No, but they aren't unrelated. The inscrutability of reference implies that extension is equally inscrutable. There is no "fact of the matter." But on the view that "what an insect is," is just how the token "insect" is used, this also means there is no fact of the matter about what an insect is. And this wouldn't just apply to universals either, but concrete particulars.

That is unless you want to say that "the rake in this room" can uniquely specify a set with one element via extension, and we can know this, but we also cannot uniquely specify what "the rake in this room refers to." Or "insects" uniquely specifies a set with discrete elements, but the same word cannot refer uniquely to insects as a group or to individual insects.

This is strange and is going to have a host of bizarre consequences, especially if what defines extension in the first place is just how we use a word (particularly because different people understand and use the same terms in different ways, and the same people understand and use the same words in different ways in different contexts). For one, the unique set specified by a term will be unknowable, so it will be a set that exists in virtue of what? As an abstract object detached from human knowledge, but which is defined by aggregate human word usage?

Nor Banno, for that matter.

At least not while being aware of it.

However, you did spend an entire thread arguing that "truth" didn't make sense outside of satisfaction, while also arguing that there is no correct logic, but that logics should be selected for based on usefulness.

That truth depends on what is useful is a consequence of such a position (although perhaps only if it is useful :rofl: ). If truth is always truth in terms of satisfaction vis-á-vis some system (indeed you ridiculed the notion of anything being "actually true") and the criteria by which a system is selected is usefulness, then truth depends on usefulness. Actually, you were quite incredulous at the idea of a correct logic, that truth wouldn't be defined in terms of useful ways of speaking.

For example, if truth is just satisfaction, and if one selects between holding to or not holding to the principle of noncontradiction based on usefulness, then what is true or false depends on a selection grounded in usefulness. How could it be otherwise?

:up:

I think we are always already back there—and that's the ineffable part of our experience our words cannot capture. Poetry, literature, perhaps come closest.

Anytime I bang on a wall in my house my dogs go crazy. They take it as a sign that someone is at my front door. Maybe this is how communication works. My speech is an event. You take it as a sign, not just my words, but the whole scene involving me and my noises. You make inferences. There are no magic cords connecting my words to the world. As you say, reference matters to the extent that you get your dinner.

↪Moliere I think we are always already back there—and that's the ineffable part of our experience our words cannot capture. Poetry, literature, perhaps come closest. — Janus

I'm less certain of ineffability (at least, in principle ineffability), though I can see how inscrutability could dove-tail into that.

I think of becoming-enlanguaged in analogy to a baptism: before language there is experience, after language the experience becomes effable, but also changes entirely such that most of the time our perceptions will be guided by our linguistic abilities. And I think of this is an enhancement of experience, where we are able to do more than follow our biological imperatives and wonder about things that no one wondered about before -- and be correct.

I don't think ants are curious like this, though they have their own ways of communicating -- and "ant-language" if we want to call it that. And closer to home it doesn't seem that Bonobos and orangutangs wonder about what reality is fundamentally made of.

There are clearly some examples of animals acting human-like, but my suspicion is that our language is kind of what forged an evolutionary niche for us, but that it's capable of doing much more than aiding the species' reproduction.

By 'ineffable' I mean our experience cannot be adequately described. Every experience is unique, and giving word to it only generalizes something which is profoundly particular. It is the particularity of experience which is ineffable.

It seems to me that language enables much more than mere "species' reproduction"—language is not even really needed for that, although of course humans use it for that purpose.

The major survival boon, and curse, of language, most potently in its written form, is that it enables collective learning, which in turn makes us the most adaptable of species. With the accumulated knowledge enabled by writing we have become able to inhabit virtually every environmental niche.

When we have exhausted the resources in one niche, we can go somewhere else, and our population is thus not automatically trimmed by famine when we have been feasting too hard for our habitats to sustain. This will work for us until we have nowhere left to go, when we have exhausted all resources everywhere and undermined the viability of every habitat.

Anyway, I'm veering into another topic, so I'll leave it there.

By 'ineffable' I mean our experience cannot be adequately described. Every experience is unique, and giving word to it only generalizes something which is profoundly particular. It is the particularity of experience which is ineffable. — Janus

Sometimes I feel like I do know what other people mean and feel, though -- it takes a long-term relationship of care, and we'll never be one another, but we're able to communicate our experiences just fine.

Now, if there is no relationship there or something then I'd say my experience is ineffable -- language doesn't magically give the ability to communicate.

But I do think there are conditions in which we can describe our experiences to one another and that language enables us to do that (not all by itself, but it enables).

It seems to me that language enables much more than mere "species' reproduction"—language is not even really needed for that, although of course humans use it for that purpose.

O I agree with you here. I think it's our niche, but much "came along with" basically -- things unrelated to what language does for us in terms of our biological niche.

The inscrutability of reference implies that extension is equally inscrutable. — Count Timothy von Icarus

To be clear, these are two different things. extensionality is the logical decision to count two sets that contain the very same items as the very same set. So (a,b) = (b,a)=(a,a,b) and so on. The inscrutability of reference is about whether "a" refers to a, "b" refers to b, and so on. Quine's argument shows that when someone else uses a name, say "c", there is no fact of the matter as to what that might refer to. There are two aspects of this, the first that it need not be necessary to fix the referent perfectly in order to get your rabbit stew. The second, that this is one aspect of confirmation holism, that no statement is true or false only as it stands, but that they are true or false as a part of the whole web of belief. Extensionally, to supose "gavagai" refers to the same thing as "rabbit" is to suppose that each element of the set "rabbit" is an element of the set "gavagai" - that's setting out what it would be for "gavaga" to mean "rabbit" in a way that does not rely on the intentionality of speaker meaning or web of belief. But that some individual is a member of the set "gavagai" or "rabbit" is of course open to referential opacity.

Again, extensionality is not a solution for the problem of reference. It was apparently introduced here:

Well, if Joe is consistent, he will agree that water is H2O. Perhaps he will say something like "I know water is dihydrogen monoxide, but it's not H2O"? In which case the issue is not with his belief about water but his belief about the equivalence of "dihydrogen monoxide"and H2O. And we are back to the extensional opacity of beliefs. — Banno

This was in response to a question concerning propositional attitudes, by way of explaining an aspect of Possible World Semantics. It is not being offered as a solution to the issues raised in the gavagai fable.

So no, we do not "uniquely specify a set with one element via extension". That's not it's place. What extensionality might tell us is that if there is a rake in the room, and if we accept that a rake is a tool, then it follows that there is a tool in the room. Extensionality is not so much about reference as about grouping individuals, once reference has been settled.

Now Quine expelled individual variables from his logic. The individuals in his logic are no more than the objects that serve as the values of bound variables. The domain consists in the objects over which the bound variables range. Quine does not assume any metaphysical essence to these objects; they are whatever the theory quantifies over. The individuals in the domain are not specified independently of the properties that belong to them. The approach is holistic.

A primary problem with this, and the reason is it no longer a popular view, is that it is incompatible with possible world semantics.

For Davidson there are no conceptual schemes against which the individuals may be specified. However he makes use of Tarski's approach to truth, which is extensional and makes use of individuals. For Davidson reference is a function of how a truth- theoretical approach explains language. It's pretty much just what we do with nouns.

I want to be clear that there are tensions here, between Quine and Davidson and Kripke, and that there is not a standard, accepted solution to these issues. I am not here offering a complete and coherent account of reference, but attempting to articulate the problems seen by these three great philosophers.

But by refusing to work with the Gavagai fable and recognise it's import, whatever view you are offering - and it remains for me quite unclear what that might be - is outside of this discussion. You have not understood the argument. This is evident in your "the unique set specified by a term will be unknowable". One can stipulate whatever membership one desires. That's what is involved in setting up a domain.

However, you did spend an entire thread arguing that "truth" didn't make sense outside of satisfaction, — Count Timothy von Icarus

There's a difference between being able to explain truth in terms of satisfaction, and truth not making sense outside of satisfaction. You accuse me of the latter, but what I did was the former.

If you wish to take issue with Tarski's extensional definition of truth, then do so. What that might look like, given the place of Tarski's approach in model theory, is difficult to imagine.

If you wish to take issue with the applicability of Tarski's theory of truth to our use in natural languages, set out your case.

(indeed you ridiculed the notion of anything being "actually true") — Count Timothy von Icarus

I don't think so. I've argued, elsewhere and at great length, that there are fairly plain facts that are quite true - such as that you are now reading my post.

So if you would stand by this claim, which at best could only be a misunderstanding, point to the post in which I supposedly argued such a nonsense.

Or stop making false accusations. Isn't there something about that in your Bible?

Yep. Indeed, the unsayable is the most important stuff - as Wittgenstein showed. And what cannot be said, may sometimes be shown. But the less said here, the better... :wink:

I'll show you!


(EDIT: Silly joke that popped to mind immediately and I had to say it)

the whole scene involving me and my noises — frank

Yep. Hence Quine's holism, rather than pragmatism.

:up:

And closer to home it doesn't seem that Bonobos and orangoutangs wonder about what reality is fundamentally made of. — Moliere

That they accept and move on with life doesn't mean that they are not awed by thunder or enraptured by a sunrise.

But problems happen when folk think they can prove that their sky daddy exists using the ontological argument, and so that anyone who says otherwise is anathema.

That they accept and move on with life doesn't mean that they are not awed by thunder or enraptured by a sunrise. — Banno

I agree with you here. I often struggle in making a distinction between human beings and our close cousins, but it really still seems to me that language is what differentiates us from those species.

But problems happen when folk think they can prove that their sky daddy exists using the ontological argument, and so that anyone who says otherwise is anathema. — Banno

Yeah.

And before that, really. "This land is my land, not your land..."

But problems happen when folk think they can prove that their sky daddy exists using the ontological argument, and so that anyone who says otherwise is anathema. — Banno

Or does the problem occur when atheist trolls can't manage to refute an argument, so anyone who uses it is anathema? They resort to slurs like "sky daddy" because they are too dumb to mount a coherent argument.

But Dawkins and his ilk are in their 80's and the irrational fad has passed. Once the hangers-on die out completely it will be back to inter-religious dialogue, particularly with the burgeoning forms of neo-paganism.

They resort to slurs like "sky daddy" because they are too dumb to mount a coherent argument. — Leontiskos

I want to say -- while "sky daddy" is something which any philosophically inclined person would think of as false, it's not hard to see that people really do believe in a sky daddy. Or something along those lines.

It's not a slur because there are people who literally believe in that. Demons walk earth, God floats above, Hell is underneath the earth -- the whole bit. I know this because I've had people claim things to me like "Dark magic exists" or "I've seen a demon, I know they are real" or "The Bible says giants existed, therefore they exist" or, or or or or -- so many claims. We need not say "sky daddy", but we could say "wrestling warrior", since Israel gained his name by wrestling God down. In the literal sense.

It's not trolling so much as pointing out that many people really do believe these things.

It's not a slur because... — Moliere

No, it's a slur. Get real, Moliere. :roll:

Between two atheists who walked into the bar?

It's a public board, but he was responding to me -- I get the slogan. "Sky Daddy" need not be the word, and I wouldn't use it towards a believer because anyone who bothers talking about this stuff probably doesn't believe in a sky daddy at all -- it's more sophisticated than that.

I think it's important to note how many people believe in literal interpretations of scripture, though.

- The idea that "sky daddy" is not a slur is too dumb for me to argue with. I just don't know what to say at this point.

And yes, of course atheists at the bar will use slurs to speak of religion. That's not strange at all.

- double post - server stutter -

What's the better way to refer to God when speaking about people who believe that God is above us, in a literal sense, and male, and providing us guidance?

- I don't know, maybe, "Our Father, who art in Heaven"?

Do you literally believe the words coming out of your mouth when you claim that "sky daddy" is not a pejorative slur?

Well, when you say "Pejorative" I agree.

It's pejorative, though I didn't think of it as a slur -- not in the way people use racial terms, for instance.

But pejorative in the sense that it's meant to indicate we don't believe that's the case, yes.

And insulting -- I can see that. Better words can be chosen if we want open communication, that's for sure.

The technical term, in philosophy of religion, as well as comparative mythology, is Sky Father. In this sense, it contrasts with the Earth Mother.

- So you agree it's pejorative, you agree it's insulting. Now go read the definition of slur.

Good thing you'd never engage in anything so rude, then.

Fair enough. I've been pinned to the matt on that one.

How do you feel about 's term?

Well, I mean, it's not my term, I didn't invent it.

Heh, yes -- Kind of asking if "Sky Father" is a pejorative in the same sense. I don't think it is, and will keep it in mind for the future.