The issue is the assumption, they need not follow. The sciences ask how questions all the time: how does relativity connect with quantum mechanics; how do neurons connect in such a way that experience arises?

Likewise, the humanities ask "what questions" frequently. What do human beings do when they are left in isolation, what do people think about X and Y, and so on.

We can say that quantitative aspects are quite fundamental to the sciences, this much is true and is a curious thing about them.  

I suspect that the humanities exist in part to fulfill roles science simply cannot. Something about us being innately creative creatures gets expressed in all kinds of manners which are very hard to make sense of in scientific terms. We should be grateful for this, or we would have no arts.

The sciences are concerned with “what,” whereas the humanities are concerned with “how.”

Write an elaboration of what you think this means. — ucarr

The wedge between sciences and humanities was socially constructed after the industrial revolution and rapid development of natural sciences evoked an exaggerated belief in the methods of natural science, followed by an equally exaggerated defensive response within other areas of intellectual life.

In the Renaissance there was the science of art, and the art of science.

Sciences and humanities are not mutually exclusive, and both are concerned with "what" and "how" in their respective areas of interest.

The sciences are concerned with how. How does light propagate, how are chemical bonds formed, how do worms reproduce.

The sciences aren't all about measurement. Biology has little to no measures outside of biochemistry.

The sciences ask how questions all the time: how does relativity connect with quantum mechanics; how do neurons connect in such a way that experience arises? — Manuel

Likewise, the humanities ask "what questions" frequently. What do human beings do when they are left in isolation, what do people think about X and Y, and so on. — Manuel

The sciences are concerned with how. How does light propagate, how are chemical bonds formed, how do worms reproduce. — Lionino

Sciences and humanities are not mutually exclusive, and both are concerned with "what" and "how" in their respective areas of interest. — jkop

Yes. The sciences and the humanities are each seriously concerned with both "what" and "how."

Yes. The sciences and the humanities are not mutually exclusive.

What = existence; How = journey — ucarr

Do existence and journey represent two different modal methods of discovery?

Does science culminate in the presence of a thing understood?

Does art culminate in the experience of an enduring point of view?

The essentially difference between the sciences and the humanities is cross-culturalism. Science, as a method, is not culture bound (in the general sense). It's motivation is simplicity of theory, not outcomes.

Everything in the humanities is culture-bound (in the general sense) and outcomes are the policy-driving forces. These aren't problems, though.

The sciences are all about measurement. Through the lens of the sciences, to measure a thing is to contain it and thereby to know it. — ucarr

Well, true that measurement is central to science, but so too is theory - the framework within which measurements are interpreted. The key fact in recent history being the scientific revolution and the overthrow of the medieval synthesis. Measurement was key aspect, but so too was a radically different vision of nature.

The humanities are rooted in communication of voices arising from The Hard Problem — ucarr

Well, I'm sure David Chalmers would be flattered to be counted as the Founder of the Humanities, but I'm not sure it is warranted.

Mention might also be made of the famous Two Cultures speech, C. P. Snow, 1959, and the 'science wars'.

Was going to say something similar. Do we really need to rehash CP Snow all these years later?

Only a matter of precedent, that’s all. The Culture Wars are alive and well but that was an identifiable milestone.

The Culture Wars are alive and well but that was an identifiable milestone. — Wayfarer

Which is why I prefer not to throw more wood on the fire... :wink:

The sciences are concerned with “what,” whereas the humanities are concerned with “how.” — ucarr

No. Science is concerned with science. The humanities are concerned with humans.

The give away is in the names?

The sciences are rooted in communication of existence in terms of what things are, how they’re interrelated, what they do and what functions, if any, they have. — ucarr

Huh? That sounds more like mysticism.

Science makes no assumptions. Blind speculation can happen but it is cast aside if no rational means of determining any kind of evidence can be unearthed. That said, there are some theories that fit observations so well that they live a bit longer than usual; Superstring Theory is one example.

Observation is key in all sciences (Empiricism).

The sciences are all about measurement. Through the lens of the sciences, to measure a thing is to contain it and thereby to know it. — ucarr

No. Science uses measurements based on observations. If measurements cannot be made science does not just leave it alone. We can observe changes and then speculate as to why such changes are happening. The evidence of scientific truths comes through determining a means of measuring but it is certainly not all science is.

Empiricism is fundamental to all the sciences.

The humanities are rooted in communication of voices arising from The Hard Problem: What it’s like to navigate and experience the material creation as a sentient being with an enduring individual point of view with personal history attached. — ucarr

Not really. The Hard Problem is a scientific problem.

Through the lens of the humanities, to journey from cradle to grave is to string together a personal narrative (continuity) of emblematic, pivotal, transformative and self-defining moments. — ucarr

Maybe.

In short, The Humanities are about the expression and understanding of the human condition in lived terms most often through a narrative function - although philosophy itself tends to straddle both the science and humanities through the employment of the science of logic (mathematics).

The means of accurate measuring of items like 'good' and 'bad' is obscure (and possibly a delusion?). We still measure value in human life but such measurements are so abstracted and opaque that more often than not we are misled and misguided by our sense of reasoning.

By this I simply mean that we do not possess the scope in spacial or temporal terms to pass any reasonably accurate declaration for a hard and fast 'rule' of human nature. Where we are blind the Humanities dresses us in comfort. Is there truth hidden within this comfort? I believe so.

Afaik, the sciences are a subset of the humanities – interpretative-representational discourses explicating aspects of the human condition – which seek, via defeasible reasoning, testable answers to empirical questions.

Science, as a method, is not culture bound (in the general sense). It's motivation is simplicity of theory, not outcomes. — AmadeusD

What I've underlined is succinct and insightful. Bravo. It's a clear expression of a basic value guiding the scientific process.

I know one of the best ways for testing a theory is seeing if it can make correct predictions, so I don't agree that science isn't seriously concerned with outcomes.

Science as a practice by humans in specific times and places cannot completely abstract itself from local culture.

Art, in its highest aspirations, tries to be universal and therefore beyond local culture except as an accidental association.

Well, true that measurement is central to science, but so too is theory - the framework within which measurements are interpreted. — Wayfarer

I sense great depth of meaning in your sentence above. So far I cannot sound the deep waters here, beyond vaguely ruminating on the connections between measurement and theory.

Measurement was key aspect, but so too was a radically different vision of nature. — Wayfarer

This sentence allows me to go a step further in my rumination: QM is, among other shocks, a motherlode of challenge along the axis of measurement. Its new vision of the world as theory could not have been measured in the required manner without that new vision, still today a hard thing to grasp and even harder to accept.

Well, I'm sure David Chalmers would be flattered to be counted as the Founder of the Humanities, but I'm not sure it is warranted. — Wayfarer

I don't mean to go that far in ascribing credit to Chalmers. I'm merely using his title to describe the still privileged human condition vis-á-vis the natural world.

I know one of the best ways for testing a theory is seeing if it can make correct predictions, so I don't agree that science isn't seriously concerned with outcomes. — ucarr

I think all I meant there was that the outcomes aren't hte science, they're the indicator of success. Science, as a method, doesn't care about the outcomes. It just deals with them and moves on to new methodology. It's not motivated by the outcome, per se, but by the outcome's accuracy. Unsure if that seems like a distinction without a different to some..

The sciences are concerned with “what...” — ucarr

No. Science is concerned with science. The humanities are concerned with humans. — I like sushi

The give away is in the names? — I like sushi

Since science is done presumably only by humans, the authoritatively binary distinction you seek to establish between science and art reads like an exaggeration.

By your own argument about different names, there's some sort of important difference between the two disciplines, isn't there? What do you think it is?

The sciences are rooted in communication of existence in terms of what things are, how they’re interrelated, what they do and what functions, if any, they have. — ucarr

Science makes no assumptions. — I like sushi

I need to clarify: communication of existence is supposed to convey the fact that scientists make discoveries about what exists and, in turn, they communicate details of what exists to the public.

If measurements cannot be made science does not just leave it alone. We can observe changes and then speculate as to why such changes are happening. — I like sushi

Theoretical scientists develop conjectures about things not accessible to hands-on examination by spinning out from related things that have been measured directly. At a higher level of nuance, we can surmise that theoretical conjectures are a type of measurement.

The Hard Problem is a scientific problem. — I like sushi

Is it a scientific problem that does a good job of describing what it's like to be a human endeavoring to learn truths about the natural world?

The Humanities are about the expression and understanding of the human condition in lived terms most often through a narrative function — I like sushi

Where we are blind the Humanities dresses us in comfort. Is there truth hidden within this comfort? I believe so. — I like sushi

Yes. You seem to agree a good work of art is enduring, and it's enduring because, across the generations, human individuals continue to find promise of answers to human questions unresolved.

I stated this quite clearly already, no?

...the sciences are a subset of the humanities — 180 Proof

...interpretative-representational discourses explicating aspects of the human condition – which seek, via defeasible reasoning, testable answers to empirical questions. — 180 Proof

Your clause fragment above puts on a good show for establishing the proximity of the arts and sciences, and yet, I wonder if you feel that a description of intense prolonged neuron firing at synapses of the brain's pleasure centers is really almost the same thing as a fresh and frank description of a great shag between two characters just fallen in love. There's some sort of a big difference, isn't there?

I don't mean to go that far in ascribing credit to Chalmers. I'm merely using his title to describe the still privileged human condition vis-á-vis the natural world. — ucarr

Fair enough. And looking at it through that lens, the problem is precisely that of the relationship of quantitative measurement and qualitative judgement. That is why that annoying piece of philosophical jargon, 'qualia', is central to debates about the so-called problem of consciousness. But it's anticipated in Hume's 'is/ought' distinction. What can be measured precisely as distinct from what ought to be done. I agree with your designation of the 'hard problem' as 'what it is like to be...', as Chalmers uses exactly this expression. But I think there's a more direct expression of what he's trying to convey - he's referring to the meaning of being, or the meaning of existence. That is the philosophical issue.

(incidentally, interesting to note that German universities recognise a division that Anglo universities don't, namely Geisteswissenschaften - a set of human sciences such as philosophy, history, philology, musicology, linguistics, theater studies, literary studies. The term translated literally means something like 'sciences of the spirit'. )

I think all I meant there was that the outcomes aren't hte science — AmadeusD

Take for example the discovery that light waves bend around gravitational fields; that's an outcome predicted by Relativity. It's one of the end games of Relativity as far validation is concerned. Henceforth, this bending of light waves under influence of gravity will be seen through the lens of Relativity. Isn't that a triumph not trifle of science?

It's not motivated by the outcome, per se, but by the outcome's accuracy. — AmadeusD

If you back engineer from the outcome to the theory that explains it, you see an answer in search of a question. Asking the right questions about the world we see around us is one of the seminal talents of the scientist. I don't presently see how your reasoning uncoupling answer from question is sound.

Yes, a difference in levels and objects of analyses, therefore different representations (just as e.g. a topological map & a road map can be different (complementary) descriptions.of the same terrain).

:up:

You've been clear: science is science; art is art.

Your definitions are clear: science observes and measures; art narrates living through love $\leftrightarrow$ hate and the grayscale in between.

Now, I'm waiting for you to start talking about how Newton's equations differ from the little boy who slips and tumbles down the stairs, thereafter taking comfort from his pain in mother's arms.

The sciences are concerned with “what,” whereas the humanities are concerned with “how.” — ucarr

If you can experimentally test a stubborn observable pattern, then it is scientific.

In all other cases, it is something else.

The humanities are generally about stubborn patterns in human behavior.

The humanities are often able to successfully observe stubborn patterns, but human behavior is generally not testable. You can often still do observational studies, though.

In my opinion, the key distinction is testability.

The impossibility to test is not just a problem with human behavior.

Imagine that you have a theory about the birth of solar systems. Fantastic, but how do you test the creation of a solar system? So, how do you create one? Hence, no matter how well your theory matches observations in the universe, it will never be science.

Another example is the medical claim that the HIV virus causes AIDS. Fantastic, but how do you test this claim without deliberately injecting lots of people with the HIV virus? Hence, it will never be science either, if only, because your truly scientific experimental test report would land you in jail.

Do existence and journey represent two different modal methods of discovery?

Does science culminate in the presence of a thing understood?

Does art culminate in the experience of an enduring point of view? — ucarr

Yes, different ways (methods) and different ways of understanding what is revealed in experience.

One is more intuitive, the other theoretical. But it's all the same world. You could consider the world as a kind of humanities (we appreciate and are puzzled and want to give it some meaning) - it's just that different people go about it different ways.

:up:

Hmmm.. I think it's possible you're talking about it at a level which I am not.

that's an outcome predicted by Relativity. — ucarr

Sure, I agree that prima facie, that fact is interesting, plus part-and-parcel of talking about science. But, you'll see that in your formulation the outcome and prediction are separated. Science predicts. Outcomes are the fallout of experiments. I see a pretty relevant distinction - control.
Perhaps noting that the results are open to all for use (eg using some new discovery about how hydrogen can be broken down into water (im making this up) to solve droughts). Applications. Applied science. The methodology requires years of training and peer-review to even be taken seriously (on a high enough level, anyway. An experiment that predicts the temperature of a particuar fruit's skin under specific conditions isnt on that level, for instance). I would find it very uncomfortable to call "agreement between prediction and outcome" science, as opposed to just a fact about science. Maybe that's just me.

Falsifying one's expectations is key - another apt point that seems to illustrate that outcomes come after the science. When you're done with an epic performance of a play, you aren't still performing the play when you pick up your Tony award eight months later, for instance.

Asking the right questions about the world we see around — ucarr

I fully agree here, and to me, this is purely methodology. Getting the "right answers" relies on the methodology. There is extremely little a scientist can do about the outcomes of their experiments/observations, except improve methodology if they don't make sense (or, read Kuhn).

In my opinion, the key distinction is testability. — Tarskian

Regarding my thesis, going forward from what you wrote above entails assessing whether experimentation is modally existential, with the hows and whys of the details of an pattern involving existing things being ancillary to the modally existential process of experimentation.

I have no idea what point you are trying to make here.

Obviously those two things are quite different in a number of ways. An equation is abstract, where an action is not. The former can be applied in an objective sense whereas the latter is focused more on subjectivity.

I posted because your general conception of what science is seemed misguided/inaccurate.

When talking about the humanities and sciences, they are categories of subjects in academia. If you are attempting to use these categories outside of this then you need to be more concise with what your underlying point is. For me at least! :)

Regarding my thesis, going forward from what you wrote above entails assessing whether experimentation is modally existential, with the hows and whys of the details of an pattern involving existing things being ancillary to the modally existential process of experimentation. — ucarr

Yes, it means that science is an epistemic domain governed by a justification method. It really does not matter what exactly it is about as long as the justification method of testability can successfully be applied.

The same is true for mathematics. It is the epistemic domain governed by the justification method of axiomatic provability.

The humanities, on the other hand, are not an epistemic domain. They are a (collection of) subject domain(s). The humanities are generally about human behavior.

By the way, some claims about human behavior in the humanities can actually be experimentally tested -- even though this is most generally not the case.

This means that a purely formalist view is perfectly sustainable in mathematics and science:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Formalism_(philosophy_of_mathematics)

In the philosophy of mathematics, formalism is the view that holds that statements of mathematics and logic can be considered to be statements about the consequences of the manipulation of strings (alphanumeric sequences of symbols, usually as equations) using established manipulation rules. A central idea of formalism "is that mathematics is not a body of propositions representing an abstract sector of reality.

According to formalism, the truths expressed in logic and mathematics are not about numbers, sets, or triangles or any other coextensive subject matter — in fact, they aren't "about" anything at all.

Science is not about something. Science is actually about nothing at all.
Mathematics is not about something. Mathematics is actually about nothing at all.

On the humanities, a formalist view is not possible. The humanities are always about something.

I have no idea what point you are trying to make here. — I like sushi

I posted because your general conception of what science is seemed misguided/inaccurate. — I like sushi

My thinking here is simple: we talk about science; we talk about art; sometimes we see scientific sensibilities conflicting violently with artistic sensibilities. That's a clue that the differences between the two might not be trivial. Even so, it's hard to talk rationally and generally about what is that difference.

You write well about science; you write cautiously about art:

The means of accurate measuring of items like 'good' and 'bad' is obscure (and possibly a delusion?). — I like sushi

By this I simply mean that we do not possess the scope in spacial or temporal terms to pass any reasonably accurate declaration for a hard and fast 'rule' of human nature. — I like sushi

When you talk about the difference between the two disciplines, you talk about art being resistant to accurate measurement. So, can you spin out a narrative of difference that illuminates the meaning of science being accurate measurement and art being touchy-feely measurement?

My claim, faulty though it be, characterizes the general difference as different modalities of method of discovery: the what modality for science; the how modality for art.

The what modality is a narration of things as things.

The how modality is a narration of things as experiences.