I'm quite unconvinced we can make any kind of claim like this, and is principally why I can't get on too much with Kant (along with his boiling-down to God for his fundamental conclusions, in terms of regression). — AmadeusD

Good point. This article on Causality of Hume and Kant has a through explanation on the concept.

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-hume-causality/

The OP's point was to explore the claim from Hume and Kant, our perception need external objects or excitement from the objects on our minds to operate. The OP is trying to argue that this claim is not necessarily true. Because there are cases that human perception operates even without external objects existing or external excitement on the mind (like Kant's claim). We perceive non-existence objects at times without any objects existing in front of us.

The OP's purpose of argument is to prove a possibility of another mechanism of mind which operates behind the scene being able to perceive the non-existence objects, which can offer explanation of the workings of causality, space and time and other metaphysical entities.

I don't think we can make this claim, because sans experience of an object without human perception, we have nothing to go on. It may be (as I think I lean) that human minds are literally empty at inception. We learn concepts through having them foisted on the mind. There's no reason to thinkt he mind is incapable of assenting to a concept like space, given it could not function without it, in the world (this, obviously, assumes space as a facet of reality outside of minds - which I think is uncontroversial, myself). — AmadeusD

I was trying to understand points in the passage here, but I couldn't. I am not sure if it is linguistic structure or the philosophical point which are complex and abstract.

What do you mean by "sans experience of an object without human perception, we have nothing going on"?

Human perception is always operational even in sleep according to the posters' and my own experiences. The only time human perception stops is when mind falls into unconsciousness, and when the body dies.

I am not sure if mind keeps working after death of the body, but no one alive had been dead, hence no one can certify on the mystery of mind after death.

It may be (as I think I lean) that human minds are literally empty at inception. We learn concepts through having them foisted on the mind. There's no reason to thinkt he mind is incapable of assenting to a concept like space, given it could not function without it, in the world (this, obviously, assumes space as a facet of reality outside of minds - which I think is uncontroversial, myself). — AmadeusD

Aren't some perceptions direct, and some indirect? It depends on the situations and also the objects of perception. Not all perceptions are direct, and not all are indirect. They are confused in thinking there are only one type of perception.

There are perceptions that we perceive the objects as they are (such as the objects which are accessible and possible to interact with, in which case perceptions of this kind could be described as direct), and there are objects that we perceive as our brain interprets from the sense data (which are not directly accessible and impossible to interact with), then perceptions on these objects are indirect.

Depending on the nature of the objects, we perceive and experience them in different way, not just direct realist way, or not just indirect realist way only.

The OP is trying to argue that this claim is not necessarily true. Because there are cases that human perception operates even without external objects existing or external excitement on the mind (like Kant's claim). We perceive non-existence objects at times without any objects existing in front of us. — Corvus

I understand/understood hte claim, and based on my own parochial understanding of Kant, my replies flowed. My responses (you'll perhaps see after this) are direct responses to that position). I think the premise is wrong and so the argument unneeded.

What do you mean by "sans experience of an object without human perception, we have nothing going on"? — Corvus

If we could, somehow, access an object in some way other than via the means of human perception (this appears metaphysically impossible - implicit in my wording), then we could compare the workings of both. But, we don't have that, so we can't make any 'a priori' claims. Though, it seems i meant "nothing to go on" apologies for that mis-step.

The only time human perception stops is when mind falls into unconsciousness — Corvus

Sleep is defined as a state of unconsciousness, making these claims a bit dubious to me. We lose consciousness every day, multiple times for most of us. If perception continues in this situation, we need to delineate between unconsciousness, and non-consciousness, which is what I think you mean to address, based on "unconsciousness" not doing the work you're wanting.

I think the final line of that post of yours is apt for the current convo too. No one knows what its like to be unable to perceive. That would be a perception. We are, therefore, unable to make claims about a prioris or hte nature of non-consciousness. I think...

Aren't some perceptions direct, and some indirect? — Corvus

I'm not quite sure how this para is responding to the quote it seems to respond to, so my reply might seem inapt:
No. All perceptions are indirect, on my reading, and when pressed, I think "direct realists" have to assent to the facts which lead me there. We just don't want to say the same things about it. But the image of a cup in your mind is patently, inarguable, not hte cup on the table - the same way a photograph is not, literally, the thing it represents. The rest can be argued ad infinitum, though, and I think that's where the confusion comes from. The DRists that think there's no argument literally hand-wave and ignore the discussion while asserting something so obviously wrong it's hard to engage.

there are objects that we perceive as our brain interprets from the sense data — Corvus

These are all objects, hence the above. I think you're talking about perceiving our interactions with objects, which appears direct. True, and its possible we are 'directly' touching the cup. But our perception is not of that interaction. It is a representation of it. Again, this may amount to a direct realist theory, but it doesn't seem like DRists are adequately grappling with these facts. I think you're describing imagination, which would not be direct as its a recall mechanism. It's indirect, as to the relevant 'data', the same way our mental image of the cup on the table is. In this sense, we donot have direct perceptual access to the cup. I don't think there is any empirical reason to doubt this conceptualisation - but how we deal with it is up for grabs, in some sense.

Again, before anyone gets their knickers in a twist: This doesn't mean Direct Realism is doa. It means its not what Searle etc.. childishly think they can simply assert without any decent argument. I have certainly stepped back from the fairly staunch position i took in response to Banno for this reason. I can't be doing the same thing he is, and claiming some kind of humility. I just think, as has been put forward elsewhere, the distinction is one of kind and not one of 'evidence'. I do not see the process of vision to perception as direct. He probably does. But, i put to him that the page on Perception and another (possibly Indirect Realism) on the SEP conflict with each other, when he wanted to use the former's conclusion (which isn't supported by it's article) as some kind of support for his position. It was more hand-waving.

we perceive and experience them in different way, not just direct realist way, or not just indirect realist way only — Corvus

I don't think we have any grounds to say we have different modes of perception. Our mind works the way it works. We don't have two systems of data processing. We ahve one, and multiple sources of data. Though, I find it hard to say memory counts as anythign more than weak sense data from prior experience.

I understand/understood hte claim, and based on my own parochial understanding of Kant, my replies flowed. My responses (you'll perhaps see after this) are direct responses to that position). I think the premise is wrong and so the argument unneeded. — AmadeusD

You need to explain why the premise is wrong. You cannot just say something is wrong without giving out the reason why. If there is no argument on your claim, then it is not a philosophical claim.

If we could, somehow, access an object in some way other than via the means of human perception (this appears metaphysically impossible - implicit in my wording), then we could compare the workings of both. But, we don't have that, so we can't make any 'a priori' claims. Though, it seems i meant "nothing to go on" apologies for that mis-step. — AmadeusD

But why would you do that? I don't think anyone was saying to access an object in some way other than via the means of human perception. You need to explain further on this.

Sleep is defined as a state of unconsciousness, making these claims a bit dubious to me. — AmadeusD

Sleep is not a state of total unconsciousness. Your body is fully functional in the biological level while asleep. And even mentally you are not totally unconscious. If you are totally unconscious, then you wouldn't know when to get up, or hear the loud scream or shouting telling you get up time to go to work.

In sleep, you are still perceiving the part of your bodily states, so you feel comfort or discomfort, and you are perceiving your dreams in the dream world, even if you might not be able to remember what your dream was about.

These are all objects, hence the above. I think you're talking about perceiving our interactions with objects, which appears direct. True, and its possible we are 'directly' touching the cup. But our perception is not of that interaction. It is a representation of it. — AmadeusD

You are grossly misunderstanding what I said. I never said that perception is interaction. What I said was that we can interact with some objects we perceive. We can also access the perceived objects directly i.e. I can open and close the book in front of me, I can read it. If it is an apple, you can see it, but also peel it, and eat it. This is the real perception. You read the real book, peel the real apple, and eat the real apple directly. You are not seeing and reading the book in front of you indirectly, but directly because it is touchable, visible and readable i.e. accessible and interactable.

But if you are seeing a new book in Amazon, you are only seeing the image of the book with some info about it. You are seeing the book indirectly. You are still seeing the book, but it is not the real book.

If you see apples in your neighbor's garden apple tree distance away, then you see the apples, but not quite sure what type of apples they are. They could be cooking apple, or could be red delicious. You don't know if they have bugs eaten the apple from the distance. You only have prehension of the apple. Then you would add some of your imagination on your perception of the apples, and perceive them. This could be called indirect realist's account of perception.

But I feel this division of DR or IDR arguments in perception is pointless and fruitless. Because as I said already there are different types of perception depending on the situation, the types of objects perceived, and human mind can be fed with the perceptual info in different ways via different sensory organs.

You read time from your watch or clocks, but you also perceive time via your stomach when you feel hungry in the mid afternoon, you know it is lunch time etc. Anyhow, I could go on with a plethora of examples, but I hope you get the point.

I don't think we have any grounds to say we have different modes of perception. — AmadeusD

I think we do. There are a plethora of different types of objects in the world for our perception. And our perception works in different ways for different objects in different situations. Sometimes we have to use microscopes, telescopes, radars, computers in order to perceive objects. Sometimes we just need a pair of bare eyes and ears to perceive. Sometimes we concentrate on the objects while perceiving, and other times we have flashing passing ideas and images for some new ideas, while walking or even in sleeping. It is a very rich and complicated system.