the issue is contingent on what one interprets the term “thought” to signify. — javra

I tend to agree, based on the interesting responses to the OP. The key cleavage seems to be whether thought is meant to be essentially sentential or propositional, as opposed to "representational". As usual with philosophical terms, there's no dictionary we can consult about this, and usage differs, so we have to make our best choices for clarity as we go along.

I wasn't as clear as I should have been, thanks for your patience.

The key cleavage seems to be whether thought is meant to be essentially sentential or propositional, as opposed to "representational". — J

Some thoughts in considering this:

Were thought essentially propositional, a person who for example ponders and arrives at conclusions solely via use of mental images (and, hence, not via use of any internal monologue) would then not be engaging in any thought. Which seems quite odd to affirm as far as commonsense understandings of thinking go. Or are propositions meant to be understood as sometimes being languageless? (Sentences certainly can’t be). If so, then plenty of non-human animals give all indications of using propositions all the time. But this doesn’t seem right either.

On the other hand, were thought to be essentially representational, then the faculty of understanding could not be an integral aspect of the faculty of thought—this even if understanding will always accompany thought. This will be so because, while one can of course understand representations, understandings will not of themselves be representations of anything. And, hence, will not of themselves then be thoughts.

But in either of these two scenarios regarding what thought is taken to essentially be, many if not most will at least at times be able to hold an awareness of some thought p without thinking “I think p” (without either forming a proposition regarding p or else forming a mental representation of p that is thereby other than p).

As one example: Suppose a person is daydreaming of p, and thereby holds an awareness of thought p. Doing so neither requires that the person forms a proposition regarding p nor that the person forms a representation of the p they are aware of.

Because of all this, I’ll yet maintain that for “I think” to be interpreted as accompanying all thoughts, the thinking which the “I think” addresses must be other than either propositional or representational.

I’m generally in agreement with everything you’ve said in this thread. But one of the thoughts it has triggered in me, is the role of language and, therefore, syntax and grammar, in conscious thought. Being able to think in words. Of course, I say that as a primarily verbal person, who has made a living as a technical writer and spends an inordinate of time writing on this forum. But engaging in this form of thought and activity, requires an understanding of not only the laws of grammar, but (hopefully) also those of correct inference. And that is something only intelligent subjects, or rational agents, properly possess. After all, today’s naturalism never tires of assuring us that the Universe as such does not display such a rational order, that it is something that us humans superimpose on it. And that is something that only a rational, conscious agent can do!

Am I able to think of these two entirely unrelated things at the same time? I would think so — Patterner

:100:

p and I think p. — J

Let p = the thought that "the oak tree is shedding its leaves".

When I think, it must be about something, as all thoughts must be about something.

"I think" necessitates a self that is conscious of thinking. "I" is synonymous with the self.

Possibility one = p is external to the self, internal to the self but not a part of the self or accompanies the self. If this were the case, the self would have no way of knowing about p.

Possibility two = p is part of the self. If this were the case, the self is the thoughts it has.

In other words, I am my thoughts. This solution avoids the infinite regress of the Homunculus problem.

I wasn't as clear as I should have been…. — J

It ain’t easy, is it. The thing everyone does, what is impossible that they not do….and nobody knows what it is they’re doing.
————-

I hope to explore the question of how objectivity (“p”) relates to subjectivity (“It is I who thinks p”). — J

Disclaimer: none of the following is meant to be taken as truth, none meant to be taken as proven or even provable. It is meant as an aid to your exploration from the satisfaction of my own.

Why not just a simple cause/effect relation? To think of something presupposes its possibility; to be affected by something, to perceive it, presupposes its necessity.

Why isn’t the p/“p” dualism backwards? Objectivity is the thing given to sensibility, whatever it is, it is that thing, so should be denominated as p. What I think about is nothing more than the affect that thing has on my senses, the affect cannot possibly be identical to the (p) thing itself, so can justifiably be denominated “p”, which in turn is referred to as representation of p. Shouldn’t it be the case that objectivity is p, subjectivity being how I am affected by p, which would be thought by me, post hoc ergo propter hoc, as “p”.

How does the p/“p” signification account for my mistakes? Given p objectively, but I think the affect of p as something completely unrelated to p, how can I say I thought “p”? While it must be the case I thought something, it is not the case the something I thought held a relation to the objectively given p, and the “p”/p dualism fails.

P stands for some undetermined something. What I think, any thought of mine, must necessarily be determined, otherwise I wouldn’t have that thought. There is no such thing as an empty thought, a thought having no object of its own, but that is not sufficient in itself, to posit that all thoughts correspond to given things. Therefore, objectively given p does not necessarily belong to subjectively thought “p”.

If the p/“p” dualism is invalid by thought, it may still be valid for that which is not thought. For any objectively given p to be represented, such p must undergo that by which representation is possible, yet outside that faculty by which I think, and, it must occur with immediacy, for otherwise there is no justification for having been affected by the objectively given p in the first place.

For any objectively given p, there is an intuition which represents the affect of p on the sensory apparatuses, such affect called sensation, the mode of which accords with particular intrinsic physiologies, and can be denominated as “p”. Herein the objectively given p is directly related, by intuition, to its representation, called phenomenon, and the p/“p” dualism holds without the possibility of contradiction, and simultaneously without having thought anything.

The question of how objectivity (“p”) relates to subjectivity (“It is I who thinks p”), is invalid, for two reasons. First, objectivity (“p”) is in fact objectivity p, and secondly, (“it is I who thinks p”) is reducible to (“it is I who thinks”), insofar as there is no necessity whatsoever for the objectively given p to be found in that which I think about, for as it is just as possible that I think of that which can never be objectively given.
————-

What of the notion that the objectivity “p” is just meant to indicate the object of my thinking? Therein is mere redundancy, in that the objectivity “p” is just the same as the thought p, there is no objectivity “p” of my thoughts, unless I think p. Herein the relation between the objectivity “p” and the subjectivity (“it is I who thinks p), is subsumed under the principle of identity, whereas the above, objectivity therein being empirically conditioned, is subsumed under the principle of cause and effect.

Identity being the legitimate principle, because it is necessarily the case no thought is in error. It is impossible to think something then determine there was not that thought of that very something. Error related to thought, and cognition in general, falls under the auspices of judgement.

Or not. Either way….Happy exploring!!!

I believe that objective reality exists independently of our cognition. So, if there really is a tree outside shedding its leaves, then I believe that the proposition is true before I become cognizant of its truth. However, it's impossible for me to think that it's true without "I think it's true" being implicit in the thought. So, in principle, I think logical propositions can be written without the "I think", but I cannot actually work through the proof without the "I think" being implicit.

For instance, "if an oak tree is shedding its leaves, then the ground underneath will be covered with leaves" is a form of P -> Q. I believe that P -> Q even if I'm not aware of the tree. It's not like the leaves materialize in front of me (or at least, that's not how I impinge it to work) when I look out the window. But I'm unable to formulate this idea in my mind without thinking about it.

There are logic puzzles where you have to have knowledge of what other actors know in order to solve the puzzle. In this case, knowledge of thoughts is necessary in order to solve the puzzle, so I think the "I think" is actually sort of its own entity. I suppose in the case where I am working through an abstract proof on my own, then there really is no functional difference between "P" and "I think P", since there is nothing going on in this proof outside my own mind. But the distinction becomes important if I believe that there are true propositions that I am unaware of.

"I think" necessitates a self that is conscious of thinking. — RussellA

This is one of Rödl's key points.

Possibility one = p is external to the self, internal to the self but not a part of the self or accompanies the self. If this were the case, the self would have no way of knowing about p. — RussellA

I don't follow this. Can you say more? Why couldn't the self have knowledge of something external to it?

So with these recent posts, we’re going a bit deeper into the question of “I think p” and its relation to p.

Let’s start with an important disambiguation, which is going to affect everything from Rödl’s “self-consciousness” to the standard Fregean model of force and content.

“I think p” can be understood and used in two distinct ways:

1. “I think ‛p’.”
2. “I think that p is the case.”

Filling it in:

1. “I think, ‛You’ve left your book in my car’.”
2. “I think that you’ve left your book in my car.”

1 is about an act or occurrence of thinking. It’s a report about something that has happened “in my mind.” It carries no commitment to the truth or affirmation of the content of the thought in question. Similar constructions would be: “I had the thought that Cindy was tired,” “Right now I’m thinking, ‛The dog is on the log’.” This version of “I think” foregrounds the thought, the act of thinking. The person addressed isn’t being asked to agree with whether Cindy was tired, or the location of the dog. Rather, an appropriate response would be something like, “Oh, so that’s what you’re thinking.”

2 is an affirmation in the Fregean sense. We can go so far as to say that, taken in this sense, it’s synonymous with “I judge p” or “I affirm p”. By reporting my thought that “Cindy was tired,” I mean to additionally report that I believed this thought to be true. Similar constructions would be: “Q. Did Washington cross the Delaware? A. “I think so.”; “I think you lost this”; “I think that I see a wren.” We can note that, in ordinary usage, “I think so” can be a somewhat diluted form of affirmation, but it’s an affirmation nonetheless; it expresses the speaker’s agreement with p.

Now we can ask, when philosophers contrast “p” with “I think p”, which usage do they mean, 1 or 2? This will vary case by case. But for idealists/monists like Kimhi and Rödl, I believe that they mean to dissolve the distinction between 1 and 2. They want to say that the very act of thinking always affirms something (though neither likes to use that language). And this is a major reason why they question Frege: There is no such thing, for them, as a thought of p that is only a report of a mental event which in turn contains a “propositional content.”

This sounds outrageous and wrong. But before I go any further, I invite comment on the above. Is it reasonably clear?

There's a lot here. Let me start with this (I italicized p when it stands unquoted, for clarity):

Why isn’t the p/“p” dualism backwards? Objectivity is the thing given to sensibility, whatever it is, it is that thing, so should be denominated as p. What I think about is nothing more than the affect that thing has on my senses, the affect cannot possibly be identical to the (p) thing itself, so can justifiably be denominated “p”, which in turn is referred to as representation of p. Shouldn’t it be the case that objectivity is p, subjectivity being how I am affected by p, which would be thought by me, post hoc ergo propter hoc, as “p”. — Mww

Are you suggesting we call "the thing given to sensibility" -- that is, the object we encounter -- p? So p doesn't stand for a proposition any more, on this usage, but names an object? And then "p" would be the representation (or thought) of that object p? If I've got this right, it seems reasonable enough except that traditionally p is used to refer to a proposition, not an object. Also, if "p" is any sort of representation, don't we still need a 3rd term to use for actual propositions? When you say, "What I think about is nothing more than the effect that thing has on my senses," you close the door on the idea of propositional content, it seems to me. Which may be what you intended, but it's an unusual construal, unless you're limiting the discussion to objects of perception.

I’m of course on board in upholding that language is extremely important (crucial in this sense) to the uniqueness of human intelligence. But I don’t deem it necessary (essential in this sense). I wasn’t there when it happened, but Einsteins reported epiphany about the speed of light was reputedly non-verbal, instead being strictly imaginative. Another renowned example is that of Archimedes’ eureka moment. I interpret these, and many other, examples to be instances of non-verbal thought - with a great deal of intelligence to boot. For those who uphold the possibility of a perennial philosophy or some such, the same might be said for at least some people’s epiphanies regarding the nature of being: these being non-verbal insights (which might provide profound understandings that are difficult, if at all possible, to put into propositional format in any cogent, or else non-poetic, way). These examples of non-verbal thought then entail the occurrence of non-propositional thought (unless one wants to affirm such a thing as languageless propositions). Hence, while I deem language vastly important to intellect, I don’t deem intellect (or thoughts for that matter) to necessarily be dependent on language use.

And yes, though a bit off topic, I’m in full agreement with the Cosmos consisting of Heraclitean or else Stoic Logos - which we are embedded in. Unlike Aristotle’s dichotomy of humans as the rational animal versus non-human animals all being non-rational, however, I instead interpret humans as being the current zenith of comprehension regarding the Cosmos, and hence of the Cosmos’s rational order. Such that there is a quite significant partition, or else chasm, between the human intellect and the intellects of all other known life forms. Yet this I appraise as nevertheless being an aspect of a gradated and ever evolving spectrum, or cline, in regard to comprehension-ability (an ability which, again, language tremendously benefits) - this rather than any kind of metaphysical divide between humans and all other life forms. Otherwise expressed, they too are aware subjects that are part and parcel of the Cosmos’s Logos and which likewise behave via its properties, but they lack our human ability to comprehend it (imperfect as our human comprehension nevertheless is).

….it seems reasonable enough except that traditionally p is used to refer to a proposition — J

I understand that, but I reject that we think in propositions, which makes explicit subjectivity in the form (“it is I who thinks p”), is absurd. If such is the case, then “p” suffers the same end.

I think about things; I don’t think p.

Not sure I got any more to contribute.

the issue is contingent on what one interprets the term “thought” to signify.
— javra

I tend to agree, based on the interesting responses to the OP. The key cleavage seems to be whether thought is meant to be essentially sentential or propositional, as opposed to "representational". — J

Thought could be any of the three, depending upon the sort/kind/type/species of thought under consideration. So, the 'cleavage' is not so much 'oppositional' in nature so much as comparative. They all consist entirely of correlations drawn between different things. Although, I find notions of thought being essentially 'representational' a bit more muddled than sentential or propositional thought. Thought is not 'essentially' any of those though, and that is the point here. It is 'essentially' correlational. That is, it all consists of correlations drawn between different things. All of it, not just some of it. Some is propositional(propositions are part of the content). Some is sentential(though the difference escapes me - sentences are part of the content). Some, I suppose, may be described well enough as "representational", although I'm not privy to any such notion.

Sure it is, or could be. If I thought this had a cut-and-dried answer, I wouldn't be bothering y'all with it. All opinions are welcome. — J

Cool.

So, same question to you as to Banno, earlier: If Pat is correct, does that mean that my #4 is the right response?

Well, if it is the case than not all human thought can be accurately characterized as being two thoughts, p and "I think p" - whether the "I think" is spoken or unspoken - then yes, it cannot be the case that all human thought is both(or two thoughts) p and I think p. So, #4 is 'right' in some way/sense of being right.

Pat is right to deny that that is always the case. However, some of the other answers are also correct, depending upon the specific candidate of thought under consideration.

However, this whole thread just glosses over the underlying issue. Kant did not draw the distinction between thought/thinking and thinking about thought/thinking. Rödi just assumes and further reinforces that error.

There is more than one relationship between p and I think p. It is rather obvious that the "I think" portion is superfluous in nearly the same sense that "I believe" is. It adds nothing meaningful to stating/asserting "P". I would further question your recent addition that truth is not presupposed in each and every use of "I think". In other words 'p', 'I think p', and "I think 'p'" all presuppose truth. The alternative is to deny one's own utterance. That would be to state "P but P is not true", or 'I think P, but P is not true', or "I think 'p', but I'm not thinking 'p'. Of course, there is also yet another sense of "I think" that expresses a significant amount of uncertainty regarding p. So, there's that as well.

I think about things; I don’t think p. — Mww

:smile:

Sometimes we're thinking about propositions, utterances, statements, assertions, etc. Those are things too!

:wink:

Hi M!

Or is there another response that seems better? — J

Pat is correct.

If Pat is correct, does that mean that my #4 is the right response? — J

Sometimes people make self-conscious judgments and sometimes they make un-self-conscious judgments. If you want to call that a proof, then sure, it has been "proved" wrong. But note well that, unlike every other option, #4 is hypothetical.

Right. And for Rödl (and I think Kant and Sartre) it isn't even a matter of "prefixed"; the "I think" is supposed to be structural or internal. — J

And what is that supposed to mean? "I think" is a self-conscious, intentional act. Does Rödl think people engage in self-conscious, intentional acts un-self-consciously and unintentionally? Do they think "I think" without realizing that they think "I think"?

I think developmental considerations often give the lie to these theories. When a child runs up to a puppy to pet it, upon recognizing a puppy they are not saying to themselves excitedly, "I think puppy! I think puppy!" This seems fairly uncontroversial.

The error that Kimhi and apparently Rödl make is both serious and uncommon, and I don't really see why anyone would fall into this pit. Is there some boogeyman they are trying to avoid that gets them into the pit where all thinking is self-conscious thinking? It seems like you were leaning heavily on Kant's authority saying that thinking is always self-conscious. Now that we know Rödl misled you regarding Kant, the premise of your thread is undercut. The bizarre claim that all thinking is self-conscious is in desperate need of support.

Or is there another response that seems better? — J

I take it that you are Pat. Maybe you should try writing to Rödl. :grin:

Is it reasonably clear? — J

It is, though I wouldn't lean too heavily on the niceties of phrasing. There are just too many possibilities and too many shades of meaning.

Also, I'm not sure the first-person is all that important to the distinction being drawn. We talk about other people's mental events, just as we talk about other people's affirmations and claims and all that. "Judy thought you had gone home." "Judy thinks you should go home."

I guess the biggest question is how you intend to handle the mental events side. Space of reasons or space of causes?

"Judy thought you had left because she heard the front door" as causal: "If Judy had not heard the front door, she wouldn't have thought you had left"; or as not: "If Judy had not heard the front door, she would have had no reason to think you'd left." ― The trouble with the second is that it should really have "and so she didn't" at the end, but it's pretty hard to justify. People think all kinds of stuff, or fail to.

Does any of that matter for the theory?