The argument runs as follows: a term and its denial between them exhaust the universe, or at least a universe of discourse. The demarcation lin between a term and its denial may perhaps shift as we change the meaning of the term, as we often do. But: there is one kind of shift of meaning which is both disastrous and characteristically philosophical, and that is to make the criteria for what falls under a concept either so severe, or so loose, that either nothing at all can, or everything must, fall under it.
The term then loses any contrast; it is then used "without antithesis". People who commit the fallacy of using a term "without antithesis" do it, it appears, from the essentially philosophical desire to say something wholly all-embracing, not realising that this ambition is incompatible with saying anything at all.
One might well object that this doctrine itself does not appear to have a contrast, that the Contrast Theory itself would require, presumably, that language should sometimes be used to unify and sometimes to separate. (The Contrast Theory when made explicit leads to a neat paradox; on its own grounds, a language should sometimes be usable without contrast, so that "contrast" may have a contrast.)
The job of philosophy is perhaps to unravel presuppositions of old contrasts, or discover contrasts where hitherto none had been perceived: and not to inhibit thought by insisting on well-established ones.
But maybe Gellner is right that this doesn't hold. If a child asks me what my coffee machine is for, I will explain that it makes coffee. And this explanation strikes me as perfectly valid, even though it is not possible to imagine any other kind of coffee machine. We simply have no concept of what such a machine would be like. That doesn't mean my explanation was wrong, does it? Or that I was using language incorrectly? — cherryorchard
But maybe Gellner is right that this doesn't hold. If a child asks me what my coffee machine is for, I will explain that it makes coffee. And this explanation strikes me as perfectly valid, even though it is not possible to imagine any other kind of coffee machine. — cherryorchard
One might well object that this doctrine itself does not appear to have a contrast, that the Contrast Theory itself would require, presumably, that language should sometimes be used to unify and sometimes to separate.
For me this all goes back to Aristotle's idea that a definition or understanding requires a genus and a specific difference. "Coffee machine" is "A machine" (genus) "that makes coffee" (specific difference). In order to understand a term we must understand how it is alike other things (genus) and how it is unlike the things it is alike (specific difference). — Leontiskos
In that sense we would say, "If language is to have meaning, then the Contrast Theory must hold." The relevant contrast here is the scenario where language has no meaning, and authors like Aristotle to not deny this at least as a logical possibility. — Leontiskos
Austin spends quite a lot of time in 'Sense and Sensibilia' explaining that there is no point in claiming that we only ever see things indirectly, just precisely because, if that is the case, we no longer have any idea what seeing directly would even mean. There would no longer be any such thing as 'seeing directly'. And thus (Austin argues) the term 'seeing indirectly' when used in this way appears to mean something but actually doesn't. — cherryorchard
The challenge would be met with examples like Austin's:
...
(Some ordinary language philosophers leveled a similar criticism against the realism vs nominalism debate.) — SophistiCat
First, to echo Banno's question, what would the correlate to indirect, "direct," mean in the context of your claims? — Leontiskos
Some examples might be helpful here. Can it be shown that Gellner addressed Ordinary Language Philosophy, rather than his own caricature of it?To me this seems like a fair description of some passages in Wittgenstein's 'On Certainty' and in, e.g., Austin's 'Sense and Sensibilia'. — cherryorchard
A coffee machine is not a toast machine.If a child asks me what my coffee machine is for, I will explain that it makes coffee. And this explanation strikes me as perfectly valid, even though it is not possible to imagine any other kind of coffee machine. We simply have no concept of what such a machine would be like. That doesn't mean my explanation was wrong, does it? Or that I was using language incorrectly? — cherryorchard
For me this all goes back to Aristotle's idea that a definition or understanding requires a genus and a specific difference. "Coffee machine" is "A machine" (genus) "that makes coffee" (specific difference). In order to understand a term we must understand how it is alike other things (genus) and how it is unlike the things it is alike (specific difference). — Leontiskos
No, I think you were right the first time when you pointed out that the contrast theory of meaning does not require that the opposite trait be exemplified for the exact same object under discussion. A meaningful word should pick out a particular instance or species (a "non-empty proper subset," as mathematicians would say) from the universe of discourse. In this case, the universe of discourse would include all kinds of machines (or all kinds of things), and we can readily come up with examples of machines or things that do not make coffee. — SophistiCat
Some examples might be helpful here. Can it be shown that Gellner addressed Ordinary Language Philosophy, rather than his own caricature of it? — Banno
I also find the argument, as stated by Gellner, to be convincing in itself, so I don't think Gellner is misrepresenting his opponents' views. (But I may be wrong). — cherryorchard
… it is essential to realise that here the notion of perceiving indirectly wears the trousers—‘directly’ takes whatever sense it has from the contrast with its opposite
If you tried to doubt everything you would not get as far as doubting anything. The game of doubting itself presupposes certainty.
Thanks for this response – it's extremely helpful. — cherryorchard
I suppose what I'm struggling to understand is how exactly we know which sort of term is a 'genus' and which isn't. 'Coffee machine' is quite obviously just a specific example of a 'machine' (so I apologise for the inanity of my example). But then, 'seeing' is perhaps just a specific example of 'perception' or even 'experience', or at least some people could plausibly think so. — cherryorchard
A meaningful word should pick out a particular instance or species (a "non-empty proper subset," as mathematicians would say) from the universe of discourse. — SophistiCat
Sense-data theorists might say something like 'we can feel pain directly, but we can't see material objects directly' – and thus hold that their claim 'we never see directly' still has meaning, because 'seeing' is contrasted with other kinds of 'experience' like feeling pain.
I think the issue is in the particular conjunction of terms. The word 'seeing' has meaningful contrasts, as does a word like 'directly' and a word like 'never'. But the combination of these terms together in the claim 'we never see anything directly' is meaningless because it eliminates the possibility of any contrast. That makes complete sense to me – I'm just still struggling to pinpoint why. Is it because 'seeing' is sui generis, and nothing else is really 'like' it? But is that a subjective judgement? — cherryorchard
'we only ever digest what we consume' — cherryorchard
For instance, is 'we only ever hear sounds' a meaningful statement? — cherryorchard
Of course, there are things we don't hear and things that aren't sounds. But couldn't a sense-data proponent say there are things we don't see and things that aren't indirect? Just no such thing as direct seeing – as there is no such thing as hearing smells. — cherryorchard
Well, can we explicated the "Contrast Theory of Meaning"?I would love to know how — cherryorchard
If Gellner's criticism is that Austin and Wittgenstein are using a term without antithesis, then he has simply failed to read and understand what is going on in each case.
Which is, indeed, the usual response to his work. — Banno
One might well object that this doctrine itself does not appear to have a contrast, that the Contrast Theory itself would require, presumably, that language should sometimes be used to unify and sometimes to separate. (The Contrast Theory when made explicit leads to a neat paradox; on its own grounds, a language should sometimes be usable without contrast, so that "contrast" may have a contrast.)
What is his argument? What is the problem with "the contrast theory of meaning"? — Banno
I think it's true that meaning is dependent on negation — frank
Could you explain what he means by speaking so severely or loosely that there is no real negation? — frank
The genus of (1) can be construed as actions, the set which includes things like feeling (pain) and seeing (objects). Within that broad genus one can distinguish feeling from seeing, and argue that to feel is more direct than to see. Whether they are right or wrong remains to be seen, but their distinction is not prima facie irrational. The coherence of the argument depends on the idea that the directness of feeling can be compared to the directness of seeing. — Leontiskos
But let's say I have a friend who is a sense-data proponent. He says that his terminology is perfectly meaningful. There are direct experiences (mental and physical sensations, feelings, thoughts) and indirect experiences of the outer world (sights, smells) that come to us through 'sense-data'. He says this contrast between direct and indirect makes those words perfectly valid and useful. I don't agree with him. But I still feel I'm losing the argument. — cherryorchard
To be very succinct (and therefore maybe inaccurate!) Ayer claims that we never see any material objects directly; we only ever see our own 'sense-data'. For Austin (one of the ordinary language philosophers Gellner is writing about), this is an example of a claim 'so loose, that [...] everything must fall under it. The term then loses any contrast; it is then used "without antithesis".' There would no longer be any such thing as 'seeing directly' – it wouldn't even be possible to imagine what that might be – so to claim that we 'only see indirectly' would be meaningless.
Gellner is trying to argue against Austin (and implicitly for Ayer) in this section about the 'contrast theory'. I'm just trying to get to grips with what exactly his argument is, and why it's wrong. — cherryorchard
Manuel, would you agree that Austin is wrong about indirect realism becoming meaningless due to a lack of contrast? I think an example of that kind of breakdown in meaning is the kind of idealism where one says everything is ideas. That makes the concept of idea meaningless because the very stuff that once gave the word meaning, that is physical stuff, has been redefined as ideas. If everything is ideas, the concept of idea becomes meaningless. — frank
If the claim is that if everything is indirect, then nothing is because we would have no notion of what an alternative could be, or something along those lines, then I think that's right. — Manuel
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