You have jumped to a conclusion. — apokrisis

Which conclusion?

Friston aims to generalise his Bayesian mechanics so it can capture this level of semiosis as well. — apokrisis

What do you mean, specifically?

Your comments simply brush that major project aside. — apokrisis

Don't know what you mean, I am literally just reporting Friston's account to you. I actually don't know what your specific objection is in this passage you have written.

You believe things that other folk don’t believe in. Positional certainty may be matched by momentum uncertainty. However the reverse also applies. — apokrisis

Well actually Bohmians believe in positional certainty also.

But most people are completely ignorant about the stochastic interpretation and the literature on it. Even in standard quantum mechanics, the Heisenberg uncertainty principle applies to the probability distribution of particles in a way that can only be realized when you measure a system many many times. There is no empirical fact about quantum mechanics that contradicts the stochastic or statistical or Bohmian interpretation of Heisenberg uncertainty. Any confusion comes from thinking the wavefunction has to be the actual physical particle as opposed to possibly a construct that holds information about statistics.

Again, uncertainty relations are inherent in stochastic systems. They were first discovered for Brownian motion by Furth in 1933:

https://scholar.google.co.uk/scholar?cluster=218273391326247766&hl=en&as_sdt=0,5&as_vis=1

I have already mentioned a Friston source that shows it too for classical stochastic systems and there are many other sources I could give you too if you wanted. Classical stochastic systems describe things like a dust particle floating in a glass of water, behaving randomly. Yes, under certain conditions, uncertainty relations like Heisenberg's would show up in the statistical behavior of a system like this. This is a classical system you can observe with your own eyes and in fact, the Heisenberg uncertainty relations exist in quantum mechanics for the same reason as they do in the classical case - you can mathematically derive them from the non-differentiable (i.e. randomly behaving) nature of quantum paths as in path integral formulation, which have exactly the same fractal properties as the random motion of classical Brownian paths: e.g.

https://scholar.google.co.uk/scholar?cluster=9621050886572313269&hl=en&as_sdt=0,5&as_vis=1

Similarly, non-commutativity in path integral formulation is derived for the same reasons and this is explicitly states on the path integral wikiedia page.

The fact of the matter is that Heiseinberg uncertainty is perfectly compatible with the idea of definite particle positions and it must be so because classical stochastic systems have definite particle positions and they also have uncertainty relations. Furthermore, given how uncertainty principle can be derived from quantum mechanics for the exact same reason it can in classical stochastic systems, there is no barrier from that kind of formal angle of interpreting quantum Heisenberg uncertainty from the perspective of definite particle positions.

Quantum mechanics can be derived in its entirety from unremarkable assumptions concerning statistical systems where particles are always in definite positions or configurations. It is just not very well known at all though I am pretty sure I have already shown you papers. Even the strangest quantum phenomena such as Bell violating perfect spin correlations fall out of stochastic mechanics models: e.g.

https://scholar.google.co.uk/scholar?cluster=15973777865898642687&hl=en&as_sdt=0,5&as_ylo=2024&as_vis=1

It is just a mathematical fact that stochastic systems where particles are in definite configurations can reproduce all of the predictions of quantum mechanics.

Stochastic mechanics also can be applied to field theories: e.g.

https://arxiv.org/abs/2307.03188

And the nice thing about this paper is that you can watch some of the simulations on youtube (links in paper, youtube channel below):

https://youtube.com/@quantumbeables?si=hOVFbzHhEZAvManc

Given that stochastic formulations are empirically consistent with quantum mechanics in a formally demonstrable way, I cannot agree with your idea that this kind of "classical" view of reality has been debunked.

:up:

↪Joshs
I don't think this example is actually apt to what you said it was going to demonstrate in the first sentence. You are more or less comparing quantum mechanics under a specific interpretation with Newtonian mechanics; but quantum mechanics is not going to satisfy the requirements of apokrisis for explaining higher level things like complex biology any more than Newtonian mechanics; so this demonstration doesn't really say anything about the relationship between different scales or levels — Apustimelogist

It may not satisfy the requirements of apokrisis, but the model of causality it expresses is designed to apply equally to the micro and the macro level.

what you are saying is very clearly interpretation dependent and so I don't see any reason why I shouldn't just reject Barad's ideas (Maybe you have a link to them? The quick search I did earlier didn't give me anything immediate) given that I advocate a completely different interpretation. At the same time, some would argue that you don't need to conceptualize quantum mechanics as non-linear since on face-value it is linear and deterministic in terms of Schrodinger equation. — Apustimelogist

Reject it only after you have demonstrated that you understand it. Have a look at Meeting the Universe Halfway.

https://smartnightreadingroom.wordpress.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/meeting-the-universe-halfway.pdf

“In an agential realist account, matter does not refer to a fixed substance; rather, matter is substance in its intra-active becoming—not a thing but a doing, a congealing of agency. Matter is a stabilizing and destabilizing process of iterative intra-activity. Phenomena—the smallest material units (relational “atoms”)—come to matter through this process of ongoing intra-activity. “Matter” does not refer to an inherent, fixed property of abstract,
independently existing objects; rather, “matter” refers to phenomena in their ongoing materialization. (p. 151).

“On my agential realist elaboration, phenomena do not merely mark the epistemological inseparability of “observer” and “observed”; rather, phenomena are the ontological inseparability of agentially intra-acting “components.” That is, phenomena are ontologically primitive relations—relations without preexisting relata. The notion of intra-action (in contrast to the usual
“interaction,” which presumes the prior existence of independent entities/relata) represents a profound conceptual shift. It is through specific agential intra-actions that the boundaries and properties of the “components” of phenomena become determinate and that particular embodied concepts become meaningful.”

“In my agential realist account, scientific practices do not reveal what is already there; rather, what is ‘‘disclosed’’ is the effect of the intra-active engagements of our participation with/in and as part of the world’s differential becoming. Which is not to say that humans are the condition of possibility for the existence of phenomena. Phenomena do not require cognizing minds for their existence; on the contrary, ‘‘minds’’ are themselves material phenomena that emerge through specific intra-actions. Phenomena are real material beings. What is made manifest through technoscientific practices is an expression of the objective existence of particular
material phenomena. This is, after all, a realist conception of scientific practices. But unlike in traditional conceptions of realism, ‘‘objectivity’’ is not preexistence (in the ontological sense) or the preexistent made manifest to the cognitive mind (in the epistemological sense). Objectivity is a matter of accountability for what materializes, for what comes to be. It matters which cuts are enacted: different cuts enact different materialized becomings….

This is a reworking of causality that not only goes beyond its classical conception but also goes beyond that of complex systems theory as well: ‘‘emergence,’’ in an agential realist account, is dependent not merely on the nonlinearity of relations but on their intra-active nature (i.e., on non-separability and nontrivial topological dynamics as well). Events and things do not occupy particular positions in space and time; rather, space, time, and matter are iteratively produced and performed. Traditional conceptions of dynamics as a matter of how the values of an object’s properties change over time as the result of the action of external forces won’t do. The very nature and possibilities for change are reworked.

I mean, clearly she is not a physicist and there is no mathematical model here. It's just speculative interpretation withiut the benefit of a formal model that demonstrates anything tangible.

but the model of causality it expresses is designed to apply equally to the micro and the macro level. — Joshs

I don't think the "model of causality" is as much at stake as the question of whether models at one scale can give satisfying explanations of higher levels. You can have complicated non-linear complex models of interacting particles. You can have complicated non-linear complex models of economics. It doesn't necessarily mean that the satisfying explanations for former can come from latter.

I mean, clearly she is not a physicist — Apustimelogist

Suit yourself. Barad's Ph.D. is in theoretical particle physics and quantum field theory. She held a tenured appointment in a physics department before moving into more interdisciplinary spaces.

I mean, clearly she is not a physicist and there is no mathematical model here. It's just speculative interpretation withiut the benefit of a formal model that demonstrates anything tangible. — Apustimelogist

Well, it is seems reasonable to recognize that she is a physicist but a physicist who is not, when she writes what is quoted, doing physics. That's allowed. What I object to is that while her perspective may be interesting and relevant and legitimate, it has no special authority just because she is writing from the perspective of a physicist. To be fair, I don't think she would claim that. But I'm encourated to believe that a mere philosopher might have something to contribute.

but the model of causality it expresses is designed to apply equally to the micro and the macro level — Joshs

I don't know about "designed", but certainly it is expected that it will. That expectation may be disappointed, but all too often, the existence of anything that it does not apply to, is denied.

I don't think the "model of causality" is as much at stake as the question of whether models at one scale can give satisfying explanations of higher levels. — Apustimelogist

Well, we both think they can. Our difference is about the concept of "level". Specifically whether the assumption that all the different descriptive perspectives that are available to us dovetail neatly into a single hierarchy.

It matters which cuts are enacted: different cuts enact different materialized becomings…. — Barad

This is much closer to my perspective, but it neglects the complication introduced by the apparent limitation of "becomings" to "materialized". From my perspective, some varieties of becomings are introduced, not by materialization, but by interpretation. (as in puzzle pictures.)

any kind of observation or perhaps description about the smallest scales of reality will have more information about reality than all the scales upwards simply by the fact that descriptions on higher scales necessarily coarse-grain over details, while at the same time all the observations on higher scales are effectively redundant in terms of how they would correspond to a mind-independent reality. — Apustimelogist

If that isn't reductionism, I'll eat my hat. It's the "higher scales are effectively redundant" that does it.

Now let’s take a non-linear model of a particular sort, an account which begins from the assumption that no attributes of a physical object pre-exist its actual interactions with other objects, and that each actual interaction subtly changes the qualitative properties of the objects involved. — Joshs

My word! This is very close to Berkeley. It would be interesting to dissect the differences, but I guess you would find that irrelevant, and perhaps it is.

Barad is fascinating. It is very close to philosophy. From the language, I reckon she has been reading phenomenology. Nothing wrong with that. But it also echoes a familiar issues from Berkeley and Ayer. First you say it:-

In my agential realist account, scientific practices do not reveal what is already there; rather, what is ‘‘disclosed’’ is the effect of the intra-active engagements of our participation with/in and as part of the world’s differential becoming. — Barad

... and then you take it back:-

Which is not to say that humans are the condition of possibility for the existence of phenomena. Phenomena do not require cognizing minds for their existence; on the contrary, ‘‘minds’’ are themselves material phenomena that emerge through specific intra-actions. Phenomena are real material beings. What is made manifest through technoscientific practices is an expression of the objective existence of particular material phenomena. — Barad

Yes, I have been reading Austin.
There is an unusual - to me - twist to this, however, in the phrase "material phenomena". There's a perfectly respectable use of the word in science to mean "that which needs to be explained" or, possibly "data". But the limitation of phenomena to "material phenomena" is unusual, and puzzling. I scent reductionist tendencies here.

It's time to be a bit more helpful, but I'm going to take a break here and post that later.

There is an unusual - to me - twist to this, however, in the phrase "material phenomena". There's a perfectly respectable use of the word in science to mean "that which needs to be explained" or, possibly "data". But the limitation of phenomena to "material phenomena" is unusual, and puzzling. I scent reductionist tendencies here. — Ludwig V

Philosopher of science Joseph Rouse is one of Barad’s biggest champions. He considers her notion of materialism to be a version of naturalism that avoids the pitfallls of other naturalistic conceptions of nature.

I interpret Barad as developing a revised conception of metaphysical natu­ralism. The crucial point at which she departs from other naturalists is in the conception of nature itself as disclosed through scientific work. The familiar naturalisms treat nature in terms of regularities, laws, causal powers, or causal functional roles. Nature so conceived is anormative. The semantic and epistemic normativity governing how one ought to think and talk about the natural world, and the ethical or political normativity of how one ought to act within it, must be understood as either arising from or reducible to an anormative natural world. Although she does not put the point in quite this way, I take Barad to claim instead that nature as revealed by the sciences is itself normatively constituted.

This claim needs careful exposition, however, both to clarify the sense of “nor­mativity” being invoked, and to understand Barad’s argument for it. Barad starts from a commitment to both strains of naturalism. On the one hand, an adequate ontology must be accountable to the scientific work through which an understanding of nature is achieved; otherwise, it would be an arbitrary philosophical imposition upon science. On the other hand, such scientific work must itself be comprehended as part of nature to be understood. Her position then develops in three distinct steps. First, she argues for the ontological priority of “phenomena” over objects. She then argues that phenomena in this sense must incorporate conceptual-discursive normativity. Conceptual-discursive norms are not something imposed upon phenomena “by” us, however. On the contrary, we ourselves only become agents/knowers as material components of the larger patterns of natural phenomena.

Thus, Barad neither reduces conceptual-discursive normativity to anormative causal relations, nor imposes already-articulated conceptual norms upon the material world. Instead, she is arguing that the natural world only acquires definite boundaries, and concepts only acquire definite content, together. Once that conception is in place, Barad goes on to argue that our participation in the phenomena we understand scientifically makes ethical and political responsibility integral to conceptual-discursive normativity as well.

https://digitalcollections.wesleyan.edu/_flysystem/fedora/2023-03/28634-Original%20File.pdf

I've only got 10 minutes, which is a shame. So, initial comments.

Philosopher of science Joseph Rouse is one of Barad’s biggest champions. He considers her notion of materialism to be a version of naturalism that avoids the pitfallls of other naturalistic conceptions of nature. — Joshs

I like naturalism. But I've regarded it as materialism without the ontological and conceptual dogma. So there's room in my head for something more accurate.

I take Barad to claim instead that nature as revealed by the sciences is itself normatively constituted.

Well, the concept of nature is obviously normatively constituted. So far it's just a beginning of an analysis. Not a criticism - just a reservation.

First, she argues for the ontological priority of “phenomena” over objects.

That's an ancient piece of philosophy. Here, there's some need for discussion to sort out just what phenomena are. Data?

She then argues that phenomena in this sense must incorporate conceptual-discursive normativity. Conceptual-discursive norms are not something imposed upon phenomena “by” us, however. On the contrary, we ourselves only become agents/knowers as material components of the larger patterns of natural phenomena.

This bothers me. Phenomenologists have this habit of saying something and taking it back. I realize that description is a bit crude. But it expresses my feeling that I'm being offered dogmatic assertion rather than argumentation. I think the idea is that what she writes should be seen as so obvious that it needs no argument. (as in both Wittgenstein and Heidegger. I'm not claiming such writing is impossible, but, for me, this isn't it. More needs to be said.

Thus, Barad neither reduces conceptual-discursive normativity to anormative causal relations, nor imposes already-articulated conceptual norms upon the material world. Instead, she is arguing that the natural world only acquires definite boundaries, and concepts only acquire definite content, together.

I think I can agree that the discourse of the sciences is the product of interaction with the phenomena, if that's what she's getting at. But I don't see the necessary explanation that the concept of science is like the lens through which we encounter the world. One requirement of that lens is that what we encounter and the way we encounter it must be norm-free. I've just been tangling with Aristotle's metaphysics, which is a splendid example of what I hope we have left behind. It isn't science or at least, not what we require of science.

Once that conception is in place, Barad goes on to argue that our participation in the phenomena we understand scientifically makes ethical and political responsibility integral to conceptual-discursive normativity as well.

Well, it could only need saying to an audience of scientists, but for normal people that's just obvious. But, I repeat, the practice and theory of science must be as norm-free as we can make it. Otherwise, there's no point.

Specifically whether the assumption that all the different descriptive perspectives that are available to us dovetail neatly into a single hierarchy. — Ludwig V

What do you mean?

Suit yourself. Barad's Ph.D. is in theoretical particle physics and quantum field theory. She held a tenured appointment in a physics department before moving into more interdisciplinary spaces. — Joshs

Well I am just implying that her work isn't actual physics, its philosophy and what she is saying is not a description of reality with scientific consensus which is relevant because it means that introducing her into a comparison with newtoenian physics is more or less just postulation.

If that isn't reductionism, I'll eat my hat. It's the "higher scales are effectively redundant" that does it. — Ludwig V

I mean redundant more in the informational sense wherein it just means that these descriptions are already repeating information about reality (in a correspondence theory of truth sense) that is already in the smaller scale descriptions.

I mean redundant more in the informational sense wherein it just means that these descriptions are already repeating information about reality (in a correspondence theory of truth sense) that is already in the smaller scale descriptions. — Apustimelogist

How is that not reduction? All the information is given the smallest scale description.

all the different descriptive perspectives that are available to us dovetail neatly into a single hierarchy. — Ludwig V

It is intended to re-describe your large-scale, small scale image.

Well I am just implying that her work isn't actual physics, its philosophy and what she is saying is not a description of reality with scientific consensus which is relevant because it means that introducing her into a comparison with newtoenian physics is more or less just postulation. — Apustimelogist

We all agree on that this work of hers is not physics, I think. But then, I thought that describing reality was essentially a job for physics. Philosophy might ask what reality is, but it wouldn't necessarily be particularly interested in describing it. I didn't read that part of the discussion about Newtonian science. I thought it was probably beyond my competence. I wonder if maybe you are applying the criteria for science to philosophy?

Philosophy might ask what reality is, but it wouldn't necessarily be particularly interested in describing it. — Ludwig V

I wonder if you could flesh this out a little. Doesn’t philosophy attempt to answer its own question concerning what (as well as how and why) reality is? Isn’t that what is entailed by a metaphysical position? In my view, both philosophy and the sciences describe reality. The main difference is in the conventionality of the vocabulary.

In my view, both philosophy and the sciences describe reality. — Joshs

Well, yes, in a sense that's true. But, in that context, I thought that further explanation of what was intended would help to clarify.
PS I meant to say that I wanted to know what Apustimelogist would say.

It's time to be a bit more helpful, but I'm going to take a break here and post that later. — Ludwig V

Here's the promised continuation from my last post. I hope it is somewhat helpful.

I’m not a fan of hasty generalization, or of generalization without examples. Generalization is all very well, in its place. But I’m just going to discuss three examples, with the aim of showing the variety of relationships that there are between levels of description or scales of models. One size definitely does not fit all.

A (sandy) beach. Lots of sand accumulated along the edge of the sea or a river. One might think that nothing changes as one zooms in, until one can discern the individual grains. But it’s not as simple as that.
Zoom in so as to cut out the sea. You have a sandbank – sand banked up over and against the underlying geology. Not much has changed, in a way, but it clearly is not a beach any more. Descriptions are often a question of wider and narrower contexts, or of focus, if you like.
Zoom in closer. In a way, there’s no obvious level between the bank and the grains, but we can identify a heap of sand and a volume of sand as segments of a bank or beach – I call them segments because they can be cut out and removed from the bank. But the sand that we remove does not constitute a bank or a beach. So, in a sense, nothing has changed.
Yet closer, and finally we arrive at the grains of sands, which are independently existing components in the sense that they can be individually separated from the beach or bank.
The game changes at this point, so I’ll move on.

A flat-pack bookcase When it arrives, it is not a bookcase, but a set of parts for a bookcase. We can lay them all out on the floor, count them, check them. Now, what needs to happen to make it a bookcase? All the parts are there. Nothing needs to be added. What’s the problem? Easy, the parts needs to be put together as designed. But the design specifies the structure of the finished article; it is not a missing element that needs to be added to the parts.
But the bookcase has a top and bottom, a left side and right side, a front and a back. These are all parts of the bookcase. Where did they come from? They were not laid out on the bench, although the part that was to become the top was there, and it is called the top because when it is where it is supposed to be. Its top will be the top of the bookcase. Each shelf – and the part that will form the bottom - also has its own top, but the bottom of this part will also be the bottom of the bookcase. But the point here is that these parts are not components that can be separated from the bookcase and laid out on the floor or work-bench.
Holism. Levels of description are interdependent. One cannot understand what the parts are without understanding the role they play in the whole, which conditions their physical properties like shape, size, composition, etc.
I’ll leave out all the other dimensions (descriptive systems) that the beach is part of. Aesthetics, politics, economics. Zooming in and out won’t ever capture them. But that's not a problem - it's a feature.

A rainbow A bookcase is special because it is a human artifact, with a purpose. A rainbow does not, it is a very different from a sandy beach. It has parts, but not separable parts. There is the shape, the bands of colour, but that’s more or less it. So is it a physical object? In a sense, yes, but it would be less misleading to describe it as a physical phenomenon.
To understand what a rainbow is, we look to physics. To view a rainbow, your back must be to the sun as you look at an approximately 40 degree angle above the ground into a region of the atmosphere with suspended droplets of water or even a light mist. Each individual droplet of water acts as a tiny prism that both disperses the light and reflects it back to your eye. As you sight into the sky, wavelengths of light associated with a specific color arrive at your eye from the collection of droplets.
I’m sure you know the rest of the story. But there is a very complex step about the explanation why we see a single large arc instead of multiple small ones. I've gathered that it involves fractals, so it is likely beyond me, though I would love to understand it. But it is very relevant because it is a holistic effect, not a compound of the individual reflections from the individual rain-drops.
One might say that this is an explanation of the cause of the rainbow, but that generates a huge metaphysical issue about what the rainbow is, and a distinct temptation to say that it is not a physical object, but a mental one. Unless one wishes to embrace dualism, we need to say that the explanation in physics is an analysis of the rainbow, not a cause. (In the same way that we would say that the physics of a single grain of sand is an analysis, not a cause – thought it does of course cause the behaviour of the grain.)

I’m not arguing that we have to abandon the large-scale, small-scale model or the idea that physics explains everything, just that we recognize there are several ways that levels of description (scale) and categories of objects map on to each other and that the domain of physics is, well, the physical. So other forms of explanation also have their non-hierachical place.

How is that not reduction? All the information is given the smallest scale description. — Ludwig V

I think its a lot weaker than reduction: e.g. consider these descriptions from wikipedia.

"Ontological reductionism: a belief that the whole of reality consists of a minimal number of parts."

"Methodological reductionism: the scientific attempt to provide an explanation in terms of ever-smaller entities."

"Theory reductionism: the suggestion that a newer theory does not replace or absorb an older one, but reduces it to more basic terms. Theory reduction itself is divisible into three parts: translation, derivation, and explanation"

I don't think what I said resembles any of these. On the other hand, it seems almost tautologically the case that if you examine reality at the finest details, you will have more information about it in the sense of being able to make distinctions - specifically in the sense of correspondence ideas about truth.

I should also probably refer back to my post here:

- — Apustimelogist

I wonder if maybe you are applying the criteria for science to philosophy? — Ludwig V

No, I just think what was being talked about implied a scientific comparison based on things that are not disputed scientifically. Either way, I don't think Joshs's initial comment really engaged eith the nature of the discussions about different levels.

Methodological reductionism: the scientific attempt to provide an explanation in terms of ever-smaller entities. — Apustimelogist

That seems to fit what you are saying pretty well.
But I do accept that you are not claiming that because a glass of water consists of H2O, the water doesn't really exist.
I'm not sure whether you are saying that the analysis of water as H2O captures all the information about it. But I do think you might be.

On the other hand, it seems almost tautologically the case that if you examine reality at the finest details, you will have more information about it in the sense of being able to make distinctions - specifically in the sense of correspondence ideas about truth. — Apustimelogist

What do you mean "more information"?

Larger scale maps have less detail than smaller scale maps, but wider scope. I wouldn't know how to answer which has more information. Ditto pictures.
A picture of something close up which is 5" x 7" or 100,000 pixels has the same amount of information whether it is a picture of a landscape or a picture of a molecule.

An X-ray gives us information that we cannot get without it. But it loses information that an ordinary camera does capture. A camera cannot capture smells and sounds. A microphone cannot capture the weather (or not all of the weather. Different kinds of information are relevant.

When you think of a bishop threatening a king, your are thinking of the bishop in a wider context than if you are thinking of the bishop as an aesthetic or historic object. When you are thinking of a bishop as a physical object, you lose the context of the actual game and the aesthetic and historical context, but gain the physical properties of the bishop - down to its molecular constitution.

That seems to fit what you are saying pretty well. — Ludwig V

Not at all. I haven't been talking about prescribing explanations to get smaller.

I'm not sure whether you are saying that the analysis of water as H2O captures all the information about it. — Ludwig V

I'm just saying when you make observations at finer, smaller scale, you get more information.

What do you mean "more information"? — Ludwig V

In the sense of distinctions. When we make obaervations we are forming a map between our acts and the external world, distinguishing parts of reality. Finer-grained observations make distinctions that do not exist for coarse-grained observations even though they may be mapping to the same sets of events.

but wider scope. — Ludwig V

But this is a pragmatic issue that doesn't negate the idea that, in principle, it is always missing details in our mapping to reality.

A picture of something close up which is 5" x 7" or 100,000 pixels has the same amount of information whether it is a picture of a landscape or a picture of a molecule. — Ludwig V

Its not about information in the picture but information about the unobservable reality beyond. Neither is it about the picture as a.whole but simply the fact that any coarsed-grain observation of events in reality could be swapped for a finer-grained pne which reveals more distinctions or details whether you're talking about the cameras or the weather or bishops or whatever. The point has nothing to do with what information is "relevant" or useful for us to do science, which is why it has nothing to do with methodological reductionism.

I'm not sure whether you are saying that the analysis of water as H2O captures all the information about it.
— Ludwig V
I'm just saying when you make observations at finer, smaller scale, you get more information. — Apustimelogist

You really hate an example, don't you? Nothing but large-scale generalizations. So you miss the detail.

In the sense of distinctions. Finer-grained observations make distinctions that do not exist for coarse-grained observations even though they may be mapping to the same sets of events. — Apustimelogist

Yes, they certainly do. But then you don't get the bigger (larger-scale) picture. Then you can't see the wood for the trees. You may know the wood is there, but that's only because you've looked at a larger scale picture. The larger-scale picture doesn't tells you about the wood, but not the trees. The smaller-scale picture tells you about the trees, but not the wood.

Its not about information in the picture but information about the unobservable reality beyond. — Apustimelogist

You don't get information about the unobservable reality beyond the picture. It's unobservable in the picture. So it is observable, but only in a different picture.

You really hate an example, don't you? Nothing but large-scale generalizations. So you miss the detail. — Ludwig V

What are you implying? I don't understand what you are saying here. My answer reflects the fact that I am saying something much more general than the status of specific contemporary theories in physics or chemistry.

But then you don't get the bigger (larger-scale) picture. Then you can't see the wood for the trees. You may know the wood is there, but that's only because you've looked at a larger scale picture. The larger-scale picture doesn't tells you about the wood, but not the trees. The smaller-scale picture tells you about the trees, but not the wood. — Ludwig V

Yes, I agree. But that has not much to do with what I am saying imo. Hence why I can agree with this and also uphold what I said. What I am saying isn't to do with the pragmatics of navigating one's picture of the universe. It is not really about strong reductions as in the wikipedia descriptions I gave.

You don't get information about the unobservable reality beyond the picture. It's unobservable in the picture. So it is observable, but only in a different picture. — Ludwig V

What I mean by information here is purely about distinctions one can signal that map to distinctions in reality. There doesn't have to be a fact of the matter about the meaning or content of the signal for the observer and the observer doesn't need to know anything else about the unobservable reality causing the signal. The only assumption is that in principle there is consistent mapping between some area of reality and a signal being made by the observer. Coarse-grained distinctions will obviously smooth over and blend finer-distinctions that would have only been possible with a more fine-grained observations - and they are both caused by the same areas of reality.

What I mean by information here is purely about distinctions one can signal that map to distinctions in reality. — Apustimelogist

So a map of a single grain of sand cannot signal distinctions between grains, and a map of the inside of a grain cannot signal the whole grain, and a map of part of the beach cannot signal the dune at the back of the beach.

What I am saying isn't to do with the pragmatics of navigating one's picture of the universe. It is not really about strong reductions as in the wikipedia descriptions I gave. — Apustimelogist

Well, I'm picking up what you said about large-scale and small-scale models/maps/descriptions/theories.
Now, I don't understant what your doctrines are to do with. They are not to do with navigating the scale of them or about strong reductions. Yet you keep saying things that look like strong reductions and then denying that they are. What is what you are saying to do with? I'm at a loss to understand.

So a map of a single grain of sand cannot signal distinctions between grains, and a map of the inside of a grain cannot signal the whole grain — Ludwig V

Well I don't want to take this example too seriously but surely these distinctions are more or less at the same scale or granularity? At the same time, the mapping of a whole grain is mapping to the same part of reality as mappings to different parts of the grain so there is a redundancy. The parts mapping is mapping to the same part only it makes more distinctions, more information. The coarser grain mapping ignores distinctions that exist.

What is what you are saying to do with? — Ludwig V

Simply that observations about reality naturally carry more information about it at the smallest scales when looked at through a kind of correspondence view of truth.

Well I don't want to take this example too seriously but surely these distinctions are more or less at the same scale or granularity? At the same time, the mapping of a whole grain is mapping to the same part of reality as mappings to different parts of the grain so there is a redundancy. The parts mapping is mapping to the same part only it makes more distinctions, more information. The coarser grain mapping ignores distinctions that exist. — Apustimelogist

Yes, but the coarser grain mapping enables you to supply what the fine grain mapping leaves out - the whole that the fine grain mapping can't present. Think seeing the wood (coarse grain) and seeing the trees (fine grain). The two mappings are interdependent and both necessary for a comprehensive understanding.

Yes, true; though they still have a correspondence to the same area of reality, which injects redundancy. By virtue of coarse-graining itself, the coarse picture also loses information about distinctions or events in reality, like blurring over the details in a photo.

Yes, true; though they still have a correspondence to the same area of reality, which injects redundancy. — Apustimelogist

Well, yes. It is redundancy in one sense, but it has a point, which makes it not entirely redundant. There has to be something that the picture/map have in common, to establish that they are different pictures/maps/models of the same thing. So we seem to be agreed.

If I may, I would like to try another example. When your flat-pack arrives, it is not a bookcase, but a set of parts for a bookcase. We can lay them all out on the floor, count them, check them. Now, what needs to happen to make it a bookcase? All the parts are there. Nothing needs to be added. What’s the problem? Easy, the parts need to be put together as designed.

So the list of parts of the bookcase is complete, but leaves out something. But it doesn't leave out another part. It leaves out the design. The design is not a physical object; it is an abstract object - it belongs in a different category from the parts. Yet it is not less basic or more fundamental than the parts.

The design is not a physical object; it is an abstract object - it belongs in a different category from the parts. — Ludwig V

True, though this could apply to any scale of description I think.

True, though this could apply to any scale of description I think. — Apustimelogist

Yes, it could. But that's what links the different scales together, as different representations of the same thing.

We can also extend the format from things that have a purpose and are created by human beings, by saying that the design gives the (internal) structure of the object - relationships between the components at a lower (smaller) level.

Does a pile of sand have an internal structure? In one sense, no. But in another sense, yes. Each grain of sand has a relationship to each other grain of sand in the pile, and that's what makes it a pile.

So now we can see that the "bottom up" relationship between levels that you identified is matched by a "top down" relationship. So the hierarchy goes in both directions. You can call it a hierarchy from both perspectives, but "objectively" it is not two hierarchies, but one structure of a collection of pictures/maps...

Yes?

No, because you can have observations at multiple different scales and independently apply the abstract concept of design to each scale. It has nothing necessarily to do with the relationship between different scales in a way that is different from how the observations at different scales relate to each other.