Whereas "the oak tree is shedding its leaves" is a combination of two lower level thoughts. — Patterner

But you have said that "the oak tree is shedding its leaves" is the lower level thought.

Is it possible to think ‛I think that the oak tree is shedding its leaves.’ without thinking ‛The oak tree is shedding its leaves.’? The words are actually in the sentence, after all. The higher level thought cannot exist without the lower level thought. — Patterner

Any examples come to mind? — Wayfarer

Sure, insects like an ant. They can think, but I'm pretty sure one has never realized its an 'I'. Thinking does not presume one has ever thought of the self. The phrase is not "think, therefore attempt X for goal" The phrase is "I think, therefore I am". It is the proof of the self which can only be done by the self if that self exists.

Really appreciate everyone's participation here.

I don't get from the discussion where this "I think p" resides. — T Clark

Right, I'd say that was the very question up for discussion, or one of them, at any rate. I was trying to lay out some possibilities about the "I think" -- is it meant to be an experience? a thought in addition to whatever I'm thinking about p? an unexperienced structure? another way of naming or describing self-consciousness? etc. And one of the problems of conceiving the "I think" as a new thought is precisely the one of infinite regress.

See @fdrake's post.

there are thinking things that do not have a sense of self. — Philosophim

A cat is thinking about the leaves falling off the tree as it playfully leaps up to attack them as they're falling. But I do not believe a cat is capable of thinking about thinking about the leaves falling off the tree. That's a different level of thought, of which cats are not capable. — Patterner

some animals are definitely aware of themselves but don't have language. — fdrake

This is a question that I doubt would even have occurred to Kant, given his era's primitive understanding of animals. I'm not sure what we should say about non-human "thinking things." Certainly it could represent a limit case about self-consciousness. For now, I want to resist the temptation to divvy up "think" in terms of whether only humans can do it. If we need that discrimination later on, we can double back to it.

Even if I can't think the higher level thought without the lower level though, I can think the lower level thought without the higher. — Patterner

Yes, if "I think p" is indeed meant to be present to consciousness at all times that "p" is thought.

there's a bunch of sentential content bubbling up from/in the mind, some surveyor partitions it into A-OK and "dump it" - the latter of which is discarded somehow. The A-OK stuff gets labelled/willed as "I think", associated with the selfhood/subjectivity of that person, and that stuff can get asserted by that person. Call that account A.

Alternatively the "I think" is what takes mental/bodily gubbins and puts it in sentence form and filters it into A-OK and "dump it". Then the remainder of the first account holds of the sentence forms. Call that account B. — fdrake

Good, that's clear. These are different accounts of when thought becomes propositional, if I understand you. And yes, the respective qualia would be different.

"I think" has an implicit sentence placeholder — fdrake

This is one of the points that has come up quite quickly in this discussion. Is that what Kant meant? When Rödl considers "I think p", does he understand the thinking to begin with the sentential formation of p? How plausible is that?

I, personally, am just not aware of a cloud of sentences associated with environmental objects and my own thoughts. The majority of my meta-awareness is perceptual rather than sentential, and the parts of it which are linguistic are more broadly narrative than declarative. — fdrake

That's my experience as well, especially if you add in "memories". This could point us toward deciding that whole "'I think' is ubiquitous" thing is misguided. Or, we could accept B as the best account of when the "I think" emerges.

the expression of an idea rather than a particular sentence, — fdrake

Another way of forming the same question. Some philosophers will object that ideas don't occur separated from sentences. I think they can.

If I had no thoughts, "I" would not exist. "I" could not exist if I had no thoughts. — RussellA

Do the quotes around "I" mean that there is literally no self without thoughts, or only that the "I" of philosophy, so to speak -- the self-conscious cogito -- is constructed from our thoughts? And same issue here, of course: "thoughts" as sentential, or more broadly as images, perceptions, etc.?

the simple and in itself perfectly contentless representation “I” which cannot even be called a conception, but merely a consciousness which accompanies all conceptions. By this “I,” or “He,” or “It,” who or which thinks, nothing more is represented than a transcendental subject of thought = x, which is cognized only by means of the thoughts that are its predicates, and of which, apart from these, we cannot form the least conception…. — Mww

I bolded Kant's phrase, above, because it focuses on what we'd like to understand better -- just what the heck does it mean for consciousness to "accompany" something? Would we know it when it happened? As a thesis, can it be falsified by experience?

Whereas "the oak tree is shedding its leaves" is a combination of two lower level thoughts.
— Patterner

But you have said that "the oak tree is shedding its leaves" is the lower level thought. — RussellA

And you pointed out that it is (what might be called?) a compound lower level thought.

Do the quotes around "I" mean that there is literally no self without thoughts, or only that the "I" of philosophy, so to speak -- the self-conscious cogito -- is constructed from our thoughts? — J

As I see it, there could be no self without thoughts. The self doesn't have thoughts, the self is the thoughts that the self has.

If you had no thoughts, would it be possible for you to have a self?

How could you express your self without thoughts?

As regards the word "constructed", in the same way that a wooden table is constructed of wood, the self is constructed of thoughts. The self is neither external to, internal to or accompanies thoughts, but rather the self is the thoughts that the self has.

Even if I can't think the higher level thought without the lower level though, I can think the lower level thought without the higher.
— Patterner

Yes, if "I think p" is indeed meant to be present to consciousness at all times that "p" is thought. — J

Am II right that a cat can think about the tree, but cannot think about thinking about the tree?

Do the quotes around "I" mean that there is literally no self without thoughts, or only that the "I" of philosophy, so to speak -- the self-conscious cogito -- is constructed from our thoughts?
— J

As I see it, there could be no self without thoughts. The self doesn't have thoughts, the self is the thoughts that the self has.

If you had no thoughts, would it be possible for you to have a self?

How could you express your self without thoughts? — RussellA

Someone recently told me about Noesis and Noema. I have only started reading it, but I think it's relevant?

And you pointed out that it is (what might be called?) a compound lower level thought. — Patterner

The question was whether it is possible to think about two things at the same time.

So then is the question "Can you think A and B at the same time?" — Patterner

The compound lower level thought "the oak tree is shedding its leaves" shows that it is possible to think about two things at the same time, "the oak tree" and "is shedding its leaves"

Some philosophers will object that ideas don't occur separated from sentences. I think they can. — J

Up to quibbling on the concept of separateness I agree.

I agree.



And I disagree with myself. :rofl: To wit:

However, i also understand the difference. And i agree with Pat. — Patterner

I've literally never thought about these things before, so I don't have a solid position. I came to a new conclusion while posting, then didn't proofread very well. I had just said (what I called) nested thoughts means I am thinking ‛The oak tree is shedding its leaves.’ as I am thinking ‛I think that the oak tree is shedding its leaves.’ Else I wouldn't know what I was thinking. (Can't think about nothing. [Well, not in this sense.])

I recently said (Janus and/or Meta?) something along the lines of all this. Maybe compound thoughts of the same level, and nested thoughts of different levels, can exist if one is built upon the other, but not if there is no connection. But is even that correct? Am I thinking about leaves falling from the tree and the height of the Empire State Building when I say, 'The leaves are falling from the tree, and, when you include the antenna, the Empire State Building is 1,454 feet (443.2 m) tall"?

….just what the heck does it mean for consciousness to "accompany" something? — J

Depends on what you want consciousness to represent. Simply put, I suppose, given that consciousness is a relative state of being conscious, and given it is necessary to be fully conscious to conceive anything at all, we just say one accompanies the other, insofar as the latter would be impossible without the former.

I’m guessing here, but I nevertheless doubt any decent PhD would admit to employing a mere figure of speech on its own, without first having given a sufficient exposition of the terms used, and their relation to each other. After having done that….all 700-odd pages of it…..Kant might have figured the average academic, the target of record for his thesis after all, would just accept the nomenclature.
———-

As a thesis, can it be falsified by experience? — J

As a thesis, speculative metaphysics can’t be falsified at all, without altering the parameters upon which it rests. ‘Course, neither can it be proved from experience.
———-

↪Mww See fdrake's post. — J

Oh, I did, but I’m far under that level, so….

Am I thinking about leaves falling from the tree and the height of the Empire State Building when I say, 'The leaves are falling from the tree, and, when you include the antenna, the Empire State Building is 1,454 feet (443.2 m) tall"? — Patterner

Possibly yes.

When thinking about "The leaves are falling from the tree" you are thinking about two things connected by the common thought of leaves, allowing you to think about them both at the same time.

When thinking about "the leaves are falling from the tree and the Empire States Building is 443.2 m tall", you are thinking about two things connected by the common thought of height, also allowing you to think about them both at the same time.

There are many different things we can think about at the same time, such as the speed of my car and how many pedestrians are on the road, the price of a restaurant meal and when I was last paid, writing a post knowing that dinner is waiting on the table, etc.

Moreover, if "I think" was required for self consciousness, it would be odd, right? Because some animals are definitely aware of themselves but don't have language. — fdrake

So what's the relationship between thought and language? I've often found myself confused on that topic when reading philosophy, as if there's a basic assumption of thought being inherently linguistic? I can't find a good approach to this thread because of this confusion.

To my mind, there's this "stream of consciousness". When we think of "thought", I think we think abstract from this stream of consciousness and we structure and order it in some way. And language helps with this because sentences are artifacts that spring from this and have a fixed form, as opposed to the flow. But language (as in sentence-forming) isn't the only thing that's fixed in a way to help us structure our stream of consciousness, as is apparent to me when I build a lego model or solve a sudoku (as no words accompany this kind of activity; my stream of consciousness is "silent").

To me, language is an extra that may or may not accompany thought - this is my experience. But to "pin down" a thought I need language. Language fixes a thought with a sentence, and then you can think the sentence and think more complex thoughts, because you can store the bundle (by repetition) while bypassing the sentence. Maybe. So some thoughts we have may well be impossible without language, while still not being associated with a particular sentence.

But with self consciousness being rather basic, I have no problem with ascribing non-linguistic thought to animals without language. But I'm unsure if we disagree about anything, or if I just have a broader intuitive concept of what makes a thought.

I get even more of a head ache when I remember that "p" in "I think p" is likely for "proposition"... I've left that aside for now, deliberately. Because, when I make a post like this, I'm always insecure about my sentences representing my thoughts (or my thoughts being stable to begin with).

Ok, my example wasn't good enough to make my point.

"The leaves are falling from the tree, and the temperature of the surface of the Earth's core is estimated to be around 9,800°F/5,430°C."

Am I able to think of these two entirely unrelated things at the same time? I would think so, or anything might come out of my mouth. If so, then any thoughts can be thought at the same time. They don't have to be related, or one built upon the other

As far as animal intelligence is concerned, a rudimentary sense of 'self and other' would characterise any life whatever, even that of single-celled organisms, in that the hallmark of any organism is its ability to maintain separateness from the sorrounding environment. Minerals and inorganic matter, on the other hand, have no such separation and are altered by whatever energetic forces and chemical influences act on them from the sorrounding environment; they are not agents, in that sense. But I for one don't believe that insects, amoeba, reptiles, and fish engage in thought as such, as their behaviours can be explained solely in terms of stimulus and response. The higher animals - primates, canids, felines, whales, bears, birds - have a correspondingly greater or more elaborated sense of themselves, defending territories and mates, and many can recognise themselves in mirrors (see the mirror test.) But I think questions about 'whether animals think' really belong in the Rational Thinking Humans and Animals thread.

I bolded Kant's phrase, above, because it focuses on what we'd like to understand better -- just what the heck does it mean for consciousness to "accompany" something? Would we know it when it happened? As a thesis, can it be falsified by experience? — J

There's a word I've only become aware of recently 'ipseity'. It means 'having a sense of self'. It seems pretty straightforward that as far as self-aware beings are concerned, ipseity in the sense of the differentiation between self and other, me and not-me, is fundamental, as noted. In simple organisms, I think it operates without any conscious sense or self-awareness as such. Perhaps higher animals, and certainly in humans, the self becomes self-aware. But whether that sense constitutes an 'experience' is moot - I would say not. I would say it signifies the capacity for experience. Unconscious, anaesthetized or asleep, that sense of self falls into abeyance - there is no self-awareness, although in sleep the parasympathetic nervous system maintains a low level of self-awareness sufficient to rouse the subject if needed. In any case, when anaesthetised, (and leaving aside the perplexing cases of near death experience where subjects report seeing their body from the outside) there is no experience nor the capacity for it. But the conscious state is not so much an experience, as the medium of experience. //As per your #3//

Pat is correct. I know this isn't what you're after, but...

The underlying issue is an historical failure to draw and maintain the distinction between thought and thinking about thought.

If one thinks about the leaves falling from the trees, then they're thinking about leaves and trees. If one thinks about the fact that they're thinking about the leaves falling from the trees, then they're thinking about their own thoughts. Those two examples are directed at very different things. The former is of the sort of thought that does not require a language user for it's formation. The latter is the sort of thought that does, for it is thinking about thought, and thinking about one's own thoughts is something that can only be done after they are picked out of the world to the exclusion of all else, via naming and descriptive practices(language use).

"I think" is always metacognitive. The thought to which "I think" is prefixed is not always.

But I think questions about 'whether animals think' really belong in the Rational Thinking Humans and Animals thread. — Wayfarer

It is relevant, because, if an animal that either has no sense of self, or has a sense of self but no thought of self, can think anything along the lines of ‛That oak tree is shedding its leaves,’ then the “I think” does not necessarily accompany all thought. And if it does not necessarily accompany all thought, then it might not always accompany all our thought.

Pat is correct. I know this isn't what you're after, but... — creativesoul

Sure it is, or could be. If I thought this had a cut-and-dried answer, I wouldn't be bothering y'all with it. All opinions are welcome. So, same question to you as to @Banno, earlier: If Pat is correct, does that mean that my #4 is the right response?

Someone recently told me about Noesis and Noema — Patterner

I know these terms from Husserl. I'll read it and get back to you, thanks.

As a thesis, can it be falsified by experience?
— J

As a thesis, speculative metaphysics can’t be falsified at all, without altering the parameters upon which it rests. ‘Course, neither can it be proved from experience. — Mww

OK, but we don't want to beg the question that it is speculative metaphysics. On one construal, we're supposed to be able to actually experience the "I think" as an accompaniment or component of our thoughts. In that case, I would say that's an empirical question that could be falsified. Especially if the construal claims that we must experience it.

Context! Sebastian Rödl's book is about human reason. The title is "Self-Consciousness and Reason: An Introduction to Absolute Idealism" (Google Books preview.) I don't think, from what I've read so far, that 'animal consciousness' is even considered in this book.

I didn't realize the intent of this thread was to discuss the topic only in relation to Rödl's book.

...deny the force/content distinction — J

It's pretty unclear what this would amount to.

The distinction is easy to display. "The grass is green" can be an assertion, a command or a question, depending on context. The name given to the distinction between these three utterances is illocutionary force. Three utterances can have the same propositional content and yet have different illocutionary forces.

Seems odd to deny this.

In the Frege thread some folk seemed to have a different sort of force in mind, going by the name "assertoric force", but it remained very unclear whether, and how, this was different from illocutionary force. It was as if folk were under the misapprehension that assertoric force was somehow prior to the other illocutionary forces, such that they were dependent on or derived from some sort of truth value.

But there seems no reason to give precedence to one of the illocutionary forces over the others, and good reason not to. In the end, force just classifies what we are doing with an utterance, and prioritising assertion appears to be mere chauvinism.

There is no way of stating p without stating p. — J

But one can question P without stating P. Kinda that point of asking a question.

Are all propositions first-person propositions? — J

No. That's why we have the distinction between first person and second person and third person.

What is the relationship of "p" and "I judge that [think/believe/propose etc.] p"? — J

"p" sets out a state of affairs, and "I judge that [think/believe/propose etc.] p"sets out an attitude towards that state of affairs. What's the issue?

Something here bothers you, but it remains unclear what. So I'm taking this thread as your articulating what it is you find troublesome. If you can see some error or lack of clarity in what I've said, it might help.

But it seems to me that Kimhi and Rödl are yet another instance of misleading phenomenological analysis.

The “I think” accompanies all our thoughts, says Kant. Sebastian Rödl, in Self-Consciousness and Objectivity, agrees with this but points out that “this cannot be put by saying that, in every act of thinking, two things are thought: p and I think p.” He calls this a confusion arising from our notation, and suggests, not entirely seriously, that we could devise a more accurate notation “that makes I think internal to p: we may form the letter p by writing, in the shape of a p, the words I think.” He interprets Kant as saying the same thing: for Kant, “the I think is not something thought alongside the thought that it accompanies, but internal to what is thought as such.”

This has some obvious relevance to the debate about the force/content distinction in Frege, which we discussed at length in an earlier thread, inspired by Kimhi. But for now . . .

Suppose my friend Pat replied as follows:

“Sorry, but I don’t have this experience. When I look out the window and say to myself, ‛That oak tree is shedding its leaves,’ I am not aware of also, and simultaneously, thinking anything along the lines of ‛I think that the oak tree is shedding its leaves.’ Please don’t misunderstand me as saying that I’ve never had such a thought, or wouldn’t know what it was to experience such a thought. There are indeed circumstances under which I may additionally reflect ‛And I am thinking thought p at this moment’ or ‛Thought p is my thought’ or ‛I judge that p’. But I disagree that this characterizes my experience of thinking in general.”

Which of these responses do you think would be appropriate to make to Pat?:

1. You've misunderstood. The thesis of the ubiquity of the “I think” is not based on empirical observation. It’s not about what you experience; whether you are aware of having such an experience is not decisive either way. Some people are aware of it, some are not. But we’re not relying on personal reports when we claim that the “I think” must accompany all our thoughts.

2. The “I think” is an experience of self-consciousness, and requires self-consciousness. When you say you are “not aware of it,” you are mistaken. But you can learn to identify the experience, and thus understand that you have been aware of it all along.

3. The “I think” is not experienced at all. It is a condition of thought, a form of thought, in the same way that space and time are conditions of cognition. Self-consciousness, in Rödl’s sense, is built in to every thought, but not as a content that must be experienced.

4. If your report is accurate, then the thesis that “the ‛I think’ accompanies all our thoughts” has been proven wrong.

Or is there another response that seems better? — J

For my part, this issue boils down to what one interprets by the term “thought”.

If one holds that cognizance (a fancier way of saying “awareness”) is in itself a form of thought, then there can be no apprehension of p in the absence of thinking p. For one must cognize p in order to in any way apprehend it. And, since cognizance is here taken to be one form of thought, one must then think p in order to apprehend it.

And, in this interpretation, it is possible that one simultaneously has a meta-cognizance of cognizing that which one immediately apprehends, say, though one’s physiological senses. In other words, it is possible that one can hold an awareness of being aware. Conversely, some might at least at times be aware without being aware of so being.

Apropos, this first interpretation can be in harmony with the more ancient understanding of intellect (one in keeping with the original Latin): namely, that of the intellect being the faculty of first-person understanding via which one understands anything which is other (be this other a concept or a concrete reality). One’s understanding of a concept (say, the concept of biological evolution) will always be necessarily but insufficiently contingent on the depth, or else nonquantitative magnitude, of one’s ready occurring body of first-person understanding. Otherwise exemplified, an adult human holds the potential to thereby understand what (the concept of) a mathematical variable is, but neither can a human infant nor an adult dog ever understand what a mathematical variable is, and this irrespective of how much they come to experience. This, in short, due to their own intellect being far smaller as both faculty and body of content by comparison to that of a typical adult human’s. Hence, if understanding too is deemed to be an aspect of thought, then here too there can be no apprehension of p in the complete absence of an understanding of p—and, thereby, in the absence of thought of p. (Interesting to me, in ancient interpretations, there also at times seems to be an equivalency between understanding and knowing. One cannot know that which one does not understand, nor can one understand something without knowing that which is understood. This being a knowledge other than that of JTB.)

Yet, in stark difference to all the aforementioned, wherever thought is interpreted to be the “representation created in the mind without the use of one's faculties of vision, sound, smell, touch, or taste” then there certainly will be times when one apprehends p without in any way thinking p. For instance, at any given time, one will always apprehend things in one’s peripheral vision which one in no way thinks about (this when thought is interpreted as being representations created in the mind which one can then in any way manipulate at will).

In this latter interpretation of thought, (4) will be valid.

But when considering the former interpretation of thought, a hybrid between (1) and (3) might likely be upheld. Maybe as follows: You misunderstand. Thought—when understood to necessarily consist of both cognizance, i.e. awareness, and understanding—is a precondition for any thought in the sense of “representation created in the mind”. Hence, the “I think” when interpreted to mean “I am aware (of)” is a condition for anything one might think of in the latter sense.

But then, so construing would endow even bacteria with the reality of being a first-person thinking creature—this IFF bacteria happen to be in any way aware (such as of what is and is not food, and how these differentiate from predators)—for then they too will hold some form of, acknowledgedly miniscule, cognizance and understanding.

Again, the issue is contingent on what one interprets the term “thought” to signify.

we don't want to beg the question that it is speculative metaphysics — J

No chance of that; you asked about a statement made from a thesis concerning pure speculative reason, which couldn’t be anything other than metaphysical, and I answered from the same thesis.

If you’d asked something similar, mere accompaniment in general, but without specifying Kantian authorship by the bolding of it, I’d agree.

It’s just a focus, and Rödl’s book is very focused. Otherwise, questions like ‘what is consciousness’ and ‘are animals conscious’ just become like hundreds of other topics on this forum.

Something here bothers you, but it remains unclear what. So I'm taking this thread as your articulating what it is you find troublesome. If you can see some error or lack of clarity in what I've said, it might help. — Banno

Good way of putting it. This is a quintessentially philosophical experience: something is bothering me, for all the evident clarity, and I'm trying to put my finger on it. Maybe I can construct some Rodelian replies to your laying out of the "standard model." Something to do during the massive snowstorm we're about to have . . .

Wish we would get some rain. Stay warm.

you asked about a statement made from a thesis concerning pure speculative reason, which couldn’t be anything other than metaphysical — Mww

Again, I'm not sure this is right. Is the thesis "The 'I think' accompanies all our thoughts"? I was trying to include, in my possible replies to Pat, the possibility that this is meant as a report about experience, not a metaphysical position. We may not find that very promising, but we should at least be able to say why. In other words, let's be completely clear that the thesis of the ubiquity of the "I think" is metaphysical, that no one's experience can discredit it.

I was trying to include, in my possible replies to Pat, the possibility that this is meant as a report about experience, not a metaphysical position. — J

Ahhhh….now I understand you better.

Another reason I chose #3: thought is not an experience, it’s a function, represented by “I think”.