What makes you assume that universities do have a higher caliber of discussion? — Thorongil
I see our task on forums like this as primarily one of edifying ourselves and each other rather than pushing forward the boundaries of knowledge. — Baden
There is a fundamental disconnect with that way of life and the modern one: it's not a matter of certain contingent things about life being out of whack, but the values that determine what people think a life should consist of to begin with are so foreign to those interests that there's no connection. — The Great Whatever
What would that look like today, and what sort of values would foster that kind of community? Is this the kind of commitment Jesus demanded of his disciples? Leave your normal life and practice philosophy instead? — Marchesk
Also, it seems you think the Cyrenaics figured out most of the interesting philosophical problems, so how would contemporary philosophers improve upon that, in your view? — Marchesk
ther projects, such as 'knowledge of the universe,' or 'seeing how things hang together generally,' are only of extrinsic interest, that is, they are not interesting on their own terms, but only insofar as an arbitrary opinion decides to grant them interest relative to something else. — The Great Whatever
They find them interesting insofar as... Remove the condition following, and they lose their interest. Their interest is, in other words, derivative. — The Great Whatever
Put another way, it is possible to lose interest in such questions, while it is not possible to lose interest in living well, whatever one's opinions on the matter are. Thus, only an arbitrary opinion imbues such other questions with their (extrinsic) interest. — The Great Whatever
For example, you might be compelled by metaphysical hypotheses about the basic structure of the world because you feel uneasy when you lack understanding of something, and so have a desire to understand, or feel as though you understand, everything. But if circumstances change and so does your psychological predisposition, so that you no longer feel uneasy in these circumstances, the corresponding metaphysical hypotheses will cease to be interesting. — The Great Whatever
whereas living well involves commitments that must be made in virtue of being alive — The Great Whatever
pleasure and pain, which have intrinsic, rather than extrinsic, value: they are never good or bad 'insofar as...'. — The Great Whatever
I can feel pain and think it's a good thing, and feel pleasure and think it's bad. I can also think that a less pleasurable state is preferable. It just depends on the context. — Marchesk
But if circumstances change and so does your psychological predisposition, so that you no longer feel uneasy in these circumstances, the corresponding metaphysical hypotheses will cease to be interesting. Or, you might have an interest in such questions because your intellectual tradition does, and you have independent interests in being a part of, or contributing to, that tradition. When that interest is lost, so will be the interest in the metaphysical hypotheses — The Great Whatever
As regards who is to exercise such faculties, who is it that is to do philosophy, the question is largely whether philosophy is a personal activity, or an institutional one. Given that I have just opined that the faculty needed to conduct philosophy is literally personhood itself, it should come as no surprise that I think that philosophy is for each and every person to do, to the best of their ability to do so. Nevertheless, institutions are made of people, and I do value the cooperation and collaboration that has arisen within philosophy in the contemporary era, so I don't mean at all to besmirch professional philosophy and the specialization that has come with it. I merely don't think that the specialized, professional philosophers warrant a monopoly on the discipline. It is good that there be people whose job it is to know philosophy better than laypeople, and that some of those people specialize even more deeply in particular subfields of philosophy. But it is important that laypeople continue to philosophize as well, and that the discourse of philosophy as a whole be continuous between those laypeople and the professionals, without a sharp divide into mutually exclusive castes of professional philosophers and non-philosophers. And it is also important that some philosophers keep abreast of the progress in all of those specialties and continue to integrate their findings together into more generalized philosophical systems.
. Of course the case can be made that the same happens in academia and schools, but if the internet (search engines) directed you to opposition to your position in the way a library might arrange books by topic, there might be more of a realization that there is serious work opposed to the movement. I wouldn't categorize philosophy on the internet as fruitless, but it can give the appearance of a greater understanding and consensus and should be cautious of becoming a "safe" community absent of dissent. — Soylent
Even in the serious sciences, do you think "real" scientists discourage personal research? Experiments? The whole impetus of science is to search for answers, to want answers, why would any "real" accredited scientist discount the interest and fascination of those less experienced than him? — Grre
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