We pick up on them, we become aware that they are there, just as we become aware that these four apples still exist -as four apples, not merely as a non-numerical bunch of fruit-, when no one is in the house.

Apples are a good example, but cats or whole apple trees might be a better. Are there no discrete individual, whole plants or animals in the world such that they make up a multitude? Organisms are only organic unities as ens ratonis - in our minds? This sounds pretty implausible. And likewise, we have our own thoughts and sensations, not other people's, and so, barring solipsism, this is a fairly obvious instance of multiplicity.

In a debate with Richard Rorty, Umberto Eco tried to press the point that things cannot be pragmatism and convention "all the way down." A screwdriver, in some sense, shapes what we choose to do with it. Rorty disagreed and gave the unfortunate counter example that we could just as well scratch our ear with a screwdriver. Except we wouldn't, because of what a screwdriver is and what we are (or, if the point isn't clear enough, consider a razor sharp hunting knife). The world, and truth, imposes itself on how we deal with things.

things cannot be pragmatism and convention "all the way down." — Count Timothy von Icarus

Of course. What a sound thing to say. Brilliant, I would say. I'm not trying to be funny here, I believe in good common sense myself.

The world, and truth, imposes itself on how we deal with things. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Absolutely. I agree with this. It's funny that I should agree with Eco and not Rorty on this point, but I'm a metaphysical realist before being a pragmatist. That being said, I'm also a materialist, an atheist, a literalist (in some sense of the term), and a staunch defender of scientism. Not just of science as a body of knowledge and what have you, but of scientism itself as a mentality. I'd put it like this: I'm a simple person interested in complicated ideas.

Can I whistle it in French?

Eco is pretty interesting on this point, although I don't know if I'd totally recommend Kant and the Platypus. He starts off by granting the advocates of the linguistic turn and post-moderns most of their premises, and TBH I found the recap of all their points a bit tedious, particularly since some of these premises seem fairly dubious.

It is one thing to say the philosophizing is primarily done with language, it is another to simply assume that language is posterior to being because all talk of being involves language. The assumption seems to require that those without language simply cannot think, which seems a bit much. This is the old reduction of reason to ratio I mentioned earlier, except now ratio is confined to language (and perhaps to isolated, sui generis "language games").

I wouldn't be willing to cede these points. Similarly, one could argue that the senses are that through which we know not what we know. So too do it seem plausible that language is that through which we articulate thought (which is not to say that we don't sometimes use language to think) and another means through which we know, not thought itself and what we know. In the semiotic tradition Eco is advocating for, the sign vehicle is what joins the object and interpretant in an irreducibly triadic relationship (a gestalt perhaps), it is the mediator of a union, and it's a bit tedious to allow it to instead become an inscrutable and insurmountable barrier, only to try to work one's way back from this assumption.

Likewise, it seems unwise to me to leave unchallenged the presumption that truth is primarily in sentences, in syllables and symbols, and not primarily something that relates to the intellect.

Plus, some of the modeling exercise stuff he does could certainly benefit from advances in information theory and the philosophy of information. Although there is certainly still good stuff there. Perhaps the exercise is worthwhile. It is worth pointing out that in the "continua," (his term for "bare" experience prior to language/naming) there are limits. One can suppose that we can go about naming things in many different ways, but we cannot proceed arbitrarily on pain of being corrected on our errors. That there might be many ways to say things need not entail that all are equally correct. One might challenge the notion of genus and species, but if one tries to mate a cat to a dog one shall find a limit on how our conventions might develop.

Still, to me this smacks of the old empiricist view you find in Locke. A sort of atomization at odds with how learning actually occurs. Even brutes have a grasp on wholes. Sheep need not be exposed to many wolves in order to piece together "bundles of sensation" into an "abstracted image" of some whole. The sheep sees or smells their first wolf a bolts, and it is quite good for it that it has this capacity (St. Thomas makes this point in the commentary on De Anima).

That's what I'm not sure about. I don't think I'm asking for the inexpressible itself (call it P) to be expressed; that would indeed be impossible. Rather, I want to know why P is inexpressible. Call that explanation Q. Does it really follow that, if P is inexpressible, Q must be as well? — J

So give an example of something that is inexpressible... — Banno

OK, the challenge is to come up with something that is both a) inexpressible, and b) whose inexpressibility can be explained. It also ought to be something worth worrying about, I would add.
How about starting from the quoted Witt passage?:

The sense of the world must lie outside the world. In the world everything is as it is and happens as it does happen

.

Would it follow from this that the sense of the world is inexpressible, because it lies outside the world? I know what Witt means, more or less: sense, values, interpretation, none of these things are items in the physical world, which is only a collection of happenings, probably accidental. We import these items. So the question is, in doing so have we rendered “the sense of the world” expressible, or is it still inexpressible?

This is just a preliminary question. If you think we can express the sense of the world in this fashion, then my example won’t serve.

Still, to me this smacks of the old empiricist view you find in Locke. A sort of atomization at odds with how learning actually occurs. Even brutes have a grasp on wholes. Sheep need not be exposed to many wolves in order to piece together "bundles of sensation" into an "abstracted image" of some whole. The sheep sees or smells their first wolf a bolts, and it is quite good for it that it has this capacity (St. Thomas makes this point in the commentary on De Anima). — Count Timothy von Icarus

As far as semiotics are concerned, especially philosophical semiotics, and especially philosophical semiotics that lean towards scientism, I gravitate towards Charles Sanders Peirce's philosophy of the tripartite sign and its corresponding areas of study and application: semantics, syntax, and pragmatics.

OK, the challenge is to come up with something that is both a) inexpressible, and b) whose inexpressibility can be explained. — J

I'm just going on intuition here:
In response to the first point, my table is not expressible. It's literally inexpressible. It cannot express anything by itself (because it's an inorganic object), and I cannot express it (because I cannot speak for it, since it's an inorganic object). What I can do is talk about the table, I can tell you about it. I can describe its features, I can explain why it has them, factually. I can speak highly of it, in the manner of a poet or a wine salesperson. But, technically speaking, I cannot "express" it. Therefore, it's inexpressible.
In response to the second point: I have already explained its inexpressibility in the preceding paragraph.

I agree about the table, and I'm glad you spelled it out, because that's why I added the proviso that the desired "inexpressible something" should be worth worrying about. A mere category mistake -- which is what I think you've described -- isn't what we want. Nevertheless, we could look at the table example and ask, "Is there something we can learn from the kind of explanation that's being offered for the table's inexpressibility?" I suspect so, but we'll need to find an adequate example first. @Banno may not think the passage from Witt is any use in generating such an example.

OK, the challenge is to come up with something that is both a) inexpressible, and b) whose inexpressibility can be explained. — J

If Wittgenstein or anyone else claims that X is inexpressible, then they have already expressed the inexpressible. If X were truly inexpressible then it could not be identified and deemed inexpressible.

And if Wittgenstein or anyone else claims that X is inexpressible, then they have reasons why they think it is inexpressible, and thus the putative grounds for its inexpressibility are already contained within the claim that it is inexpressible. After all, we don't claim that X is Y for no reason at all.

If Wittgenstein or anyone else claims that X is inexpressible, then they have already expressed the inexpressible. — Leontiskos

I'll take that bet. I claim that my table is inexpressible. And in saying that, I have not expressed the inexpressible. If you disagree with me on these two points, then I kindly ask you to define, for the purpose of this conversation, what the word "inexpressible" literally means, and I would like a credible source for the definition of that word.

If X were truly inexpressible then it could not be identified and deemed inexpressible. — Leontiskos

I believe that proposition is false. "Truly inexpressible". What do you mean by "Truly" here? Your argument sounds like the "No True Scotsman" fallacy.

if Wittgenstein or anyone else claims that X is inexpressible, then they have reasons why they think it is inexpressible. — Leontiskos

False. The antecedent of that conditional statement is true, while its consequent is false. I claim that my table is inexpressible, but I have no reason why I think it is inexpressible: I'm just going on intuition, not reason.

the putative grounds for its inexpressibility are already contained within the claim that it is inexpressible. — Leontiskos

That is false, as I have just demonstrated.

we don't claim that X is Y for no reason at all. — Leontiskos

It depends on the case. Sometimes we do, sometimes we don't. The conditions and the circumstances of the case matter in such instances.

If you disagree with me on these two points, then I kindly ask you to define, for the purpose of this conversation, what the word "inexpressible" literally means, and I would like a credible source for the definition of that word. — Arcane Sandwich

See:

not capable of being expressed : indescribable — Inexpressible Definition | Merriam Webster

Note how erroneous your definition is:

my table is not expressible. It's literally inexpressible. It cannot express anything by itself (because it's an inorganic object), and I cannot express it (because I cannot speak for it, since it's an inorganic object). — Arcane Sandwich

...."Unable to express itself; unable to be spoken for." You won't find your definition in any dictionary. "X is inexpressible" does not mean "X is unable to speak."

...."Unable to express itself; unable to be spoken for." You won't find your definition in any dictionary. "X is inexpressible" does not mean "X is unable to speak." — Leontiskos

Point taken. Granted.

not capable of being expressed : indescribable — Inexpressible Definition | Merriam Webster

"Indescribable". I claim that my table is "indescribable", and by that I mean, whatever the Merriam Webster Dictionary defines as "indescribable".

The example of my table still stands, @Leontiskos

"Indescribable". I claim that my table is "indescribable", and by that I mean, whatever the Merriam Webster Dictionary defines as "indescribable".

The example of my table still stands, Leontiskos — Arcane Sandwich

"Table" is a common noun, so when you talk about your table you have already given a description. When you talk about your table we all know what sort of thing you are describing.

"Table" is a common noun, so when you talk about your table you have already given a description. — Leontiskos

I think not, and allow me to tell you why I think that. The word "table" is a common noun, but the table in my living room is not a common noun, it's an ordinary object made of wood. And the noun "table" does not literally describe my table, it just defines what the world "table" means. And the Merriam Webster Dictionary definition of the common noun "table" makes no reference to my table, the one in my living room, so how could it describe it? It can't, therefore my table, the one that's in my living room, is indescribable by definition, if by "definition" we understand whatever the Merriam Webster Dictionary has to offer in relation to that word.

EDIT:

When you talk about your table we all know what sort of thing you are describing. — Leontiskos

But that's my point: you only know what sort of thing I'm describing, but you don't know what thing it is specifically, because it's my table.

Right. Your table is a rigid designator.

I've somewhat averse to rigid designators as a concept, so I'm not sure that if I would "side" with the Kripkeians here. That's not to say that Kripke has only produced trash, some of it is trash and some of it makes genuine sense. That's one of my disagreements with Bunge, he saw nothing but trash in Kripke's works.

And the noun "table" does not literally describe my table — Arcane Sandwich

Sure it does. That's why you used the word "table" to represent the object in your living room. If you had said "chair" we would have known that we are talking about a different object.

And the Merriam Webster Dictionary definition of the common noun "table" makes no reference to my table, the one in my living room, so how could it describe it? — Arcane Sandwich

When you say, "This object in my living room is a table," you are appealing to the definition of 'table'. The definition of a table describes tables. That's what a definition does.

It can't, therefore my table, the one that's in my living room, is indescribable by definition — Arcane Sandwich

Of course it's not. You already described the object: it's a table. You could further describe it by giving its color or its material or its height. In no way is your table indescribable or inexpressible.

The definition of a table describes tables. That's what a definition does. — Leontiskos

I think you're wrong. I would like you to quote the Merriam Webster Dictionary definition of the word "definition".

Of course it's not. You already described the object: it's a table. You could further describe it by giving its color. In no way is your table indescribable or inexpressible. — Leontiskos

I disagree, from a metaphysical standpoint, with what you just said there. I described my table, but I did not fully describe it (you agree with me up to here, yes?), I could indeed further describe it by giving its color (you just said so yourself), but I disagree with the following thing that you said. My table is in some way indescribable or inexpressible, because I cannot describe it forever. At some point, I will die. The table will still exist. At some point, humanity will become extinct. Tables will still exist, at least for some time. No one will be alive to describe them. So, they are indescribable and inexpressible in such a scenario (which, by all accounts, will actually, physically, happen in the future). The table becomes indescribable and inexpressible in the absence of beings capable of expressing what it is, in the sense of describing it, because such beings have effectively ceased to exist. One hand waving does indeed make a sound, a tree that falls in the forest when no one is there to listen does indeed make a sound, but there is no meaning in the latter scenario, while there is indeed meaning in the former: someone who waves a hand, and in the manner of Moore says "here is one hand, here is another hand, there are two things, thus solipsism is false" is arguing in a valid, sound way.

That's one of my disagreements with Bunge, he saw nothing but trash in Kripke's works. — Arcane Sandwich

Bunge doesn't sound like the brightest bulb in the pack.

Bunge doesn't sound like the brightest bulb in the pack. — frank

He was a stubborn man, from what I gather. And he had a great sense of humor. But yeah, he put no stock in modal logic. I'm not sure that I do myself either, but I do take the concept of "modality" somewhat seriously from a philosophical standpoint. I mean, how could I not? Contingency and necessity are modal notions, by definition. This is what Bunge struggled with, I believe. Or maybe he just didnt "buy it", he wasn't "persuaded" by it (again, it seems that he was a stubborn man).

What do I make of his intellect? I think he was a genius, really. At the level of Jorge Luis Borges. At the level of Willard van Orman Quine. I don't think we can deny him that prestige. Did he earn that prestige? I think he did. Is he right about everything? Of course not. There's even theorems that lead to contradictions in some of his more analytical works (like the eight volume of his Treatise on Basic Philosophy). But what I like about Bunge is that he believed, at the same time, in good common sense and scientism. He actually used the very word "scientism" in a positive, unabashed, unapologetic way. And that, quite frankly, is awe-inspiring.

My table is in some way indescribable or inexpressible, because I cannot describe it forever. At some point, I will die. The table will still exist. At some point, humanity will become extinct. Tables will still exist, at least for some time. No one will be alive to describe them. — Arcane Sandwich

"Indescribable" does not mean "unable to be described forever." If that's what it meant then, by your own criteria, everything would be indescribable, and at that point the word would mean nothing at all.

"Indescribable" does not mean "unable to be described forever." If that's what it meant then, by your own criteria, everything would be indescribable, and at that point the word would mean nothing at all. — Leontiskos

Then, for the sake of argument, I would say that there are only two logical options here.

1) Option one: you want to solve this problem (the dilemmas of Mathematical Platonism) in a purely "philosophical" way, or
2) Option two: you want to solve this problem (the dilemmas of Mathematical Platonism) in a purely non-philosophical way, i.e., with the language of mathematics alone. Perhaps even with the language of first-order symbolic logic (or perhaps something more exotic, like second-order logic, though I agree with Quine here, second-order logic is just "set theory in wolves' clothing").

Or you can just quote the definition of the word "indescribable", as the Merriam Webster Dictionary defines that word.

EDIT: Note to self: what Quine actually said is "in sheep's clothing", not "in wolves' clothing".

Or you can just quote the definition of the word "indescribable", as the Merriam Webster Dictionary defines that word. — Arcane Sandwich

I could keep quoting the dictionary for you. You keep asking me to. But better that you learn to fish. Use the dictionary yourself. Before writing a post claiming that "indescribable" means something like, "unable to be described forever," go check your claim against a dictionary. Too much of this exchange has been you giving highly inaccurate definitions and me correcting these inaccuracies. If you use words in an accurate way people will be much more keen to engage your thought.

But better that you learn to fish. — Leontiskos

Just sell me the damn fish, mate. I'll "teach you to fish" some other sort of "fish" in return.

Use the dictionary yourself. — Leontiskos

Fair enough, but you're the one that chose Merriam Webster, not another dictionary. I myself would have made a different choice of dictionary, for example. Is that allowed, or do we have to refer to Merriam Webster in this Thread?

. Before writing a post claiming that "indescribable" means something like, "unable to be described forever," go check your claim against a dictionary. — Leontiskos

That's actually a very solid thing to say. Point taken, lesson learned.

Too much of this exchange has been you giving highly inaccurate definitions and me correcting these inaccuracies. — Leontiskos

Well... that's debatable. Again, in what "Room" are we? Is this "the Ontology Room", is it the "Linguistics Room", is the "Mathematics Room"? At what "level" of awareness are we currently discussing when you say something like that?

If you use words in an accurate way people will be much more keen to engage your thought. — Leontiskos

I agree. So, take the lead. What words should we use to reach a general agreement as far as the topic of Mathematical Platonism goes?

He actually used the very word "scientism" in a positive, unabashed, unapologetic way. And that, quite frankly, is awe-inspiring. — Arcane Sandwich

Was he gainfully employed?

Was he gainfully employed? — frank

My understanding is that he was. He taught Epistemology and Metaphysics at McGill University in Canada, if I'm not mistaken.

The definition of a table describes tables. That's what a definition does. — Leontiskos

The Merriam Webster Dictionary definition for the word "definition"

And I quote:

1) "a statement of the meaning of a word or word group or a sign or symbol."

2) "a statement expressing the essential nature of something."

3) "a product of defining."

4) "the action or process of stating the meaning of a word or word group."

5) "the action or the power of describing, explaining, or making definite and clear."

6) "clarity of visual presentation: distinctness of outline or detail."

7) "clarity especially of musical sound in reproduction."

8) "sharp demarcation of outlines or limits."

9) "an act of determining. Specifically: the formal proclamation of a Roman Catholic dogma."

These are all options, mate. And they're collectively incompatible with each other, that is, they lead to contradictions if you accept all of them at the same time. Choose at least one. Which one of these Merriam Webster definitions is the one that is equivalent to your own definition of the word "definition"? You said "That's what a definition does". Does it? Refer to the previous list of nine options and choose at least one, then. I can't make that choice for you, mate.

These are all options, mate. — Arcane Sandwich

Here is your claim:

And the Merriam Webster Dictionary definition of the common noun "table" makes no reference to my table, the one in my living room, so how could it describe it? — Arcane Sandwich

The word "table" presumably describes the object in your living room, given the fact that you used the predication. Most of the definitions of 'definition' will suffice to show that the word 'table' describes the object in your living room.

The word "table" presumably describes the object in your living room — Leontiskos

No it does not, since my table is arguably a rigid designator in the Kripkean sense of the term. I don't think it is, but you could in principle argue in a Kripkean way about this point.

given the fact that you used the predication. — Leontiskos

Rigid designators are not predicates, mate. They're individual constants.

Most of the definitions of 'definition' will suffice to show that the word 'table' describes the object in your living room. — Leontiskos

No, none of them will suffice. And that's my point. If you wish to argue that point with me, then make an actual argument. I'll "teach you how to fish" in that sense, if that's what you need. If not, do it yourself, I'm not going to make the argument for your.

No it does not, since my table is arguable a rigid designator in the Kripean sense. I don't think it is, but you could in principle argue... — Arcane Sandwich

A rule of thumb for you: don't argue for things you don't believe are true.

A rule of thumb for you: don't argue things you don't believe are true. — Leontiskos

Why not? That's what science does. You argue things that you don't believe in, to see if they hold up. It's called putting a hypothesis to the test, mate. Again, what "Room" is this? At what "level of awareness" do you want to reach an agreement on the issue of Mathematical Platonism? You're being uncooperative and trying to put the blame of un-cooperativeness on me. Well, I'm laying the blame right at your feet. Explain your POV on Mathematical Platonism, tell me why it's better than mine, and be done with it, mate.