You are hung up on that word "description," — Leontiskos

That was Kripke. He kinda used the word a whole lot.

Meanwhile, the elephant sits patiently, waiting....

- Because I am covering multiple posts of yours. Count Timothy already pressed your early, question-begging posts into the arguments that appeared in the later posts (although those arguments are still fairly thin).

Goose.

For consistency god must have created the world of necessity. In modal logic (S5) if there is a necessary being then everything in every possible world is necessary. — Banno

Is there any logical reason why there could not be just one necessary being?

But now, given the ubiquity of the use of the name, there is a widespread agreement as to the referent of "Socrates" such that it is not dependent on that particular act. — Banno

But does the widespread agreement not come about due to many descriptions that form part of the causal chain? This would seem to be inevitable if there were more than oine Socrates and question like 'Which Socrates are you referring to?" or 'I've never heard of Socrates, when did he live and what did he do?'.

I agree that for those who already know who the name refers to descriptions need not be at hand. :cool:

Likewise, God recalling all of creation history from outside time does not affect the freedom of creatures in time. Boethius decisive innovation was to make it clear they being located at one moment in time is as limiting as being located in one space. To be at just one moment of time is to be separated from oneself, and not to fully possess all of oneself. God was already thought to be most truly One, so God's existence in time also runs into the problem of dividing God from Himself. — Count Timothy von Icarus

An interesting addition to the argument!

Is there any logical reason why there could not be just one necessary being? — Janus

Well, in S5 that would lead to everything being necessary. Much as Spinoza concluded. But that's not a theistic god. It seems pantheism is more logical than theism... :wink:

But does the widespread agreement not come about due to many descriptions that form part of the causal chain? This would seem to be inevitable if there were more than one Socrates and question like 'Which Socrates are you referring to?" or 'I've never heard of Socrates, when did he live and what did he do?'. — Janus

You'll be familiar with the examples. Who is the question "I've never heard of Socrates, when did he live and what did he do?" about? I suggest it is about Socrates, despite the speaker perhaps not having anything available with which to fix the referent. It's not that there are no definite descriptions, but that they are not needed in order for reference to work perfectly well.

Well, in S5 that would lead to everything being necessary. Much as Spinoza concluded. But that's not a theistic god. It seems pantheism is more logical than theism... :wink: — Banno

Yes, Spinoza was a determinist so in one sense for him everything was necessary, but he also made a distinction between a being (God or Nature) that is necessary in the sense of depending on nothing else, for its existence and beings that are contingent in that they depend on other conditions and beings for their existence.

You'll be familiar with the examples. Who is the question "I've never heard of Socrates, when did he live and what did he do?" about? I suggest it is about Socrates, despite the speaker perhaps not having anything available with which to fix the referent. It's not that there are no definite descriptions, but that they are not needed in order for reference to work perfectly well. — Banno

Right, logically the question is about Socrates, but for someone who does not know who Socrates is said to have been, descriptions will be needed for reference to work.

I have trouble seeing a connection between dependency and modality.

logically the question is about Socrates — Janus

Yes, it is. SO the question is clear, and the referent fixed - the question is about Socrates. It would be odd to answer "But since you don't know who Socrates is, I don't understand your question".

And again, it is clear that reference is a communal activity. Hence, a private "speaker's meaning" is problematic.

I have trouble seeing a connection between dependency and modality. — Banno

Spinoza has modes, but they are conceptually different to modality in modern logic, as I understand it. The simple point is that Spinoza sees necessity in terms of dependence. A necessary being does not depend on anything for its existence, whereas contingent beings do. So, contingent temporal beings that come into and go out of existence depend on Nature or God (Deus siva Natura) for their existence, Nature or God is eternal, does not come into or go out of existence and depends on nothing.

Yes, it is. SO the question is clear, and the referent fixed - the question is about Socrates. It would be odd to answer "But since you don't know who Socrates is, I don't understand your question". — Banno

It's not a matter of not understanding the meaning of some reference to Socrates when one has no idea who the name 'Socrates' refers to, but of not knowing who or what is being referred to. Descriptions will be necessary to provide that information.

Contingent temporal beings that come into and go out of existence depend on Nature or God (Deus siva Natura) for their existence, Nature or God is eternal, does not come into or go out of existence and depends on nothing. — Janus

I don't see what to make of this except as saying that there is stuff. So, yes. And folk want to say more, but as soon as they do, there are all sorts of problems. So I'll leave it at that.

It's not a matter of not understanding the meaning of some reference to Socrates when one has no idea who the name 'Socrates' refers to, but of not knowing who or what is being referred to — Janus

But we do know who the question refers to... Socrates. Yes, there is more that one can learn about Socrates, but that is still about Socrates. Kripke's point, that we do not need a definite description at hand in order for a propper name to function correctly, stand... no?

I don't see what to make of this except as saying that there is stuff. So, yes. And folk want to say more, but as soon as they do, there are all sorts of problems. — Banno

I actually agree with you on that. I was just trying to unpack the logic employed by Spinoza regarding necessity and contingency.

But we do know who the question refers to... Socrates. Yes, there is more that one can learn about Socrates, but that is still about Socrates. Kripke's point, that we do not need a definite description at hand in order for a propper name to function correctly, stand... no? — Banno

I can't see how we could know who the name refers to if we didn't know at least one of the following that Socrates is purported to be; that is 'the teacher of Plato', 'the agora gadfly' 'the man charged with corrupting the youth of Athens and condemned to drink hemlock' and so on.

Of course if someone is familiar with those descriptions the proper name 'Socrates' "functions correctly", but for someone who doesn't I can't see how it functions at all.

I actually agree with you on that. — Janus

:up:

I can't see how we could know who the name refers to if we didn't know at least one of the following that Socrates is purported to be; that is 'the teacher of Plato', 'the agora gadfly' 'the man charged with corrupting the youth of Athens and condemned to drink hemlock' and so on. — Janus

I agree with that. The point is that the questioner succeeds in picking out Socrates uniquely, and this despite not having a definite description available. They don't know who Socrates is, and yet demonstrably they can talk about Socrates. They can say "I don't know who Socrates is" and that can be a true sentence about their knowledge of Socrates.

I can't see how we could know who the name refers to if we didn't know at least one of the following that Socrates is purported to be; that is 'the teacher of Plato', 'the agora gadfly' 'the man charged with corrupting the youth of Athens and condemned to drink hemlock' and so on.

Of course if someone is familiar with those descriptions the proper name 'Socrates' "functions correctly", but for someone who doesn't I can't see how it functions at all. — Janus

Yes, I agree. I had a conversation with Banno on this topic awhile back, such as <here>. One example exchange from that thread:

A novice who asks "Who is Thales?" does not have at hand a description of Thales, and yet they are asking about Thales. — Banno

But the novice does have a description of 'Thales'. If they had no description they would not be able to ask the question. Specifically, if they did not believe that 'Thales' described an ancient philosopher, they would not be able to ask the question. "Thales was an ancient philosopher" is a description, as is (1).

Suppose, ex hypothesi, that the novice has no description of 'Thales'. If this were so, then what in the world do you propose they would be asking about when they ask about 'Thales'? In that case they could not be asking about a man, because if they were asking about a man then 'Thales' would have a description. They could not be asking about a previously existing thing, because if they were asking about a previously existing thing then they would have a description. They could not be asking about a name from their textbook, because if they were asking about a name from their textbook then they would have a description, etc.

So again, you are contradicting yourself in simultaneously holding that the novice has no description of 'Thales' and nevertheless uses the name in a meaningful sense. — Leontiskos

What's interesting is that if you start with Russell's (bad) theory, it is very hard to extricate yourself. You end up compulsively concerned with the question concerning a verifiable "definite description."

For consistency god must have created the world of necessity. In modal logic (S5) if there is a necessary being then everything in every possible world is necessary. That is, god does not make choices.Whatever god does he is compelled to do out of necessity. The alternative, of course , is that there are no necessary beings.

If anything is necessary, then everything is necessary?

If anything is necessary, then everything is necessary? — Count Timothy von Icarus

That's a misrepresentation of the argument. In S5, if there is a necessary being than every being is necessary.

You can find the argument online, or ask your friendly AI to run up a version.

:up:

What's interesting is that if you start with Russell's (bad) theory, it is very hard to extricate yourself. You end up compulsively concerned with the question concerning a verifiable "definite description." — Leontiskos

Yes, the salient difference between descriptions and "a verifiable definite description".

Is "being" the key term then? I'm not finding anything and AI is presenting gobbledygook.

Lots of people thing mathematical objects are necessary entities, so this seems problematic for a system if it includes them too.

https://chatgpt.com/share/67a2daa7-2c28-800f-a827-6ca73e18cb24

But we do know who the question refers to... Socrates. Yes, there is more that one can learn about Socrates, but that is still about Socrates. Kripke's point, that we do not need a definite description at hand in order for a propper name to function correctly, stand... no? — Banno

“But we do know who the question refers to…God. Yes, there more that one can learn about God, but that is still about God. Kripke’s point, that we do not need a definite description at hand in order for a proper name to function correctly,…no?”

Hmmm, I suppose neither a logical construction that Anselm puts forward.

So, if anything we might quantify over is possibly necessary then everything is necessary?

Floridi has a demonstration to the effect that any (mathematically describable) universe must have at least one bit (some binary difference across a dimension) to be distinguishable from nothing. But this would imply that a bit is necessary in every universe (or at least possibly necessary).

I am not sure if one can draw any serious metaphysical conclusions from such axioms. It does the work of Plantinga's modal argument for him.

So, if anything we might quantify over is possibly necessary then everything is necessary? — Count Timothy von Icarus

Why include "qualify over" here? The axiom is 5:◊A→◻◊A, where A might or might not be a quantification.

If you want us to consider "Floridi", then link to the paper, or set out the argument. The bald assertion appears unconnected to S5.

Modal logical systems model how we might talk coherently about modal topics. That's how they are useful in our metaphysical considerations. They show us were we might be going wrong.

On to the next bit of §5.

There's a bit of waffle about Catholics being able to talk about pagan gods.

Then Klima concedes the point made earlier concerning his argument, citing Aquinas as his authority: "...no inconsistency is involved in being able, for any given thing either in the intellect or in reality, to think something greater..."

See this post.

"...no inconsistency is involved in being able, for any given thing either in the intellect or in reality, to think something greater..." — Banno

Nor meaning, either.

:cool:

Then there is a discussion supposing a form of incommensurability. The upshot is that understanding the argument as a proof of god's existence requires a commitment to the existence of god. Not a lot of help for evangelists.

There's also the conceit that the understanding had by a theist is qualitatively different to that had by the pagan, so that they 'could claim to have a full grasp of the meaning of this term".

One wonders how one tells that a fellow theist has "a full grasp of the meaning of this term" - presumably becasue they agree with your argument... :roll:

Here again we hit on the problem of intensional opacity. And here again is the closing off of the argument to critique by those who disagree.

Unless one is able to learn to think and live with the concepts of another person and the thought objects constituted by them, one will always fail to have a real grasp on the meaning of the other person.

How does one know someone has "the concepts of another person and the thought objects constituted by them"? Apparently by agreeing with them. It is open for the theist to say, of anyone who disagrees with their argument, that they have not spent sufficient time "to go through the same long meditative process that the theist did in building up his own concept of God".

All rather sequestered and distasteful, really. "Mutual understanding" here means "agreeing with me".

@Leontiskos,

Sorry for the tardy reply to your question of 4 days ago.

Just to clarify, the comment regards "omnipotence" was an attempt to clarify/make clearer @Tim Wood's previous entry about "omnipotence" and attempted to clear up any misconceptions of the breadth of the meaning of "omnipotence".
And perhaps, with a light general "warning" about using "omnipotence" in a way that degrades the all encompassing potency of the word's full meaning

Sorry it was not meant as a direct comment about St. Anselm's Proof.

helpful smile

- Okay, thanks kazan.

Many have been especially interested in the proof itself and section 2. Such people may be interested in another paper of Klima's where he spends much more time on objections to the argument. That paper may be an alternative version of the book chapter of the OP, and it uses a slightly different formalization of Anselm's proof:

"Anselm’s Proof for God’s Existence in the Proslogion," by Gyula Klima

Presumably any substantive critique of this new paper will also be ignored.

The upshot is that understanding the argument as a proof of god's existence requires a commitment to the existence of god. — Banno

Banno has shown with each of his posts that he simply lacks any real skills of reading comprehension. All of his posts are full of weird shit that does not come from Klima or the paper, and when it is pointed out to him over and over, he just buries his head in the sand and moves on as if nothing has occurred. Probably the most absurd case occurred here, but the occurrences are constant:

Even if we admit (1), why shouldn't we just suppose that the greatest thing can be conceived of, but not be real? Why could it not be the case that the greatest thing can be imagined, and yet might not exist? — Banno

.. :lol: Anyone who has read Klima's argument knows that this is precisely what (2) does.

Why does Banno persist in this sort of behavior, here and elsewhere? Because he is a troll. He uses the forum to try to address his emotional needs, and here he is emotionally invested in the idea that Klima or his paper must be dismissed. He has engaged in this sort of emotion-driven nonsense from his very first post in the thread. That he has not managed to read or comprehend the paper is no surprise, for reading the paper would get in the way of his emotional needs. Banno is a hack who has no real desire for philosophical discourse or authentic dialogue. He just goes around shitting on everything he fails to understand, and his capacity for said failure is unparalleled.*

After Banno tried to overtly hijack the thread I just put him back on ignore, where he belongs. I have since responded to posts of his that others have picked up, but I think most people on TPF recognize that Banno is in large part a bored troll who is merely engaged in emotional, knee-jerk gainsaying.

Those who have read the paper carefully already recognize Banno’s absurd misrepresentations. I invite them to engage with the paper thoughtfully and to avoid falling into the sort of trolling that Banno's whole persona has been reduced to. Engaging those who are not serious and do not have the capacity to authentically interact with the paper is a waste of time. There is no need to waste our time with such people. Tony Roark is a great example of someone who engaged the paper thoughtfully and with intellectual honesty. He is the sort of person we should imitate.


* And that is the great irony. Klima is trying to build a bridge to mutual understanding, and Banno is intent on destroying the bridge before it is built, lest light come into his solipsistic cave. Banno is the Logical Positivist who refuses to admit that the project has failed, and who closes his eyes tightly whenever anyone presents him with the obvious evidence.

Oh, goodie, we are back to talking abut me!

If you don't think my posts appropriate, mark 'em for the mods.