Cool.

Good! But that must mean that "existence" is being given a much broader interpretation than "made of material stuff." So here we go again . . . — J

Existence, in my philosophy, is what has a spatiotemporal location. It has nothing to do with the concept of "being made of material stuff". To be material, in my philosophy, is to be able to change, at least with regards to position in space and moment in time. So you see, existence and matter are not the same thing. True, I hold that material objects, and only they, are the ones that exist. But that does not mean that existence is the same thing as the plurality of material objects that we call "the Universe".

EDIT: In other words, I believe that existence is a property of material objects. And it just so happens that only material objects have that property. Fictional entities like Pegasus do not have that property.

The words "exist" and "existence" cause nothing but trouble, because they call like Sirens to philosophers, inviting us to argue about which use of the word is correct. "My use is correct!" says one group, "because when I use it, I mean concept A." "No, my use is correct!" says another group, "because when I use it, I mean concept B." "Well, Plato used it for concept A." "Well, Kant used it for concept B." — J

I've had years of dispute on this forum about the meaning of the term 'ontology'. At one point in the past, etymologyonline.com had the etymology of the word derived from the present participle of the Greek verb 'to be' - which is, of course, 'I AM'. (Regrettably that detail is now no longer extant at the source.) I seized on that detail to argue for the distinction between ontology qua probing the nature of being, and natural science, qua probing the nature of what exists. I used this as a kind of wedge to distinguish 'being' from 'existence', which I think is a fundamental but generally forgotten or neglected distinction (although C S Peirce recognised it, as he held to a form of scholastic realism and insisted that universals are real.)

One of the previous mods, also a very active contributor, disagreed violently with me about this (although he had a tendency towards violent disagreement with many people which eventually led to his being banned.) Anyway, he posted a link to an article which is apparently a classic in respect of that question, The Greek Verb to Be and the Problem of Being , Charles Kahn, which I've read very carefully a number of times. And I think it supports my general contention about this distinction. Which leads to:

Existence, in my philosophy, is what has a spatiotemporal location — Arcane Sandwich

The generally Platonist objection to that would be, what, then, of numbers, logical and scientific principles, and so on and so forth? In what sense to these exist? That has been the subject of this thread the last couple of weeks, and I think it's by no means settled.

My heuristic, and it is only that, is that numbers, laws, etc, are real but not existent as phenomena. They do not appear amongst phenomena, but can only be discerned by the intellect (nous). So they are, in the Platonic sense, but not the Kantian, noumenal objects, object of nous. Of course, we rely on them automatically, transparently, and continuously, in the operations of discursive thought, whenever we make inferences or judgements. But the elements of those judgements do not, themselves, exist in the way that tables and chairs and Banno's beloved crockery exists. Without them, though, we could not even converse, let alone pursue philosophy.

I used this as a kind of wedge to distinguish 'being' from 'existence', which I think is a fundamental but generally forgotten or neglected distinction — Wayfarer

This, to me, is starting to step in the right direction, because with this distinction we're at least no longer asking "existence" to do more work than it can handle.

Existence, in my philosophy, is what has a spatiotemporal location. It has nothing to do with the concept of "being made of material stuff". — Arcane Sandwich

OK.

existence and matter are not the same thing. — Arcane Sandwich

OK.

I hold that material objects, and only they, are the ones that exist. — Arcane Sandwich

But now you've lost me. Is this a coincidence? You've said there's no definitional relation, so how and why does this relation obtain?

, , my contribution to rebutting the centrality of a being/existing distinction is to point out the three translations of "is" in first order logic - predication, equivalence and quantification. Is there something that is not covered by these but is available in being or existing?

the three translations of "is" in first order logic - predication, equivalence and quantification. — Banno

Only that the sense of 'is' implicit in 'A=A' seems of a different order to that conveyed in 'The cat is on the mat' or 'that apple is red'. In mathematics, "is" (or the equals sign) denotes a relationship of equivalence or identity with absolute precision (e.g., A=A) reflecting the necessary and universal nature of mathematical truths, which are immune to the vagaries of empirical or contextual variation.
Such expressions are intelligible objects belonging to the domain of the noumenal.

In natural language, "is" has a broader and often less precise function. It can indicate:
Predication: "The apple is red."
Existence: "The cat is on the mat."
Identity: "Hesperus is Phosphorus."

These uses depend are context-dependent, and the precision of "is" in natural language is correspondingly far less than in mathematics. Empirical judgements are always in some sense approximations.

The apodictic nature of mathematics—its reliance on axioms, proofs, and logical necessity—was seen as a model for how scientific knowledge should be pursued.

(For that matter, isn't a large part of the astonishing success of science since Galileo owed to the way in which science learned to harness empirical observations to mathematical logic, through the quantification of primary qualities?)

Polysemy of 'being' - At the beginning of the Metaphysics. Aristotle’s recognises that "being" is said in many ways. Disambiguating and differentiating these meanings becomes foundational to his metaphysics and has had a major influence on the Western philosophical tradition.

The fact that this nuanced understanding of "being" is often overlooked today, except in the formalized context of analytic modal metaphysics, is a significant commentary on the state of contemporary philosophy.

In the Metaphysics, Aristotle identifies multiple senses of "being," which include:
* Substance (ousia): The primary sense of being, referring to what a thing fundamentally is.
* Qualitative Attributes: Being in the sense of having certain properties (e.g., "the apple is red").
* Existence: Being in the sense of "being there" or existing in time and space (e.g. "the apple is on the table")
* Potentiality and Actuality: Being as a dynamic process, involving what something can become versus what it is. (Heisenberg, in his interpretation of quantum mechanics, recognized Aristotle's concept of 'potentia' as a useful way to describe the indeterminate states of subatomic particles before measurement.)

What does that post say? Is it in some way a counterproposal? How?

Let's say, for the sake of argument, that the three first-order translations, taken together, describe the conceptual territory covered by "exist" in loose talk. We can of course recommend drawing a line under this and saying, "Please use these three disambiguated terms. While there's nothing pre-ordained about them, they attach easily to three important conceptual areas that cover the field, we can use them to refer to and describe those areas, and they're reasonably familiar from previous usage."

Now on this understanding, the question is not "Is there something that is not covered by these but is available in being or existing?" We've stipulated that the conceptual ground is indeed covered. Rather, the question is "Will it ever be helpful to use the words 'being' and 'existing' to talk about this ground?" Again, notice how much depends on separating term from concept. We want maximum fidelity as to concept and maximum flexibility as to term. So, to my amended version of your question, I would reply, "Sure, it's quite possible. Let's find out. Let's read Heidegger. But what we mustn't do is mistake the question as being about additional conceptual territory. If we do that, we fall once again into the endless battle about what counts as Existence. No, we are asking a terminological question."

Final thought: This is all based on: "for the sake of argument, the three first-order translations, taken together, describe the conceptual territory covered by 'exist' in loose talk." They may not, in which case an entirely different conversation will occur. Here the friends of Existence and Being have the task of convincing us that the issue is conceptual, not terminological.

I hold that material objects, and only they, are the ones that exist. — Arcane Sandwich


But now you've lost me. Is this a coincidence? You've said there's no definitional relation, so how and why does this relation obtain? — J

If by "coincidence" you mean something like an atheist version of occasionalism, then I would say no. It's not a co-incidence, as if two "things" were "inciding" with each other somehow. Let me just go back to my definitions (as in, the context of my personal philosophy):

Existence: it is a property. It is something that material objects have. It is the property of having a spatiotemporal location (which can be fuzzy or clear-cut, it doesn't matter).

Matter: it is not a "stuff", and it is not a single object (i.e., a universal "blob"). Let me explain it like so: to exist is to have a spatiotemporal location, and to be material is to be able to change. I need the concept of matter (in my philosophy) in order to be able to explain why things can change (at the very least, their current spatiotemporal location). Otherwise, you end up with a Parmediean universe. Someone from the school of Parmenides (like Einstein, arguably) will tell you that there is no movement, no change. In other words, a Parmenidean would agree with my definition of existence: it is the property of being in a place and at a time. But then she would disagree with my definition of matter: she would say that nothing changes, that spatiotemporality is in some sense eternal, we are not really moving in our ordinary lives, we just can't see the truth of the immobile, Parmenidean Being, etc.

Existence, in my philosophy, is what has a spatiotemporal location — Arcane Sandwich


The generally Platonist objection to that would be, what, then, of numbers, logical and scientific principles, and so on and so forth? In what sense to these exist? That has been the subject of this thread the last couple of weeks, and I think it's by no means settled.

My heuristic, and it is only that, is that numbers, laws, etc, are real but not existent as phenomena — Wayfarer

My response to the Platonist there is that numbers, logical and scientific principles, and so forth, have the same ontology: they are all just concepts, which means that they are fictions, which means that they are brain processes occurring inside the living brain of a member of the biological species homo sapiens. And I mean that as a metaphysical and scientific statement at the same time. This is textbook Bunge. Which doesn't mean that he's right, since he could be wrong. I'm just saying, I didn't invent this part of my personal philosophy, I simply take this part from Bunge. I'm willing to discuss it rationally and scientifically to see if I have to abandon it, not doubt about that. But anyways, in Bunge's ontology there is a difference between what he calls "conceptual existence" and "real existence". Conceptual existence, according to him, is what the number 3 and Pegasus have in common: they only exist as fictions, which is to say, as brain processes. On the other hand, this stone on the floor and this table in my living room both have the property of real existence, even though the former is a natural object and the latter is an artificial object. How does Bunge define "real existence"? He thinks that real existence is a mereological property. One of his Postulates is that the Universe itself is identical to Reality itself, and that it is the Largest Thing of all. It is the largest Individual in a metaphysical sense, and it is the largest Whole in a mereological sense. To have real existence, he then says, is to be a mereological part of the Universe, because the Universe is Reality itself. And that is where I disagree with him (I also disagree with him on other topics): I don't think that the Universe is a single object, I think it's a plurality that composes no further object. So, my definition of existence, unlike Bunge's, can't be mereological. I agree with Bunge when he says that existence is a property. But I claim that it's the property of having physical spatiotemporality, not the mereological property of being a part of the largest whole.

But I claim that it's the property of having physical spatiotemporality, not the mereological property of being a part of the largest whole. — Arcane Sandwich

I like what you, and Bunge, have to say about numbers being fictions created by the brain (idealizations a might be a better word than fictions). But how can we assign a reality to the universe independent of such brain processes consisting of spatiotemporal localizability? Isnt the notion of spatiotemporal localization based on a mathematical
abstraction?

Isnt the notion of spatiotemporal localization based on a mathematical abstraction? — Joshs

Well I mean, if you want to get technical about it, it has a lot of math to it, but it's ultimately within the domain of what physicists study. To them, math and logic are just tools, they have no ontology. Physics is the academic discipline that deals with the ontology of the world, not math. I don't expect you to agree with that idea, I'm not so sure that I agree with it myself, but that would be the "Bungean" answer to your question, I suppose. It sounds like a fallacy to me, but that's the best I got in relation to your question.

Well I mean, if you want to get technical about it, it has a lot of math to it, but it's ultimately within the domain of what physicists study. To them, math and logic are just tools, they have no ontology. Physics is the academic discipline that deals with the ontology of the world, not math — Arcane Sandwich

I think math is more than a tool for physics. Physics deals only with those aspects of the world which are mathemetizable. The objects of physics are based on geometric idealizations such as space and time. These are presuppositions imposed on the world by physics rather than emanating from the ontology of the world. Forgetting the role such presuppositions play leads to such confusions as Wigner’s famous paper on the ‘unreasonable effectiveness’ of mathematics in the natural sciences.

I think math is more than a tool for physics. Physics deals only with those aspects of the world which are mathemetizable. — Joshs

But that's my point: there are aspects of the world which are not mathematizable. They're called objects, in the literal sense of the term. They are "out there", outside of our brains, they are what Descartes called res extensa. We ourselves are a res extensa. But it does not follow that we are not also a res cogitans in the Cartesian sense. We are both. Our body in general, and our brain more speciffically, is a Cartesian res exstensa and res cogitans at the same time. So, by grammatical simplification, you can remove the word "res" from both of those terms. What that leaves you with, is two "disembodied" predicates: just extensa, and just cogitans. And the argument here, is that there is something to which the predicates extensa and cogitans apply. So, there is something. That something is the brain as a res extensa, and as a physical body more generally, which is physically related to other physical bodies, some of them containing human brains just like yours, just like mine. And the brain is the object to which the predicate cogitans applies as well. One thing (the brain), two predicates (extena and cogitans). The brain is a thing, but the mind is not a thing, the mind is simply what the brain does, in the same sense that digestion is what your gut does. Your gut is the object (the res extensa) in that case, but your digestion is not: your digestion is a process that your gut undergoes (it's more complicated than that, biologically, but that's "how this works" at the basic level of ontology)

But that's my point: there are aspects of the world which are not mathematizable. They're called objects, in the literal sense of the term. They are "out there", outside of our brains, they are what Descartes called res extensa. — Arcane Sandwich

Res extensa forces onto objects the concept of persisting identity, which is also the basis of enumeration.

Heidegger explains:

“Thus what can be shown to have the character of constantly remaining, as remanens capax mutationem, constitutes the true being of beings which can be experienced in the world. What enduringly remains truly is. This is the sort of thing that mathematics knows. What mathematics makes accessible in beings constitutes their being.”

Heidegger argues that the fundamentally undiscussed ontological foundations of empirical science since Descartes are based on his formulation of objective presence. Just like number, the notion of pure self-persistence is a fiction applied to the world.

“Thus the being of the "world" is, so to speak, dictated to it in terms of a definite idea of being which is embedded in the concept of substantiality and in terms of an idea of knowledge which cognizes beings in this way. Descartes does not allow the kind of being of innerworldly beings to present itself, but rather prescribes to the world, so to speak, its "true" being on the basis of an idea of being (being = constant objective presence) the source of which has not been revealed and the justification of which has not been demonstrated.

Thus it is not primarily his dependence upon a science, mathematics, which just happens to be especially esteemed, that determines his ontology of the world, rather his ontology is determined by a basic ontological orientation toward being as constant objective presence, which mathematical knowledge is exceptionally well suited to grasp.”

Res extensa forces onto objects the concept of persisting identity, which is also the basis of enumeration. — Joshs

Do I agree with this? I'm not so sure. Let's see what Heidegger has to say, in those passages that you quoted.

Heidegger argues that the fundamentally undiscussed ontological foundations of empirical science since Descartes are based on his formulation of objective presence. — Joshs

Does he argue that? I'm no so sure that he does. But let's continue. You then say:

Just like number, the notion of pure self-persistence is a fiction applied to the world. — Joshs

I don't think so. I think it's an objective feature of the world. The world was already like this, before I was born. And it will continue to be this way, after I die. And currently, it is that way, the fact that I'm alive has nothing to do with it, and since my mind does not live by itself (it requires my living brain), the world simply is that way tout court, so to speak. So, Heidegger (and you) are simply wrong about that. At least that's my opinion. I could be wrong, of course, but I don't see how anyone could possibly make a convincing case for it, let alone state it as an argument (i.e., an exclusive series of true premises that deductively entail a conclusion).

“Thus the being of the "world" is, so to speak, dictated to it in terms of a definite idea of being which is embedded in the concept of substantiality and in terms of an idea of knowledge which cognizes beings in this way. Descartes does not allow the kind of being of innerworldly beings to present itself, but rather prescribes to the world, so to speak, its "true" being on the basis of an idea of being (being = constant objective presence) the source of which has not been revealed and the justification of which has not been demonstrated.

Thus it is not primarily his dependence upon a science, mathematics, which just happens to be especially esteemed, that determines his ontology of the world, rather his ontology is determined by a basic ontological orientation toward being as constant objective presence, which mathematical knowledge is exceptionally well suited to grasp.” — Heidegger

What is Heidegger saying there, in your honest opinion?

remanens capax mutationem — Heidegger

Or just explain this part to me, @Joshs, what does Heidegger even mean by that? I genuinely don't get it. And I studied Classical Latin at the Uni for one semester. "Remanens capax mutationem"? What does that even mean? Is there any textual evidence to back this sort of claim up? Like, is that an actual phrase from ancient Roman times, yes or no? I think Heidegger wants to imply that it is, but I'm arguing for the opposite point of view here.

EDIT: According to Google Translate, "Remanens capax mutationem" means "remaining capable of change" in English, and "Siendo capaz de cambiar", in Spanish. That doesn't make any conceptual sense to me, so I doubt that it many sense for anyone other than Heidegger himself.

EDIT: According to Google Translate, "Remanens capax mutationem" means "remaining capable of change" in English, and "Siendo capaz de cambiar", in Spanish. That doesn't make any conceptual sense to me, so I doubt that it many sense for anyone other than Heidegger himself. — Arcane Sandwich

I assume he means , that which truly is is that which remains self-identical in its substantive qualities as it undergoes quantitative change in spatial or temporal location. I’m with Heidegger here. I don’t believe there is anything in the world which retains its exact qualitative identity over time. It just appears to us as if this is the case because things can remain SIMILAR to themselves over time, and that’s why we invented number (same thing, different time).

I assume he means , that which truly is is that which remains self-identical in its substantive qualities as it undergoes quantitative change in spatial or temporal location. I’m with Heidegger here. I don’t believe there is anything in the world which retains its exact qualitative identity over time. It just appears to us as if this is the case because things can remain SIMILAR to themselves over time, and that’s why we invented number (same thing, different time). — Joshs

Yeah sorry, I genuinely don't understand that. It sounds like Heidegger and you are on to something there, but I don't know what it is. That's always been the case with Heidegger and I. It was even like that for himself, since the literal reason why he didn't write the conclusion for Being and Time is because he didn't have the language to do such a thing.

And his point was, that no one does. However -what follows is extremely important, if you're a Heideggerian (which I'm not)- that situation has historical limits. It's not a static thing. It changes. Think of it like Hegel's Absolute Spirit marching through History, think of it more like that. At least that's how I read it, but I could be wrong, of course.

Nice work. I'll go along with that.

I baulk at your distinguishing "conceptual" from "terminological". Our terminology sets out our "conceptual framework" as it were.

(existence) is a property. It is something that material objects have. It is the property of having a spatiotemporal location (which can be fuzzy or clear-cut, it doesn't matter). — Arcane Sandwich

"A is at (x,y,x,t)".

Therefore something is at (x,y,x,t).

But π is not at (x,y,x,t); are you willing to conclude that π does not exist?

There are genuine problems with treating existence as a property, some brought out in free logic, some accounted for in ordinary first-order logic. There are reasons that quantification is different to predication. Reasons first order logic works with "∃(x)" and not ∃!x. Foremost are perhaps the difficulties in applying extensionality to existence if it is treated as a predicate.

Extensionality is simply the idea that if two predicates range over the same individuals, they are the smae predicate. If f={a,b,c} and g={a.b.c} then f=g. If we allow ∃! to be a predicate of this sort, then does it includes everything? What things are not in ∃!? The elements of ∃! are the domain of discourse.

I don't know how Bung deals with this, but in free logic is leads to there being two domains, one of things that exist and one of things that do not. And it gets a bit weird.

So if ∃! is a property, it is not like (f,g,h...) and the other properties of first order logic.

which means that they are brain processes occurring inside the living brain of a member of the biological species homo sapiens. — Arcane Sandwich

There's a simple argument to show that this is not so.

If π is a brain process in your brain, and also a brain process in my brain, then it is two different things.

But if that were so, when I talk about π I am talking about a quite different thing to you, when you talk about π.

This is a cut-down version of the private language argument. π is not private thin in each of our heads, but a public thing that is used openly to make calculations and settle disagreements.

This is a cut-down version of the private language argument. π is not private thin in each of our heads, but a public thing that is used openly to make calculations and settle disagreements. — Banno

Right, but that's what I'm saying. Explain this phrase to me: "remanens capax mutationem". Those are Heidegger's literal words, they make no sense in the English language nor in the Spanish language (not if we're being charitable towards them). And those are the only languages that I speak as an individual. I don't speak Classical Latin. But that's how Heidegger "means it", that's the intent of those words. But that phrase itself, never appears in classical documents. Better classicists than me have argued this point quite strongly, and historians back up such claims. So what's Heidegger saying? It's incomprehensible to me. What it means, according to Google Translate, is "remaining capable of change" in English, and "Siendo capaz de cambiar", in Spanish.

And that doesn't make any conceptual sense to me, but it does make grammatical sense. What he's saying is grammatically correct, but semantically meaningless.

If π is a brain process in your brain, and also a brain process in my brain, then it is two different things.

But if that were so, when I talk about π I am talking about a quite different thing to you, when you talk about π.

This is a cut-down version of the private language argument. π is not private thin in each of our heads, but a public thing that is used openly to make calculations and settle disagreements. — Banno

Pi is like any other word. It is communicated in partially shared circumstances. This circumstance includes your brain processes and my brains processes , along with their embodiment in each of our organisms and the embeddedness of our brains and bodies in a partially shared social environment. None of these aspects
can be neatly disentangled from the others, but the fact that the meaning of pi is only partially shared between us explains why its use by either of us can always be contested by the other.

None of these aspects
can be neatly disentangled from the others, but the fact that the meaning of pi is only partially shared between us explains why its use by either of us can always be contested by the other. — Joshs

But that brings back @Count Timothy von Icarus's point about the debate between Rorty and Eco. Things cannot be pragmatism and convention all the way own. That's what Eco said to Rorty. And it's an excellent, sound, reasonable thing to say. Why? Because it's true, that's why.

I don't find Heidegger of much use. Same goes for most of that school of Phenomenology.

the meaning of pi is only partially shared... — Joshs

But that's not quite right - π refers to the ratio of the diameter to the circumference of a circle; that's it.

Moreover, the idea of meaning as shared is decrepit. Meaning is something we do. Or better, stop looking at meaning and look instead at use.

↪Arcane Sandwich I don't find Heidegger of much use. Same goes for most of that school of Phenomenology. — Banno

Apparently you dont have much use for practice-based accounts of discursive normativity either.

the meaning of pi is only partially shared...
— Joshs
But that's not quite right - π refers to the ratio of the radius to the circumference of a circle; that's it.

Moreover, the idea of meaning as shared is decrepit. Meaning is something we do. Or better, stop looking at meaning and look instead at use. — Banno

Use determines the sense of meaning , and use is a function of partially shared discursive practices within a community of language users. The definition of pi doesn’t determine its sense any more than any rule determines its use.

But that brings back Count Timothy von Icarus's point about the debate between Rorty and Eco. Things cannot be pragmatism and convention all the way own. That's what Eco said to Rorty. And it's an excellent, sound, reasonable thing to say. Why? Because it's true, that's why. — Arcane Sandwich

In case you didn’t see it , I responded to Count Timothy this way:

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/956726

The extension of π, what it refers to, is the ratio of a circle's diameter to it's circumference. The "sense" or "meaning" of π? If we have what we do with π, what more is there?