I didn't speak about God at all. So why are you bringing God in? I've asked you to prove merely that love is JUST a chemical cocktail and nothing more. It's not a black and white thing. If love isn't just a chemical cocktail, that doesn't mean God exists, so don't be scared. This is not a trap. I'm just asking you an honest question. — Agustino
And don't you need to prove your point if you want to convince us that love is just a chemical cocktail? Or do you expect us to fall down before your great wisdom in blind acceptance? That sounds quite like what you project on religious people to tell you the truth. It's quite hypocritical to hold others to standards you don't hold yourself to. — Agustino
What does that mean? I didn't ask you to recite what I said, I asked you what it means. You say you're familiar with Aristotelian tradition, so please go ahead and explain to me what exactly a rational soul is. What is this thing that human beings are formed of? — Agustino
Okay, I agree. What would you say "obscure" and "unsubstantiated" mean? How do you make a belief "clear" and "substantiated"? — Agustino
And would you agree that we mean someone good at healing, instead of good at baking pies, because we appeal to the function of the doctor, and so we consider a doctor to be a good doctor when he performs his function well? — Agustino
Right, and I agree with that. But to claim that this tradition is presented without evidence is quite silly - even on an a priori basis, some of the brightest minds who have ever lived have believed it. To really make that claim you must first show that you understand that tradition, and show that it lacks such evidence, something that you haven't done. To be able to do that, you'd have to engage with the tradition, do you agree? — Agustino
The fact that it necessarily frustrates the telos of intimacy of sex. — Agustino
Oh come now. Appeal to un-philosophicalness? — VagabondSpectre
Why should it always follow friendship? Because that's how you feel about it? Because otherwise your feelings get hurt? — VagabondSpectre
I don't understand what you mean here; I don't have sex with objects, I have sex with people. — VagabondSpectre
Your moral point about approaching women with sexual interest/intentions is that it's harmful to them. — VagabondSpectre
Why is "friendship" required to be "morally conscious"? — VagabondSpectre
I am going to do my best to avoid most of the nonsense that you write and try to find the best parts of your argument, because it is clear that you are a broken record incapable of thinking beyond your little world and that somehow writing lengthy posts would enable you to present yourself as an authority on this subject when, by your own admission, you have stated that you enjoy such argumentative tact. I personally find that distasteful. — TimeLine
This is the last time I am going to say this to you. I am NOT talking about individual, case-by-case situations. I am talking sexual morality. Do you understand that? It is not harmful to them - we are not discussing a problem of ethics - I specifically wrote it is about the person' intent, what you think, how you perceive. You keep on going back to the same thing, hence the broken record. — TimeLine
It is the other way around; through friendship one becomes morally conscious, they begin to experience empathy. And as I will reiterate (again :-d ) that seeking a genuine bond with a man does not suddenly mean that I am averse to sex, so I would appreciate your coercive subtleties to be kept to a minimum; was it not you that said that you should not be concerned about the emotional well-being of women? — TimeLine
Do you want me to wield a moral hatchet like yourself? — VagabondSpectre
Certain thoughts and intentions are immoral, and wanting to have sex with a woman and approaching her on that basis is one such inherently immoral/un-virtuous thought — VagabondSpectre
I even sympathize with you — VagabondSpectre
This is what I mean by not wanting to have to consider everyone's emotional well-being — VagabondSpectre
I only intend to approach women with sexual interests in mind in reasonable settings, such as a club setting, although circumstances can make this a bit of a grey area (i.e, body language)). — VagabondSpectre
You say this: — TimeLine
So if I call someone who is a tramp, a tramp (not to her face in this case) is that bad? Why? — Agustino
But then, earlier in your little tirade against me, you said: — TimeLine
That's not kind, that's not nice, and that's not virtuous. End of story. — Agustino
Ok so what does the fact that I call a tramp a tramp have to do with the fact that I think some of your behaviour is not kind, nice or virtuous? :s How is that a contradiction? The only way I can see it as a contradiction is if you assume that calling an actual tramp a tramp is wrong, and that's precisely what I've asked you - if it is wrong. So you cannot answer me by the contradiction story, since that would be to beg the question.You contradict yourself constantly — TimeLine
When did I claim to be? :s Really, you keep making up shit, the same way you made up shit that I called you a dog. I never called you a dog - I said you were foaming at the mouth LIKE A DOG. Which was true, since you had an entire post written all in caps, combined with repeatedly insulting me for no reason by calling me an idiot, a moron, etc. Comments which by the way, you removed - good that I managed to quote them before you did. So I'm not quite sure which one of us is running away from responsibility.so I am not kind or nice or virtuous when I speak, but you are? — TimeLine
Funny that you project that on me. I'm not sure how I'm trying to get out of anything - I answered all your questions, the same cannot be said about you - you've avoided all my questions.is only deceptive to you and asking a multitude of irrelevant questions is as much a tactic as appealing to the 'many people agree with me' rhetoric when you attempt re-direct the blame to your interlocutor. — TimeLine
No, only ONE post was deleted, and in my opinion that shouldn't have been deleted as I had a valid point. You tempered with your comments to remove evidence, that's not what a person with integrity does. It is true that it was quite a harsh post, but it nevertheless had a valid point.Several of your posts have been deleted if you haven't noticed. — TimeLine
No it's absolutely not a game, and I never claimed not to have been aggressive, so why do you keep imputing shit to me that I've never said? You always do this. Always. Almost every single sentence contains a lie.This is not a game of who can write the most or who will give up first or who can manipulate words the best as a way to deflect any responsibility. Again, here you are contradicting yourself and you are indeed aggressive. — TimeLine
This is false. Buddhists for example don't believe in God, and yet they'd disagree that evolution alone is responsible for what love is, if you take evolution to be a purely physical process.I bring God into it because that's the only other source of "why love is what it is" (with it's specific telos, etc...) that I can imagine you have in mind other than evolution (as a basis for why this telos is morally important) — VagabondSpectre
Good question, we will answer it in due course.(Or in other words, why should our teleological assessments of "love" be taken as morally necessary to pursue or immoral to frustrate?) — VagabondSpectre
Why must love be designed in the first place?If only evolution designed love — VagabondSpectre
And there is actual evidence, namely our experience of love.To say that love is something more than it's physical description, from my perspective, makes a claim that begs for actual evidence (my scientific standards). — VagabondSpectre
No, you cannot back that up with evidence at all. You cannot show that love is just a chemical cocktail, you yourself have just admitted this. Maybe what you want to say is that you can back up with evidence the fact that the experience of love involves the release of certain chemicals within the body, but that is an entirely different story. Correlation does not necessarily entail a causal link.Claiming that love is basically a chemical cocktail and evolution is the bar-tender is something I can back up with evidence. — VagabondSpectre
Okay, I don't think you have the right understanding of what a soul is in Aristotelian terms, but for now we'll work with yours. So you say that a "rational soul" is the form of a living thing with nutritive, perceptual, and mind components. You also say that "the actual form that humans take can be understood by the actions/functions that they manifest". So if the form is understood by the actions/functions they manifest, then clearly the test to determine the existence of the form is to see if they manifest the respective actions/functions that the respective form would entail. But previously you said:So, Aristotle's soul is the actual form that humans take which can be understood by the actions/functions that they manifest. Plants have only the "nutritive soul" (where seeking nutrition and consuming nutritious material is an action inherent to the form of plants), while non-human-animals have a "perceptual soul" in addition to a nutritive soul (they perceive things, but do not understand them), and finally human-animals actually have "a mind" aspect to their soul, which is what supposedly makes us totally special and unique, and able to actually engage in complex activities which require complex understanding. A "rational soul" is the form of a living thing with nutritive, perceptual, and mind components. — VagabondSpectre
I believe that it's time to retract this statement, since we have shown that forms are understood by the actions/functions they manifest (just like atoms would be understood by the actions/functions they manifest) and we do know that human beings have nutritive, perceptual and mind components - we know it from direct observation.The assumption that humans have a "rational soul" is not proven or scientific. — VagabondSpectre
No it's not satisfactory. Substances per Aristotelian ontology are composed of form & matter - hence the doctrine of hylomorphism. This isn't a very controversial thing, since both matter (potential) and form (actuality) are required to have an actual, real substance.So if the above is satisfactory to you, can I now tell you why I think Aristotle's teleological approach to understanding the world (per the above) is a primitive and poor basis for objective moral reasoning? (let alone critical and scientific thinking)... — VagabondSpectre
Okay. So then that seems a bit contradictory to me because on the one hand you do not want to stick to the very well defined philosophical terminology of Aristotelianism, but at the same time you want to avoid the vagueness that exists in other more colloquial terminology.By "clear" I mean with language that is not tied to some specific (and ancient -_-) school of thought or thinker who tended to use their own vocabulary in specific ways, but also, and especially also, not using using or invoking concepts which point to very complex phenomena without at least giving a solid definition and description of what that phenomena is (for example: "emotional well being" or "person-hood") — VagabondSpectre
How do we go about choosing correct premises? A conclusion is only as good as the premises, but mostly because the premises already contain the conclusion. But clearly we decide on the premises before we decide on the conclusion. Therefore it is at least logically possible to get to the conclusion without any premises, right? Certainly it's not the argument that will decide what the truth is, for the argument always presupposes premises, and premises always presuppose some other source - other than arguments.So I really like it when premises and conclusions are clearly defined and clearly articulated. — VagabondSpectre
I would hope the premises don't follow logically FROM the conclusions.In terms of "substantiated" all that I ask is that your premises logically follow from your conclusions (or are made highly probable by them) — VagabondSpectre
Your objection to my premises can always happen - it's not constrained by anything, except your honesty and your experience.If I cannot object to your premises, and I cannot disagree with the logic your conclusion employs, then I'll accept the conclusion. — VagabondSpectre
Okay I see. So then I think you'll also agree that a good watch is one which tells the time right, a good hairdresser is one which does your hair right, and a good eye is one which allows you to see well, correct?"Good" can be used as a adjective describing someone skilled in their profession, so yes? — VagabondSpectre
Yes we don't but I don't wish to talk about language, but rather the underlying concepts.And when we say "doctor" we don't mean "baker" due to an arbitrary reality of the english language. — VagabondSpectre
But would you agree that if anyone, regardless of who they are, understands what we mean by doctor, then they will also understand that a good doctor is one who is good at what we mean by healing? I'm trying to talk about the underlying concepts now, not about whatever words we use to refer to the concepts, so just checking if you're still with me. Because concepts are objectively related to each other in a certain way - such as doctor with healing.We're not appealing to some innate and necessary function of an immutable "doctor form", per se, we're just pointing to the common understanding of doctor when we say it. — VagabondSpectre
Okay!To show that a tradition lacks evidence I would have to engage with the tradition yes... — VagabondSpectre
Right, so I think you should retract the statement that there is no evidence for the tradition, since quite clearly you do not wish to prove a negative. So we can cross this one out.I'm not the one trying to argue that it has sufficient evidence though, that's your position, and I cannot be expected to prove a negative. You're the one who in the process of arguing for the position that casual sex and promiscuity are inherently harmful eventually pointed directly to the existence of a tradition (as evidence/argument) and now again are making this explicit appeal that the existence of a tradition is reason enough to believe something is valid until someone comes along and proves that the tradition contains insufficient evidence.
This is called an "Appeal to tradition". It's a well known informal fallacy and piece of sophistry/rhetoric that humans have irrationally employed for millennia. It's employment is itself a tradition. I'm sure there's irony hiding around here somewhere...
In other words, saying "smart people believed this stuff and it's really old so you need to show why it lacks evidence" is a fallacious appeal to my request that you explain to me why your Aristotelian teleological framework is a sound basis for a moral one, or at the very least what makes casual sex necessarily harmful. I think I've been very sporting of your constant demands that I rebuke Aristotle directly, so now maybe you can meet me half way and close the remaining logical gaps in your argument without demanding that I recite or paraphrase the meaning of the terms you employ without yourself actually qualifying them. — VagabondSpectre
So if I say that the function of the heart and the cardiovascular system is to pump blood that is my personal definition, and no more true than saying that the function of the heart and cardiovascular system is to stare at the moon?It ends with your personal definition of what the function of humans are. — VagabondSpectre
Well it's quite peculiar that you complain that my morality is based on experience, on what is yours based?Essentially it amounts to your own experience based assessment of how you think humans ought to live — VagabondSpectre
Your body cannot actualise a form, rather a form actualises your body, and together they make the substance you consider to be "you".The "form" (soul) that my body "actualizes" wasn't merely created by my parents alone (they didn't design it) — VagabondSpectre
Okay, so let's see, why do you think evolution is opposed to Aristotelian teleology? I think that quite the contrary, evolution requires Aristotelian teleology to make sense. If you think about it, a certain combination of genes produces a certain effect. Clearly it seems that specific genes are directed towards producing a certain range of effects, which is exactly what modern molecular biology is discovering. If specific genes weren't directed towards a specific range of effects, then evolution wouldn't even get off the ground, because everything would be chaotic. One day gene X caused blonde hair, and the next day the same gene would cause purple hair! So natural selection would have nothing to select from if there wasn't this underlying teleology.Evolution really gives Aristotle's teleology quite a hard time in my opinion. — VagabondSpectre
Sure, I agree with you, but this genetic mechanism in no way negates teleology, because it is itself teleological as I've illustrated above. It just has to be to even get off the ground. Teleology just explains why a certain cause is directed towards certain effects and not towards others, which is just as needed today to account for science, as it was 2000 years ago. When we say for example that pollen particles suspended in water seem to undergo random motion as noticed even by the materialist Lucretius more than 2000 years ago, then clearly we have to attribute to something - in this case atoms - the power to produce such an effect on the pollen particle. We know this as Brownian motion in modern science today. But we must attribute only such a power to the collisions that atoms cause, and not for example the power to make the pollen particle fly to the moon. Clearly the underlying causes are teleologically oriented towards those effects.Genetic mechanisms and the information they store is a much more interesting description of the form of the human body, and it's a world neither you, nor I, nor Aristotle can speak authoritatively about... — VagabondSpectre
The assumption that humans have a "rational soul" is not proven or scientific. Dividing this unproven soul into the "animal" and "vegetative" is an unsubstantiated extension of just assuming "rational souls" exist in the first place (regardless of how vague I might object the terms to be).Then comes the arbitrary moral value assumption that says the "vegetative" is more morally valuable than the "animal". And finally comes the assumption that the telelogical hierarchy of necessary ends of these realities constitutes a sound basis for objective moral reasoning. This is just bullshit predicated on bullshit... — VagabondSpectre
It's a good sign but it is not without it's trials and tribulations. The best part of getting older with someone is: one is usually in good health of the body and the other is in good health of the mind. He made the mistake of saying that it didn't surprise him when I hurt my back because of what he called my "fragility" to which I loudly objected to while wincing in pain.So despite your attempt at an open marriage, you have a monogamous one. That's life right there for you. If you're still holding hands, that's a very good sign :) — geospiza
Why must love be designed in the first place? — Agustino
And there is actual evidence, namely our experience of love. — Agustino
No, you cannot back that up with evidence at all. You cannot show that love is just a chemical cocktail, you yourself have just admitted this. Maybe what you want to say is that you can back up with evidence the fact that the experience of love involves the release of certain chemicals within the body, but that is an entirely different story. Correlation does not necessarily entail a causal link. — Agustino
Okay, I don't think you have the right understanding of what a soul is in Aristotelian terms, but for now we'll work with yours. So you say that a "rational soul" is the form of a living thing with nutritive, perceptual, and mind components. You also say that "the actual form that humans take can be understood by the actions/functions that they manifest". So if the form is understood by the actions/functions they manifest, then clearly the test to determine the existence of the form is to see if they manifest the respective actions/functions that the respective form would entail. But previously you said:
The assumption that humans have a "rational soul" is not proven or scientific. — VagabondSpectre
I believe that it's time to retract this statement, since we have shown that forms are understood by the actions/functions they manifest (just like atoms would be understood by the actions/functions they manifest) and we do know that human beings have nutritive, perceptual and mind components - we know it from direct observation. — Agustino
I meant that it's not an adequately testable or precise regime of interpreting the differences between objects (and how they change), and it doesn't lead to any predictive power...No it's not satisfactory. Substances per Aristotelian ontology are composed of form & matter - hence the doctrine of hylomorphism. This isn't a very controversial thing, since both matter (potential) and form (actuality) are required to have an actual, real substance.
The form of the living body, as Aristotle writes in De Anima, is known as the soul. The form of the body has nothing to do with the shape of the body. Rather, the soul is the principle by virtue of which the body is a living body, instead of a dead body. The soul is not some ghosty thing which has the shape of the body, and leaves the body upon death to go up to heaven, or whatever you may have imagined when you made the silly statement that there is no scientific evidence for the soul. — Agustino
Now forms give the matter that they govern the powers that it has, and only those powers. Forms are absolutely necessary to explain the behaviour we notice in matter. Take the simplest particle, the quark. Why does it have the behaviour that it does, and not some other behaviour? Clearly to explain this we have to postulate a principle which governs its behaviour. Even if, via the Heisenberg Uncertainty principle that behaviour happens to be somewhat random, we still require a reason why it's random, and not non-random — Agustino
Also think about genes. You say that genes are responsible for the features that we have. So why do genes have such powers? This is more besides the point, but you have to understand why Aristotle postulated forms in the first place. — Agustino
Now - we have discovered that the soul is the form of the living body, and together they constitute the creature in question. If either the soul is gone, or the living body is gone, then we cannot have the creature. Once the creature dies, the soul disappears or dies - and the body stops being ANIMATED (Anima = soul). That's why, for example, Epicurus the atheist and materialist believed in souls - he, unlike Aristotle, thought that the soul dies with the body.
Now a rational soul is distinguished by the powers it gives the respective body. Namely all the powers the vegetative soul has (nutritional, reproduction, etc.), all the powers of the animal soul (locomotion, sensory, etc.), and in addition to those, will and intellect, which are uniquely human powers (as far as we know). There's nothing primitive about Aristotelianism, in recent years in fact it's been coming back very strongly in philosophy of science. — Agustino
Okay. So then that seems a bit contradictory to me because on the one hand you do not want to stick to the very well defined philosophical terminology of Aristotelianism, but at the same time you want to avoid the vagueness that exists in other more colloquial terminology. — Agustino
How do we go about choosing correct premises? A conclusion is only as good as the premises, but mostly because the premises already contain the conclusion. But clearly we decide on the premises before we decide on the conclusion. Therefore it is at least logically possible to get to the conclusion without any premises, right? Certainly it's not the argument that will decide what the truth is, for the argument always presupposes premises, and premises always presuppose some other source - other than arguments. — Agustino
Your objection to my premises can always happen - it's not constrained by anything, except your honesty and your experience. — Agustino
Okay I see. So then I think you'll also agree that a good watch is one which tells the time right, a good hairdresser is one which does your hair right, and a good eye is one which allows you to see well, correct? — Agustino
Would you agree that a moral man is a good man? — Agustino
But would you agree that if anyone, regardless of who they are, understands what we mean by doctor, then they will also understand that a good doctor is one who is good at what we mean by healing? I'm trying to talk about the underlying concepts now, not about whatever words we use to refer to the concepts, so just checking if you're still with me. Because concepts are objectively related to each other in a certain way - such as doctor with healing. — Agustino
Right, so I think you should retract the statement that there is no evidence for the tradition, since quite clearly you do not wish to prove a negative. So we can cross this one out. — Agustino
So if I say that the function of the heart and the cardiovascular system is to pump blood that is my personal definition, and no more true than saying that the function of the heart and cardiovascular system is to stare at the moon? — Agustino
Well it's quite peculiar that you complain that my morality is based on experience, on what is yours based? — Agustino
Your body cannot actualise a form, rather a form actualises your body, and together they make the substance you consider to be "you" — Agustino
Okay, so let's see, why do you think evolution is opposed to Aristotelian teleology? I think that quite the contrary, evolution requires Aristotelian teleology to make sense. If you think about it, a certain combination of genes produces a certain effect. Clearly it seems that specific genes are directed towards producing a certain range of effects, which is exactly what modern molecular biology is discovering. If specific genes weren't directed towards a specific range of effects, then evolution wouldn't even get off the ground, because everything would be chaotic. One day gene X caused blonde hair, and the next day the same gene would cause purple hair! So natural selection would have nothing to select from if there wasn't this underlying teleology. — Agustino
Certain thoughts and intentions are immoral, and wanting to have sex with a woman and approaching her on that basis is one such inherently immoral/un-virtuous thought — VagabondSpectre
Yes. Now, that we have established this, can we move forward? What I am interested in is not whether mutually consensual casual sex between two single adults is immoral (which is a case-by-case situation that depends on a number of factors), but this very assumption that enables one to assume the right to approach a woman with the sole intent of having sex with her. This objectifies the woman - turns her into an object or a thing - that who she is, what she thinks, what she has done etc., are all irrelevant as you yourself have confirmed. When your objective has been fulfilled, her as an object is no longer necessary and she becomes disposable. — TimeLine
Don't contradict yourself. Was it not you who said:
This is what I mean by not wanting to have to consider everyone's emotional well-being — VagabondSpectre — TimeLine
Friendship itself enables the opportunity to experience mutual care and trust and other duties that are constitutive of a relationship and this relationship draws two close enough to begin a teleological purpose and where one becomes motivated by concern and affection for their said-friendship. This shared interest in one another' well being enhances the experience of empathy, because they begin to share a genuine bond and a shared sense of what is important. — TimeLine
Well that's quite bleek and negative...When two people who lack this friendship or said-bond are in a relationship based on mutual need rather than empathy and love, it always results in unhappiness. There may exist deception and lies, blanketed by an external show that is bound together by social or perhaps even familial expectations. — TimeLine
To pursue a sexual relationship preceding friendship would mean that you are not seeking to form this bond or that you desire to learn more about and experience the person. This is wrong and why any sexual relationship should be initiated only after forming a friendship. — TimeLine
I only intend to approach women with sexual interests in mind in reasonable settings, such as a club setting, although circumstances can make this a bit of a grey area (i.e, body language)). — VagabondSpectre
A 'grey area' is not good enough. You should be concerned about the intent itself and the formulation of categories that hastily generalise. — TimeLine
Not necessarily, because love may be a basic metaphysical fact of the world, in which case it would not be designed, but it would simply be there.If love isn't designed then the necessary ends of love (what you suggest are morally necessary to uphold) become the result of evolutionary dice rolls that have resulted in a random human telos. — VagabondSpectre
A deformed triangle is still a triangle, just like a deformed human person is still a human person, therefore their teleologies are the same. A crooked triangle still shows the form of a triangle, even though quite imperfectly.If someone were born with a physical or mental deformity, then their teleology — VagabondSpectre
If such was the case, then perhaps our happiness too would revolve around how well we use our hardened heads, so yes, I don't see why not.if male humans had hardened knuckles and hardened heads that were designed for us to compete by knocking one another out, then according to our teleology it would be a morally necessary end to use the tools we are given toward their intrinsic purpose (one might argue a society based around the numbest skulls would be moral) Morality in this case becomes evolutionary happenstance. (side note: my personal moral position accounts for evolutionary happenstance, but because I found my morality on only the most universally shared values (like the desire to be free from pain and freedom to pursue happiness) they are therefore more common and more applicable (more persuasive to the individual) when considering the outlying dilemmas). — VagabondSpectre
Sure, but then differences are never so big such that we don't recognise someone else's description of love, are they? The mere fact we recognise someone else's description as a description of love, shows that our different experiences have commonalities. Furthermore, you're speaking of love in a very narrow sense (simply erotic love), but love is much larger than this, and even erotic love presupposes charity (love of neighbour) - for your beloved is always first your neighbour and only secondly your beloved.People experience love differently, I think that much is clear. People also tend to value it differently given different preexisting psychologies and actual experiences of love. "Love" (the exclusive monogamous and romantic kind) is not actually a universally shared experience or value. Because our feelings toward that specific kind of love differ so much, it becomes very difficult for us to come to agreements about what is morally obligatory when it comes to love (among other things). — VagabondSpectre
I don't think you can make this argument. This would be a metaphysical, not a physical argument. Love is correlated with the state of the physical brain, that's what we do know scientifically, but to go beyond that would be to overstep the boundaries of science.I am making the argument that love is causally linked to the physical brain. — VagabondSpectre
And equally compelling evidence comes from people like this man:Some very compelling evidence comes from degenerative brain diseases which tend to produce drastic and irreversible changes in behavior, up to and including utterly losing the ability to even remember who your spouse is, let alone love them. — VagabondSpectre
Yes, you are correct! But your misunderstanding is in thinking that Aristotelians disagree with you, they don't. Distinctions are matters of the intellect and they don't exist as distinctions in reality. The functions which the intellect takes to be separate are actually one thing in reality.It's difficult enough to try and classify something by "function from form" when they exhibit very many and varied (and often contradictory) behaviors and actions, but to even begin by arbitrarily categorizing human functions along "nutritive" and "animal/mind" lines implies that the parts of us which "seek out nutrition" (which lacks an explanation of how) are wholly separated from the parts of us which perform other kinds of functions (like intimacy). This separation in the first place could be the result of a misunderstanding of the underlying causal mechanisms. — VagabondSpectre
Right, but even so, it does not lack scientific evidence, which is what your initial claim was stating. So that claim is false, we can clearly discard it.All you're really saying with "rational soul" is that humans have the ability to think, and the drive to consume energy to say alive, but you're saying nothing about the why and how of these human attributes, so at best it amounts only to a general observation... — VagabondSpectre
The test is simple. Do people have such capacities? If they do, then it is clear. It has a lot of predictive power - we rely on that predictive power even in this discussion. For example on prediction is that you have will and intellect - if you didn't, I wouldn't be trying to have this conversation with you.I meant that it's not an adequately testable or precise regime of interpreting the differences between objects (and how they change), and it doesn't lead to any predictive power... — VagabondSpectre
This is not true. Metaphysical categories, such as forms, aren't just placeholders, they are absolutely essential to give a final account of reality - a metaphysical account - above and beyond physics. Whatever the ultimate level in physics happens to be, we must still account for why that level is such as it is. And to do that, we'll have to make an appeal to its nature - to its form. It simply has such a nature so as to have such properties. If we don't do that, we cannot explain why it does have the properties that it does. And this is true regardless of what ultimate physical constituent we land on.Such categorizations can be quite charming but we mustn't forget that these categories are actually just placeholders for actual physical descriptions we do not yet and may never have (or metaphysical one's we'll probably never have). — VagabondSpectre
It still is true today - quarks display these mysterious qualities - as does quantum mechanics as well. Why should it behave the way it does rather than another way? It's just as mysterious today."matter of different types which have different inherent characteristics and mysterious qualities" — VagabondSpectre
This is actually false. It has never been described by fundamental and elementary particles. Physicists think it can IN PRINCIPLE be so described, but it has never actually been done.(describable by fundamental and elementary particles/forces) — VagabondSpectre
Clearly it's not just the body, because the same body can also be a dead body, which is not animated at all. So something - the form - which we would describe via a process in the brain most likely - is so responsible.As far as I understand what animates the body is not "the powers given to it by the rational soul" but rather that the body animates itself (describable by fundamental and elementary particles/forces) — VagabondSpectre
This is false. You cannot assert a causal link based purely on correlation. For all you know, idealism could be the case, and everything is thought, and indeed then neurons firing in sequence are the result of thought (though not of your thought, or conscious thought that is)As far as I understand it, a human thought is the result of networks of neurons firing in sequence: it's bio-chemical/mechanical. — VagabondSpectre
Nobody stopped at them as fundamental at all.Stopping at "will/desire and intellect/creativity" or "love" as fundamental or elementary parts instead of going deeper with science seems primitive to me. — VagabondSpectre
Ok, I feel this is very important. Doubt presupposes a different set of premises, so this doesn't work. If I have statement A, I cannot just doubt it. To doubt it I need to first believe statement B, which is contrary to A or an implication of A, and then I will start having GROUNDS TO DOUBT. Without grounds to doubt, my doubt is irrational.The answer to choosing robust premises is to apply doubt to them and test them in every conceivable way. — VagabondSpectre
But those supporting arguments will ultimately also be composed of premises, just like the main argument is correct? So what use? We'll still have to return to some premises which are totally unsupported by anything else, except our PERSONAL EXPERIENCE. If we don't, then we'll have an infinite regress of premises, backed by arguments which are supported by other premises, which are backed by argument, ad infinitum. Sextus Empiricus proved this clearly in his Outlines of Pyrrhonism, and Plato and Aristotle were well aware of it, that's why their main question was how to come to correct premises.Usually premises themselves have supporting arguments, and so attacking the premises of the argument supporting one of your chosen premises can also be an effective way of falsifying premises. — VagabondSpectre
It can never be by probability, since the conclusion must necessarily follow from the premises to be valid.Strictly speaking, the premises of an argument don't "contain" their conclusion, but are rather indicate or point to that conclusion (sometimes via probability, sometimes via necessity). — VagabondSpectre
Agreed.If a single premise contains a conclusion, then it's circular logic, and really what should be considered is the argument for the premise in the first place. — VagabondSpectre
This isn't so simple, because what counts as being violable must be determined, via an argument as well.When we get down to fundamental premises though (premises with no traditional logic behind them, such as the premises underlying logic itself) (let's call them brute facts) they're really only as good as they are demonstrably inviolable. — VagabondSpectre
:s gravity would in no way count as a first principle.The existence of gravity is a good example of a starting assumption whose underlying argument involves simply observing it bunch of times and becoming confident that the phenomenon of gravity is reliably and consistently existent. — VagabondSpectre
Is this premise easy to falsify as well?The best fundamental premises are those premises which are very easy to falsify, but despite all attempts remain un-falsified. — VagabondSpectre
There is no subjectivity in the meaning of it though. The WW1 good doctor is "bad" only in reference to the better doctor of today. But what it means to be a good doctor - to be good at healing, never changes so long as the terms are understood.Yes, but it might also be worth noting that anything we call "good" can be also considered "not good" by someone with different standards of quality or even decency. A good doctor from WW1 is a butcher by today's standards who wouldn't be qualified to treat a horse. A "good" performer for example is hard to justify on any objectively measurable quality other than how successfully they entertain people, but the problem there is that different types of people might be highly entertained by a given performance, and a different crowd might be entirely offended by it. We should keep this subjective nuance to the word "good" in mind going forward. — VagabondSpectre
Okay, so it seems that so far you agree that we describe something as good if does its function well, and a moral man is a good man. Thus to determine what a moral man is would be equivalent to determine what a good man is. So, since we appeal to the function of a thing/person to determine whether they are good in a certain context (like for the watch, hairdresser, doctor, etc.) it seems quite intuitive that we should appeal to a man's function in order to determine whether he is a good or a bad man, and thus whether he is moral or immoral. But in the past, you were quite obnoxious about morality being dependent on teleology, in multiple instances, here's one of them:Sure, but what if we disagree about what is "moral" and how might we come to moral agreement? — VagabondSpectre
And finally comes the assumption that the telelogical hierarchy of necessary ends of these realities constitutes a sound basis for objective moral reasoning. This is just bullshit predicated on bullshit... — VagabondSpectre
We weren't discussing about their qualities now.but again keep in mind that what people consider to be "good doctor" qualities can differ drastically. — VagabondSpectre
No, this isn't what I asked you to retract. I asked you to retract your definite statement that there is no evidence. Not that you do not see that there is any evidence. That is an entirely different thing.You're telling me to prove that X does not exist (or that there is no evidence for X) in order to justify my exclamation that I see no reason/evidence to believe in X (or for you to provide evidence for X). — VagabondSpectre
Sure!We understand what hearts are and what hearts do with much more fully than we understand what humans are and how/why they do what they do. — VagabondSpectre
Well that depends. Is morality important for human beings? If it is, then we better make an effort to define our final causes, because as we have shown, to be moral we have to know our final causes and direct ourselves towards them. Even an inkling of an idea, a hypothesis, is better than nothing, for at least it will enable us to act in a certain way which may take us closer to our goal.The reason we should refrain from defining "the final causes" of humans is because we understand ourselves so poorly and the reality of our complexity is quite beyond us. — VagabondSpectre
Well this is very quaint, because if we are to go by shared experience, then I think we'll have to conclude the very opposite of what you do in fact conclude. As I have illustrated, most large societies that have ever lived have been quite conservative with their sexual norms - certainly more conservative than we are today. So if we are to go by shared experience, then we should not only prioritise today, but the whole of human history. And if we do, then you'll remark that the number of large civilisations (to take into account population) which have held to conservative sexual standards, far outweighs the opposite. Sure, there were tribes here and there who lived nude, and who didn't think casual sex immoral. But then virtually all the large religions of today have a very conservative sexual morality, and we're talking even atheistic religions like Buddhism now. So if we are to take mankind's experience as a whole, I'm afraid we'll have to conclude that casual sex is immoral.Shared experience... — VagabondSpectre
This is all fine and good, but it would of course depend on what you mean by being free of oppression. I do want to be free of oppression, but what I consider oppression may not be oppression to you, and inversely, what you consider oppression may not be oppression to me. So it's still not very simple, even though we do agree fundamentally that we want to be free of oppression - but what we mean by this is actually different, and our superficial agreement would only hide this.I might have trouble persuading you than something is not harmful (promiscuity and sex) due to some extra beliefs that you hold, but I reckon I would have no trouble persuading you that something IS harmful per my own moral beliefs. In my moral reasoning I try to only use the most universally shared positions as starting points (the most brute-fact realities of the human condition), and from there if I use good reasoning then I wind up with very persuasive and agreeable moral arguments and positions. The fact that both you and I want to be free from the oppression of others is simple but powerful, and as a starting moral value stands on it's own like a brute fact that cannot be disagreed with. With this idea alone we could tear down a tyrannical monarchy and contrive a system of governance, by us and for us, in pursuit of a system which promotes freedom of the individual while also seeking to protect them harm done to them by others (including the new government itself). — VagabondSpectre
Ah, but it seems you yourself have argued for this better than I could!I eagerly await your argument that demonstrates the moral importance/necessity of adhering to teleological final causes in the first place... — VagabondSpectre
Indeed, but we have managed to isolate genes, and determine that certain genes for example lead to higher risks of certain diseases.It's actually incorrect to think that individual genes do anything specific and necessary (in fact, "genetic markers" are vast swaths of individual base pairs in DNA which more or less work together - somehow - to achieve more complex results down-the causal line). The best we can currently do is to look at the prevalence (recurrence) of specific genetic markers in the overall code of an individual and make correlation based assumptions about what those genes might actually have some influence over (we're beginning to get at the first steps of "how" but we're no where close to bringing it full circle to "here's it's range of possible behaviors"). The trouble is that these genetic markers in all likelihood influence many things and in many different ways (through spurious and hidden factors we don't yet understand), and layers of complexity we cannot consciously grasp, and this lack of understanding renders us only able to make approximate guesses about what final/necessary effects a higher and lower prevalence of specific genetic markers actually have. It's actually a good analogy that demonstrates the pitfalls of assuming discrete categories and functions of things without understanding the full scope of how they actually interact and behave. — VagabondSpectre
It seems we have gone through everything, apart from why some ends are more valuable than others, more precisely why the ends belonging to the rational part of the soul are more valuable than the ends belonging to the animal part of the soul. This is a relatively minor point granted that we've gone past the two bigger hurdles, but that's what we'll discuss next.The assumption that humans have a "rational soul" is not proven or scientific. Dividing this unproven soul into the "animal" and "vegetative" is an unsubstantiated extension of just assuming "rational souls" exist in the first place (regardless of how vague I might object the terms to be).Then comes the arbitrary moral value assumption that says the "vegetative" is more morally valuable than the "animal".And finally comes the assumption that the telelogical hierarchy of necessary ends of these realities constitutes a sound basis for objective moral reasoning. This is just bullshit predicated on bullshit...— VagabondSpectre
Do you like those walls of text? (L) Or are they too powerful for you?I wonder what Serena Williams would think if she knew that a thread started about her on a philosophy forum would end up with a dozen plus pages filled with humongous walls of texts saying nothing of import. — Heister Eggcart
If such was the case, then perhaps our happiness too would revolve around how well we use our hardened heads, so yes, I don't see why not. — Agustino
Sure, but then differences are never so big such that we don't recognise someone else's description of love, are they? The mere fact we recognise someone else's description as a description of love, shows that our different experiences have commonalities. Furthermore, you're speaking of love in a very narrow sense (simply erotic love), but love is much larger than this, and even erotic love presupposes charity (love of neighbour) - for your beloved is always first your neighbour and only secondly your beloved. — Agustino
I don't think you can make this argument. This would be a metaphysical, not a physical argument. Love is correlated with the state of the physical brain, that's what we do know scientifically, but to go beyond that would be to overstep the boundaries of science. — Agustino
And equally compelling evidence comes from people like this man: — Agustino
Yes, you are correct! But your misunderstanding is in thinking that Aristotelians disagree with you, they don't. Distinctions are matters of the intellect and they don't exist as distinctions in reality. The functions which the intellect takes to be separate are actually one thing in reality — Agustino
Right, but even so, it does not lack scientific evidence, which is what your initial claim was stating. So that claim is false, we can clearly discard it. — Agustino
The test is simple. Do people have such capacities? If they do, then it is clear. It has a lot of predictive power - we rely on that predictive power even in this discussion. For example on prediction is that you have will and intellect - if you didn't, I wouldn't be trying to have this conversation with you. — Agustino
This is not true. Metaphysical categories, such as forms, aren't just placeholders, they are absolutely essential to give a final account of reality - a metaphysical account - above and beyond physics. Whatever the ultimate level in physics happens to be, we must still account for why that level is such as it is. And to do that, we'll have to make an appeal to its nature - to its form. It simply has such a nature so as to have such properties. If we don't do that, we cannot explain why it does have the properties that it does. And this is true regardless of what ultimate physical constituent we land on. — Agustino
It still is true today - quarks display these mysterious qualities - as does quantum mechanics as well. Why should it behave the way it does rather than another way? It's just as mysterious today. — Agustino
This is actually false. It has never been described by fundamental and elementary particles. Physicists think it can IN PRINCIPLE be so described, but it has never actually been done. — Agustino
Clearly it's not just the body, because the same body can also be a dead body, which is not animated at all. So something - the form - which we would describe via a process in the brain most likely - is so responsible — Agustino
This is false. You cannot assert a causal link based purely on correlation. For all you know, idealism could be the case, and everything is thought, and indeed then neurons firing in sequence are the result of thought (though not of your thought, or conscious thought that is) — Agustino
This isn't so simple, because what counts as being violable must be determined, via an argument as well. — Agustino
:s gravity would in no way count as a first principle. — Agustino
Okay, so it seems that so far you agree that we describe something as good if does its function well, and a moral man is a good man. Thus to determine what a moral man is would be equivalent to determine what a good man is. So, since we appeal to the function of a thing/person to determine whether they are good in a certain context (like for the watch, hairdresser, doctor, etc.) it seems quite intuitive that we should appeal to a man's function in order to determine whether he is a good or a bad man, and thus whether he is moral or immoral. — Agustino
But in the past, you werequite obnoxious about morality being dependent on teleology, in multiple instances, here's one of them: — Agustino
And finally comes the assumption that the telelogical hierarchy of necessary ends of these realities constitutes a sound basis for objective moral reasoning. This is just bullshit predicated on bullshit... — VagabondSpectre
You even called it bullshit, but it seems to be quite reasonable now. You seemed to say that we can't establish what man's ends/functions are, which may be true, but that doesn't invalidate the claim that morality must be based on teleology (if it is to be based on anything at all), which we have just shown to be true. So by your own words now you admit that it isn't bullshit at all, and it's not a silly assumption to make at all, but quite the contrary, it is dictated by the very logic we have so far pursued. So I think you should retract that statement. — Agustino
No, this isn't what I asked you to retract. I asked you to retract your definite statement that there is no evidence. Not that you do not see that there is any evidence. That is an entirely different thing.
One thing that is important in this discussion if it is to be productive is that we each stick with what we have said. If we start moving goal posts, and changing what we say, etc. we'll get nowhere. You said something, and we've just shown that it doesn't stand up to scrutiny. If you meant something else, that's all fine and good, but you must agree to retract what you first said. — Agustino
Well this is very quaint, because if we are to go by shared experience, then I think we'll have to conclude the very opposite of what you do in fact conclude. As I have illustrated, most large societies that have ever lived have been quite conservative with their sexual norms - certainly more conservative than we are today. — Agustino
And if we do, then you'll remark that the number of large civilisations (to take into account population) which have held to conservative sexual standards, far outweighs the opposite. Sure, there were tribes here and there who lived nude, and who didn't think casual sex immoral. But then virtually all the large religions of today have a very conservative sexual morality, and we're talking even atheistic religions like Buddhism now. So if we are to take mankind's experience as a whole, I'm afraid we'll have to conclude that casual sex is immoral. — Agustino
This is all fine and good, but it would of course depend on what you mean by being free of oppression. I do want to be free of oppression, but what I consider oppression may not be oppression to you, and inversely, what you consider oppression may not be oppression to me. So it's still not very simple, even though we do agree fundamentally that we want to be free of oppression - but what we mean by this is actually different, and our superficial agreement would only hide this. — Agustino
Indeed, but we have managed to isolate genes, and determine that certain genes for example lead to higher risks of certain diseases — Agustino
Not at all, my moral argument from teleology holds that we all, as human beings, have the same telos, which is by no means "average", but quite the contrary. Our telos is what human excellence itself would be.Your moral argument from teleology indicates that I should adhere to some average standard in order to be moral (find happiness?), but what if I'm not average?. — VagabondSpectre
This is demonstrably false. A cannibal may look for a victim who wants to be eaten. It would not be moral for that action to happen, even though they both share the same values and would think they are profited from it.but rather that morality is a mutually shared/cooperative agreement that we generally figure out based on what makes us both happy/unhappy — VagabondSpectre
This is false, and a form of argumentum ad populum, which is a fallacy.note: the controversial sentiments of a few people aren't sufficient for my standards of moral argument. The values which I do base moral arguments on are the most universally shared values available — VagabondSpectre
Then the function of that appendage would be to castrate. That, however, does not mean that castrating would be moral in all circumstances. It wouldn't be moral in circumstances where it would contradict the telos of other parts (perhaps more important) of the body/soul. It would for example contradict the telos of brotherhood among men, and thus would be immoral in most circumstances, unless perhaps you used it on someone trying to kill you, etc.Conversely if humans had an extra appendage designed to castrate men, our telos would define it as moral to use it per your reasoning, correct?. — VagabondSpectre
You're now moving goalposts again. If you can recognise their concepts as being concepts of love instead of something else, then they clearly do share commonalities.I can recognize anyone's concept of love (although occasionally with some strain) but that doesn't mean our definitions are common enough that I therefore agree with your teleological and moral positions. — VagabondSpectre
Sorry, science isn't in the business of deciding on metaphysical questions. Science just had to find predictabilities and understand how one thing is associated with another. Science is in the business of identifying correlations.All scientific arguments are inexorably based on strong correlation. — VagabondSpectre
:s Gravity being nothing else than the apple falling to the ground when you drop it, I understand. That's just a predictability that you observe in the world.The strong inductive argument supporting gravity isn't metaphysical, and it doesn't overstep the boundaries of science so much as it defines them (repeatable observation and successful prediction) — VagabondSpectre
Yes of course they affect ability to think/feel so what? That doesn't mean that ability to think/feel doesn't also affect the physical brain - gasp - it does! It's called neuroplasticity. Glasses affect your ability to see, but so do your eyes.If you don't think that brain damage/disease or psychoactive drugs can causally affect someone's feeling of love, I'm not sure where else to go but to lectures in human behavioral/neuroscience and more examples of brain damage affecting behavior. — VagabondSpectre
I think you are.What is compelling here? Am I missing something? — VagabondSpectre
This is a strawman - the categories are neither invented, nor are we speaking of norms. And finally, it's also a non-sequitur.But if you're only making distinctions based on invented categories from observed norms, why should we hold that the "final cause" of a human is required to be upheld for morality (happiness?). — VagabondSpectre
>:O >:O >:O Good one, you must be one of those people who does metaphysics while they're thinking they're not doing it.We don't actually need metaphysics if we found our starting positions on physical evidence (i.e: the test-ability of gravity). I cannot demonstrate the physical mechanism that makes gravity work, but I can at least demonstrate it's consistency with strong inductive arguments that have massively persuasive power. — VagabondSpectre
Even if you had all the pieces of the puzzle you would STILL not be able to assume that, since it's a matter of metaphysics, not of physics.How many pieces of the puzzle do you need before you will agree that we're on the right track by assuming that the goings-on of the brain dictate the goings-on of the mind? — VagabondSpectre
ORGANISMIC ACTIVITY >:O >:O - sounds like a soul to me! In fact PRECISELY like a soul, for the soul also is an activity, and not a thing ;) (don't forget forms are act, matter is potency)Living bodies have organismic activity — VagabondSpectre
>:O Yes, but it's not all about how you can manipulate the world to do your will. That's a very selfish view of things.Inductive reasoning has a long and proud tradition of providing strong reasoning which has carried many a person towards the successful ends they've sought. — VagabondSpectre
No it hasn't. All that has been demonstrated is that objects in the Universe we have observed seem to currently attract each other. There's no statement there about this happening in the future, why it happens, or whether it even happens outside of what we know as the visible Universe. And in fact it's worse - things are actually not even attracting, so we postulated this weird dark energy that we don't have a fucking clue what it is. Maybe just our understanding of gravity is wrong. That's what my money is on actually. Einstein overcame Newton, and someone will overcome Einstein. That's science - always looking for more and never reaching an end.Gravity has been physically demonstrated to exist beyond a reasonable doubt — VagabondSpectre
That's scientism at its best. No we have a piss poor understanding of our emotions, and the like in all truth. A large of the so called understanding we have is culturally mediated and only valid in certain cultures.At some point correlation can become so reliable and consistently un-violated that it becomes like a brute and undeniable fact of existence; a starting point for good arguments. — VagabondSpectre
Today, but wait till tomorrow. It wouldn't be the first or last time science changed its mind ;) - if you base your life off science, you may soon find the ground under your feet running away.Oh but it does by my standards. It's one of the four fundamental forces. — VagabondSpectre
That's false. We're looking for objective morality, and we have shown that a good doctor is objectively one who is good at healing, where healing is the doctor's function - and objectively so. A good man also depends on his function, in similar manner. There is no equivocation between the terms, the terms good have the same sense in both phrases. It's funny how now you're all backpeddling and moving goalposts - soon you'll be falling off the pitch!There are two issues here. The statement "a moral man is a good man" uses a different and colloquial meaning of the term "good" that the statement "my watch works good" employs. The "goodness" of a moral man has to do with what I believe to be moral in the first place while the "goodness" of a watch has to do with how well it performs it's function. This is known as equivocation. — VagabondSpectre
So what if I can't convince you? That means I wouldn't be right? :s That's certainly a very strange way to establish what right and wrong is. But clearly when you run out of other means, you appeal even to those!The second issue is that even if you could convince me that "teleological final causes" are somehow morally obligatory to pursue and uphold, you could n ever convince everyone that your idea of "proper human function" actually applies to them or that their contrary definition of proper human function is not superior to your own. The reality is that human function seems endlessly diverse, and I see no good reason to cherry pick a few variants and hold them to be the moral ones... — VagabondSpectre
Not at all, my moral argument from teleology holds that we all, as human beings, have the same telos, which is by no means "average", but quite the contrary. Our telos is what human excellence itself would be. — Agustino
I address this in the very next sentence and I've addressed it previously in this threadbut rather that morality is a mutually shared/cooperative agreement that we generally figure out based on what makes us both happy/unhappy — VagabondSpectre
This is demonstrably false. A cannibal may look for a victim who wants to be eaten. It would not be moral for that action to happen, even though they both share the same values and would think they are profited from it. — Agustino
note: the controversial sentiments of a few people aren't sufficient for my standards of moral argument. The values which I do base moral arguments on are the most universally shared values available — VagabondSpectre
This is false, and a form of argumentum ad populum, which is a fallacy. — Agustino
You're now moving goalposts again. If you can recognise their concepts as being concepts of love instead of something else, then they clearly do share commonalities. — Agustino
Sorry, science isn't in the business of deciding on metaphysical questions. Science just had to find predictabilities and understand how one thing is associated with another. Science is in the business of identifying correlations. — Agustino
Gravity being nothing else than the apple falling to the ground when you drop it, I understand. That's just a predictability that you observe in the world. — Agustino
Yes of course they affect ability to think/feel so what? That doesn't mean that ability to think/feel doesn't also affect the physical brain - gasp - it does! It's called neuroplasticity. Glasses affect your ability to see, but so do your eyes. — Agustino
I think you are. — Agustino
>:O >:O >:O Good one, you must be one of those people who does metaphysics while they're thinking they're not doing it. — Agustino
Even if you had all the pieces of the puzzle you would STILL not be able to assume that, since it's a matter of metaphysics, not of physics. — Agustino
ORGANISMIC ACTIVITY >:O >:O - sounds like a soul to me! In fact PRECISELY like a soul, for the soul also is an activity, and not a thing ;) (don't forget forms are act, matter is potency) — Agustino
No it hasn't. All that has been demonstrated is that objects in the Universe we have observed seem to currently attract each other. There's no statement there about this happening in the future, why it happens, or whether it even happens outside of what we know as the visible Universe. And in fact it's worse - things are actually not even attracting, so we postulated this weird dark energy that we don't have a fucking clue what it is. Maybe just our understanding of gravity is wrong. That's what my money is on actually. Einstein overcame Newton, and someone will overcome Einstein. That's science - always looking for more and never reaching an end. — Agustino
That's scientism at its best. No we have a piss poor understanding of our emotions, and the like in all truth. A large of the so called understanding we have is culturally mediated and only valid in certain cultures. — Agustino
There are two issues here. The statement "a moral man is a good man" uses a different and colloquial meaning of the term "good" that the statement "my watch works good" employs. The "goodness" of a moral man has to do with what I believe to be moral in the first place while the "goodness" of a watch has to do with how well it performs it's function. This is known as equivocation. — VagabondSpectre
That's false. We're looking for objective morality, and we have shown that a good doctor is objectively one who is good at healing, where healing is the doctor's function - and objectively so. A good man also depends on his function, in similar manner.
There is no equivocation between the terms, the terms good have the same sense in both phrases. It's funny how now you're all backpeddling and moving goalposts - soon you'll be falling off the pitch! — Agustino
So what if I can't convince you? That means I wouldn't be right? :s That's certainly a very strange way to establish what right and wrong is. But clearly when you run out of other means, you appeal even to those!
But alas, you can sleep well, it's not my purpose to convince you in particular that casual sex is wrong. I've done my purpose in this thread by educating you on Aristotelian philosophy, so that at least you understand the basics correctly and see the motivations behind the distinctions Aristotle drew. Maybe you'll come to your own conclusions later. — Agustino
Causality is actually a metaphysical not a physical category. That's why there are actually attempts, including by atheists like Bertrand Russell, to eliminate it from science altogether. You add gasoline, oxygen and a spark and you get combustion. That's a physical correlation. The causality is explained metaphysically through the natures of the elements added.When we add gasoline, oxygen, and a spark, there's no physical cause of combustion, it's just some metaphysical cause that for all we know is playing out in the "physical world" like some abstract reflection that we're unable to understand? — VagabondSpectre
That's wrong. Metaphysics is required in the first place to make sense of any kind of physics whatsoever. It observes and categorises non-empirical first principles which we need in order to make sense of the world. Causality is one such principle that it needs to discover. Metaphysics works by establishing coherence mainly, but also correspondence. We certainly compare different metaphysics by how coherent they are.In my opinion the difference between physics and metaphysics is that physics bases itself on the material and observable world while metaphysics tend to be based on nothing at all. — VagabondSpectre
They do work, but the theory is false. The reason for example why objects attract one another via gravity given by Newton is false. We now know that it's the curvature of space-time that accounts for gravity, with mass having the property of bending the space-time continuum.Einstein did not overcome Newton. GR and SR added precision to Newtonian calculations (especially concerning gravity) it did not overturn them. All of modern Newtonian scale physics still works, Einstein just enhanced it. — VagabondSpectre
I actually do mean definition 1 in both cases. A man who performs his function well is a moral man. That's what Plato illustrated if you read, for example his Republic, or if you read Aristotle's Nichomachean Ethics."A good watch": Definition 1: A good watch is a watch which performs it's function well.
"A good watch" Definition 2: A good watch is a watch that satisfies my personal watch-standards.
"A good man" Definition 1: A good man is a man which performs his function well.
"A good man" Definition 2 : A good man is a man that satisfies my personal "goodness/morality" standards. — VagabondSpectre
Causality is actually a metaphysical not a physical category. That's why there are actually attempts, including by atheists like Bertrand Russell, to eliminate it from science altogether. You add gasoline, oxygen and a spark and you get combustion. That's a physical correlation. The causality is explained metaphysically through the natures of the elements added — Agustino
That's wrong. Metaphysics is required in the first place to make sense of any kind of physics whatsoever. It observes and categorises non-empirical first principles which we need in order to make sense of the world. Causality is one such principle that it needs to discover. Metaphysics works by establishing coherence mainly, but also correspondence. We certainly compare different metaphysics by how coherent they are. — Agustino
They do work, but the theory is false. The reason for example why objects attract one another via gravity given by Newton is false. We now know that it's the curvature of space-time that accounts for gravity, with mass having the property of bending the space-time continuum. — Agustino
"A good watch": Definition 1: A good watch is a watch which performs it's function well.
"A good watch" Definition 2: A good watch is a watch that satisfies my personal watch-standards.
"A good man" Definition 1: A good man is a man which performs his function well.
"A good man" Definition 2 : A good man is a man that satisfies my personal "goodness/morality" standards. — VagabondSpectre
I actually do mean definition 1 in both cases. A man who performs his function well is a moral man. That's what Plato illustrated if you read, for example his Republic, or if you read Aristotle's Nichomachean Ethics. — Agustino
Causality.Give me an example of a "non-empirical first principle" other than a fundamental particle or force. — VagabondSpectre
These are empirical, sorry to disappoint.fundamental particle or force. — VagabondSpectre
He actually did.He charted it, he didn't give a reason or explanation of it's origin, and what he described still holds true (GR and SR add precision to Newtonian calculations involving masses of certain scales). — VagabondSpectre
Suuuuure, nobody, just several philosophical traditions :sI know you mean that, but nobody else does. — VagabondSpectre
Causality. — Agustino
These are empirical, sorry to disappoint. — Agustino
He actually did. — Agustino
Suuuuure, nobody, just several philosophical traditions :s — Agustino
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