Oh, no worries, these are difficult topics. FWIW, my question about representation was strictly about its Kantian use, since it seems that, if Rödl fudges anywhere, it's there. You say:

representation is absolutely necessary for any and all Kantian speculative metaphysics, — Mww

And that's my understanding too, but until now I would have said that substituting "thought" for "representation" (again, within Kant-world) isn't a major misunderstanding. Could you say more about what hinges on this for him? Many thanks.

When I think, I am thinking in either sentences or images...But if I try to think about my thoughts, I don't have any content but the thought is my object of thought. Because the contents of the thought is either shielded by the thought, or is empty. — Corvus

The equivalence of thinking and being consciously aware

When I think of an oak tree, I am consciously aware of an oak tree.

Rather than say "I am thinking of an oak tree", I can equally say "I am consciously aware of an oak tree".

I don't say "consciously aware of an oak tree", which would be ungrammatical, because I am consciously aware that it is "I" that is looking at an oak tree.

Therefore, I am consciously aware of two things, consciously aware not only of the oak tree but also it is "I" that is consciously aware of the oak tree.

But thinking is equivalent to being consciously aware

So I can also say, I am thinking of two things, thinking not only of the oak tree but also thinking about the "I" that is thinking about the oak tree.

This is why the "I" is included in the proposition "I am thinking of an oak tree", rather than just "thinking of an oak tree".

In other words, not only thinking about the oak tree but also thinking about the "I" that is thinking about the oak tree.

IE, not only thinking but also thinking about thinking.

until now I would have said that substituting "thought" for "representation" (again, within Kant-world) isn't a major misunderstanding — J

@Mww explained the difference between thought and representation in some detail, but the basic logic here is straightforward:

The I think must be able to accompany all my representations — Kant, CPR, B131-133 (pp. 246-7)

vs.

<Every time p is thought, I think p is thought> [Rödl] — Leontiskos

(Or else, <The I think accompanies all my representations>.)

Rödl is misrepresenting Kant whether or not we (mistakenly) allow "thought" and "representation" to be interchangeable.

• Kant: "The I think must be able to accompany all my representations"
• Pseudo Rödl: "The I think accompanies all my representations"
• ...
• Pseudo Kant: "Every time p is thought, I think p could be thought"
• Rödl: "Every time p is thought, I think p is thought"

Kant says, "All hamburgers are able to be accompanied by ketchup." Rödl says, "Kant thinks every hamburger has ketchup on it."

Still beavering away at this, not ready for prime-time yet. But you can help with a clarification:

A. "The oak tree is shedding its leaves."
B. "I see the oak tree."
C. "I think* 'The oak tree is shedding its leaves'."
D. "I think** 'The oak tree is shedding its leaves'."

*Popper's World 2 sense of "think" = a mental event
**World 3 sense of "think" = results in Frege's "proposition"

Am I right that all four of these sentences are propositions in good standing, according to Frege? The fact that A is from no particular point of view, whereas B - D are, doesn't matter, correct? Also, the fact that C & D quote another proposition is likewise kosher?

Cool. All’s well….yaddayaddayadda.
————-

Kant says, "All hamburgers are able to be accompanied by ketchup." Rödl says, "Kant thinks every hamburger has ketchup on it." — Leontiskos

Brilliant!!!!

In other words, not only thinking about the oak tree but also thinking about the "I" that is thinking about the oak tree.

IE, not only thinking but also thinking about thinking. — RussellA

Being conscious and having the concept of "I" is the precondition of all mental activities i.e. they are already there as base of your thinking.

When you are saying, the oak tree is standing there, you already have "I", and you already have thought about it, so you could have made up the statement and uttered it or wrote it.

You are only saying that you think about your thinking that the oak tree is standing there, because you are reflecting your thoughts, which had already taken place, not because you are thinking about your thoughts.

You can write about anything linguistically of course, without thinking or knowing, some gibberish such as the oak tree is 100 pages long, and you could say you think the oak tree is 100 pages long , and you think you think you think you think ... the oak tree is 100 pages long . But it doesn't sound intelligible.

When you say, the oak tree is standing there, the other party will know that you think the oak tree is standing there, and you are conscious of what you said, also you are claiming that you exist as a perceiver who apprehended the existence of the oak tree standing there across from you with the other party both witnessing and perceiving the existence of the oak tree standing.

Adding that you are conscious of the oak tree is standing there, and also you as a being exists, on the statement that the oak tree is standing there would be unnecessary information for the communication in logical and linguistic point of view.

There doesn't seem to be difference between saying,

1) The oak tree is standing there. and
2) You think that the oak tree is standing there.

You would only say 2), when you are asked why you said 1).

Am I right that all four of these sentences are propositions in good standing, according to Frege? — J

I don't think so. Firstly Frege presented two logics, which are somewhat different. Secondly he was not concerned with sentences as such, so much as with truths about the world; that is, his emphasis is very different to that of modern logic.

The fact that A is from no particular point of view, whereas B - D are, doesn't matter, correct? — J

I think otherwise. The judgement stroke "⊢" turns a proposition into a judgement. "The oak is shedding it's leaves" would be bound together as a whole by the horizontal stroke:

—The oak is shedding it's leaves

And become a judgement with the addition of the vertical stroke

⊢The oak is shedding it's leaves

For Frege the operator "⊢" transforms expressions into judgements. This is quite different to recent usage.

So I'd suggest that Frege might parse (A) as —φ. He could not have differentiated (C) and (D), not having Popper's language, but I suggest that he would parse both as ⊢φ. Whether "See" is a judgement or not is moot, so (B) is undecidable.

This is simply how I read the SEP article on Frege's Begriffsschrift

@J, in your musings you might consider Davidson's "On Saying That", in which he sets out an argument that would result in "Pat thinks the Oak is shedding leaves" as "The Oak is shedding leaves" and "Pat said that" were that indicated the previous quoted statement.

https://eclass.uoa.gr/modules/document/file.php/PHS180/davidson_on_saying_that.pdf

Yes, I remember that article, I'll reread, thanks.

I may not have asked what I meant to ask here. I was wanting to affirm that all 4 statements are well-formed propositions -- that is, they are candidates for having all the things done to them that we do with propositions, including asserting, questioning, etc. In that sense, "I see the oak tree" may not be a judgment, but can't it be asserted?

Or, leaving Frege out of it, I'm trying to home in on whether 1st-person statements that quote a proposition internally, as it were (such as C and D), are in any way logically problematic.

I don't think I can help here. How a sentence is parsed in logic depends on the task in hand. So even "The oak tree is shedding its leaves" might be parsed as "is shedding its leaves (the oak tree )", with the form f(a); or as "Is shedding(The oak tree, its leaves), with the form f(a,b); and the possibilities multiply in the other examples. Explicitly, there is no standard way to parse "I think that φ".

I'd add that this is not a problem for logic, but for English, in that "I think..." is unclear, and even ambiguous, outside of a context, and hence first order logic has multiple options as to how to pars it.

In particular, is "Pat thinks the Oak is shedding its leaves" something Pat experiences, as your OP implies, or something Pat does?

So yes, C and D are logical problematic, in that there are multiple ways to set out their structure.

No, that's a big help. Sort of what I thought. Rödl calls this kind of statement "a thorn in the side" of propositional logic, in part because of the linguistic ambiguities you note. And these in turn lead to conceptual puzzles, such as the one about whether to conceive of thinking as an experience or an action. Also, perhaps even more crucially, whether "a thought" is a World 2 or a World 3 item. Frege would of course not have that terminology to hand, but I think a lot of what he had to say about psychologism is an attempt to sort it out.

Cheers.

Rödl calls this kind of statement "a thorn in the side" of propositional logic — J

Again I'd point out hat this is a misappraisal. The problem is not with propositional logic, but with interpretation. The conceptual puzzles are us working out wha the structure of such sentences might be.

Speech act theory is much more useful than talk of world 2 and world 3. "Thought" is a group terms for a range of activities, "I wonder...", "I assert...". "I suggest..." and so on. These are each slightly different in ways that clumping them together hide. And declaratives explain how the structures thought of as part of world 3 come about.

There doesn't seem to be difference between saying,
1) The oak tree is standing there. and
2) You think that the oak tree is standing there.
You would only say 2), when you are asked why you said 1). — Corvus

OK. How about Pat's problem, which presumably is a metaphysical rather than linguistic problem.

When I look out the window and say to myself, ‛That oak tree is shedding its leaves,’ I am not aware of also, and simultaneously, thinking anything along the lines of ‛I think that the oak tree is shedding its leaves.’ — J

1) Pat says "the oak tree is standing there"
2) Pat says "I think that the oak tree is standing there"

Linguistically these are different, but metaphysically the same.

What about the metaphysical problem?
3) Pat is thinking about her thinking that the oak tree is standing there.

OK. How about Pat's problem, which presumably is a metaphysical rather than linguistic problem. — RussellA

I am not quite sure what you mean by a metaphysical problem. I asked you about it already, but didn't get replies on that point. What is a metaphysical problem, and why is it a metaphysical problem?

p and I think p — J

I am assuming that Pat's problem is metaphysical rather than linguistic. Pat said:

When I look out the window and say to myself, ‛That oak tree is shedding its leaves,’ I am not aware of also, and simultaneously, thinking anything along the lines of ‛I think that the oak tree is shedding its leaves.’

1) I think that the oak tree is shedding its leaves
2) I am thinking the thought that the oak tree is shedding its leaves

Consider "I think x", where x = the oak tree is shedding its leaves. All three words are important within the sentence.

The sentence cannot be "I think"
A thought must be about something. For Frege a thought has a content, in this case that the oak tree is shedding its leaves.

The sentence cannot be "I x"
There must be a relation between "I" and x. For Frege there must be an act, whether I am standing next to x or I am thinking about x.

The sentence cannot be "think x"
There must be a subject, whether "Patachon thinks x" or "I think x".

I can only say "I think x", if I am aware that the "I" refers to me, and it is me that is doing the thinking, rather than someone else, such as Patachon.

When I say "I think the oak tree is shedding its leaves", I am aware that I am thinking the thought rather than Patachon, for example.

Pat and her belief
Pat is mistaken in her belief.

In order for Pat to say to herself "that oak tree is shedding its leaves", Pat must be aware that she is thinking the thought, rather than someone else, such as Patachon.

The reply to Pat should be response 1, "“I think” must accompany all our thoughts"

If we didn't know who was thinking our thoughts, our identity as a person would no longer exist.

1) I think that the oak tree is shedding its leaves
2) I am thinking the thought that the oak tree is shedding its leaves — RussellA

It seems to me that 1 is talking about (pointing to) the oak tree while 2 is talking about (pointing to) thoughts. What our present goal is determines what we try to point to with language. Why would I be interested in you thinking the oak tree is shedding its leaves when I can see the oak tree is shedding its leaves for myself? Even if I were not there with you, why would I want to know what you are thinking instead of what is happening independent of your thoughts - like the oak shedding its leaves? The basis of this thread seems to me a useless endeavor of trying to parse some use of language that is never used in normal circumstances, but only on a philosophy forum.

I am not quite sure what you mean by a metaphysical problem. I asked you about it already, but didn't get replies on that point. What is a metaphysical problem, and why is it a metaphysical problem? — Corvus

Given the sentence "I think I think the Eiffel Tower is 400m tall"

Linguistically it could mean "I think the Eiffel Tower is 400m tall, but I'm not sure"

Metaphysically, what does "I think I think" mean. Can a thought think about itself. If it can, does this infer free-will, where a thought causes itself to come into existence, an example of spontaneous self-causation. Or what about the infinite regress homuncules problem used against Direct Realism. Where do thoughts exist in the physical brain. Do thoughts exist, or are they just illusions. Things like that.

Language use is not a requirement for thinking. One can think without saying that you are thinking. Words are just scribbles and sounds. To think in words is to think in scribbles and sounds. You must be able to think prior to learning a language, so being able to say to yourself, "I think..." is not a requirement to think, to learn or to know things.

What our present goal is determines what we try to point to with language. — Harry Hindu

I've been assuming that this thread is about the philosophical implications of "thought", rather than how "thought" is used in language, though it is true that ambiguities in language make the task of philosophy more difficult.

Language use is not a requirement for thinking. — Harry Hindu

True, but it would be difficult to know Kant's and Frege's insights about thoughts without language.

I've been assuming that this thread is about the philosophical implications of "thought", rather than how "thought" is used in language, though it is true that ambiguities in language make the task of philosophy more difficult. — RussellA

The philosophical implications of the scribble, "thought", or actual thoughts? Seems to me that to understand some philosophical implication of something, that something needs to be defined, keeping in mind that using language to define something is not to point to more scribbles, but to the actual thing that isn't just more scribbles. We only need language to relay information, not to create reality. Only language that relays relevant information is useful, else it's the ramblings of a madman or philosophy gone wild.

Going from "The oak tree is shedding its leaves" to "I think the oak tree is shedding its leaves" is going from thinking in the visual of an oak tree shedding its leaves to thinking in the auditory experience of hearing the words (you talking to yourself) "I think the oak tree is shedding its leaves". They are two separate experiences - one visual the other auditory, unless you are thinking in the visual scribbles, "I think the oak tree is shedding its leaves", then you would be having two separate visual experiences that are mutually exclusive - one of scribbles and the other of an oak tree shedding its leaves.

We only need language to relay information, not to create reality. Only language that relays relevant information is useful, else it's the ramblings of a madman or philosophy gone wild. — Harry Hindu

Does that include the realities created by To Kill a Mockingbird by Harper Lee, 1984 by Orwell, The Lord of the Rings by Tolkein, The Great Gatsby by Fitzgerald, Anna Karenina by Tolstoy, etc.

Does that include the realities created by To Kill a Mockingbird by Harper Lee, 1984 by Orwell, The Lord of the Rings by Tolkein, The Great Gatsby by Fitzgerald, Anna Karenina by Tolstoy, etc. — RussellA

Calling them "realities" would be a misuse of words. They are fictional stories, and we do not normally use the words, "fiction" and "reality" in ways that are synonymous.

One could say that the use in reading a fictional story is to escape reality, at least temporarily. Is the goal of philosophy to escape reality?

Going from "The oak tree is shedding its leaves" to "I think the oak tree is shedding its leaves" is going from thinking in the visual of an oak tree shedding its leaves to thinking in the auditory experience of hearing the words (you talking to yourself) "I think the oak tree is shedding its leaves". — Harry Hindu

It's also going from certainty to uncertainty

Calling them "realities" would be a misuse of words. They are fictional stories, and I don't see any relevance between the words, "fiction" and "reality". — Harry Hindu

Wolfgang Iser in The Reality of Fiction: A Functionalist Approach to Literature makes the point that fiction and reality are often very difficult to separate, as we can see in today's mainstream media.

If fiction and reality are to be linked, it must be in terms not of opposition but of communication, for the one is not the mere opposite of the other - fiction is a means of telling us something about reality.

The problem is not with propositional logic, but with interpretation. — Banno

Fair enough. I could quibble about whether there would be propositional logic without interpretation, but I take your point.

In order for Pat to say to herself "that oak tree is shedding its leaves", Pat must be aware that she is thinking the thought, rather than someone else, such as Patachon.

The reply to Pat should be response 1, "“I think” must accompany all our thoughts" — RussellA

I think this is right if we interpret the phenomenology generously. The point of response #1 was supposed to be that, strictly speaking, "I think" isn't something we have to experience. Nor need we be aware of it, though sometimes we are. So even if Pat is not aware that she is thinking the thought, the "I think" is nonetheless present. Thus, I would question whether we need to stipulate Pat's awareness of thinking the thought. If we bring the awareness to mind, and question her about it, she will probably answer as you suggest: "Yes, it is I and no one else who thinks my thought." Is this good enough to earn the description "The 'I think' must accompany all our thoughts"? At this point we're really fine-tuning (in a way that can be all too annoying in a lot of phenomenology). I think a case could be made either way -- that "being aware that X [me] is thinking the thought" is an inseparable aspect of thinking, or that this awareness is always available to me but not always experienced.