100%, that is a very good point. All that I would say is that in other senses, science is not like religion, because science is atheist (or at least agnostic). Individual scientists can be religious, but that is a private matter. Science, in the public sense, is not religious (it cannot be, by definition). — Arcane Sandwich

Of course Science is not religion. No one would argue about that. My point was, that the way that Science can mislead the ordinary folks' perception at times is the same as religion.

the principle that things could be other than they are — we can imagine reality as being fundamentally different even if we never know such a reality — part of a critique of correlationism.

Ok, so this sounds like “factiality” has nothing to do with facticity; since this definition tells us that the former is a principle about the modality of states of affairs (namely, that reality could be different).

This sounds like merely the negation of necessitarianism.

From now on, we will use the term 'factiality' to describe the speculative essence of facticity, viz., that the facticity of every thing cannot be thought as a fact

Just working with what I’ve got here—admitting full well I haven’t read the d*** book—this sounds completely incoherent with the other definition you gave; since this definition does link ‘factiality’ to facticity and the above merely notes that at least some parts of the world are properly contingent (i.e., anti-necessitarianism).

Let’s break it down a bit more though.

we will use the term 'factiality' to describe the speculative essence of facticity

What does this mean?!? What is a “speculative essence”?!?

viz., that the facticity of every thing cannot be thought as a fact

What?!? That’s just jibberish. Facticity is the noun for anything pertaining to facts; and so everything that pertains to facticity pertains to facts. Give me example where the facticity of a proposition cannot be thought of as a fact or non-fact.

Likewise, what theory of truth does this Meillassoux accept? How do they define facticity and fact?

Hi @Bob Ross, welcome back, glad to see that you haven't given up on this Thread.

What does this mean?!? What is a “speculative essence”?!? — Bob Ross

We (as in, Meillassoux's typical readers) honestly don't know. I don't think Meillassoux ever defines what he calls "speculative essence". Not as far as I'm aware of, anyways. And in the interviews that Meillassoux has given, I don't think he ever clarified that point.

What I think the are, the speculative essences (and this is just my interpretation) is something like "objective ideas", in the manner of the German Idealists of the 19th Century, especially Schelling. But I could be wrong about that, of course. I see Meillassoux leaning more towards Fichte or Hegel than Schelling, but again, I could be wrong about that.

What?!? That’s just jibberish. Facticity is the noun for anything pertaining to facts; and so everything that pertains to facticity pertains to facts. Give me example where the facticity of a proposition cannot be thought of as a fact or non-fact. — Bob Ross

Hmmm... so let's reconstruct your argument, a bit more formally. As far as I can see, these are your premises so far:

1) Facticity is the noun for anything pertaining to facts.
2) Everything that pertains to facticity pertains to facts.

Is that right?

As for the example that you ask, let me check After Finitude real quick. I don't know if the following words count as an example, but maybe they'll help clarify what Meillassoux is trying to say when he uses that word, "factiality":

Thus factiality must be understood as the non-facticity of facticity. We will call 'non-iterability of facticity' the impossibility of applying facticity to itself - this non-iterability describes the genesis of the only absolute necessity available to non-dogmatic speculation - the necessity for everything that is to be a fact. — Quentin Meillassoux

Does that mean anything to you?

Of course Science is not religion. No one would argue about that. My point was, that the way that Science can mislead the ordinary folks' perception at times is the same as religion. — Corvus

Yes. The ordinary folk should not be deceived, in any way. It would be immoral to do so.

We (as in, Meillassoux's typical readers) honestly don't know.

**sigh**

Hmmm... so let's reconstruct your argument, a bit more formally

Nothing about your reconstruction was formal. Here’s a crude formal version:

P1: If A only pertains B, then everything about A pertains to B. [ (A ↔ B) → (A → B) ]
P2: Facticity only pertains to facts*. [ A ↔ B ]
C1: Therefore, everything about facticity pertains to facts. [ A → B ]

Is that right?

Arcane: why are you asking me? I provided an informal argument (or more like explanation) of why it was jibberish, you copied and pasted what I said into numbered bullet points, and then asked me if it is correct???

Does that mean anything to you?

No, because you aren’t actually engaging in the discussion. You are supposed to be the one who understands After Finitude: you are supposed to explain it to me. If you ask me about something I am familiar with, then I would be able to give a brief and basic explanation of the core concepts involved. You seem to keep failing at doing that with this book.

Let me just ask you: are you familiar with the book, or are you using this OP to familiarize yourself with it?

Let me just ask you: are you familiar with the book, or are you using this OP to familiarize yourself with it? — Bob Ross

Hi Bob, thanks for your contributions to this Thread, they will be recognized in the edited version of the OP once we're done with the discussion throughout the Thread.

In response to your question, it is both, at the same time. I am familiar with the book. I have also published 6 or 7 articles about different aspects of Meillassoux's philosophy. I have praised what I felt needed to be praised, I refuted what I believed needed to be refuted. I then published a book about Meillassoux, in Spanish, with the Editorial of a National University of my country (Argentina). So, yes, I am quite familiar with the book. Still, I do not claim to understand all of the theorems (conclusions, if you will) of his axioms (his premises, if you will).

EDIT: If you would like to take a look at my publications about Meillassoux, or any publications of mine in general, about other topics as well, you're free to send me a Private Message, and I'll share some links with you.

Answer me this (in all honesty): how have you published multiple books on their works and yet cannot give me a simple explanation of what factiality is?

You have to be able to appreciate my frustration here. I haven't written anything on Transcendental Idealism nor Aristotelianism, and I can give you an in depth (an adequate) explanation of both views.

Let me try one more time: what is factiality? What would be mean for there to be non-facts about facts that aren't just non-objective dispositions?

Answer me this (in all honesty): how have you published multiple books on their works and yet cannot give me a simple explanation of what factiality is? — Bob Ross

Because the concept of factiality is a difficult one to understand, since Meillassoux never explained what he means when he speaks of "the speculative essence" of such and such. The best we've got so far (the Meillassoux scholars, that is) is a connection to the "objective ideas" of Fichte, and perhaps Schelling, or maybe even Hegel. Or, one might understand the "speculative essences" as something more or less comparable to Graham Harman's "real qualities", as he distinguishes them from "sensual qualities" in the context of Speculative Realism, of which both Meillassoux and Harman are pioneers and, you could say, "Founding Fathers", together with Ray Brassier and Iain Hamilton Grant.

You have to be able to appreciate my frustration here. I haven't written anything on Transcendental Idealism nor Aristotelianism, and I can give you an in depth (an adequate) explanation of both views. — Bob Ross

So what is it that would want from me at this point? A sort of crash course on Speculative Realism? A crash course on After Finitude? What?

Let me try one more time: what is factiality? What would be mean for there to be non-facts about facts that aren't just non-objective dispositions? — Bob Ross

You have to understand that this is what we're currently investigating here. What is factiality, anyways? Not how the dictionary defines it, not how Meillassoux defines it in After Finitude, but more concretely, what would it be, if it were a "real thing", so to speak? A "real thing" like something that exists in your ordinary life, for example.

You have to understand that this is what we're currently investigating here. What is factiality, anyways? Not how the dictionary defines it, not how Meillassoux defines it in After Finitude, but more concretely, what would it be, if it were a "real thing", so to speak? A "real thing" like something that exists in your ordinary life, for example.

How am I supposed to discuss it with you, if you can't give a basic description of what the word refers to?

You want me to step through the door, when I can't until you tell me the password.

How am I supposed to discuss it with you, if you can't give a basic description of what the word refers to?

You want me to step through the door, when I can't until you tell me the password. — Bob Ross

Ok Bob, let's say that's fair (I don't know if it is, but let's just pretend for a moment). I'll try to be more charitable to you, since you're making (to my mind, at least) a very specific request. You want me to just deliver some information, in an objective but brief way, in such a way that it makes sense to you, so that you can tell me if I'm right or wrong about whatever it is that I'm talking about. So, here's what we'll do:

I will attempt to explain to you (and to myself, BTW) what, if anything, the word "factiality" means for Quentin Meillassoux himself. I hope you can see why this is a tall order from you, Bob, and not "a mere request".

Factiality, to the best of my knowledge, and to the best of my understanding, is a word that the French philosopher Quentin Meillassoux, invented. He made it up. Now, his argument (let's see if it's even an argument to begin with) is that the word that he made up, "factiality", should be understood as a technical, philosophical term (comparable, to, say, the word hyle, meaning "wood", which Aristotle takes from the common language of his time and gives it a precise, technical meaning in his own philosophy: it is materia, matter.)

That's how Meillassoux intends the very word "factiality". In short: he want us to take him seriously.

Ok, so what does he mean, by "factiality"? Well, he says that it's "the speculative essence" of facticity. So what are those? The speculative essence, is basically "the essence of facticity". In other words, Meillassoux is an essentialist: he believes that essences are real. Which things have essences? Does an animal have an essence? Does a number have an essence? What is an essence? Is it a soul? Is it the most important property of a thing? In that case, the essence would be identical to the essential property, which means that the essence must be a quality, not a quantity, and certainly not a res in the Medieval Latin sense.

Well, which things have essences, according to Meillassoux? Apparently, just one: facticity itself. Nothing has an essence, except for facticity. In other words, there is only one essence in the world: it is the one that facticity has, and he wants to call that: "factiality".

Are you with me up to here, Bob? Or do you want to interrupt me and say something?

Well, which things have essences, according to Meillassoux? Apparently, just one: facticity itself. Nothing has an essence, except for facticity. In other words, there is only one essence in the world: it is the one that facticity has, and he wants to call that: "factiality". — Arcane Sandwich

I'll just suppose, if only for the sake of argument, that this is our point of disagreement, @Bob Ross. I'm not saying that it is, I'm just imagining it as a possibility among others. It's a hypothesis, nothing more. That's how science works, Bob. You imagine a hypothesis, which is a claim about some thing or feature of the world, and then you investigate that claim to see if it's true. You don't have to believe the claim yourself. If you did, it wouldn't even be a hypothesis to being with. It would be something else, like justified true belief, for example.

Now, with that in mind, I'm not asking you to believe Meillassoux's claims. Stated differently, I'm not asking you to believe him when he says that factiality is the speculative essence of facticity. I'm just telling you to consider it simply as a hypothesis to be investigated. Why would someone investigate it, you might ask? To see if it's true or not. What more do you expect from philosophy, Bob? Honest question.

Let's proceed. I'm going to quote Meillassoux's definiton of facticity, Bob. Not of factiality, this time we're gonna take a look at what he has to say about facticity, which, so far, seems to be the "metaphysical substrate", if you will, of this other thing that he calls "factiality", which he claims is the "speculative essence" of facticity. I'm not asking you to take his word for it, ok? I'm just saying: entertain the thought, for a moment, if only for the sake of argument, even if you, personally, cannot picture it or cannot understand it. I'm just saying: if he's saying "A", and we know that "not B" is true, can we construct a modus tollens that shows that "A" is false? That's just one question among many that can be reasonably asked at this point. That's the sort of thing that would strike a fatal blow to Meillassoux's Speculative Materialism. The problem is, that no one, so far, it seems, has been able to construct that sort of coup de grâce argument yet, even though many have been attempted (I myself published a few good, decisive critiques of Meillassoux's Speculative Materialism, but nothing of the importance of a modus tollens style refutation of his concept of factiality). That being said, let's take a look at Meillassoux's definition of the word "facticity". He says:

Let us go back to Kant. What is it that distinguishes the Kantian project - that of transcendental idealism - from the Hegelian project - that of speculative idealism? The most decisive difference seems to be the following: Kant maintains that we can only describe the a priori forms of knowledge (space and time as forms of intuition and the twelve categories of the understanding), whereas Hegel insists that it is possible to deduce them. Unlike Hegel then, Kant maintains that it is impossible to derive the forms of thought from a principle or system capable of endowing them with absolute necessity. These forms constitute a 'primary fact' which is only susceptible to description, and not to deduction (in the genetic sense). And if the realm of the in-itself can be distinguished from the phenomenon, this is precisely because of the facticity of these forms, the fact that they can only be described, for if they were deducible, as is the case with Hegel, theirs would be an unconditional necessity that abolishes the possibility of there being an in-itself that could differ from them. — Quentin Meillassoux

The main takeaway there seems to be that facticity is to be understood (Meillassoux suggests) as the fact that the forms in question can only be described (as Kant would have), not deduced (as Hegel would have).

EDIT : Later on, he says:

Let us try to attain a better grasp of the nature of this facticity, since its role in the process of de-absolutization seems to be just as fundamental as that of the correlation. First of all, from the perspective of the strong model, it is essential to distinguish this facticity from the mere perishability of worldly entities. In fact, the facticity of forms has nothing to do with the destructability of a material object, or with vital degeneration. When I maintain that this or that entity or event is contingent, I know something positive about them - know that this house can be destroyed, I know that it would have been physically possible for this person to act differently, etc. Contingency expresses the fact that physical laws remain indifferent as to whether an event occurs or not -they allow an entity to emerge, to subsist, or to perish. But facticity, by way of contrast, pertains to those structural invariants that supposedly govern the world - invariants which may differ from one variant of correlationism to another, but whose function in every case is to provide the minimal organization of representation: principle of causality, forms of perception, logical laws, etc. These structures are fixed - I never experience their variation, and in the case of logical laws, I cannot even represent to myself their modification (thus for example, I cannot represent to myself a being that is contradictory or non self-identical). But although these forms are fixed, they constitute a fact, rather than an absolute, since I cannot ground their necessity - their facticity reveals itself with the realization that they can only be described, not founded. But this is a fact that - contrary to those merely empirical facts whose being-otherwise I can experience - does not provide me with any positive knowledge. For if contingency consists in knowing that worldly things could be otherwise, facticity just consists in not knowing why the correlational structure has to be thus. — Quentin Meillassoux

EDIT 2: He talks about facticity throughout other sections of the book, but the only other "really important" snippet seems to be the following one:

Facticity is the 'un-reason' (the absence of reason) of the given as well as of its invariants. Thus the strong model of correlationism can be summed up in the following thesis: it is unthinkable that the unthinkable be impossible. I cannot provide a rational ground for the absolute impossibility of a contradictory reality, or for the nothingness of all things, even if the meaning of these terms remains indeterminate. Accordingly, facticity entails a specific and rather remarkable consequence: it becomes rationally illegitimate to disqualify irrational discourses about the absolute on the pretext of their irrationality. From the perspective of the strong model, in effect, religious belief has every right to maintain that the world was created out of nothingness from an act of love, or that God's omnipotence allows him to dissolve the apparent contradiction between his complete identity and His difference with his Son. These discourses continue to be meaningful -in a mythological or mystical register - even though they are scientifically and logically meaningless. — Quentin Meillassoux

He wants to refute strong correlationism, and he thinks that Speculative Materialism is the right tool for that task.