Doesn't matter. Carry on.

And we must include eye movement and lens focusing (i.e. ciliary muscle) in this too - your eye palpates the scene in its motion and focusing which is part of your distinct familiarity with 3D space. — Apustimelogist

Yes. In terms of focusing, there is also the "squinting" that aligns the eyes so that they can focus on the same objects. (Hold up a finger at arm's length in front of you. Move it gradually towards you. You will find that you have to adjust your eyes to follow it. If you don't, you'll find you see two images of the finger. Then there's the peculiarity of how one sees one's own nose.) But none of that is 2D information. The ears work differently. They apparently note the difference when a given sound arrives at each ear and compute the direction from that. How knowledge of my own body's position works - or our balance sense - I have no idea.
But it's also true that at greater distances, we rely on 2D information.
(I like the idea that my eye "palpates" the scene. My hands and feet also palpate my surroundings. In the second case, it is clearly not 2D information.)

I would say maybe there is something like intelligibility in common with non-human life. — Apustimelogist

It would seem you are a minimalist on this question. Let's not forget the differences between dogs and bacteria. There's not one answer for all non-human life. There's a spectrum. What complicates the issue even more is that, IMO, the relationship we can form with (the "higher" forms of life") actually affects, not only our judgement, but also how those creatures behave and consequently the practices that they and we can share. That shouldn't be a surprise. We learn to be human - what being human is - through our interactions with those around us.
But then, there also people with whom we do not share everything. As in the holocaust and other examples of inhuman or bestial treatment meted out by human beings - not to mention occasions when we find the behaviour of others unintelligible - there are examples all around us.

I'm under the impression that there was a hierarchical relationship between Quine and Davidson. That may or may not be termed "philosophical oppression". I say that it might have been such a thing, for all I know.

Epicurus was not like that, for example. He considered slaves as equals, not only to each other, but to himself as well.

Epicurus was therefore a better role model than Quine, as far as Ethics goes.

But none of that is 2D information. — Ludwig V

Well, yes it is 3D information in the sense that the objective world seems to be spatially 3D. I'm just saying that we can only navigate this visually, on a 2D space of the retina.

Maybe proprioception and body motion you can argue actually is much more directly 3D...

[Edit: and I am not sure 3D body information is entirely trivial since no single joint in your body has access to all possible degrees of freedom of motion in a 3D space. It is conceivable to me that information of movement in a single joint is not sufficient for a brain to infer 3D space - rather I imagine, many joints are needed and possibly even other information like vestibular and visual, at least for 3D space as we know it.]

... But then the inference about 3D space as you see it in vision is then a consequence of how body motion changes a 2D image. The non-trivial way in which this happens allows the inference of 3D space, but I would say that this can equally seen as just transitions in 2D patterns on the retina interacting with proprioceptive and other kinds of sensory information. All the visual information about space is inherently 2D. For me, 3D visual perception is not some direct perception of 3D information - you only ever have 2D visual information. Rather, its your ability to enact predictions about 3D space through motion, and your inherent familiarity with that.

It would seem you are a minimalist on this question. — Ludwig V

What would non-minimalism be?

All the visual information about space is inherently 2D. — Apustimelogist

It is certainly true that all the visual information about space can be represented in 2D. It's called a picture, and you can walk around the world thinking of yourself as watching a movie. That's why I draw your attention to the other senses, since there is no equivalent in those contexts. You mention proprioception and body motion as possible 3D. But how could we have 3D bodies in a 2D world? BTW, you are forgetting that we have 3D hearing as well.

Well, yes it is 3D information in the sense that the objective world seems to be spatially 3D. I'm just saying that we can only navigate this visually, on a 2D space of the retina. — Apustimelogist

If we only had a 2D picture and no other information, I don't think we could even conceive of a 3D space, never mind navigate it. Our intepretation of that 2D image is conditioned by what we know from all our senses. Without that, I don't think we could even make sense of the possibility of a 3D space.

For me, 3D visual perception is not some direct perception of 3D information - you only ever have 2D visual information. — Apustimelogist

Well, as I said above, any 3D scene can be represented in 2D. We have learned to interpret 2D pictures as 3D scenes. If all we experienced were 2D, how could we even get the idea of 3D?
There is a real difference between a 2D and 3D visual image, but it is not simply based on 2D information, but on the fact that the two images our visual system works with are slightly different. In combination, they give a diferent experience. Call that an inference if you like, but the experience really is different.

What would non-minimalism be? — Apustimelogist

I was just picking up on what you said:-

I would say maybe there is something like intelligibility in common with non-human life. Maybe we can say humans an animals might share some vague sense of mutual intelligibility with regard to something like space or even emotions on some minimal level depending on the animal, but then animals may be incapable of many of the kinds of abstract predictions a human can. — Apustimelogist

A non-minimalist would have said "to a greater or lesser extent" and cut out all the "maybe" qualifications. I would have said that there is often mutual comprehension between animals and humans based on whatever interactions occur in each case. However, even though that looks like an empirical question, it depends how the facts are interpreted, so I'm pessimistic about the possibility of productive argument about that. That one of the reasons why I don't think that all disagreements can be settled on empirical grounds.

definitely one of a kind! Enjoy it

But how could we have 3D bodies in a 2D world? — Ludwig V

They are different senses about different things, one from directly inside the body, the other from outside.

I'm talking about what you see. Its a 2D image.

BTW, you are forgetting that we have 3D hearing as well. — Ludwig V

But this is not very different from the visual case in the sense that your learning about 3D space vicariously through cues.

We have learned to interpret 2D pictures as 3D scenes. If all we experienced were 2D, how could we even get the idea of 3D? — Ludwig V

For me, the question here is: what does it mean to say that you interpret 2D pictures as 3D? Does the 2D image magically turn into a 3D one? I don't think so. Thats why I believe that 3D perception, and what we might think of as our experiences of 3D space, are rather about your ability to enact predictions about 3D space through body motion, and your inherent familiarity with that. From my perspective, it is then not an experience per se in the same way that directly seeing blue is, or feeling touch on the skin.

A non-minimalist would have said "to a greater or lesser extent" and cut out all the "maybe" qualifications. — Ludwig V

I wouldn't necessarily say I am a minimalist then, I just don't know what level of mutual comprehension occurs between humans and other animals - and presumably it dependa on the animal - and I was framing it in a way I would if I didn't know what the other person's perspective on that would be either. I think even people who think very little of animal cognition would agree there is a minimal level of intelligibility between humans and certain animals, even in an emotional sense.

definitely one of a kind! Enjoy it — Alonsoaceves

Thank you!

I think there are radical differences in how we are thinking about this. I'm not saying it is all just a question of words. But our different uses of words are not helping us.

They are different senses abput different things, one from directly inside the body, the other from outside. — Apustimelogist

The problem here is about the meaning of "direct" and "indirect". You seem to the saying that internal senses are direct and external senses are not? But we have pain and touch receptors connected to the brain and processed in the brain before we experience anything. If what we see is the image on our retina, how is that any different?
In any case, if the internal senses are direct, they give us 3D information directly.

I'm talking about what you see. Its a 2D image. — Apustimelogist

"What you see" is ambiguous. When I look at a normal 2D picture, I can say that I can see the picture and say that I see my car in the the picture. Presumably, the same applies to this 2D image. The iimage is more like a lens, by means of which I see my car.

You pointed out that the image on our retina is 2D. Fair enough. But I don't see that we ever see that image, because it is extensively processed, including the amalgamation of two images. Don't forget. that retinal image is broken up into what, presumably is an encoding that is quite different from any image.
I'm not sure whether to count the result of comparing two images or the extent to which our lens needs adjusting to produce a clear image a visual cue. It could go either way, I suppose.

But this (sc. 3D hearing) is not very different from the visual case in the sense that your learning about 3D space vicariously through cues. — Apustimelogist

I partly agree with that. But what is learning is not me, it is, let us say, my brain. I don't ever hear two sounds, one for each ear and then realize that I can deduce where the sound is from that. I hear one sound, located in space. The learning and the processing takes place way "below" consciousness and involves an encoding process that is nothing like a sound even though it is caused by sound.

For me, the question here is: what does it mean to say that you interpret 2D pictures as 3D? Does the 2D image magically turn into a 3D one? — Apustimelogist

I'm not sure whether you are aware of the phenomenon of trompe l'oeil painting. There are many examples in Wikipedia - Trompe l'oeil painting . I think that "Escaping Criticism" by Pere Borrell del Caso, 1874 is a particularly clear example - the pictured person is climbing out of the frame. (I would upload it if I could!)

The 3D spectacles that are used in 3D cinemas are a different technique for achieving similar effects. I would say that, in the case of trompe l'oeil it is the case that a 2D image is experienced as 3D. There's no magic involved. I realize that you may know about this already, but it is possible that you don't and I want to make sure that we are talking about the same phenomena.

I can be a bit relentless when I get stuck into a philosophical debate like this. Sometimes I annoy people. Please let me know if I am annoying you.

I just don't know what level of mutual comprehension occurs between humans and other animals - and presumably it dependa on the animal - and I was framing it in a way I would if I didn't know what the other person's perspective on that would be either. I think even people who think very little of animal cognition would agree there is a minimal level of intelligibility between humans and certain animals, even in an emotional sense. — Apustimelogist

Some people (Descartes' is the classic philosophical example) deny that any animals experienced anything and saw them as purely mechanical. This resulted in some of his followers concluding that dogs don't feel pain and cruelly mistreating them in order to prove the point. But the disagreement is not a question of evidence, but of interpretation of the evidence. So Davidson's thesis that we can abandon talk of conceptual schemes and return to beliefs and experiences seems to me to be false.
Most people are on the spectrum, but the issue is where a mechanical explanation is sufficient, (as with creatures like bacteria and fungi) and where it is appropriate to apply the kinds of explanation we use to explain (most of) the actions of human beings. Reason and purposes vs causes and evolution.
Which is not to claim that we do not learn the conceptual schemes that we apply to the world.

The problem here is about the meaning of "direct" and "indirect". — Ludwig V

I wasn't intentionally implying anything at all here by the word "direct" tbh other than the fact that the sense comes from inside our bodies.

If what we see is the image on our retina, how is that any different? — Ludwig V

Yes, you're right, I think - it isn't. But as I say earlier, I think you could argue that joint positions don't actually directly convey 3D physical space without further integration of information (e.g. A finger joint typically cannot move through all degrees of freedom of 3D space).

The image is more like a lens, by means of which I see my car. — Ludwig V

But what do you then mean when you say that you see your car? There is nothing more, imo, to seeing a car than this 2D information, your reactions to it, and your ability to make predictions about it and engage with it. Thats the only way knowledge makes sense to me. For me, just saying "I see a car" isn't good enough. I need to make sense of what it actually means that I see that car, and this is the conclusion I have come to introspectively. There is nothing but the images - I can just react to them in sophisticated ways.

But I don't see that we ever see that image, because it is extensively processed, including the amalgamation of two images. Don't forget. that retinal image is broken up into what, presumably is an encoding that is quite different from any image.
I'm not sure whether to count the result of comparing two images or the extent to which our lens needs adjusting to produce a clear image a visual cue. It could go either way, I suppose. — Ludwig V

But I don't think whatever is inferred is anything that isn't latent in 2D patterns on the retina, and hence limited by the 2D nature. Hence, why you can manipulate pictures to create illusions of depth; because it is nothing above picking out those 2D patterns. Yes, you can say that is seeing in 3D, but .... similar to the question of "what do you then mean when you say that you see your car?":

What do you then mean when you say that you see depth?

We have 2D information from the retina, and our ability to engage with how that 2D information may change over time and in different contexts.

We can say "that is far away?". But does saying something is far away have any meaning without your ability to move in 3D space. When you say "that is far away?", are you literally seeing "far away" or are you just reacting to a salient cue in a way that represents or pre-empts your ability to recognize and predict what would happen in some context. Is this cue you identify or distinguish anything above a 2D pattern latent on the retina? I guess it isn't technically 2D because color and brightness add extra dimensions, but these aren't inherently spatial. For me, we just use these distinctions to infer something about what would happen with regard to movement. And this is a continual thing too in real-time, not just because we are bodies always sitting in 3D space, but our eyes are continually sampling the environment, and their sampling will be intuned with depth; most of the time, we aren't even aware of what our eyes are doing.

I guess my perspective also leads to the question - are you literally seeing anything?

Not in any essentialitic way. We see complicated patterns and we react to them in real-time.

"What you see" is ambiguous. — Ludwig V

Yes, I think you are correct. But the 2D nature of the image on the retina is not ambiguous - so that is my anchor.

I partly agree with that. But what is learning is not me, it is, let us say, my brain. I don't ever hear two sounds, one for each ear and then realize that I can deduce where the sound is from that. I hear one sound, located in space. The learning and the processing takes place way "below" consciousness and involves an encoding process that is nothing like a sound even though it is caused by sound — Ludwig V

Its going to be the same for vision and hearing.

But are you actually hearing the location of a sound, or just hearing a certain quality to the sound across your two ears that changes are you re-orient your body? If you have no body to re-orientate, what you hear when you "hear the location" could not possibly give you any spatial information - it would simply be a difference in the quality of sound in your ears.

trompe l'oeil painting. — Ludwig V

But I would say this is what we have been talking about all along.

I would say I am not necessarily saying that we don't see in 3D, but that this is nothing above information on a 2D retina and an enactive component regarding movement and prediction. Space itself I think is the same - spatial perception is more like spatial enaction - familiarity with how movement changes visual information. For me the idea of perceiving any space, let alone 3D space doesn't make any sense above what is essentially a behavioral familiarity - spatial perception is nothing above our real-time manipulation of information through movement.

Please let me know if I am annoying you. — Ludwig V

Not at all!

But the disagreement is not a question of evidence, but of interpretation of the evidence. So Davidson's thesis that we can abandon talk of conceptual schemes and return to beliefs and experiences seems to me to be false. — Ludwig V

I would say that this question of evidence interpretation is a question of beliefs and so in that regard, Davdison would not consider it as something about conceptual schemes.

But as I say earlier, I think you could argue that joint positions don't actually directly convey 3D physical space without further integration of information (e.g. A finger joint typically cannot move through all degrees of freedom of 3D space). — Apustimelogist

Perhaps not. But a knuckle joint or a thumb or an arm or a spine can. On the other hand, I would agree that our understanding of 3D space does depend on "holistic integration of the information of the senses". The result of that integration happens to be true. So what's wrong with it?

But what do you then mean when you say that you see your car? There is nothing more, imo, to seeing a car than this 2D information, your reactions to it, and your ability to make predictions about it and engage with it. — Apustimelogist

I mean that I see a 3D object, which I can walk round, get inside, drive around and take to pieces. None of those is true of images of the car, no matter how many you accumulate.

For me, we just use these distinctions to infer something about what would happen with regard to movement. — Apustimelogist

I wouldn't object to that. But what validates the inference? There must be some way that you can compare the image of a 3D object with the 3D object. But you seem to deny that we can. So the image of my car is no different from an image of starship Enterprise or a dragon - and even in those cases, we know what it would mean to see the real thing, even if it never happens.

If you have no body to re-orientate, what you hear when you "hear the location" could not possibly give you any spatial information - it would simply be a difference in the quality of sound in your ears. — Apustimelogist

Perhaps. But I do have a body to re-orient.

I guess my perspective also leads to the question - are you literally seeing anything? — Apustimelogist

It depends what you mean by "literally". For me, when I walk through my front door, I literally see my car. If I only see the image on my retina, then I don't see "literally" my car, but an image of it.

Yes, I think you are correct. But the 2D nature of the image on the retina is not ambiguous - so that is my anchor. — Apustimelogist

An image is always an image of something else, never the real thing. So my anchor is the real thing. That's what makes the image of a car an image as opposed to a complex array of coloured shapes.

I would say I am not necessarily saying that we don't see in 3D, but that this is nothing above information on a 2D retina and an enactive component regarding movement and prediction. — Apustimelogist

But the image on our retinas (we have two, remember) and our enactive lives are what enable us to see the 3D world. They do not prevent us from seeing it.

I would say that this question of evidence interpretation is a question of beliefs and so in that regard, Davdison would not consider it as something about conceptual schemes. — Apustimelogist

Suppose that someone died, and we are considering a suspect. There is good evidence that S caused the death, but also evidence that they did not intend to. I think that means that S is not guilty of murder. You think that means they are guilty of murder. Our disagreement is not about the facts, but about what counts as murder - that is, our concept of murder. Murder is part of a group of concepts under the heading of "crimes". So our disagreement is not about what happened, the facts of the case, but how we should clssify them. You can label that a disagreement about beliefs, if you like. But it is not the same as a disagreement about the facts and cannot be settled in the same way.

Perhaps not. But a knuckle joint or a thumb or an arm or a spine can. — Ludwig V

Well, I think its at least debatable. I don't think those joints are anywhere near mobile enough, imo.

None of those is true of images of the car, no matter how many you accumulate. — Ludwig V

Well then the 2D image is how I am seeing a 3D car. I can't shake the awareness that my visual field is two-dimensional (except for the color dimension) even though I can distinguish distance.

wouldn't object to that. But what validates the inference? There must be some way that you can compare the image of a 3D object with the 3D object. But you seem to deny that we can. — Ludwig V

The brain doesn't have any direct access to the outside world. It can never intelligibly compare things with some criterion that has come from the way things somehow are on the outside world. All the brain can do is construct models which make predictions about what happens next, and that can fail and get re-adjusted.

So the image of my car is no different from an image of starship Enterprise or a dragon - and even in those cases, we know what it would mean to see the real thing, even if it never happens. — Ludwig V

Not sure what you mean here.

It depends what you mean by "literally". For me, when I walk through my front door, I literally see my car. If I only see the image on my retina, then I don't see "literally" my car, but an image of it. — Ludwig V

I'm just saying I dispute the idea that there is some kind of phenomenal essence to things that we recognize and perceive - rather I see it in terms of just the direct patterns I see, and my reactions to those patterns in real time. Without those reactions, the idea that I am recognizing an object like a car is empty. I see the 2D patterns of the car and react to them in a way consistent with my recognition of it.

An image is always an image of something else, never the real thing. So my anchor is the real thing. That's what makes the image of a car an image as opposed to a complex array of coloured shapes. — Ludwig V

Sure, but I don't think the "real thing" can be transcend the 2D information accessible from the retina.

I think the difference in our perspective is that you just say you see the 3D car and stop there; while to me, my percepts can be deconstructed so I do see that my visual space is 2D (apart from the color). But you seem to just embrace the idea that you are directly acquainted with a 3D object. When I then ask what it means that I am acquainted with these 3D objects, it comes back to what I have said about 2D information and enactive processes.

But it is not the same as a disagreement about the facts and cannot be settled in the same way. — Ludwig V

But I think the animal case is conceivably a disagreement about facts as opposed to classification.

Well,

But as I say earlier, I think you could argue that joint positions don't actually directly convey 3D physical space without further integration of information (e.g. A finger joint typically cannot move through all degrees of freedom of 3D space). — Apustimelogist

Perhaps not. But a knuckle joint or a thumb or an arm or a spine can. — Ludwig V

Well, I think its at least debatable. I don't think those joints are anywhere near mobile enough, imo. — Apustimelogist

The main point is that we do have the information and it is integrated knowledge. So we agree. What matters here is that we don't have it via an image of any kind.

Well then the 2D image is how I am seeing a 3D car. I can't shake the awareness that my visual field is two-dimensional (except for the color dimension) even though I can distinguish distance. — Apustimelogist

Well, I agree that the 2D image is how you are seeing the 3D car. But it doesn't follow that you are seeing the image, except perhaps indirectly. When I look through a telescope or similar, what I see is the ship or star. I may be aware of the telescope indirectly because of my limited field of vision, but I do not see two images, the one in my eye and the one in the telescope.
When you refer to the 2D image, you are not seeing the image in your retina. That would mean seeing two images. What we see is one image at most.
It is very easy to fall in to thinking of the eye as some sort of camera or telescope, and in some ways it is. But the difference is that the camera focuses its image on an image-recording device, which an observer can access later, and a telescope has an observer at the eye-piece. But the eye does not have an observer (perhaps the brain) or an image-recording device.

The brain doesn't have any direct access to the outside world. It can never intelligibly compare things with some criterion that has come from the way things somehow are on the outside world. — Apustimelogist

Well, somehow we can work out when our eyes deceive us, so there must be some criterion that lets us know when those 2D images are wrong. Acting and moving with a 3D body in a 3D world is a rich source of correction. But that does depend on linking perception with action rather than experience.

All the brain can do is construct models which make predictions about what happens next, and that can fail and get re-adjusted. — Apustimelogist

If you suppose anything like an image or model in the brain, the question arises how the brain can access it in order to apply it to the incoming information. The answer is always an observer of some kind. But then, that observer will need to construct its own model or image and there will have to be a second observer inside the first one.... I'm sure you see the infinite regress that has begun. The brain is not an internal observer - unless you call it an observer of the outside world.

I see it in terms of just the direct patterns I see, and my reactions to those patterns in real time. Without those reactions, the idea that I am recognizing an object like a car is empty. I see the 2D patterns of the car and react to them in a way consistent with my recognition of it. — Apustimelogist

People sometimes talk about "affordances" in this context. (I seem to remember they were mentioned earlier in this thread). Of course they are important, because they are the significance of the objects that I see.
Some images are images of something, some are just patterns. If you treat them all as of the second kind, you have lost the significance of the image.

Sure, but I don't think the "real thing" can be transcend the 2D information accessible from the retina. — Apustimelogist

I don't understand what you mean here.

But you seem to just embrace the idea that you are directly acquainted with a 3D object. When I then ask what it means that I am acquainted with these 3D objects, it comes back to what I have said about 2D information and enactive processes. — Apustimelogist

If "directly" just means inside the body, then obviously I cannot be directly acquainted with objects outside my body. Not very interesting. The interesting an important question is whether I can be acquainted with objects outside my body. The answer has to be, yes. I would not use directly and indirectly in the the context of objects outside my body.

But I think the animal case is conceivably a disagreement about facts as opposed to classification. — Apustimelogist

Oh, it certainly could be a question of facts. But some people have insisted on describing the sounds emitted by an animal in pain from an experiment as "vocalizations" in the misguided belief that is more objective than "screaming". Such differences of classification prevent rational argument about the facts. So, classification needs to be agreed before the facts can be agreed, and if people are in the grip of the idea that animals are just machines, that agreement is not possible.

Another example:-

I think the difference in our perspective is that you just say you see the 3D car and stop there; while to me, my percepts can be deconstructed so I do see that my visual space is 2D (apart from the color) — Apustimelogist

We do agree pretty much on how the eye works, yet we describe the facts differently. Our disagreement is not about the facts, but about agreeing a coherent way of describing them, i.e. how to think about them, i.e. a coherent conceptual structure for understanding them. It's not a straightforward task.

what I see is the ship or star. — Ludwig V

Which is just a pattern that I see; thats all I mean by image, without further distinctions or assumptions.

But that does depend on linking perception with action rather than experience. — Ludwig V

They aren't mutually exclusive. You only know something about your actions insofar that you have experiences about your actions.

If you suppose anything like an image or model in the brain, the question arises how the brain can access it in order to apply it to the incoming information. The answer is always an observer of some kind. But then, that observer will need to construct its own model or image and there will have to be a second observer inside the first one.... I'm sure you see the infinite regress that has begun. The brain is not an internal observer - unless you call it an observer of the outside world. — Ludwig V

The brain is the model, no infinite regress of observers required.

Some images are images of something, some are just patterns. If you treat them all as of the second kind, you have lost the significance of the image. — Ludwig V

I believe that all the images are just patterns and the significance is retained by way of what I said in the bit you quoted.

I don't understand what you mean here. — Ludwig V

What you see must be constrained by your physical perceptual systems.

If "directly" just means inside the body, then obviously I cannot be directly acquainted with objects outside my body. — Ludwig V

I wasn't using directly in the same sense as earlier!

So, classification needs to be agreed before the facts can be agreed, and if people are in the grip of the idea that animals are just machines, that agreement is not possible. — Ludwig V

Yes, agreed.

We do agree pretty much on how the eye works, yet we describe the facts differently. Our disagreement is not about the facts, but about agreeing a coherent way of describing them, i.e. how to think about them, i.e. a coherent conceptual structure for understanding them. It's not a straightforward task. — Ludwig V

Yes, I would probably agree here too.

Which (sc. ship or a star) is just a pattern that I see; thats all I mean by image, without further distinctions or assumptions. — Apustimelogist

It's as if I were to say that I see an animal, "without further distinctions or assumptions". Do you not even recognize a distinction between the images that enable me to infer that some images are images of 3D objects? It's as if you were to say that all writing is just marks on paper etc., or that the body of my dead friend is just meat.

They aren't mutually exclusive. You only know something about your actions insofar that you have experiences about your actions. — Apustimelogist

.. and you only have experiences of your actions because you act.

The brain is the model, no infinite regress of observers required. — Apustimelogist

That's an interesting reply. But on reflection, since we remember things and there's evidence the memories are stored in the brain, I've decided not to pursue this line. "Model", these days, is flexible enough to cover almost any form of information storage.

I believe that all the images are just patterns and the significance is retained by way of what I said in the bit you quoted. — Apustimelogist

So an image plus affordances is not an image?

I wasn't using directly in the same sense ("inside the body") as earlier! — Apustimelogist

OK. Can you explain the new sense? I'm particularly interested in whether you think there is such a thing as indirect perception and what that might amount to.

On "conceptual schemes", I should add that there is quite a lot that Davidson says that I agree with. I think he is right to argue that there is not one single conceptual scheme that all human beings share. I do maintain, however, that our world includes many partially incommensurable schemes - partly shared and partly not. Further, the difference between scheme and content is not anything like as clear-cut as his argument requires. On the other hand, I accept that the differences in thinking can be expressed as beliefs. I think, for example, that belief in God is not a straightforwardly empirical scheme, but the anchor of a way of thinkng about the world that is conceptually different from the way an atheist or sceptic thinks about the world. But then, Davidson doesn't seem to recognize that there are different kinds of belief.

It's as if you were to say that all writing is just marks on paper etc — Ludwig V

What else is it? Anything else about it does not come from the writing itself but context and relationships those markings have to other things, including our engagement with them. Without those things, yes writing is just marks on paper; writing is nothing more than marks on paper and how those marks relate to other parts of the world.

.. and you only have experiences of your actions because you act. — Ludwig V

Which are not intelligible without experience of them!

I'm particularly interested in whether you think there is such a thing as indirect perception and what that might amount to. — Ludwig V

I'm quite agnostic on direct vs. indirect perception. I think both can be argued in different ways. I think the idea that we are directly aquainted with structure in the outside world is a coherent notion. But I am not someone inclined to say that there is some single, strong, absolute way of describing structure in the world, so I think this direct perception is quite weak. There are plausible inumerable kinds of structure that an organism could tap into when engaging with the world. You could also argue indirectness though in the sense that we are still in some sense insulated from the outside world by our sensory states, the structure of the brain and its possible foibles, and in principle issues of chronic indeterminacy. So I am open to both types.

On "conceptual schemes", I should add that there is quite a lot that Davidson says that I agree with. I think he is right to argue that there is not one single conceptual scheme that all human beings share. I do maintain, however, that our world includes many partially incommensurable schemes - partly shared and partly not. Further, the difference between scheme and content is not anything like as clear-cut as his argument requires. On the other hand, I accept that the differences in thinking can be expressed as beliefs. I think, for example, that belief in God is not a straightforwardly empirical scheme, but the anchor of a way of thinkng about the world that is conceptually different from the way an atheist or sceptic thinks about the world. But then, Davidson doesn't seem to recognize that there are different kinds of belief. — Ludwig V

I more or less agree with Davidson's reasoning in his argument about conceptual schemes but I have never really been familiar woth the context of why he is making these arguments. He is attacking a very strong notion of conceptual schemes; when I think often peoplr talking about this kind of thing just might be referring to what I think is trivial - we use words in different ways depending on the environments and cultures and customs we have been exposed to, and sometimes it is difficult communicating between these things. I don't think this notion needs to be as strong as the one Davidson is attacking. I think maybe the core of what Davidson is attacking is possiby relativism, which would require that not only do people have different ways of talking and refer to different things, but their validity relative to someone's conceptual niche cannot be overturned, maybe entailing that there can be no communication between different conceptual niches in which such a challenge to validity can arise. So maybe thats why his notion of conceptual schemes is very strong, whereas I think most would agree we can uphold the trivial idea that people have different ways of talking or referring without mecessarily having to uphold some kind of relativism.

, .

Neither of you have read much Davidson, have you.

Whats the issue?

No, I haven't. I would welcome enightenment from someone who has.

I have a question for you. Am I right to understand Davidson's thesis as being that conceptual differences come down to different beliefs, and that, at some point, the differences can be settled empirically?

What else is it? Anything else about it does not come from the writing itself but context and relationships those markings have to other things, including our engagement with them. Without those things, yes writing is just marks on paper; writing is nothing more than marks on paper and how those marks relate to other parts of the world. — Apustimelogist

I'm going to assume that "it" in the first sentence is the marks on paper. But then your second sentence should have read "Anything else about them does not come from the marks themelves, but from constext and relationships those markings have to other things." That's true, and in that context, one can refer to those marks as writing. So writing is more than marks on paper. It is marks on paper and how those marks relate to other parts of the world. The difference in vocabulary depends on and signals a difference in how we are to think about the phenomenon.

Which are not intelligible without experience of them! — Apustimelogist

So either we are in a hopelss circle or the two are inter-dependent.

I think both can be argued in different ways. I think the idea that we are directly aquainted with structure in the outside world is a coherent notion. But I am not someone inclined to say that there is some single, strong, absolute way of describing structure in the world, — Apustimelogist

Well, yes. "Direct" and "indirect" are applied in different ways, depending on the context. (So are "inside" and "outside".) So there is a bit of a morass there. You are also right that there is no single, strong, absolute way of describing structure in the world. It all depends on what we are trying to describe.

You could also argue indirectness though in the sense that we are still in some sense insulated from the outside world by our sensory states, the structure of the brain and its possible foibles, and in principle issues of chronic indeterminacy. — Apustimelogist

I've no objection to saying that our senses and cognitive capacities have their limitations. But, at the same time, they do work for many purposes, and we've been quite clever about working out ways of pushing the boundaries.

It is marks on paper and how those marks relate to other parts of the world. The difference in vocabulary depends on and signals a difference in how we are to think about the phenomenon. — Ludwig V

Yes, but if you look at writing, you just see marks. You don't somehow see marks and the totality of its relations to other parts of the world. Those relations are only experienced in real time in specific behaviors or thoughts or reactions.

But, at the same time, they do work for many purposes, and we've been quite clever about working out ways of pushing the boundaries. — Ludwig V

Yes, I think if you assume that there is some objective way the world is, then they have to work in some effective way, mapping to things out in the world. But, I would say that if one were able to make a coherent separation between some thing and some other thing "representing" it, then their relationship is not an intrinsic one but subject to the whims of how the world allows them to coherently map and the "representation" be used. That it is a representation is then, imo, in a weak sense - hence the use of "". I have no objection to the notion of representation as long as it comes with caveats regarding how they work, how their use can be deconstructed. If everyone were to agree on representation in this sense, then I guess the "" would be redundant though.

or the two are inter-dependent. — Ludwig V

Naturally!

I have a question for you. Am I right to understand Davidson's thesis as being that conceptual differences come down to different beliefs, and that, at some point, the differences can be settled empirically? — Ludwig V

Not quite, I think. Rather, apparent differences in belief, and therefore apparent conceptual differences, are in the main differences in expression. Suitable re-expressions, reinterpretations, may be able to make this apparent.

Rather, apparent differences in belief, and therefore apparent conceptual differences, are in the main differences in expression. Suitable re-expressions, reinterpretations, may be able to make this apparent. — Banno

That's much better. It seems to allow a much more flexible idea of what translation involves than I thought. But then, it seems to leave open the possibility of failure. I'm not sure that's really compatible with what he wants to demonstrate - unless he envisages the possibility of a pragmatic accomodation or even the possibility of the relevant beliefs changing as a result of the encounter - even if both sides stick to their own languages. Is that a possibility?
I looked again at the actual arguments and found it much harder going than I thought when I first read it. One reason is the dearth of actual examples, or, better, cases. His discussion of the yacht (p.18) is fine, though limited. Then he seems to want to extend the scope of this case very widely - even suggesting (though not stating) that this is how philosophy proceeds. Perhaps. Somtimes. And then one wants to say that if that method could resolve philosophical disagreements, philosophical debate would be much more fruitful than it actually is.
I'm still not happy about the slide from conceptual differences to beliefs. It would be tedious to complain that not all differences in beliefs are differences in concepts, so I won't bother with that. However, concepts (or, given the link he establishes between concepts and language) and conceptual schemes (language-games to me) aren't true or false. They are what enables us to establish truth and falsity. Some of the issues he deals with later on seem to me to be very much over-simplified. Yet, I find it hard not to agree with his last paragraph, except for the idea in the last sentence that "we .... reestablish unmediated touch with the familiar objects whose antics make our sentences and opinions true or false." Following his example, I ask what "mediated touch" would be; if that makes no sense, it would seem that "unmediated touch" also makes no sense.

Yes, but if you look at writing, you just see marks. You don't somehow see marks and the totality of its relations to other parts of the world. Those relations are only experienced in real time in specific behaviors or thoughts or reactions. — Apustimelogist

That's not quite right. If you look at marks, you may be looking at 1) meaningless (to you) marks, or you may be looking at 2) marks that you know are meaningful, but don't know the meaning of (scripts that you can't read), or you may be looking at 3) meaningful marks that you can read. In each case, your experience will be different. There are three different visual experiences involved.

Our interpretation of what we see affects our experience, or, better, the significance (or lack of significance) of what we see affects our experience of it. We literally see the difference.

You have probably encountered puzzle pictures, but here are two examples that illustrate what I mean.
The Duck-Rabbit Illusion
Rubin's vase

There's an illusion here, that there is a "neutral" - uninterpreted - description of the pictures in terms of the patterns presented. But there's nothing special about this way of seeing the picture - it's just another interpretation.

The trompe l'oeil pictures are another example of this phenomenon.

This is another part of our discussion about the ambiguity of "see". There is a very influential discussion of this in Wittgenstein Philosophy of Psychology - A Fragment, [previously known as ‘Part II’ of the Philosophical Investigations] Section xi, para. 118

In each case, your experience will be different. — Ludwig V

Yes, but what is different isn't the markings but your reactions to the markings.

The duck-rabbit illusion that you give is an excellent example. My inclination is that what is happening is still about changes in the way we are reacting to the image: attending, sampling, making predictions regarding the image and confidence of reporting. The experience then is inextricably entwined with our ongoing engagement with the image, imo.

Yes, but what is different isn't the markings but your reactions to the markings. — Apustimelogist

In a way, that's true. But it is also true that there are three different kinds of markings, though it is true that they are distinguished by how I can engage with them.

The experience then is inextricably entwined with our ongoing engagement with the image, imo. — Apustimelogist

Quite so. There's an interactive process going on. The ambiguity of "see" strikes again, of course. I would want to say that I see the markings differently. You would not be wrong to say that we both see the same markings in a different way. I'm not sure that anything important hangs on the difference. I certainly hope not.
The case of writing is somewhat special, in that writing is 2D, and the writing in the image on my retina is exactly the same as the writing in the 3D book. So we shouldn't have a problem in agreeing that what I see is the writing (or the marks). What's going on with 3D is still unclear.
There are various considerations that might make you pause about saying that we see the image on our retina. I've mentioned already that, in a sense, we not see two images, but a single combination. There are other bits of editing that have gone on that differentiate what we are aware of and what is actually there. 1) There's a blind spot where the optic nerve joins the retina. Our brain fills that in by guess-work, which can go wrong and so we can become aware of that even though it is invisible to us. 2) There's a patch in the centre of the retian that is more densely populated with retinal cells than the margins. The sharp focus that we think we see at the edges of our visual field is the result of our constantly looking around us, so the fuzzy image at the edges of the field of vision is filled in with memories from the last time we looked. 3) I've mentioned the squinting that goes on to enable us to "range-find" objects out in the world.

You mentioned attention. When I look through a telescope or microscope, I do not attend to the image as such (unless I need to focus the lens, or clean it). So I think it is more accurate to say that I look at the ship in the distance through the telescope, that is, through the telescope's image. I would say the same for the retinal image. Most of the time, we are not aware of the retinal image unless there is a problem with it - dust floating on the surface of the lense causes spots to appear in what we see, failures in the lens make the image fuzzy or distorted.

You would not be wrong to say that we both see the same markings in a different way. — Ludwig V

What I would say is seeing the same marks differently is more to do with a different engagement with the information extractable from those markings; but I agree that "see" is ambiguous, partly leading to my previous consideration of whether we see anything at all.

You mentioned attention. When I look through a telescope or microscope, I do not attend to the image as such (unless I need to focus the lens, or clean it) — Ludwig V

You're always attending to things whether you realize it or not, constantly scanning parts of what you see.

The case of writing is somewhat special, in that writing is 2D, and the writing in the image on my retina is exactly the same as the writing in the 3D book. So we shouldn't have a problem in agreeing that what I see is the writing (or the marks). What's going on with 3D is still unclear. — Ludwig V

I don't think this is relevant because I don't believe the distinction between the outside 3D world and what we see is relevant given the fact that our brain cannot access anything independently of 2D information. From my perspective, the patterns we see are 2D. Its our somato-motor engagement with the world that brings an additional dimension to what we "see", both in terms of our body and eyes.

What I would say is seeing the same marks differently is more to do with a different engagement with the information extractable from those markings; — Apustimelogist

I don't disagree.

but I agree that "see" is ambiguous, partly leading to my previous consideration of whether we see anything at all. — Apustimelogist

OK. The idea that we don't "see" anything at all is interesting. I must have missed it. (I'm assuming it's in this thread somewhere?)

I don't think this is relevant because I don't believe the distinction between the outside 3D world and what we see is relevant given the fact that our brain cannot access anything independently of 2D information. From my perspective, the patterns we see are 2D. Its our somato-motor engagement with the world that brings an additional dimension to what we "see", both in terms of our body and eyes. — Apustimelogist

I agree that the images on our retinas are 2D. But I would say that our brain has access to information about the 3D world through somato-motor engagement (with some reservation about hearing) and I think that affects how the brain interprets the 2D information and consequently how we see it. I think the distinction between our brain doing something and us doing something matters. But I admit that what conscious experience amounts to is not at all clear.

OK. The idea that we don't "see" anything at all is interesting. I must have missed it. (I'm assuming it's in this thread somewhere?) — Ludwig V

Aha, I think it was something I wrote but must have not posted because it was both too vague and complicated a thought, and distracting from some point of a post. Just forgot I didn't post it.

I agree that the images on our retinas are 2D. But I would say that our brain has access to information about the 3D world through somato-motor engagement (with some reservation about hearing) and I think that affects how the brain interprets the 2D information and consequently how we see it. I think the distinction between our brain doing something and us doing something matters. But I admit that what conscious experience amounts to is not at all clear. — Ludwig V

I think thats fair.

Aha, I think it was something I wrote but must have not posted because it was both too vague and complicated a thought, and distracting from some point of a post. Just forgot I didn't post it. — Apustimelogist

I do that quite often. Sometimes a thought just doesn't survive being written down.

I think thats fair. — Apustimelogist

It's good to reach a consensus. Thanks for the discusssion.