The problem of "existential anxiety" only ever exists precisely in reference to religions and spiritualities, old and more recent.
It's inconceivable otherwise. — baker

Suffering (with a capital "S") is simply the label I give all this negative understanding (self-awareness). Bed bugs, diseases, emotional trauma, and cancer are often situational and contingent. That is to say, they happen under certain conditions, in certain spaces and times at certain probabilities. The likelihood of any situational negative experience is high on a daily basis. The ability to combine this into a category and label it "Suffering", is something our species is able to do. Negativity/Suffering is simply a universal for a diverse set of instances. The name or label, or even manner in which it is spoken (metaphorical, allegorical, mythological) is less relevant.

However, there is another form that you can put into the bucket- the "existential" kind. This one is felt most with the emotional feeling of boredom. It's the engine running but no clearly interesting goals. It's the baseline. It's the Pascal's "cannot sit still in an empty room" scenario. Most cultures, at least to any degree of writing, has written about it- chasing after "vanity", Buddhist notions of dissatisfaction- Dukkha, Gnostic and Platonic notions of a corrupted reality and ideal reality. It all revolves around these themes of a general existential dissatisfaction.

Other animals do indeed feel pains and are harmed, but don't have the contingent-thinking to know that "something could be different". Things happen to most other animals. They don't opine that it could have been something else. They don't have the ability to see the picture of the category of Suffering in general.

So here we are, animals that can see the big picture of Suffering. That can know that things could be different, but are currently not the ideal.

The fact that we exist is something over which we have no control, it precedes us. As such, we have no say over its meaning. — baker

Hence the need for antinatalism as an ethic.

To try to figure out why we exist or why life is worth living and to make this a matter of decision is like trying to choose one's parents. That is, it's irrational, it cannot be done. — baker

I didn't say this. That's something you asserted here for some reason, kind of an aside maybe. When I said this:

Rather, all these "goods" are not necessarily only "factual" or objective but rather normative. There is an agenda, at the cost of much suffering. But we must look at this and see what it is we are trying to do here and why we are insisting on doing it. That's why I suggested we should treat existence as a political committee would, putting a moratorium on it until we understand why we trudge forth, but do this analysis unflinchingly, without the poetic cliches. — schopenhauer1

I mean in general, the human project. What are we wanting people to "do" here? Why procreate more people here? When someone begins to answer this, the agenda reveals itself. Suffering considerations take a back seat.

Hence the need for antinatalism as an ethic. — schopenhauer1

I'm gonna be the devil's advocate here and side with you.

To me, the psychological crisis that people have talked about -- and I think all philosophers had gone through it -- is the realization of our mortality: life will end soon and we question whether life could have been better. Although it is only a temporary phase in life, it is one of the 'sufferings' that we would have to experience, as any normal human being would have. If we are being honest to ourselves, we would pass this information on to our children -- someday, they, too, would have to experience the same thing.

That aside, all studies point to the idea that 'population control' is the best thing to solve a lot of human problems. But as long as we believe that procreation is a fundamental right, population control is sometimes successful and sometimes not. We just cannot get a grip of it because of the "fundamental right".

Suffering (with a capital "S") is simply the label I give all this negative understanding (self-awareness). Bed bugs, diseases, emotional trauma, and cancer are often situational and contingent.
[...]
/boredom/ — schopenhauer1

Why do you call these "negative"? Based on what standards? Why those standards?

Other animals do indeed feel pains and are harmed, but don't have the contingent-thinking to know that "something could be different". Things happen to most other animals. They don't opine that it could have been something else. They don't have the ability to see the picture of the category of Suffering in general.

So here we are, animals that can see the big picture of Suffering. That can know that things could be different, but are currently not the ideal.

These comparisons with animals seem to be very important to you. It's not yet clear, why, though. Some form of envy or nostalgia?
Do you think animals are better off than humans?

What are we wanting people to "do" here? Why procreate more people here? — schopenhauer1

To fight, to be strong, to rule. People love to fight, to rule.

Why do you call these "negative"? Based on what standards? Why those standards? — baker

Negative is as it implies: If you are at a more positive state (happy, neutral), and you experience something that brings you to a less positive state, it is negative. Not that hard.

These comparisons with animals seem to be very important to you. It's not yet clear, why, though. Some form of envy or nostalgia?
Do you think animals are better off than humans? — baker

If you read some of my posts, I think you can get what I am saying. I explain the dilemma of human consciousness as compared to other animals.

To fight, to be strong, to rule. People love to fight, to rule. — baker

That is an interesting answer, but I doubt that would consciously be the reason people procreate. The worst offenses are continuation of bloodline, to add a laborer, or to continue society. The medium, to play role as parent. The least (yet still misguided), to give the "opportunity" for the new being to experience X, Y, Z positive experiences.

Obviously, the reasons are multivarious and multicausal. An answer one day might change the next. It's hard to pin down any specific desire to a reason, but many are proffered.

I’ve been listening the last two years to John Vervaeke’s Awakening from the Meaning Crisis. …
— Wayfarer

Yes, I have watched most of that series. I noticed he discusses Hegel but does not have one on Schopenhauer. I think that's something revealing. — schopenhauer1

He talks about him in Episode 22, immediately prior to the episode on Hegel. He says Schopenhauer was the ‘godfather of nihilism’ which I don’t necessarily agree with. But that and the preceding two episodes are riveting,

. He says Schopenhauer was the ‘godfather of nihilism’ which I don’t necessarily agree with. — Wayfarer

What are the reasons for you don't agree with the claim?

I can see why he says it, and why Schopenhauer has the reputation of being a pessimist who says that life is meaningless. I'm a lot more drawn to his 'World as idea' than I am to the whole 'philosophy of the Will' aspect. But that is not the whole of his philosophy. Take a look at Moral Awareness as a Mode of Self Transcendence and the following sections.

It seems clear that Schopenhauer was strongly influenced by Kant's idealism and transcendental philosophy as well as Buddhism. I gather he had written substantial critical commentary on Kant's TI, but seems to had adopted part of the TI into his epistemology and the idea of the World.

But if you read his original essays called "On the Suffering of the World", it seems to be unmistakably nihilism writing. Isn't Buddhism after all based on the nihilism?

as well as Buddhism. — Corvus

He was very much a disciple of Kant, although one who dared to correct his teacher, but his main Eastern source was a translation of one of the Upaniṣads, not Buddhism. Buddhism was not well known in Schopenhauer's day, although he does mention it.

Isn't Buddhism after all based on the nihilism? — Corvus

Nihilism is rejected as a false view in Buddhism. It is one of the 'two extremes', the other extreme being eternalism, although that is a difficult concept to explain in few words.

Although that essay you quote is indeed pessimistic, perhaps I have been too easily impressed by the idealist aspects of his philosophy. His dour pessimism is alienating at times.

The way I compare Schopenhauer's philosophy to Buddhism is that he has an acute sense of the 'first noble truth' of Buddhism, that existence is dukkha, suffering or sorrowful or unsatisfying. But not so much of the remaining three 'noble truths' - that suffering has a cause, that it has an end, and that there is a way to that end. So it's not unreservedly pessmistic, although it is not very compatible with what modern culture regards as normality.

Nihilism is rejected as a false view in Buddhism. It is one of the 'two extremes', the other extreme being eternalism, although that is a difficult concept to explain in few words.

Although that essay you quote is indeed pessimistic, perhaps I have been too easily impressed by the idealist aspects of his philosophy. His dour pessimism is alienating at times. — Wayfarer

Buddha was a royal dude in his country where he was born. He had everything i.e. money, power, luxury of life and thousands around him to do things for him. But he knew all that good things in life won't last. He will get old, and eventually die giving up everything he had just like any other ordinary folks.

So after much thought about it, he decided to abandon everything he had, and went up to the mountain penniless and hungry. He sat down under the tree, and meditated for the knowledge and meaning of life until his death.

That is a typical scenario of nihilism. All the good things and luxury of life one has at present will not last, because everything changes, and his life too. Getting old and dying is the fate of man. Therefore everything in life is meaningless. But if life is meaningless, then dying is also meaningless. Because whether one likes it or not, it will come to him anyway. Isn't it nihilism?

Schopenhauer says in his essays, because all above and more, life is bad, and not worth living. After reading his pessimistic essays, many German young folks killed themselves at the time when Schopenhauer was living. One of the famous philosophers who followed the path was Mainlander, I believe. But ironically Schopenhauer didn't kill himself. He lived a long life, and had a natural death.

The way I compare Schopenhauer's philosophy to Buddhism is that he has an acute sense of the 'first noble truth' of Buddhism, that existence is dukkha, suffering or sorrowful or unsatisfying. But not so much of the remaining three 'noble truths' - that suffering has a cause, that it has an end, and that there is a way to that end. So it's not unreservedly pessmistic, although it is not very compatible with what modern culture regards as normality. — Wayfarer

Suffering will only end after one's death. That's not a good ending. Death is unknown and eternal, forcing life to give up even the minimum existence and freedom of thinking. Life is a pinnacle of tragedy from Schopenhauer's view in his essays.

We attribute values to things. We then necessarily attribute value to our sense of self.

A "self" is needed to value.

This seems massively too easy a question to answer so tell me what you are getting at please.

Meaning: What point are you driving at, or what underlying question/s are you looking to address/reveal?

If life is bad and non-being is good, this as antinatalism advocates and disseminates, then there is no surprise that many out there will come to infer that the only logical conclusion to the unpleasantries of life is to commit suicide. Even though an antinatalist will not advocate for suicide per se, the message they send via their tenuous reasoning directly works toward this effect, most especially for those who believe death to equate to non-being. — javra


This to me is a load of bullshit. So yeah I don't follow the reasoning. — schopenhauer1

Since I've now got some spare time, I'll try again:

In the sense of what Shakespeare asked by the question "to be or not to be?", do you or do you not uphold that being (to be) is bad and non-being (not to be) is good?

If you do not uphold this underlined part, how would your held onto position not contradict all moral arguments if favor of antinatalism?

If you do uphold this underlined part, how then does this upheld position not rationality endorse the obtaining a state of non-being via any action one can accomplish toward this very end? And if corporeal death is taken to equate to eternal non-being, how would suicide not be just such an action?

I think javra is making a solid point. — Wayfarer

Somewhat belated, but thank you.

In the sense of what Shakespeare asked by the question "to be or not to be?", do you or do you not uphold that being (to be) is bad and non-being (not to be) is good?

If you do not uphold this underlined part, how would your held onto position not contradict all moral arguments if favor of antinatalism?

If you do uphold this underlined part, how then does this upheld position not rationality endorse the obtaining a state of non-being via any action one can accomplish toward this very end? And if corporeal death is taken to equate to eternal non-being, how would suicide not be just such an action? — javra

Because I antinatalism does NOT entail suicide. You can perhaps force an argument that way, but it wouldn't be mine. I don't see there being an equivalence with preventing life and ending it, and I am sure you can think of scenarios where you would not start something but once it happens, it perhaps is not always best to end it either. But not ending it doesn't negate the former.

This seems massively too easy a question to answer so tell me what you are getting at please.

Meaning: What point are you driving at, or what underlying question/s are you looking to address/reveal? — I like sushi

Existence entails suffering.

No one is going to disagree with that.