observations of effects is a view of the past. We cannot say that they are two sides of the same coin because neither can account for the reality of the present, and this is what keeps the two as incompatible.

Also, there is a lot of moral value at issue here, specifically value of persons to decide whether they want to continue seeing/living that we are deciding between. — Dan

Again, you repeat the same falsity, the misrepresentation. It is not a question of do I want to continue seeing and living, it is a question of deciding whether others ought to continue seeing and living. And by your stated principles this is a very big difference. The former is a question which belongs to a person, and the latter does not belong to the person. By your principles, the latter has no moral value and is not morally relevant.

No I mean, the choice that belongs to the people whose eyes and lives are at stake is valuable because their eyes and lives belong to them.

At no point do I say either explicitly or implicitly that a person "only has freedom to make decisions which belong to the person". What I have said is that the measure of moral value is the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices. This ability to understand and make one's own choices, which I call freedom is to freedom consequentialism what happiness is to utilitarianism. It is thing which determines the value of consequences. There are a great many decisions we need to make which are morally important precisely because they affect the freedom of others.

Again, I have been saying that decisions which belong to other people are valuable all along. What I have been saying is not valuable is one person's ability to make choices which don't belong to them. I can see why you would disagree with me given the bizarre view which you think I have been espousing. I would suggesting reading back over some of what I have said now that isn't what I said or meant and I think you will see that some of the disagreements probably melt away.

By "value scale" do you mean any moral principles at all, or do you mean something else? Those two definitely are relevant, as both make the application of moral principles relevant. That isn't what consequentialism is and there isn't really a conflict there.

Again, the choice of the persons' whose eyesight or life is at stake is the measure of value that makes the consequences of them losing their eyesight or life against their will morally bad. The decision between one happening and the other is morally important because it leads to bad consequences, not for the person making the choice, but for other people.

Again, I have been saying that decisions which belong to other people are valuable all along. What I have been saying is not valuable is one person's ability to make choices which don't belong to them. — Dan

Isn't this what the example is, a person faced with making a choice which does not belong to that person, because it concerns the lives of others? And isn't this what you say is not valuable?

The decision between one happening and the other is morally important because it leads to bad consequences, not for the person making the choice, but for other people. — Dan

Yes, for the person making the choice, the choice does not concern this person's life, or eyesight, so the choice does not belong to the person who is making the choice. Therefore by the principle stated above, this choice is not valuable.

By "value scale" do you mean any moral principles at all, or do you mean something else? Those two definitely are relevant, as both make the application of moral principles relevant. That isn't what consequentialism is and there isn't really a conflict there. — Dan

I mean any type of value judgement, from moral to numerical. The thing to be judged must first be categorized to determine what sort of scale is applicable. So for example, are we judging temperature, weight, volume, etc..

In the case of your example, the person is faced with making a choice concerning the life and eyes of others, so that choice does not belong to that person. Therefore, as you say it is not morally valuable. However, I suggest that perhaps there is another type of scale by which it could be judged.

Yes, the person's ability to make this decision is not inherently valuable. However, the value is in the choices that belong to the people who may lose their sight/life. Again, to compare to another form of consequentialism. The decision whether to flip the switch in the trolley problem isn't valuable according to utilitarianism. The world wouldn't be missing out on any value were you not able to make that decision because no one was on the tracks in the first place. Rather, the value is in the lives of the people being saved. Likewise, the value here is not in your ability to make a decision regarding other people's freedom, it is in those people's freedom.

You seem to think that I am claiming that only choices which belong to a person have any moral content, which is not at all what I am claiming. What I am claiming is that the measure of whether consequences are good or bad is the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices. In the case given here, with persons' eyes or lives on the line, the decision of which to save has a great deal of moral content/weight/import because it has consequences for the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices. It isn't because the choice itself is morally valuable that we should care which option is picked, it is because of the consequences.

the decision of which to save has a great deal of moral content/weight/import because it has consequences for the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices. It isn't because the choice itself is morally valuable that we should care which option is picked, it is because of the consequences. — Dan

If I am not missing your point, I think this distills it well in a way that clears the air for what MU has been saying (if not, for them proper).
You're talking about two different values. The value of the choice made (by the 'external' chooser) and the inability of the subjects to make choices about that which belongs to them (life, eyes) due to the choice made by the 'external' chooser.
The former only has moral value inasmuchas it restricts (or doesn't, depending the choice) the freedom of the subjects to make their own choices about that which belongs to them(eyes, life).

Is that right? I've been trying to follow but it gets a bit weedy at times.

I think there is basically some ambiguity in the term "moral value" as it is being used here. So I'll try to be as clear about what I mean as possible:

The choice between whether one person loses their life or five lose their sight is morally important because it leads to consequences which are good and/or bad. They are good and/or bad due to the gain and/or loss of freedom (by which I mean ability of persons to understand and make their own choices) involved.

Hopefully that is nice and clear. I think it is a fairly simple concept, but I think some confusion in the discussion between myself and MU has led to it looking a lot more complicated than it is.

Thanks Dan. Unfortunately, I don't actually think you're being all that clear.

The choice between whether 1.one person loses their life or five lose their sight is morally important because it leads to consequences which are 2.good and/or bad. They are good and/or bad due to the gain and/or loss of 3.freedom (by which I mean ability of persons to understand and make 4. their own choices) involved. — Dan

All the bolded creates a murky, insufficiently direct sort of paragraph. By number, the questions I would ask to clarify (this, meaning I've understood you to be aligning with what I've said, just linguistically uncomfortable, so are re-stating):

1. Which person? The chooser, or (any one of) the subjects?;
2. For whom? The chooser, or (any one of) the subjects?;
3. For whom? The chooser, or (any one of) the subjects?; and
4. Whose choices?
-- ----- --------- ------ -----------

my stab at the answers, which, if true, mean you are saying what i'm saying:

1. Any one of the subjects;
2. Any one of the subjects;
3. Any one of the subjects; and
4. Any one of the subjects.

So, it seems the choice being made (i.e by the Chooser, not one of the subjects) has no moral value other than the way in whcih is adjusts the ability of the subjects to make their choice. This seems an exact, contextual, instantiation of:

It isn't because the choice itself is morally valuable that we should care which option is picked, it is because of the consequences. — Dan

This is all to say, if so, it was sufficiently clear in my first attempt, as I see it. But, I think you are not being particularly clear and I can now see how MU is getting what they're getting.

1: In the example given not the chooser, just a person. But it doesn't make any difference which person it is. Any one of the subjects is a fine answer here.
2: Morally good to bad. Not for anyone. Good or bad objectively.
3: The freedom is lost and/or gained by the people whose eyesight or life is preserved or lost. Again, in the example we were talking about not the chooser. Any one of the subjects is also a fine answer here.
4: I'm not sure I totally understand question four. When I say the "ability of persons to understand and make their own choices" I mean that person's choices, the choices that belongs to the person whose freedom is being discussed. It's possible that any one of the subjects is a fine answer here, but I'm not entirely sure what you mean by the question, so I'm not sure.

Yes, it would be reasonable to say that the choice being made has no moral value (at least, no intrinsic moral value). But it is morally important because it affects the freedom of the subjects involved.

I mean, I think I'm being clear and using plain language whenever possible.

Yes, the person's ability to make this decision is not inherently valuable. However, the value is in the choices that belong to the people who may lose their sight/life. Again, to compare to another form of consequentialism. The decision whether to flip the switch in the trolley problem isn't valuable according to utilitarianism. The world wouldn't be missing out on any value were you not able to make that decision because no one was on the tracks in the first place. Rather, the value is in the lives of the people being saved. Likewise, the value here is not in your ability to make a decision regarding other people's freedom, it is in those people's freedom. — Dan

I think I now see what's going on, thanks to @AmadeusD. You have two distinct value systems. One is "moral value" based in consequentialism, and the other is the value of a person's ability to understand and make their own decisions. The problem is, as I've been saying from the beginning of the thread, that these two, consequentialism based principles, and freedom based principles, are "incompatible". But now that we have progressed toward looking at these principles in terms of "values", the better word might be "incommensurable". So, we have the situation where the value of one cannot be measured by the same scale as the value of the other, and this indicates the the two are categorically different.

To put this in perspective, with your example, let's consider that all people have freedom to understand and make there own decisions. And, any individual can scale and value the decisions which one makes. That is how a person decides, through some priority system. Also, since everyone has such freedom, and one's own system for deciding, we need a scale of value to relate one person's freedom and decisions to another person's. These two are very different, how I value and scale my own freedom and decisions, and how I relate two or more people's freedom and decisions.

Let's call the latter, relating a number of peoples freedom and decisions, to each other, as "moral" value. The reason I got so confused was that you were saying that the former, the value of one's freedom to make one's own decisions constituted "moral relevance". So let's give this value a different name. I propose we call this "intellectual value". So the value of a person's ability to understand and make ones own decisions, is called "intellectual value", and the value of one person's decisions in relation to others is called "moral value".

Would you agree that it might be helpful if we look at things under these distinct terms, so that I don't get confused? Then in your example, each person involved has one's own intellectual value, and the question you are asking does not concern the intellectual value of one person, the person in the position of making that choice, but it concerns moral value, which is a relationship of the intellectual values of all the people involved.

No, everything you just said is incorrect. There aren't two systems of value at all. I think you have gotten very much the wrong end of the stick again, but somehow it's an entirely different end than you had before. I'm starting to wonder what shape this stick is. Let me try to explain again.

What is of moral value is the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices. The extent to which this is protected or restricted/violated determines whether some set of consequences is good or bad. For example, if I steal your car, then i have restricted your ability to understand and make choices regarding your car, which you own, so this is bad. If I save your life from an alligator, I have protected your ability to choose whether you want to live, so this is good.

When I said that only some choices are morally relevant, I meant that we only need to worry about protecting and not restricting persons' ability to understand and make their own choices, not choices that don't belong to them. For example, my ability to understand and make the choice to steal your car is not one that needs to be protected, because it is your car.

Essentially, as happiness and lack of unhappiness is to utilitarianism, the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices is to freedom consequentialism.

No, everything you just said is incorrect. There aren't two systems of value at all. I think you have gotten very much the wrong end of the stick again, but somehow it's an entirely different end than you had before. I'm starting to wonder what shape this stick is. Let me try to explain again. — Dan

I don't know Dan, you presented me with the stick. I tried both ends, and still get it wrong, maybe it's time to go sideways.

What is of moral value is the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices. The extent to which this is protected or restricted/violated determines whether some set of consequences is good or bad. For example, if I steal your car, then i have restricted your ability to understand and make choices regarding your car, which you own, so this is bad. If I save your life from an alligator, I have protected your ability to choose whether you want to live, so this is good. — Dan

Now we're right back to the original problem. I think the stick is circular, we've gone right around the bend, and we're back at the beginning What is of moral value to me, is to make my own choices, my free choice. But that includes the possibility of choosing to steal your car, or throw you to the alligators. When I told you this, you wanted to restrict this value, to choices which "belong" to me, meaning concerning what is mine. So that is how you define "one's own choice".

But this means choosing to save you from the alligators has no value to me, because it is not a choice which belongs to me. Now you include others, and say that their ability to make their own choices is also to be protected, and, " The extent to which this is protected or restricted/violated determines whether some set of consequences is good or bad." But this still does not provide me with the principle require to save you from the alligators. What gives me the right to make a choice which does not belong to me? Making such choices is not protected, and if you move to protect them, I may choose to throw you to the alligators instead.

Do you see what I mean? My freedom to choose what belongs to me is protected. But for me to choose to protect someone else's freedom to choose what belongs to them, this is not a protected choice. However, it is necessary for me to make choices which do not belong to me, in order for me to do morally good deeds. So that restriction, the restriction which limits my protected choices to those which belong to me, must be bad itself. And now we're right back to the beginning, where protecting one's freedom of choice meant protecting ones right to choose anything.

We can't have it both ways. If restricting one's freedom, to only choices which belong to the person, is good, then we cannot base good and bad on whether or not a persons freedom is restricted. You first assumed that this was not a restriction, just a type of freedom, but when I pressed you, you recognized that it really is a restriction. Now, since it is a restriction, and it is a good restriction, we cannot base moral good and bad on whether freedom is restricted.

You ought to see the vicious circle you put us into. First you say that a person's freedom to make one's own choices is good. Then you say "one's own" means concerning only their own body and property. Then you want to allow that saving someone from the alligators, a choice which is not one's own choice, is also good, so you allow that making a choice which does not belong to the person is also good, so long as it protects another's ability to make own's own choice. But this circling back has undermined your primary principle, because we now we have to allow that making a choice which is not one's own choice, is also good, and might even be better than making one's own choice. Therefore we must conclude that the primary premise, that a person's ability to make one's own choices is what needs to be protected is faulty. We need to premise instead, that one's ability to make choices, whether the choices belong to them or not, needs to be protected, if we want to proceed with consequentialism.

First of all, it isn't a matter of what is of moral value "to you" it is a matter of what is of moral value. Second, I very much restricted it to only the choices that belong to the person in everything I have said up until now, including the quote you have just made. Their "own" choices.

I think the problem might be that you are thinking of things having "moral value to you" or "to me", but that isn't the case. Your choice to not be eaten by alligators has moral value. Objectively, universally. It's not a matter of who it has value to. The reason I should save you from the alligators is because it protects your choice not to be eaten by them (assuming you aren't trying to get eaten by alligators). The choice to save you from alligators doesn't itself need to be protected. It is right because it protects a choice that ought to be protected and doesn't violate other choices that ought to be protected.

I didn't say it wasn't a restriction. It is a type of freedom, specifically one restricted to only those choices that belong to a person. We can absolutely base morality on whether this type of freedom is restricted.

This is not a vicious circle at all, rather it is a misunderstanding on your part. I say that a person's ability to understand and make their own choices (which I have always maintained are the choices that belong to them) is the measure of moral value, the thing that determines whether the consequences of an action are good or bad. Actions that protect that thing are good, actions which violate it are bad. The action of saving you from alligators protects this thing (the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices, in this case yours to continue living), so it is good. That's not a contradiction, that's the difference between determining a measure of value which is used to evaluate actions and evaluating an action.

Objectively, universally. — Dan

Oh, I see. You're yelling into the ether then...

You surely can't only be realizing that I'm an objectivist now. And less yelling into the aether and more determining what moral truths if any there are to be had.

determining what moral truths if any there are to be had — Dan

Is the position that ethics are objective, whether or not we apprehend them? And that we actually don't apprehend them? This is somewhat confusing. One would think, if you're an objectivist, it's because you've come up against an objective ethic?

I think the problem might be that you are thinking of things having "moral value to you" or "to me", but that isn't the case. — Dan

Your example is of a choice which an individual must make. And, your principle is that what is valued and protected is the individual's capacity to understand and make one's own choices. How do you introduce this other sense of "value", "moral value" which is neither a value to me in my decision making, nor to you in your decision making?

You've been saying that my ability to choose is protected, and valuable, as well as that of others. Now you are claiming another type of value, "moral value". This is an indication of what I've been telling you, you have to distinct scales of evaluation.

I didn't say it wasn't a restriction. It is a type of freedom, specifically one restricted to only those choices that belong to a person. — Dan

How can you say it isn't a restriction to freedom, and then proceed to say that it is a freedom which is restricted to...? Don't you see this as explicit contradiction?

I say that a person's ability to understand and make their own choices (which I have always maintained are the choices that belong to them) is the measure of moral value, the thing that determines whether the consequences of an action are good or bad. — Dan

But now you are saying that moral value is independent from anyone's choices. If it's independent from the choices people make, then on what principles do you value a person's ability to choose? This would just be a random choice as something to be chosen as valuable. If the ability to choose, the ability to make my own choices, is not a value to me, and not a value to anyone else, then how can you claim that it is something valuable? You're making no sense at all now. You are proposing values which are not valuable to anyone. How can you even call them "values"?

The position is that moral facts are objective facts. That leaves open the possibility of moral realism or moral error theory. It may be that there are no moral facts at all. I don't think this is the case, but it isn't ruled out by the claim that moral facts are objective facts.

It's been moral value all along. What is morally valuable (or rather what is the measure of moral value) is persons' ability to understand and make their own choices. It isn't about whether you value your ability to do so or not, or whether that provides some value to your life, the claim is that the extent to which that ability is violated or restricted determines the goodness or badness of the consequences of some action (and therefore the morality of that action).

No, there isn't a contradiction there at all. It's the ability to understand and make some decisions that ought to be protected, but not the ability to understand and make others. That is entirely coherent.

Again, you are getting caught up in things being valuable "to" people. What I am claiming is that the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices is the measure of moral value. The thing which makes the consequences of an action good or bad. It is not about what is valued by people, it is about what matters morally, objectively, universally, whether or not we care about it.


I'm going to draw a comparison with two other types of consequentialist theory so that it is really clear what role the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices is playing in freedom consequentialism.

In preference utilitarianism, the measure of moral value is the satisfaction of preferences and the lack of dissatisfaction of preferences. This is what is what determines the moral value of consequences, their utility. Now, if a preference utilitarian had to choose between five people losing their sight and one person losing their life, then the right thing to do (according to their theory) is whichever satisfies the most preferences/dissatisfies the least. It doesn't matter if the preference utilitarian doesn't have a preference for either one occuring, because the people who are going to lose their sight and/or life sure do, and their preferences matter morally.

In classical utilitarianism, the measure of moral value is happiness and the lack of unhappiness (or pleasure and the lack of pain if you prefer). This is what determines the moral value of consequences, their utility. Now, if a classical utilitarian had to choose between five people losing their sight and one person losing their life, then the right thing to do (according to their theory) is whichever leads to the greatest overall happiness minus unhappiness. It doesn't matter that the person in question is made neither happy or unhappy by making the decision, because the people who are going to lose their sight or lives are going to be made happy/unhappy by it, and their happiness/unhappiness matters morally.

In freedom consequentialism, the measure of moral value is the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices. This is what determines the moral value of consequences. Now, if a freedom consequentialist had to choose between five people losing their sight and one person losing their life, then the right thing to do is whichever protects the most freedom (or perhaps the most important freedom? This is very much the problem that I haven't solved yet. How to weigh freedom over different things in such a way). It doesn't matter that the choice in question doesn't require protecting, because the choices of the people not to lose their sight or lives do, and their ability to understand and make their own choices matters morally.

Does that clear things up?

(most recent reply to MU)
It seems to for me.

As far as your response to me, that's relatively clear as to the position - but I find it really hard to believe anyone could hold to moral realism, but not that there are moral facts (note: Not "there are no moral facts" but you do seem open to that too. Error Theory I guess. I see that as a cop-out personally). That seems contradictory. Well, not entirely contradictory, but the fact you are not committed to any moral facts seems to fly in the face of being committed to moral realism. I say that as someone who was a moral realist for basically comfort reasons, but have utterly failed to find anything even remotely resembling a moral 'fact'. The idea is incoherent to me at this point.

It's not contradictory at all. Moral objectivism vs subjectivism vs whatever else is about what kind of things moral facts are. To be a moral objectivist is to say that moral facts are objective. That doesn't mean there are any. Similarly, we can sensibly say that all facts about the length of unicorn horns are objective and that all the claims we make about unicorn horn length are intended to point at objective truth, but there aren't any unicorns, so there aren't any unicorn horns, so all of these claims are mistaken. Unicorn error theory, as it were.

That being said, I am a moral realist, I was just pointing out that moral objectivism doesn't entail moral realism.

It's been moral value all along. What is morally valuable (or rather what is the measure of moral value) is persons' ability to understand and make their own choices. It isn't about whether you value your ability to do so or not, or whether that provides some value to your life, the claim is that the extent to which that ability is violated or restricted determines the goodness or badness of the consequences of some action (and therefore the morality of that action). — Dan

OK, so let's call this premise #1, a person's capacity to make one's own choices is what defines "morally valuable". That is the premise which lays out the measurement scheme for "moral value". We can say that a person's ability to make choices which belong to them defines "moral value", and moral valuation is a judgement as to the degree that this ability is enabled

Now, you want to allow a second premise, that a person's choices which are not one's own choices (as per your examples), are also morally valuable. Do you see that the two proposed premises are inconsistent? We cannot say, without contradiction, that the measure of moral value is a person's ability to make one's own choices, and also say that the person's ability to make choices which are not one's own choices also has moral value. The latter, premise #2, the person's ability to make choices which do not belong to them, has already been excluded from the possibility of having any moral value, by premise #1.

At no point am I saying that their choices are themselves morally valuable, I am saying that they can be good or bad because they produce consequences that are good or bad. And those consequences are good or bad precisely because they lead to the protection/violation of persons' ability to understand and make their own choices. Please see my above examples of different kinds of consequentialism for a clear explanation.

You say that the ability to make "one's own" choices is the measure of moral value. Then, you want to allow that a person making choices which are not one's own, also has moral value. This is contradictory.

It is the measure of moral value, the goodness or badness of this choice is precisely because of how it affects persons' ability to understand and make their own choices. Just like if the person shot a lion that was about to eat someone, it isn't that shooting lions is intrinsically valuable it is good because it protects the ability to understand and make their own decisions of the person who is about to be eaten. This isn't contradictory, it's consequentialism.

It is the measure of moral value, the goodness or badness of this choice is precisely because of how it affects persons' ability to understand and make their own choices. Just like if the person shot a lion that was about to eat someone, it isn't that shooting lions is intrinsically valuable it is good because it protects the ability to understand and make their own decisions of the person who is about to be eaten. This isn't contradictory, it's consequentialism. — Dan

The problem is that the choice being made does not belong to the person making it. It is not one's own choice. It is a choice concerning the life of another. Therefore, by your principle, goodness or badness is irrelevant because these are concerned with the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices, and this is a different type of choice. It is a choice which is not one's own.