Emotional distress and its justified/rational relationship to disconnected moral injustices.

substantivalism

I presume that this would be a proper place to submit this highly personal conundrum that I've had for the past couple of years now.

We are all so familiar with how prevalent, tangible, and easily accessible worldly suffering is. It's literally at out finger tips from a google search to read recollections of the horrid upbringings of those around us or glimpse the moral atrocity that is their present. Abusive or neglectful parents, homelessness, religious persecution, forceful cultish indoctrinations, pedophilic rapists, individuals crushed by the privatization of basic necessities, etc.

The reaction of me or anyone else to such injustices generally would be one of moral disapproval that would take the emotional form of anguish, sadness, depression, discontentment, disgust, rage, etc. The list of appropriate emotional states is one of tremendous variety for a great many reasons.

Over time these emotional states will, however, subside while the moral disapproval would not. In typical modernist fashion it would probably be from overstimulation via over indulgence in such provocative media. It could also arise from ignorant but understandable disconnection from such subject matters by a plethora of distractions.

The question I then have is, if one expresses moral disapproval but with a heavily diluted emotional reaction/connection to a perceived injustice are they in fact diluting their moral sensibilities/judgement as well?

Is their any role or place for the notion of a emotional ought of sorts to be coupled with the usual moral ought's?

Further, just as some go against their internal desires/intentions to fulfill new moral principles should one forcefully make oneself feel a certain way because they see it as more permissible a reaction? Should this be seen as a moral action in its own way?

Or is apathetic moral judgement a supreme standard by which we should either stride for or see as the end state of proper rational deliberation on such actionably distant affairs?

ToothyMaw

The question I then have is, if one expresses moral disapproval but with a heavily diluted emotional reaction/connection to a perceived injustice are they in fact diluting their moral sensibilities/judgement as well? — substantivalism

I kind of see the emotional part of it as providing an impetus to act and giving us a bearing kind of like a compass; we know there are many ways of acting, and that some are more correct than others, but without a sense of emotional growth or stimulation we are largely rudderless because it is the emotions that give the narratives that guide us salience in a human sense. So yes, I do think this process of becoming jaded often dilutes moral judgments/sensibilities.

Further, just as some go against their internal desires/intentions to fulfill new moral principles should one forcefully make oneself feel a certain way because they see it as more permissible a reaction? Should this be seen as a moral action in its own way? — substantivalism

I would say that sometimes it is a good thing to expose oneself to the realities of others to remind oneself just how awful or good things can be, but I don't think that an entity needs their emotions to be in flux all of the time to be truly moral. Not that you are saying that last part, but I have to qualify what I'm saying. Whether or not there is an emotional, moral ought compelling us to do such a thing is questionable, but I think an argument could be made.

Emotional distress and its justified/rational relationship to disconnected moral injustices.

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