100%, that is a very good point. All that I would say is that in other senses, science is not like religion, because science is atheist (or at least agnostic). Individual scientists can be religious, but that is a private matter. Science, in the public sense, is not religious (it cannot be, by definition). — Arcane Sandwich

Of course Science is not religion. No one would argue about that. My point was, that the way that Science can mislead the ordinary folks' perception at times is the same as religion.

the principle that things could be other than they are — we can imagine reality as being fundamentally different even if we never know such a reality — part of a critique of correlationism.

Ok, so this sounds like “factiality” has nothing to do with facticity; since this definition tells us that the former is a principle about the modality of states of affairs (namely, that reality could be different).

This sounds like merely the negation of necessitarianism.

From now on, we will use the term 'factiality' to describe the speculative essence of facticity, viz., that the facticity of every thing cannot be thought as a fact

Just working with what I’ve got here—admitting full well I haven’t read the d*** book—this sounds completely incoherent with the other definition you gave; since this definition does link ‘factiality’ to facticity and the above merely notes that at least some parts of the world are properly contingent (i.e., anti-necessitarianism).

Let’s break it down a bit more though.

we will use the term 'factiality' to describe the speculative essence of facticity

What does this mean?!? What is a “speculative essence”?!?

viz., that the facticity of every thing cannot be thought as a fact

What?!? That’s just jibberish. Facticity is the noun for anything pertaining to facts; and so everything that pertains to facticity pertains to facts. Give me example where the facticity of a proposition cannot be thought of as a fact or non-fact.

Likewise, what theory of truth does this Meillassoux accept? How do they define facticity and fact?

Hi @Bob Ross, welcome back, glad to see that you haven't given up on this Thread.

What does this mean?!? What is a “speculative essence”?!? — Bob Ross

We (as in, Meillassoux's typical readers) honestly don't know. I don't think Meillassoux ever defines what he calls "speculative essence". Not as far as I'm aware of, anyways. And in the interviews that Meillassoux has given, I don't think he ever clarified that point.

What I think the are, the speculative essences (and this is just my interpretation) is something like "objective ideas", in the manner of the German Idealists of the 19th Century, especially Schelling. But I could be wrong about that, of course. I see Meillassoux leaning more towards Fichte or Hegel than Schelling, but again, I could be wrong about that.

What?!? That’s just jibberish. Facticity is the noun for anything pertaining to facts; and so everything that pertains to facticity pertains to facts. Give me example where the facticity of a proposition cannot be thought of as a fact or non-fact. — Bob Ross

Hmmm... so let's reconstruct your argument, a bit more formally. As far as I can see, these are your premises so far:

1) Facticity is the noun for anything pertaining to facts.
2) Everything that pertains to facticity pertains to facts.

Is that right?

As for the example that you ask, let me check After Finitude real quick. I don't know if the following words count as an example, but maybe they'll help clarify what Meillassoux is trying to say when he uses that word, "factiality":

Thus factiality must be understood as the non-facticity of facticity. We will call 'non-iterability of facticity' the impossibility of applying facticity to itself - this non-iterability describes the genesis of the only absolute necessity available to non-dogmatic speculation - the necessity for everything that is to be a fact. — Quentin Meillassoux

Does that mean anything to you?

Of course Science is not religion. No one would argue about that. My point was, that the way that Science can mislead the ordinary folks' perception at times is the same as religion. — Corvus

Yes. The ordinary folk should not be deceived, in any way. It would be immoral to do so.

We (as in, Meillassoux's typical readers) honestly don't know.

**sigh**

Hmmm... so let's reconstruct your argument, a bit more formally

Nothing about your reconstruction was formal. Here’s a crude formal version:

P1: If A only pertains B, then everything about A pertains to B. [ (A ↔ B) → (A → B) ]
P2: Facticity only pertains to facts*. [ A ↔ B ]
C1: Therefore, everything about facticity pertains to facts. [ A → B ]

Is that right?

Arcane: why are you asking me? I provided an informal argument (or more like explanation) of why it was jibberish, you copied and pasted what I said into numbered bullet points, and then asked me if it is correct???

Does that mean anything to you?

No, because you aren’t actually engaging in the discussion. You are supposed to be the one who understands After Finitude: you are supposed to explain it to me. If you ask me about something I am familiar with, then I would be able to give a brief and basic explanation of the core concepts involved. You seem to keep failing at doing that with this book.

Let me just ask you: are you familiar with the book, or are you using this OP to familiarize yourself with it?

Let me just ask you: are you familiar with the book, or are you using this OP to familiarize yourself with it? — Bob Ross

Hi Bob, thanks for your contributions to this Thread, they will be recognized in the edited version of the OP once we're done with the discussion throughout the Thread.

In response to your question, it is both, at the same time. I am familiar with the book. I have also published 6 or 7 articles about different aspects of Meillassoux's philosophy. I have praised what I felt needed to be praised, I refuted what I believed needed to be refuted. I then published a book about Meillassoux, in Spanish, with the Editorial of a National University of my country (Argentina). So, yes, I am quite familiar with the book. Still, I do not claim to understand all of the theorems (conclusions, if you will) of his axioms (his premises, if you will).

EDIT: If you would like to take a look at my publications about Meillassoux, or any publications of mine in general, about other topics as well, you're free to send me a Private Message, and I'll share some links with you.

Answer me this (in all honesty): how have you published multiple books on their works and yet cannot give me a simple explanation of what factiality is?

You have to be able to appreciate my frustration here. I haven't written anything on Transcendental Idealism nor Aristotelianism, and I can give you an in depth (an adequate) explanation of both views.

Let me try one more time: what is factiality? What would be mean for there to be non-facts about facts that aren't just non-objective dispositions?

Answer me this (in all honesty): how have you published multiple books on their works and yet cannot give me a simple explanation of what factiality is? — Bob Ross

Because the concept of factiality is a difficult one to understand, since Meillassoux never explained what he means when he speaks of "the speculative essence" of such and such. The best we've got so far (the Meillassoux scholars, that is) is a connection to the "objective ideas" of Fichte, and perhaps Schelling, or maybe even Hegel. Or, one might understand the "speculative essences" as something more or less comparable to Graham Harman's "real qualities", as he distinguishes them from "sensual qualities" in the context of Speculative Realism, of which both Meillassoux and Harman are pioneers and, you could say, "Founding Fathers", together with Ray Brassier and Iain Hamilton Grant.

You have to be able to appreciate my frustration here. I haven't written anything on Transcendental Idealism nor Aristotelianism, and I can give you an in depth (an adequate) explanation of both views. — Bob Ross

So what is it that would want from me at this point? A sort of crash course on Speculative Realism? A crash course on After Finitude? What?

Let me try one more time: what is factiality? What would be mean for there to be non-facts about facts that aren't just non-objective dispositions? — Bob Ross

You have to understand that this is what we're currently investigating here. What is factiality, anyways? Not how the dictionary defines it, not how Meillassoux defines it in After Finitude, but more concretely, what would it be, if it were a "real thing", so to speak? A "real thing" like something that exists in your ordinary life, for example.

You have to understand that this is what we're currently investigating here. What is factiality, anyways? Not how the dictionary defines it, not how Meillassoux defines it in After Finitude, but more concretely, what would it be, if it were a "real thing", so to speak? A "real thing" like something that exists in your ordinary life, for example.

How am I supposed to discuss it with you, if you can't give a basic description of what the word refers to?

You want me to step through the door, when I can't until you tell me the password.

How am I supposed to discuss it with you, if you can't give a basic description of what the word refers to?

You want me to step through the door, when I can't until you tell me the password. — Bob Ross

Ok Bob, let's say that's fair (I don't know if it is, but let's just pretend for a moment). I'll try to be more charitable to you, since you're making (to my mind, at least) a very specific request. You want me to just deliver some information, in an objective but brief way, in such a way that it makes sense to you, so that you can tell me if I'm right or wrong about whatever it is that I'm talking about. So, here's what we'll do:

I will attempt to explain to you (and to myself, BTW) what, if anything, the word "factiality" means for Quentin Meillassoux himself. I hope you can see why this is a tall order from you, Bob, and not "a mere request".

Factiality, to the best of my knowledge, and to the best of my understanding, is a word that the French philosopher Quentin Meillassoux, invented. He made it up. Now, his argument (let's see if it's even an argument to begin with) is that the word that he made up, "factiality", should be understood as a technical, philosophical term (comparable, to, say, the word hyle, meaning "wood", which Aristotle takes from the common language of his time and gives it a precise, technical meaning in his own philosophy: it is materia, matter.)

That's how Meillassoux intends the very word "factiality". In short: he want us to take him seriously.

Ok, so what does he mean, by "factiality"? Well, he says that it's "the speculative essence" of facticity. So what are those? The speculative essence, is basically "the essence of facticity". In other words, Meillassoux is an essentialist: he believes that essences are real. Which things have essences? Does an animal have an essence? Does a number have an essence? What is an essence? Is it a soul? Is it the most important property of a thing? In that case, the essence would be identical to the essential property, which means that the essence must be a quality, not a quantity, and certainly not a res in the Medieval Latin sense.

Well, which things have essences, according to Meillassoux? Apparently, just one: facticity itself. Nothing has an essence, except for facticity. In other words, there is only one essence in the world: it is the one that facticity has, and he wants to call that: "factiality".

Are you with me up to here, Bob? Or do you want to interrupt me and say something?

Well, which things have essences, according to Meillassoux? Apparently, just one: facticity itself. Nothing has an essence, except for facticity. In other words, there is only one essence in the world: it is the one that facticity has, and he wants to call that: "factiality". — Arcane Sandwich

I'll just suppose, if only for the sake of argument, that this is our point of disagreement, @Bob Ross. I'm not saying that it is, I'm just imagining it as a possibility among others. It's a hypothesis, nothing more. That's how science works, Bob. You imagine a hypothesis, which is a claim about some thing or feature of the world, and then you investigate that claim to see if it's true. You don't have to believe the claim yourself. If you did, it wouldn't even be a hypothesis to being with. It would be something else, like justified true belief, for example.

Now, with that in mind, I'm not asking you to believe Meillassoux's claims. Stated differently, I'm not asking you to believe him when he says that factiality is the speculative essence of facticity. I'm just telling you to consider it simply as a hypothesis to be investigated. Why would someone investigate it, you might ask? To see if it's true or not. What more do you expect from philosophy, Bob? Honest question.

Let's proceed. I'm going to quote Meillassoux's definiton of facticity, Bob. Not of factiality, this time we're gonna take a look at what he has to say about facticity, which, so far, seems to be the "metaphysical substrate", if you will, of this other thing that he calls "factiality", which he claims is the "speculative essence" of facticity. I'm not asking you to take his word for it, ok? I'm just saying: entertain the thought, for a moment, if only for the sake of argument, even if you, personally, cannot picture it or cannot understand it. I'm just saying: if he's saying "A", and we know that "not B" is true, can we construct a modus tollens that shows that "A" is false? That's just one question among many that can be reasonably asked at this point. That's the sort of thing that would strike a fatal blow to Meillassoux's Speculative Materialism. The problem is, that no one, so far, it seems, has been able to construct that sort of coup de grâce argument yet, even though many have been attempted (I myself published a few good, decisive critiques of Meillassoux's Speculative Materialism, but nothing of the importance of a modus tollens style refutation of his concept of factiality). That being said, let's take a look at Meillassoux's definition of the word "facticity". He says:

Let us go back to Kant. What is it that distinguishes the Kantian project - that of transcendental idealism - from the Hegelian project - that of speculative idealism? The most decisive difference seems to be the following: Kant maintains that we can only describe the a priori forms of knowledge (space and time as forms of intuition and the twelve categories of the understanding), whereas Hegel insists that it is possible to deduce them. Unlike Hegel then, Kant maintains that it is impossible to derive the forms of thought from a principle or system capable of endowing them with absolute necessity. These forms constitute a 'primary fact' which is only susceptible to description, and not to deduction (in the genetic sense). And if the realm of the in-itself can be distinguished from the phenomenon, this is precisely because of the facticity of these forms, the fact that they can only be described, for if they were deducible, as is the case with Hegel, theirs would be an unconditional necessity that abolishes the possibility of there being an in-itself that could differ from them. — Quentin Meillassoux

The main takeaway there seems to be that facticity is to be understood (Meillassoux suggests) as the fact that the forms in question can only be described (as Kant would have), not deduced (as Hegel would have).

EDIT : Later on, he says:

Let us try to attain a better grasp of the nature of this facticity, since its role in the process of de-absolutization seems to be just as fundamental as that of the correlation. First of all, from the perspective of the strong model, it is essential to distinguish this facticity from the mere perishability of worldly entities. In fact, the facticity of forms has nothing to do with the destructability of a material object, or with vital degeneration. When I maintain that this or that entity or event is contingent, I know something positive about them - know that this house can be destroyed, I know that it would have been physically possible for this person to act differently, etc. Contingency expresses the fact that physical laws remain indifferent as to whether an event occurs or not -they allow an entity to emerge, to subsist, or to perish. But facticity, by way of contrast, pertains to those structural invariants that supposedly govern the world - invariants which may differ from one variant of correlationism to another, but whose function in every case is to provide the minimal organization of representation: principle of causality, forms of perception, logical laws, etc. These structures are fixed - I never experience their variation, and in the case of logical laws, I cannot even represent to myself their modification (thus for example, I cannot represent to myself a being that is contradictory or non self-identical). But although these forms are fixed, they constitute a fact, rather than an absolute, since I cannot ground their necessity - their facticity reveals itself with the realization that they can only be described, not founded. But this is a fact that - contrary to those merely empirical facts whose being-otherwise I can experience - does not provide me with any positive knowledge. For if contingency consists in knowing that worldly things could be otherwise, facticity just consists in not knowing why the correlational structure has to be thus. — Quentin Meillassoux

EDIT 2: He talks about facticity throughout other sections of the book, but the only other "really important" snippet seems to be the following one:

Facticity is the 'un-reason' (the absence of reason) of the given as well as of its invariants. Thus the strong model of correlationism can be summed up in the following thesis: it is unthinkable that the unthinkable be impossible. I cannot provide a rational ground for the absolute impossibility of a contradictory reality, or for the nothingness of all things, even if the meaning of these terms remains indeterminate. Accordingly, facticity entails a specific and rather remarkable consequence: it becomes rationally illegitimate to disqualify irrational discourses about the absolute on the pretext of their irrationality. From the perspective of the strong model, in effect, religious belief has every right to maintain that the world was created out of nothingness from an act of love, or that God's omnipotence allows him to dissolve the apparent contradiction between his complete identity and His difference with his Son. These discourses continue to be meaningful -in a mythological or mystical register - even though they are scientifically and logically meaningless. — Quentin Meillassoux

He wants to refute strong correlationism, and he thinks that Speculative Materialism is the right tool for that task.

Well, which things have essences, according to Meillassoux? Apparently, just one: facticity itself.

Ok, now we are getting somewhere. Why would facticity have an essence but a cat wouldn’t?

Also, it seems like an equivocation is going on here; as the kinds of essences that abstracta have are not the same as the in concreto—viz., the essence of truth, propositions, true, false, facts, etc. is not really the same as the essence of a tree, a cat, etc.

That's how science works, Bob

Philosophy is not science.

ou imagine a hypothesis, which is a claim about some thing or feature of the world, and then you investigate that claim to see if it's true. You don't have to believe the claim yourself. If you did, it wouldn't even be a hypothesis to being with. It would be something else, like justified true belief, for example.

Sure, but science requires the scientific method; which, in turn, requires a positive verification of the hypothesis through strict experimentation. We are not doing that in philosophy; and we can’t. In fact, science presupposes philosophical principles and ideas to begin with….

That being said, let's take a look at Meillassoux's definition of the word "facticity"
…
“Let us go back to Kant….”

What you quoted was about how to properly understand the a priori forms of our understanding; and how that relates to things-in-themselves. It was not a description nor depiction of what Meillasoux means by a fact. I asked you what a fact is, and you gave me an instance where Meillassoux use’s the concept of a fact to talk about Kant vs. Hegel—do you see the problem?

Let us try to attain a better grasp of the nature of this facticity,
…
Facticity is the 'un-reason'

It sounds like Meilassoux might be claiming that facts are grounded, in part, in the a priori modes by which we cognize; and thusly is taking a Kantian approach.

My problem is that you clearly don’t know what they mean by facticity; because you still haven’t given me a clear (or even vague) definition.

Here, I’ll go first. A fact, by my lights, is a statement about reality which corresponds appropriately to what it references about reality; and thusly I accept a version of correspondence theory of truth. What do you mean by facticity? What does Meilassoux mean by facticity?

Philosophy is not science. — Bob Ross

The use of hypotheses is not exclusive to science. Philosophers can utilize hypotheses as well. Philosophers don't need to have justified true beliefs about X (in which X is a set of premises) in order to see if X leads to contradictions or tautologies, for example.

Sure, but science requires the scientific method; which, in turn, requires a positive verification of the hypothesis through strict experimentation. — Bob Ross

You're wrong about that, partner. Science does not verify hypotheses, it either corroborates or refutes them (the hypotheses, that is).

We are not doing that in philosophy; and we can’t. — Bob Ross

And I'm supposed to just take your word for that, Bob? It's not possible to do philosophy in other ways? Philosophy can't utilize hypothetical thinking? I think that you, and others who think like that, are simply wrong. There is a place for scientific hypotheses in philosophy.

It sounds like Meilassoux might be claiming that facts are grounded, in part, in the a priori modes by which we cognize; and thusly is taking a Kantian approach.

My problem is that you clearly don’t know what they mean by facticity; because you still haven’t given me a clear (or even vague) definition.

Here, I’ll go first. A fact, by my lights, is a statement about reality which corresponds appropriately to what it references about reality; and thusly I accept a version of correspondence theory of truth. What do you mean by facticity? What does Meilassoux mean by facticity? — Bob Ross

Facticity, as far as Meillassoux is concerned, seems to be what all facts have in common, "what it takes, or what it is, to be a fact." The idea that the forms of the correlation can only be described, not deduced. Facts are not statements: a statement is what refers to a fact. For example, "the cat is on the mat" is a statement. If it is a fact that there is a cat on the mat, then the statement in question is true. If the cat is on the couch instead, for example, then it is false. And if there is no cat, the statement is also false. That is what the correspondence theory of truth is about. I'm also a correspondentist in that sense, and I think that Meillassoux is as well, though I'm not entirely sure. In other writings (not After Finitude) he seems to lean more towards coherentism as a theory of truth.

A personal side note about your character, Bob, if you don't mind. Of course I don't know you, so I can only judge you by what I'm reading here, on this Forum. It seems to me (and I could be wrong) that you struggle a bit to find a healthy middle ground between being sheepishly meek and being as rude as the stereotypical Newyorker, lol.

EDIT: I mean that jokingly, Bob. If you'll allow me a bit more humor, this is what talking to you feels like, lol:

Let me help you out with a few tips on etiquette, @Bob Ross. Now, you are of course free do to whatever you want, these are just some recommendations for improving your interactions with me in this thread (and with anyone in general, really). First, allow me to quote a passage from the Site Guidelines:

Types of posters who are welcome here:

Those with a genuine interest in/curiosity about philosophy and the ability to express this in an intelligent way, and those who are willing to give their interlocutors a fair reading and not make unwarranted assumptions about their intentions (i.e. intelligent, interested and charitable posters).

Types of posters who are not welcome here:

Evangelists: Those who must convince everyone that their religion, ideology, political persuasion, or philosophical theory is the only one worth having.

Racists, homophobes, sexists, Nazi sympathisers, etc.: We don't consider your views worthy of debate, and you'll be banned for espousing them.

Advertisers, spammers, self-promoters: No links to personal websites. Instant deletion of post followed by a potential ban.

Trolls: You know who you are. You won't last long

Sockpuppets: You may be banned. The onus is on you to explain to us if you are using the same IP for multiple accounts. — Site Guidelines

Now, as far as I'm concerned, you're not a racist, or a homophobe, or a sexist, or any of those things. You've exhibited no such conduct or behavior, and you've espoused no such ideas. You're not an advertiser or spammer, and you're not sockpuppeting. But, in my opinion, the way that you're responding to me in this thread has a little bit of "evangelism" going on, especially in regards to how philosophy should be done. I'm not saying that you're a full blown evangelist in that regard, just a little bit. You're also being just a little bit trollish. Not too much, just a bit. It seems (and I could be wrong) that you want to get some sort of emotional reaction from me, and I'm just not interested in having a discussion on such sour terms. Hope you get where I'm coming from here.

Understand that if I were to jump in a thread about, I don't know, let's say the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas, and I just jumped in without even saying "hello", and I started to throw around comments about how the OP is messy, unclear, vague, etc., I wouldn't exactly get the most welcoming reaction from the author of the OP, even if I was indeed right. One should be courteous even when one is right, and I would add: especially so, in such circumstances. You've shown none of that.

But that's OK, you can still participate here. I didn't flag your comments or anything like that, and I didn't report you for disruptive behavior, even though I could have. If you wish to engage with me, and with this Thead, you would obtain better results if you were genuinely interested and if you were genuinely charitable towards me. Right now, it feels like you're a State Trooper repeatedly asking some stranger if he has a driver's license or not. You can see why that wouldn't be the most productive attitude in the world for the type of discussion that we're having here.

You've said more than once that you haven't read After Finitude. Well, what's stopping you? Lack of interest? But then it kinda makes no sense for you to have such strong opinions about its content, and about me, a humble scholar, if you haven't even read the book. I mean, put yourself in my shoes, for a moment. Imagine if I just barged into a Thread about Thomas Aquinas, told everyone that I didn't read whatever reading material there was to read, and then told the author of the OP that they don't understand Aquinas if they can't explain to me in simple English some notoriously difficult part of his philosophy (such as, for example, his interpretation of Aristotle's concept of the "active intellect").

In short, it doesn't really sound like you're trying to help me. It sounds more like you want to prove some kind of philosophical point. What that might be, I have no idea. All that I can suggest is that if you genuinely care about this OP and this thread, you take the time to familiarize yourself a bit more with After Finitude, so that you can make up your own mind about it. I even offered to give you a crash course on Speculative realism and After Finitude, but you squarely rejected my offer because you wanted to double-down on your questionable attitude towards me. That's not what a charitable, genuinely interested reader does.

Why do you think that I have the obligation to fully understand one of the most complicated philosophical concepts (factiality) that has been advanced in the last 20 years or so? You're not exactly asking me to explain to you why the sky is blue.

I've quoted a dictionary definition of the word "factiality". I've quoted Meillassoux's own definiton in After Finitude. I've also quoted his definition of facticity, with additional text. I've even tried to explain it using my own words. If that's not good enough for you, then the only sensible thing that I can suggest is that you take a look at After Finitude yourself, and that you tell me what you make of it, including the word "factiality".

That's all I got for you, Bob. You're welcome to keep contributing to this Thread, as always. It just so happens that I find you a bit socially awkward, that's all. Try to be more constructive here, show more initiative, instead of incessantly hassling me over this or that, just to see if I snap.

All the best,
- Arcane Sandwich.

In accord with your response, I think it is best we agree to disagree and move on from this thread: this discussion is wholly unproductive (for the both of us).

I do want to clarify that nothing I have said is in any way violating the forum guidelines, I am not evangelizing anyone, and I have no intention of inciting an emotional reaction out of you. I cannot stress enough, that I was being properly polite at the beginning and you made fun of me for it; and now that I am being more plain, you charge me with impoliteness! Anyways, water under the bridge.

My original and main point in joining this thread despite knowing nothing about the book, is that the ideas expressed in the OP were not directed—ironically—at the book and of which I can provide food-for-thought. It turns out, that the OP is so disorganized—which violates the very guidelines you mentioned—that it gives false impressions.

My biggest issue is not the informality of the OP (as we’ve all been there) but, rather, that you clearly don’t understand the basic building-block concepts of your own OP; and, as I mentioned before, is the source of a lot of the issues you wish to resolve. I don’t say that to be mean: it is easy to tell when someone is not very familiar with the subject because they give nothing but vague notions and muddied explanations. I suspect you appreciate to some extent what I am saying here; because you say this OP is for “exploration”.

I wish the best of luck for you in this thread; and hopefully by the end of it you will actually know what factiality means :wink:

Bob

My original and main point in joining this thread despite knowing nothing about the book, is that the ideas expressed in the OP were not directed—ironically—at the book and of which I can provide food-for-thought. It turns out, that the OP is so disorganized—which violates the very guidelines you mentioned—that it gives false impressions. — Bob Ross

It's just a sketch for now. I will edit the OP when this discussion advances a bit. You know what? I might just edit it right now. It's gonna take me a few hours, probably. It probably won't be the definitive version, but it will be an improvement.

My biggest issue is not the informality of the OP (as we’ve all been there) but, rather, that you clearly don’t understand the basic building-block concepts of your own OP; and, as I mentioned before, is the source of a lot of the issues you wish to resolve. I don’t say that to be mean: it is easy to tell when someone is not very familiar with the subject because they give nothing but vague notions and muddied explanations. I suspect you appreciate to some extent what I am saying here; because you say this OP is for “exploration”. — Bob Ross

Let me phrase it like this: the fact that I was born in 1985, according to Meillassoux, is just that: a fact. But, contrary to what tradition says, he argues that facts are not contingent. They are necessary. Everything is contingent, -he argues-, except for the fact that everything is contingent. That is not a fact, it is an absolute necessity. Think of it like this: it's like when someone says "Everything changes". Under normal circumstances, that phrase would be self-refuting. A "Meillassouxsian" answer to that challenge would be to say that everything changes, except for the fact that everything changes. Change itself does not change. By analogy, everything is a fact, and that is not one more fact, it is an absolute necessity.

I don't expect you to understand this. Few people do, if any. But that doesn't matter too much. All that I want to see is if Meillassoux's philosophy holds up. If the claims A and B lead to a contradiction, C, then I don't need to understand what their actual content is: all I need to show is that C is a contradictory conclusion. I don't need to fully understand what factiality is in order to refute such a notion, if it is indeed the case that such a notion leads to a contradiction (no one has been able to prove this, BTW).

I wish the best of luck for you in this thread; and hopefully by the end of it you will actually know what factiality means :wink:

Bob — Bob Ross

Thanks! See you around.

Right, but they could have been born in the past. Right? — Arcane Sandwich

No because their parents were not born then. It's an infinite regress of impossibility.