Why do you lose memories when you teleport and why do you posit that I have a continuous memory from birth to now? — Hanover

Please forgive any prickliness here. It seems, outright, you are not reading my entire posts. Eg, the above vs:

You're free to say you were not 'you' before, say, age 4 when clear memories coalesced. — AmadeusD

So, to be clear, I can;t answer your question because I did not make the claim it refers to. I will do my best to ignore this, as it comes up, and just respond to what I can stand behind. So, apologies if things seemed to be missed and such.

You're distinguishing your example from mine — Hanover

By the fact that, in 'my' (it's actually Derek Parfit) case, you choose to use a machine which purports to "recreate" you somewhere else. But what actually happens, is that you go into a machine, it copies you perfectly - atom for atom - then destroys you and sends the data to another machine which 3d-prints you from that data. This is clearly not like your case of simply living through life, even if this reduces to saying they're are just different cases.
Ignoring the question of whether this would preserve psychological continuity (relation R) at all (reductionists are essentially committed to saying yes, it would, by virtue of being your exact physical double at the moment of transfer) and the question of how, moments after re-creation, you couldn't be the original person as your memories now diverge sufficiently to defeat the rule of identity, the point is this:

If there is someone who recalls being you, and is physically identical do you - is this you? The reason this is an important thing to nail down about identity is presented in:

the kicker for this thought experiment is what's called the 'branch-line case" in which the machine malfunctions, and you survive several hours after the transfer and can talk to your double. You are, though, destined to die in the 'normal' way, in several hours time.

Can there be two "you"s? Uncomfortable. But seems fairly true, if relation R holds. You may simply disagree that this is the correct notion of identity and that's totally fine. I've just not come across a better one, however much this has increased my fear of death.

But if I go from Point A to Point B over 50 years and not a single same cell or single same memory exists from age 1 to age 50, then don't I have the same identity problem as you noted in the teleporting? — Hanover

I think the underlined is not quite right. This might be rectified by moving the date forward to age 4, per the above correction I've made to your initial questions. But that said, in your example - not a single cell, and not a single memory remain? You are not the same person. That seems simple. It relies on the same logic/reasoning/position as the teletransporter case. That case is simply the reverse. Can someone who does have the exact physical make-up, and psychological make-up as you.. actually be you? It seems they can. And, for me, the only issue is how to get around the possibility of two "you"s. For me, this is solved by the fact that the exact instant one becomes aware they did not die in the machine, the two have disparate memory banks. Nothing ship-of-theseus rears its head.

Here is a thought experiment - I do not think it is mine, but I cannot remember whose it is — Clearbury

Parfit outlines several versions of this in Reasons and Persons as related to humans. He uses surgeries replacing body parts, and swapping body parts to tease out the intuitions. Far too long to summarize, but that may be helpful in you find the discussion. DM me if you need further help on that...

On the other hand, if the mind stays with the functioning, then the mind stays where it is and the reassembled brain is either just a lump of meat or another mind, but it isn't the original one. — Clearbury

This is a conclusion for a different thought experiment, on my view. Yours speaks to "at what point" certain things become, or are disestablished. The whole-sale transference of matter in the sense of "Reassembling" is not the same question, I don't think. However, I think when you turn this to brains and minds, we don't know enough about functional memory and where/what in the brain houses/contributes to/eliminates memories to justly answer whether or not the "old, reassembled" brain would carry any memories with it.

This is a conclusion for a different thought experiment, on my view. — AmadeusD

I think it's about the one described as there seems to be a radical difference between what our reason tells us about where the valuable machine goes, and where the mind goes, even though we have exactly the same replacement process at play in both.

If our minds are our brains - a view I think is false - then our minds would, like the valuable machine, go with the matter. That there was uninterrupted consciousness in the other place - like the uninterrupted functioning of the machine - would be irrelevant.

But my reason anyway represents my mind to stay with the uninterrupted consciousness.

But it can't plausibly be that the consciousness was uninterrupted that explains why my mind stayed where it was (even though it assures us of it), for clearly a mind can be unconscious for a stretch and still be the same mind afterwards (just as a machine can stop functioning for a while and still be the same machine afterwards).

It's this combination that then implies that the mind is not the brain, but a bearer of conscious states that is associated with brains. That the consciousness was uninterrupted assures us that the mind was present there the whole time, but the consciousness is not the mind, but simply a state the mind was in.

why they think banning abortion is the right thing to do. — Samlw

"If someone is willing to kill even their own unborn children, then how can they be counted on that they won't kill other people?"

This, as far as I can reconstruct, is the concern that is actually behind some of the disapproval of abortion, although I've never heard it directly voiced like this (which is not surprising, given the content).

This also explains why anti-abortionists generally don't have a problem with capital punishment -- it's killing innocents that ix wrong, but not criminals. And also why they are in favor of firearm possession -- it's for personal protection, as they fear for their lives, living among those who are casually willing to kill even their own, innocent children.

Most abortion debates get nowhere because they're focusing on the personhood status of the unborn or the lack of such status, rather than looking at the intention for abortion and the implications of such intention.

The tragedy is the concept of unwanted pregnancies, which have the potential to result in unwanted children. Unwanted children are over represented in the criminal element as adults. Effective Birth Control has lowered this number considerably, but every BC method has a failure rate.

Most abortion debates get nowhere because they're focusing on the personhood status of the unborn or the lack of such status, rather than looking at the intention for abortion and the implications of such intention. — baker

What are the implications?

The brain has all the connections it had before it was removed from your body, so she will have your memories.

And I think that's absurd. It's not the case that Jane forgets her life and remembers yours; it's the case that Jane is dead and you're alive in her body.

You mean my brain is alive in her body. Every person you’ve ever met, and will ever meet, is more than a brain. So that’s large and ever-increasing body of observable evidence just left to the side. It’s why you cannot imagine yourself being a disembodied brain without some sort of mechanism to keep you alive while you’re outside the body. And here I thought persons were supposed to be autonomous, but we are treating the brain like a dependent fetus, something that needs to be kept alive through intervention.

I can't be a single person in two disconnected bodies with two disconnected brains, and neither half is somehow privileged such that one is me and the other isn't. So it must be that neither is me. Therefore I'm dead.

But your brain is still alive. If a person is a brain, and the brain is still alive, the person is still alive, no?

You mean my brain is alive in her body. — NOS4A2

And there is a person. That person remembers growing up as you, not as Jane. Your claim is that this person is Jane because it's Jane's body and my claim is that this person is you because it's your brain (and memories and personality and so on).

I think that my view is more reasonable than your view.

But your brain is still alive. If a person is a brain, and the brain is still alive, the person is still alive, no? — NOS4A2

As I said above, I am a single person. If my brain is cut in half and each part kept alive and put in two different bodies then there are now two people. Given that I am not two people and given that neither new person is privileged, it must be that neither of these two people are me, and so I am dead.

The same reasoning applies to your claim that the organism is the person; if your body is cut in half and each half kept alive by replacement organs then there are now two organisms, not one. You cannot be both, therefore either neither is you or one of them is privileged. But at least in this case I would say that the half that kept the brain is the privileged half and so is you; the other half is just a bunch of organs, not a person.

It’s why you cannot imagine yourself being a disembodied brain without some sort of mechanism to keep you alive while you’re outside the body. — NOS4A2

I certainly could imagine it. It's just not biologically feasible as a brain cannot survive without help.

Relevant to this is this:

Decapitation is quickly fatal to humans and most animals. Unconsciousness occurs within seconds without circulating oxygenated blood (brain ischemia). Cell death and irreversible brain damage occurs after 3–6 minutes with no oxygen, due to excitotoxicity. Some anecdotes suggest more extended persistence of human consciousness after decapitation, but most doctors consider this unlikely and consider such accounts to be misapprehensions of reflexive twitching rather than deliberate movement, since deprivation of oxygen must cause nearly immediate coma and death ("[Consciousness is] probably lost within 2–3 seconds, due to a rapid fall of intracranial perfusion of blood").

A laboratory study testing for humane methods of euthanasia in awake animals used EEG monitoring to measure the time duration following decapitation for rats to become fully unconscious, unable to perceive distress and pain. It was estimated that this point was reached within 3–4 seconds, correlating closely with results found in other studies on rodents (2.7 seconds, and 3–6 seconds). The same study also suggested that the massive wave which can be recorded by EEG monitoring approximately one minute after decapitation ultimately reflects brain death. Other studies indicate that electrical activity in the brain has been demonstrated to persist for 13 to 14 seconds following decapitation (although it is disputed as to whether such activity implies that pain is perceived), and a 2010 study reported that decapitation of rats generated responses in EEG indices over a period of 10 seconds that have been linked to nociception across a number of different species of animals, including rats

There is, perhaps, at least a few seconds where the brain is alive (and a conscious person).