You think they are just disagreeing over whether an arbitrary set of letters should be correlated to a concept? And that that is what Quine was worried about? — Count Timothy von Icarus

No. He was saying there is no fact of the matter regarding a speaker's reference. If you're interested in what I'm saying right now, you won't find anything in the world, any state of things, that tells you it must be this. He gives examples of why that is.

You can work to show why his argument is wrong. For instance, if it has logical problems, pick those out. If some fact clearly contradicts his conclusion, show that.

Rather, I'm working toward understanding what we need to refer to in order to resolve a disagreement about what I'll call "essentiality" (or perhaps you have a term you prefer).

Well, given we agree that there are such things as tigers, stars, and daffodils, it would be whatever makes those things the sort of thing they are and not anything else. — Count Timothy von Icarus

So would it be fair to say that, in the example of the tiger, we must refer to the tiger itself? And a disagreement about the tiger's "essentiality" (or definition, if you prefer) would be investigated by saying, in effect, "Let's return to the tiger. Let's examine him more closely in the relevant aspects so we can learn which of us is right"?

Is that about how you see it? (I do too.)

We've been over that a bit. Quine's starting premises are dubious, and in particular there have been a great many challenges to his holism, although the particular sort of "view from nowhere" behaviorism assumed strikes me as more obviously objectionable. Also the idea that our own sense of what we are referring to is "unobservable." I can observe it fine.

However, even in the argument itself there are questionable leaps. The second linguist thinks to himself: "ah, what if this culture only recognizes clouds of particulars and no wholes, maybe they only ever refer to parts of things like feet."

But a foot or ear does constitute a sort of whole. And anyhow, is there any culture on Earth that does this? No. Any language with no universals? No. Which might lead us to assume that the premises involved are wrong. Is such a culture plausible if wholes do exist?

Here is the thing: if an implicit premise is that there are no things to refer to, only arbitrary coorelations of sense data/observations and stipulated sounds, then it seems Quine has simply begged the question.

- Your quote is misattributed. You are quoting me, not Count.

The important thing here is to set out what one believes Quine's intended conclusion was. I would suggest avoiding vague words like 'fact' in setting that out. My point was that it has nothing to do with J's theory about so-called "metaphysical super-glue," and it looks like we agree on at least that much.

We've been over that a bit. Quine's starting premises are dubious, and in particular there have been a great many challenges to his holism, although the particular sort of "view from nowhere" behaviorism assumed strikes me as more obviously objectionable. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I don't see how his holism is a premise for inscrutability of reference. Could you flesh that out? And I don't know what you mean by "view from nowhere" behaviorism. What work is that from?

However, even in the argument itself there are questionable leaps. The second linguist thinks to himself: "ah, what if this culture only recognizes clouds of particulars and no wholes, maybe they only ever refer to parts of things like feet."

But a foot or ear does constitute a sort of whole. — Count Timothy von Icarus

The point was that nothing settles the issue of whether the speaker was referring to a whole, or referring to a part. Do you disagree with that? If so, what would tell the linguist what the speaker was referring to? What state of the world? What fact?

Here is the thing: if an implicit premise is that there are no things to refer to, only arbitrary coorelations of sense data/observations and stipulated sounds, then it seems Quine has simply begged the question. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I kind of wanted you to stop guessing at what Quine's views are and zero in on what he actually thought.

- You might think that @Count Timothy von Icarus is not taking Quine seriously, but is anyone taking Quine seriously? Is anyone exegeting Quine? Consider:

Davidson bypasses downplays indeterminism using charity – despite not being certain, we can be pretty damn confident. — Banno

Yes, it's not a very exciting result when applied to things like rabbits, because, as has been said, we can be pretty damn confident. — J

If Quine is right, then how could we be confident? If we can be confident, then how could Quine be right?

If it doesn't have an exciting result when applied to rabbits, then why did Quine apply it to rabbits?

No one here is taking Quine seriously. It makes no sense to say, "Quine's argument is sound, but we can still communicate our references anyways."

I would submit that just as for Hume we cannot know causes, so for Quine we cannot know references. The presuppositions of the systems ensure the validity of these inferences, and if we want to deny the conclusions we must deny the presuppositions of the systems. We can't just say, "Oh well. We can be pretty damn confident." To do that is to beg the question. If we can be confident about causes or references, then Hume or Quine must be wrong.

@Count Timothy von Icarus is simply avoiding the question-begging. He sees that if "we can be pretty damn confident/justified" then Quine must be wrong. He also sees that if philosophy of language is first philosophy, then Quine is not wrong.

How would we know the correct definition of "tiger"? — J

Presumably if it specifies the things in virtue of which all tigers are tigers, while not having anything that isn't a tiger fall under the definition. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Artifacts wouldn't have an essence. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Essences would belong to organisms most properly, maybe other natural kinds. — Count Timothy von Icarus

yet

"Atom with 79 protons," seems to cover gold pretty well. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I think a crucial distinction missed in most analytical attempts to return to essences is that they aren't supposed to be something like a mathematical/logical entity. To assume this would be to presuppose that "what it is to be" something is reducible to such a thing. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Essence is "what something is," existence is "that it is." And this is how you get to the idea that essence doesn't explain existence. What a tiger is doesn't imply that tigers should exist. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Aristotle says essence isn't "in" things, but you might say it is "in" them in a trancedentalese sense. That is, essence isn't a component of things, a part, or spatially located in things, it's what they are. — Count Timothy von Icarus

So essence "specifies the things in virtue of which all tigers are tigers, while not having anything that isn't a tiger fall under the definition" but "isn't a component of things, a part, or spatially located in things, it's what they are"; the essence of gold is given by it's atomic number but it is not the essence of a bishop in a chess game to remain on its own colour, essence is not reducible to a logical entity, whatever that is, essence does not explain existence and is transcendental. When a child sees a tiger they recognise it as such by some sort of communion with it's essence.

Hm.

I suggest, again, that the discussion begin with the gavagai example:

https://medium.com/@ranjanrgia/thought-experiment-1-gavagai-70ae1bfc792a

Does it show, as put it, that there's no fact of the matter regarding "Gavagai" referring to the rabbit?

And can folk see how this is quite different to

...because we have different words that we use for the same thing that there is no one referent for a specific thing and that therefor translation in speech wouldn’t be possible? — Darkneos

- Sure, but my point is that confidence and the plausibility of Quine's argument are indirectly related. Affirming confidence requires attacking Quine's argument, at least in a thread on Quine's argument.

Edit: And the funny thing here is that a pro-essence argument could exactly parallel the "confidence" argument. "Quine has an argument that reference is inscrutable. But reference isn't inscrutable so his argument must be wrong." "The anti-essentialist has an argument that we can't know what tigers are. But we do know what tigers are so his argument must be wrong." Of course we can argue about what Quine's argument does or is meant to do, but apparently we all agree that it does not undermine reference.

; the essence of gold is given by it's atomic number

The atomic number is a good definition. It's not the essence. The only thing with the essence of a tiger would be a tiger, not a collection of symbols.

I don't see "essence is transcendental." What is that supposed to mean?

Logical entity is a data science term that seems to fit suppositions about what it would mean to define something in a lot of "everything can be quantified" thought.

If Quine is right, then how could we be confident? If we can be confident, then how could Quine be right? — Leontiskos

Quine didn't say we aren't confident about agreement. He said there is no fact of the matter regarding a speaker's reference.

Affirming confidence requires attacking Quine's argument, — Leontiskos

No, it doesn't. You could say we understand one another through empathy, for instance.

He said there is no fact of the matter regarding a speaker's reference. — frank

Was he right?

So there is no "fact of the matter"* about reference, but we can still know reference through empathy? I'm not sure how that would work, despite the newfound powers that empathy is continually granted in our day and age.

* Again, "fact" being a weasel-word.

Was he right? — Arcane Sandwich

It's food for thought. :cool:

..

So there is no "fact of the matter"* about reference, but we can still know reference through empathy? I'm not sure how that would work, despite the newfound powers that empathy is continually granted in our day and age. — Leontiskos

It sounds like you're saying I'm wrong because the world is going to hell. :razz:

- Then you either failed to read or understand the post. Why don't you explain how empathy solves the problem of reference?

The only thing with the essence of a tiger would be a tiger, not a collection of symbols. — Count Timothy von Icarus

So what the essence of tiger is, what makes it a tiger. Ok, what makes it a tiger?

I don't see "essence is transcendental." What is that supposed to mean? — Count Timothy von Icarus

How do we make sense of

Aristotle says essence isn't "in" things, but you might say it is "in" them in a trancedentalese sense. — Count Timothy von Icarus

You seemed to say there that essence is transcendental, but now you say it isn't. I don't know what it is supposed to mean.

I do not understand what an essence is, for you.

But reference isn't inscrutable so his argument must be wrong. — Leontiskos

Can you show how Alex, in the story, can determine the referent of "gavagai"?

Then you either failed to read or understand the post. Why don't you explain how empathy solves the problem of reference? — Leontiskos

Suppose that understanding you requires that I put myself in your shoes. I must look at the world through your eyes. When I do that, the million things your speech could mean narrows down. Now I can test the waters to narrow it down even further. This would mean I understand you to the extent that our experiences are similar.

What we let go of in this scenario is that notion that words and sentences are little trollies carrying meaning as a payload. We're saying communication works because we're siblings with the same cultural birthright.

- You are the one who thinks "we can be pretty damn confident." That was the <whole point>. Are you saying that we can be confident about something that is inscrutable?

Cheers. :roll:

- Be serious. Stand behind your words.

There is a blatant refusal of folk here to address what Quine actually argued.

Be serious. — Leontiskos

Can you show how Alex, in the story, can determine the referent of "gavagai"? — Banno

- So presumably if Alex had possessed more empathy he would have understood what "gavagai" meant?

I agree that common ground underlies the scrutability of reference, but Quine would presumably ask how linguistic common ground could be established in the first place. (We are driving at the truth that philosophy of language is not first philosophy.)

- Banno, I literally placed an interpretation of your view in quotation marks, a view which I have been critiquing from the start of this conversation. You removed the quotation marks and acted as if I were asserting it myself. You tried to put your confused position in my mouth and make me answer for it. The dishonesty is unfortunate.

Now either you have an answer about your claim that "we can be pretty damn confident" or you don't. If you do, answer. If not, stop playing games.

If you would progress this thread, address the gavagai example.

So presumably if Alex had possessed more empathy he would have understood what "gavagai" meant? — Leontiskos

Yes. He'd need to live with the natives for a while to build empathy.

If you would progress this thread, address the gavagai example. — Banno

Again, here you go:

The point Quine is actually making is that communicating an "immediate signification" is never guaranteed or sure. — Leontiskos

(immediate signification)

Now your turn. If you would progress this thread, address the confidence problem.

Yes. He'd need to live with the natives for a while to build empathy. — frank

And therefore in order to understand language we must study something other than language, no? He requires more than language.

Quine showed a problem with interpretation. Davidson showed how charity allowed us to be confident of our interpretations. @Darkneos misunderstood the discussion. Tim thinks it's about essences. Leon has not shown that he understands any of this. Frank has.

Then we'll leave it at that.