I'll try to get to your critique of "meaning is use" sometimes tomorrow when I have time, but in the meantime, you should note that linguists already have pretty good criteria for distinguishing human language from animal signaling. One place to start is Hockett's design features.

Why are humans so concerned about whether their many, highly elaborated languages, or even simple languages, are the sole property of themselves? "Only humans... do such and such" seems to suggest an insecurity about their worth. That bees, dolphins, parrots, border collies and the British all exhibit language seems like more a cause for celebration than unease.

You have observed an infant learning how to talk. What seems to be happening? They are busy processing all sorts of experiences, they hear language, and they start matching words to -- what concepts? or things? experiences? "Mama" or "Papa" is associated with two particular people; it's too specific at first to be a concept. the child's favorite food gets a sound, maybe "ba ba" for "bottle" (as in "milk" or whatever it is the baby gets in a bottle). The connection between a food, sound, and specific word gets clearer. Then some words "din din", for instance, have more general meaning -- a concept. At din din one gets food of several kinds, and mama and papa eat something like the same thing. Sometimes din din is good, sometimes it gets unceremoniously spat out. And so on.

Pretty quickly the child's language starts manifesting structure and concept. Just listen to them.

So Fritz, or whatever this border collie's name was, could learn something like how to identify which object went with which word. It's a pretty big accomplishment for a dog's brain. I don't think Fritz generalized specifics, though. I don't think he could go fetch anything that was round and yellow and soft.

Bees communicate specific and useful information to other bees by using their bodies' movement capabilities. There is a certain amount of evaluative information in their bee-talk: a lot of flowers or not a lot. It's amazing that bees can do this, but I don't think they deal in concepts.

Dolphins... I just don't know. Their environment and sensory apparatus is so different than ours. They can, for instance, echo-analyze further beneath the skin than we can. I don't know how deep their perception goes. We just can't echo-analyze anything (except by ultra-sound gadgets).

I think it is the case that many animals have some sort of interior life of their minds, such as they are. Cows that much prefer to be milked from their left and not their right side for instance. (An unhappy cow's kick is not something to invite.) Or dogs that manipulate people to behave in preferred ways, just as people manipulate their dog to behave the way we want them to. They don't have to have language and concepts to twist us around their clever paws.

Why are humans so concerned about whether their many, highly elaborated languages, or even simple languages, are the sole property of themselves? "Only humans... do such and such" seems to suggest an insecurity about their worth. That bees, dolphins, parrots, border collies and the British all exhibit language seems like more a cause for celebration than unease. — Bitter Crank

I'd be excited if were shown that dolphins or birds had language. Pointing out that animals use sounds and what not for communication was just a tool to show the difficulty with meaning being use.

I'll try a different approach that has a similar critique.

The problem of universals shouldn't have cropped up if meaning was just use (I'm not saying that meaning can't be use, only that meaning is not entirely use). The reason it's a problem is because our language has lots of universal concepts, but the empirical world is particular. Use alone shouldn't give rise to universal ideas.

This needs to be further developed, but I see it as related to the difference between signalling, which lacks abstraction.

One could also argue from metaphor instead of universals. Why would use ever evolve into metaphorical speech? How does that come about?

No, the conceptual apparatus has to exist first, then the use can happen.

Thanks for that link.

I would say that discreteness, displacement, and duality of patterning all rely on a conceptual underpinning which is required for those aspects of language, and cannot be relegated to use.

I'll go one step further and claim that philosophy would not exist if meaning were just use.

Maybe Witty would have been happy with that, but it doesn't change the fact that humans ask philosophical questions (and not just professional philosophers).

How is it that we are able to step outside the various language games and ask these sorts of questions? It's because our concepts allow us to.

I too would be thrilled to discover that birds and dolphins, dogs and apes had language in the way we use the term. I don't think they do. Parrots have remarkable bird brains, and dogs are pretty smart -- that doesn't mean they have "concepts" in their brains. Apes are an iffy area. Their brains are are so close to ours. The jury seems to be out as to whether Noam Chimpsky et al were using language or whether he or she was manipulating signs with fingers or a keyboard.

This needs to be further developed, but I see it as related to the difference between signalling, which lacks abstraction. — Marchesk

When our retriever wants to go outside in the morning, the first step is a gentle whine. If nothing happens this is followed by nose poking. Then louder whining, finally a loud bark in one's face. This is signaling; the dog has learned to escalate if we aren't paying attention.

Oliver Sacks relates in Seeing Voices how a small group of deaf people who had very, very poor childhood education were limited by the concepts they lacked. When they were taught American Sign Language as adults, their minds were greatly expanded. Words and concepts have, it seems to me, a necessary connection. Words and concepts go together. No words, no concepts. No concepts, nothing to say. No concepts, much of the world will be either invisible or just background. No words, nobody will know what kind of hell a concept-free existence would be (for humans).

Part of the argument, to the extent that I understand it, is that there must be some sort of categorical difference between humans and animals with respect to the posession of a faculty called 'language'. But I don't understand why this ought to be the case. There can indeed be precise distinctions to be drawn with respect to different 'kinds' of language use - iconic, indexical, symbolic, or even analog and digital - but to say categorically that 'only humans posess language' (without elaborating on what is meant by language here), seems arbitrary and not a very useful way of thinking about things.

When our retriever wants to go outside in the morning, the first step is a gentle whine. If nothing happens this is followed by nose poking. Then louder whining, finally a loud bark in one's face. — Bitter Crank

For some reason, it reminded me of this Calvin and Hobbes cartoon:

The real argument is whether understanding meaning as use can explain all aspects of human language, not whether animals can be said to have some aspects of language. They may or they may not, and you're right, language needs to be defined.

My suspicion is that use (alone) cannot explain abstract thought (or metaphor), and that's what I'm fumbling to get at.

We could / should have a lexicon of odor. Perfumers do (woody, spicy, floral, fecal, etc.). Professional tasters are able to distinguish all sorts of things, as are "noses". We just have not given many of these odors names. We know what shit smells like:

The odor of human feces is suggested to be made up from the following odorant volatiles:[11]

Methyl sulfides
methylmercaptan/methanethiol (MM)
dimethyl sulfide (DMS)
dimethyl trisulfide (DMTS)
dimethyl disulfide (DMDS)
Benzopyrrole volatiles
indole
skatole
Hydrogen sulfide (H2S)

The pleasant odor of cinnamon is owing to cinnamaldehyde and eugenol, plus some other minor volatile agents. Clove, cardamom, lemon, anise, and so on all have distinct component odors which we could learn, and name -- which we would need to do, since clove only covers one generalized odor.

There was a popular women's perfume back in the 1980s that smelled--to me--like an old fashioned insect spray (it wasn't RAID). I swear some women were putting it on with a hose. Gawd awful.

I don't know why we don't pay more attention to odor. My nose isn't as sharp as it used to be, but I used to enjoy crushing all sorts of plant leaves to smell them. Some of them (like mountain ash) were very interesting. Matricaria discoidea, a common low-growing upper midwestern wild plant that one finds along sidewalks, has waxy blossoms that smell very specifically like pineapple. Then there is the unimaginably bitterness of some plants--which were of course of interest to me.

How would dolphin researchers verify that dolphins did possess language? They would do so by showing that dolphin sounds convey concepts. — Marchesk

And would they not do so by seeing what use they made of their sounds? Is conveying concepts not a use?

I always like to draw attention to the vast ambiguity of the term 'meaning' but for a change, I'll leave out the usual quote from The Meaning of Meaning, and just point out that reference, intention, understanding, significance, are all potential candidates for consideration, and it is not clear that they are all even compatible. What do you mean (intend) by 'meaning'?

I see the Wittgenstein project here as part of his attempt to undo the Cartesian error of identification as 'thinking thing' rather than 'doing thing'. Thus language is not about a transfer of some essence of conceptual meaning from my inner world to your inner world, but something that operates in the physical world. Beetles in boxes... The concepts in your mind are uncommunicable (even to yourself) unless you do something public with them - use them.

I think Moore's paradox shows that use is an element of meaning but not exhaustive.

If we consider the statement "It's raining but I believe that it is not raining" then we quite rightly take it to be an absurd thing to say, even though "it's raining" and "I believe that it is raining" do not mean the same thing. And that's because in saying "it's raining" one is (usually) indicating that one believes that it is raining, and so the statement "It's raining but I believe that it is not raining" is a performative contradiction even if not a logical contradiction (thanks to @The Great Whatever for this insight).

8-)

Is conveying concepts not a use? — unenlightened

Yes, but that doesn't make concepts use. We use language to convey concepts. I don't see at all how that makes concepts the same as use.

see the Wittgenstein project here as part of his attempt to undo the Cartesian error of identification as 'thinking thing' rather than 'doing thing'. — unenlightened

I don't think human language gets off the ground without the conceptual machinery in place. Human language is different from animal communication (in part), because our brains evolved the ability to think that way. Otherwise, how do you account for animal communication being different?

We are thinking and doing things. Witty went too far with this. If you want to think about the mind computationally (not terribly fond of it, but it's better than what Witty was trying to do), then we have algorithms other animals are lacking that give us richer forms of communication.

Our computers will be able to communicate like us when they're sophisticated enough to form concepts like we do. Maybe the machine learning will get there someday. We'll see. But notice how Siri, Alexa, etc can use words, but lack understanding, and are not able to pass the Turing Test. I'm not for a second fooled by my interactions with Siri.

As an analogy, consider the argument that tools are use. We certainly use tools, but tools are more than use. Tools are objects constructed with certain form and function to help with doing certain tasks.

So even though I can use a screwdriver like a hammer, that doesn't mean that my use of the screwdriver that way makes it a hammer. It's still a screwdriver (and it makes a rather lousy hammer, for a reason).

My suspicion is that use (alone) cannot explain abstract thought (or metaphor), and that's what I'm fumbling to get at. — Marchesk

But why not? What is it about concept use that puts the use-theory into question? I'm just trying to understand the actual argument behind the suspicion here.

What does it mean "language is use"?

But why not? What is it about concept use that puts the use-theory into question? — StreetlightX

I don't see how it gets off the ground. Say we want to use "Chair" to denote the category (or universal) for all chairs. Well how do we arrive at such a thing unless our brains are first capable of thinking in terms of categories, or universals?

How does number get off the ground, unless our brains have a capacity to quantify? There's a reason human language is full of these sorts of concepts that we've yet to detect in other animal communication (or not a lot, there may be some).

I'm still not sure I understand. Even if it is granted that 'our brains must be capable of thinking in terms of universals' (in order to designate concepts), what is the connection here with a theory of meaning? Perhaps try a syllogism? (P1)Meaning-as-use says... (P2)But... (C1)Therefore...? Fill in the ellipses?

It seems like you're trying to say that there are antecedent conditions that must be fufilled in order for the theory to work, but something like that could well be incorporated without putting it into question.

Perhaps try a syllogism? (1)Meaning-as-use says... (2)But... (3)Therefore...? Fill in the ellipses? — StreetlightX

I'll try.

1 Meaning-is-use says meaning is the way words are used in the context of a language game.

2. But, word use alone cannot explain the existence of universals, metaphors, math and logic in human language games.

3. Therefore, there is something more to meaning than use.

Admittedly, that's incomplete. There needs to be a couple more steps fleshing out how abstraction is different than other aspects of language, such as a greeting or singling out a particular.

Meaning-is-use says meaning is the way words are used in the context of a language game. — Marchesk

The correct formulation (if we're going by Wittgenstein) is "the meaning of a word is its use in the language".

But, word use alone cannot explain the heavy use of universals, metaphors, math and logic in human language games.

What do you mean by the use of universals, metaphors, math, etc.? Do you mean that the use of words and phrases like "redness", "life is a rollercoaster", "1 + 1 = 2" cannot be explained by referring to the use of words and phrases?

The correct formulation (if we're going by Wittgenstein) is "the meaning of a word is its use in the language". — Michael

That formulation is trivial. Of course "Chair" means the universal of chairs in English, because we arbitrarily (or rather through evolution of English) decided to denote that word as being such.

That's very different from saying that the meaning behind the word is merely the use of it.

That formulation is trivial. Of course "Chair" means the universal of chairs in English, because we arbitrarily (or rather through evolution of English) decided to denote that word as being such.

That's very different from saying that the meaning behind the word is merely the use of it. — Marchesk

What's the difference between saying "the meaning of a word is its use" and "the meaning behind a word is its use"?

What's the difference between saying "the meaning of a word is its use" and "the meaning behind a word is its use"? — Michael

The claim is that meaning is use, and that is determined by the role it plays in a language game.

I don't dispute that words have meaning in a context. I dispute that meaning is the usage. Rather, the usage assigns the meaning.

Wittgenstein was aiming for a radical redefinition of meaning, not merely pointing out that words acquire meaning by how they're used. Everyone knows that already. Wittgenstein's approach is behavioral, not cognitive, and I take issue with that.

You must have the cognitive (thought) prior to behavior, or there are no language games. Language games can't get off the ground without cognition.

...language needs to be defined. — Marchesk

Language: a set of signs (i.e., vocabulary) having paradigmatic and syntagmatic relations (i.e., syntax), hence; semantic information.

Human Language: a set of words (i.e., vocabulary) having paradigmatic and syntagmatic relations (i.e., syntax), hence; semantic information.

Thus language is not about a transfer of some essence of conceptual meaning from my inner world to your inner world, but something that operates in the physical world. — unenlightened

Communication: the process of encoding, transmitting, conveying, receiving, and decoding information.

Biocommunication: species-specific conscious, semi-conscious and/or non-conscious communication using signals (e.g., chemical, visual, auditory, tactile, etc.).

Zoocommunication: species-specific conscious and/or semi-conscious communication using signals (e.g., chemical, visual, auditory, tactile, etc.).

Human Communication: human conscious and/or semi-conscious communication using signals, spoken sounds (i.e., speech), or written symbols (i.e., writing) expressing thoughts and/or emotions in a human language and social context understood by both sender/source and receiver/target.

Animals communicate by means of signals (a type of sign), whereas; human beings communicate by means of language (a sign system).

When translating words from another language, we aren't translating its use, we are translating its meaning, or what it is referring to.

When translating words from another language, we aren't translating its use, we are translating its meaning, or what it is referring to. — Harry Hindu

Exactly. Also, if Witty is right about it being impossible for us to understand talking lions, because we're not part of their language games, then SETI is wasting their time.

When translating words from another language, we aren't translating its use, we are translating its meaning, or what it is referring to. — Harry Hindu

So what are we doing when we translate the word "hello"? What does it refer to? The meaning of the word "hello" is its use as a greeting, and we translate it with this in mind; we look to see what word(s) are used in the same way in other languages.

2. But, word use alone cannot explain the existence of universals, metaphors, math and logic in human language games. — Marchesk

But this is just the conclusion you're trying to establish. You can't use it as a premise without begging the question. This is the very thing im looking for an argument to underwrite.