You are hung up on that word "description," — Leontiskos
For consistency god must have created the world of necessity. In modal logic (S5) if there is a necessary being then everything in every possible world is necessary. — Banno
But now, given the ubiquity of the use of the name, there is a widespread agreement as to the referent of "Socrates" such that it is not dependent on that particular act. — Banno
Likewise, God recalling all of creation history from outside time does not affect the freedom of creatures in time. Boethius decisive innovation was to make it clear they being located at one moment in time is as limiting as being located in one space. To be at just one moment of time is to be separated from oneself, and not to fully possess all of oneself. God was already thought to be most truly One, so God's existence in time also runs into the problem of dividing God from Himself. — Count Timothy von Icarus
Is there any logical reason why there could not be just one necessary being? — Janus
You'll be familiar with the examples. Who is the question "I've never heard of Socrates, when did he live and what did he do?" about? I suggest it is about Socrates, despite the speaker perhaps not having anything available with which to fix the referent. It's not that there are no definite descriptions, but that they are not needed in order for reference to work perfectly well.But does the widespread agreement not come about due to many descriptions that form part of the causal chain? This would seem to be inevitable if there were more than one Socrates and question like 'Which Socrates are you referring to?" or 'I've never heard of Socrates, when did he live and what did he do?'. — Janus
Well, in S5 that would lead to everything being necessary. Much as Spinoza concluded. But that's not a theistic god. It seems pantheism is more logical than theism... :wink: — Banno
You'll be familiar with the examples. Who is the question "I've never heard of Socrates, when did he live and what did he do?" about? I suggest it is about Socrates, despite the speaker perhaps not having anything available with which to fix the referent. It's not that there are no definite descriptions, but that they are not needed in order for reference to work perfectly well. — Banno
Yes, it is. SO the question is clear, and the referent fixed - the question is about Socrates. It would be odd to answer "But since you don't know who Socrates is, I don't understand your question".logically the question is about Socrates — Janus
I have trouble seeing a connection between dependency and modality. — Banno
Yes, it is. SO the question is clear, and the referent fixed - the question is about Socrates. It would be odd to answer "But since you don't know who Socrates is, I don't understand your question". — Banno
I don't see what to make of this except as saying that there is stuff. So, yes. And folk want to say more, but as soon as they do, there are all sorts of problems. So I'll leave it at that.Contingent temporal beings that come into and go out of existence depend on Nature or God (Deus siva Natura) for their existence, Nature or God is eternal, does not come into or go out of existence and depends on nothing. — Janus
But we do know who the question refers to... Socrates. Yes, there is more that one can learn about Socrates, but that is still about Socrates. Kripke's point, that we do not need a definite description at hand in order for a propper name to function correctly, stand... no?It's not a matter of not understanding the meaning of some reference to Socrates when one has no idea who the name 'Socrates' refers to, but of not knowing who or what is being referred to — Janus
I don't see what to make of this except as saying that there is stuff. So, yes. And folk want to say more, but as soon as they do, there are all sorts of problems. — Banno
But we do know who the question refers to... Socrates. Yes, there is more that one can learn about Socrates, but that is still about Socrates. Kripke's point, that we do not need a definite description at hand in order for a propper name to function correctly, stand... no? — Banno
:up:I actually agree with you on that. — Janus
I agree with that. The point is that the questioner succeeds in picking out Socrates uniquely, and this despite not having a definite description available. They don't know who Socrates is, and yet demonstrably they can talk about Socrates. They can say "I don't know who Socrates is" and that can be a true sentence about their knowledge of Socrates.I can't see how we could know who the name refers to if we didn't know at least one of the following that Socrates is purported to be; that is 'the teacher of Plato', 'the agora gadfly' 'the man charged with corrupting the youth of Athens and condemned to drink hemlock' and so on. — Janus
I can't see how we could know who the name refers to if we didn't know at least one of the following that Socrates is purported to be; that is 'the teacher of Plato', 'the agora gadfly' 'the man charged with corrupting the youth of Athens and condemned to drink hemlock' and so on.
Of course if someone is familiar with those descriptions the proper name 'Socrates' "functions correctly", but for someone who doesn't I can't see how it functions at all. — Janus
A novice who asks "Who is Thales?" does not have at hand a description of Thales, and yet they are asking about Thales. — Banno
But the novice does have a description of 'Thales'. If they had no description they would not be able to ask the question. Specifically, if they did not believe that 'Thales' described an ancient philosopher, they would not be able to ask the question. "Thales was an ancient philosopher" is a description, as is (1).
Suppose, ex hypothesi, that the novice has no description of 'Thales'. If this were so, then what in the world do you propose they would be asking about when they ask about 'Thales'? In that case they could not be asking about a man, because if they were asking about a man then 'Thales' would have a description. They could not be asking about a previously existing thing, because if they were asking about a previously existing thing then they would have a description. They could not be asking about a name from their textbook, because if they were asking about a name from their textbook then they would have a description, etc.
So again, you are contradicting yourself in simultaneously holding that the novice has no description of 'Thales' and nevertheless uses the name in a meaningful sense. — Leontiskos
For consistency god must have created the world of necessity. In modal logic (S5) if there is a necessary being then everything in every possible world is necessary. That is, god does not make choices.Whatever god does he is compelled to do out of necessity. The alternative, of course , is that there are no necessary beings.
That's a misrepresentation of the argument. In S5, if there is a necessary being than every being is necessary.If anything is necessary, then everything is necessary? — Count Timothy von Icarus
What's interesting is that if you start with Russell's (bad) theory, it is very hard to extricate yourself. You end up compulsively concerned with the question concerning a verifiable "definite description." — Leontiskos
But we do know who the question refers to... Socrates. Yes, there is more that one can learn about Socrates, but that is still about Socrates. Kripke's point, that we do not need a definite description at hand in order for a propper name to function correctly, stand... no? — Banno
So, if anything we might quantify over is possibly necessary then everything is necessary? — Count Timothy von Icarus
How does one know someone has "the concepts of another person and the thought objects constituted by them"? Apparently by agreeing with them. It is open for the theist to say, of anyone who disagrees with their argument, that they have not spent sufficient time "to go through the same long meditative process that the theist did in building up his own concept of God".Unless one is able to learn to think and live with the concepts of another person and the thought objects constituted by them, one will always fail to have a real grasp on the meaning of the other person.
The upshot is that understanding the argument as a proof of god's existence requires a commitment to the existence of god. — Banno
Even if we admit (1), why shouldn't we just suppose that the greatest thing can be conceived of, but not be real? Why could it not be the case that the greatest thing can be imagined, and yet might not exist? — Banno
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