We don't know. We have guesses related to problem solving, or the brain "repairing" itself, but this is completely speculative.

The richness of the phenomena way exceeds the proposed explanations. Sure, one can see the appeal that a dream is often related to something we are thinking about, sometimes unconsciously - but the weirdness involved is quite striking (in my case anyway).

I suppose one could point out something similar, which is that if you are daydreaming, it's often the case that we do not notice the transition between daydreaming and being awake.

Maybe the differences we can describe when awake, are not so large as they seem. Perhaps there is something to that often-corny phrase, that life is a dream.

Certainly, the first instant of remembered conscious experience is quite dreamlike, waking from an eternal slumber.

Sure, one can see the appeal that a dream is often related to something we are thinking about, sometimes unconsciously - but the weirdness involved is quite striking (in my case anyway). — Manuel

It is sometimes bizarre beyond any understanding. Like if we find ourselves interacting in a way with someone we absolutely would not interact with in that way. Whether from one extreme like romantic/sexual with someone we most certainly would not, to the other extreme iof trying to kill someone we love. Yes, we've thought about the person involved. Yes, we've thought about that kind of interaction with a human. But that interaction with that person? Literally never thought about it. Yet, obviously, our unconscious did.

Sometimes I wonder if there is even any actual visual images in a dream. I'll wake up from a dream and think that the thing in the dream which was my house, or my home didn't look at all like my home. Or, the person in my dream who was supposed to be my brother didn't look at all like my brother. Then, when I start to think about it, I realize that I can't really say what these things, or people actually looked like in the dream. So I start to think that maybe there wasn't even any actual visual images, I was just thinking that I was with my brother, or in my home, but I never really saw any of that in the dream, and that's why I can't describe what they looked like.

Am I a completely different person when I am asleep, from when I am awake? — Metaphysician Undercover

When we're awake our imagination (dreams) function in such a way as to be fit to surface (in the world). When we sleep, the autonomous constructions and projections don't stop; they just function without much regard to fitness for surface. Both processes are made-up; one works to create meaning in History, the other also functions to create meaning, but strictly within one tiny locus of History (so it doesnt signify in the same linear logic of our waking narratives). The question isn't are you the same person; you are. The question is, are you really that person? Or, is that person real?

I don't really understand what you mean by "fitness to surface", but your post doesn't resolve the problem. The question is why do I at sometimes use my imagination to create things which are ft to surface, and at other times I do not have regard for fitness to surface. If these are both the same me, as you claim, why does my imagination behave in these two completely distinct and inconsistent ways.

If there is a question to be asked as to "is that person real", then how would we answer "no" unless we said it was actually two distinct people? But it's not two distinct people because the awake person has memories from the dreaming condition. And the awake person rejects the dreaming condition as "not real", but the dreaming person does not even remember the awake condition to be able to reject the awake condition.

I don't really understand what you mean by "fitness to surface" — Metaphysician Undercover

If I said dreams are autonomously moving signifiers called out of a
storage in memory, with no central agent, you would consider the arguments against that, but generally, you'd accept the possibility.

But if i said, so too are all of your so called experiences in your waking. Only in waking, these autonomous manifestations follow eons worth of evolution, such that they structure and project effeciently, following certain laws which serve their only function. First, the will to manifest (because the primordial, original or true nature of these images---the imagination---was to stimulate conditioned responses; built in was the drive to function or manifest). Following that, highly functional laws to sustain and promote the manifestations (all made-up by the evolved system), from difference, to cause and effect, reason, logic, grammar, and so on, and out of these, History.

Because dreams are just the outflow of the manifestations which have evolved not to stop, they do not conform to the rules which structure the ones in waking. So, the former seem to be what we would call random. They still signify, but that's another discussion.

The waking manifestations have been regulated, conditioned to follow a dialectic of such efficiency that only the images structured most aptly for the situation (given umpteen factors, run through speedy dialectic, conditioned trials and errors) get to manifest. That is, these operations of mind, are the most fitting to surface. To be simple, your eyes see a round red edible thing, your stomach may release triggers of hunger, etc. But these images stored in memory, autonomously flood those real bodily events with so called experience, their efficient constructions. And "apple" and the hundreds of corresponding structures displace the body with these Narratives. The "I" itself is just a structure which, in the promotion of manifestations, emerged as functional, surfaces a lot and so on. But it is just as autonomous a process in waking as in dreams.

They're both dreams, and in neither of them is "I"/ are you the real being. The body is and always is.

If I said dreams are autonomously moving signifiers called out of a
storage in memory, with no central agent, you would consider the arguments against that, but generally, you'd accept the possibility. — ENOAH

I don't think that this explanation properly allows for the creative capacity of dreams, and waking life for that matter. It cannot be that all experience consists of signifiers called from memory, because there must be a first experience, and the first cannot consist of any memory. Therefore I believe that the creative capacity, which is defined by being in the moment, living at the present, rather than by memories of the past, is just as important to the dreaming (and waking) experience, as the memories which you describe. And this is where we find the real being of "I", which you end up denying.

Not to be argumentative. I understand your points. Fair enough.

What was your (or, for that matter, 'the') first experience of 'apple'?

I do not deny the creative capacity. It's creative capacity all the way down [to the forever forsaken so called first experience]. But you're right that I deny the "I" as the source. "I" is a product/tool.

There is a so called real so called I. The body. Although that is affected by the creativity, feeling a positive bond with the "I", the feeling is real, but the object of the bond, the "I" is a small-c creation.

We are not two persons. So, again, the dreaming and the waking human is one: the body. The intriguing problem you raise is a function of the make-believe, or creative capacity.

There is a so called real so called I. The body. Although that is affected by the creativity, feeling a positive bond with the "I", the feeling is real, but the object of the bond, the "I" is a small-c creation. — ENOAH

I don't see how you reduce the "I" to the body. In my dreams I do things that a body could not do, randomly jump from one location or situation to another. That "I" in my dreams cannot be a body. So why do you insist that the I is a body?

If you assert that both the waking and sleeping I are the very same I, then you have to allow the reality of both. The I in the dreams is not constrained by the limitations of the body. You might argue that this is simply imaginative creativity, but the very essence of creativity is that it allows us to extend ourselves beyond the limitations of our bodies. Therefore "I" is something more than just my body.

I don't see how you reduce the "I" to the body. — Metaphysician Undercover

You are correct, and I have caused confusion.

The "I" is imaginary; in waking and in dreams. What I meant to say is that the real being is the living body, not in the narratives constructed by its imagination in both waking and dreaming. Although the latter is where we conventionally identify the real being (that is, with the "I").

I understand that you still take issue...I just thought I should clarify.

Thanks for clearing that up ENOAH. Now I understand. However, I prefer to think of the real being as a unity of the two, the living body, and the "I" which thinks and has feelings. It may be the case that it is more difficult and complicated to conceive of the living being as a unity of two completely different aspects, but I think it's the only realistic way.

So this would constitute a big difference between "seeing" in your sleep, and "seeing" when you are awake. How do you think that the house is caused to appear to the person in a dream, without the photons being picked up by the retina?

Suppose that this creation of "the house" in a dream, is an aspect of "procedural memory". How is this any sort of real memory, when the brain seems to be just creating random things rather than consciously remembering things? Rather than a type of memory, which is what the conscious awake mind is doing all the time, remembering things, dreaming seems to be a completely different sort of activity, where the brain is just exploring all sorts of weird things, maybe like a trial and error activity. — Metaphysician Undercover

To conjoin this with what I was previously mentioning, my own interpretation is that dreaming is a form of sheer imagining, only that in dreams the unconscious mind agentially determines most of what is being imagined, this rather than the conscious mind's volition as is typically the case when we are awake and willfully imagine things (things which in common speech are said to be seen by us with the mind's eye). When we willfully imagine a house while awake, we do it with a conscious intention. I personally believe that in dreams the somio-conscious "I" is constituted of a lesser quantity of yet unconscious awareness-endowed agencies, a sleeping "I" which then interacts with fully unconscious agencies via imaginary phenomena that are mostly intended by these unconscious agencies of mind. In contrast, a typical awake "I" would then be a non-manifold unity of agential awareness which is itself constituted from far more otherwise unconscious agencies of mind. It gets difficult in succinctly explain but it does coherently tie in with the view I presented to Patterner here - this regarding how the conscious mind is a convergence of certain aspects of the otherwise unconscious mind.

Maybe tangential, but to me it also accounts for the how and why of the waking "I" dissolving into non-occurrence when falling asleep and then re-manifesting as a somnio-consciousness when we dream: Basically, the waking "I" dissolves, or if one prefers fragments, into its constituent unconscious agencies which are otherwise unified, and thereby transiently vanishes; then, in dreams, the sleeping "I" reemerges but in what most often is a qualitatively lesser form; upon awakening, the waking "I" then is reunited from its constituent unconscious aspects. Because of this the waking "I" can sometimes remember what the sleeping "I" experienced during dreams, but the sleeping "I" most always doesn't have memories of waking "I"'s experiences.

Hoping some of this makes sense, even if disagreed with. At any rate, it's my best interpretation so far.

But the self is doing things which appear to be irrational, and the things which are happening to the self are equally impossible to make sense of. — Metaphysician Undercover

Want to draw attention to this typically being so only upon our awakening. When we are experiencing the dream first hand, we don't typically at that juncture hold an awareness of the dream being irrational. It merely is; and we find ourselves doing what we do in it.

It could be the case that the reasoning of most dreams is fully metaphorical with meanings understood by at least certain aspects of our unconscious mind but not by our awakened state of rationality. This, for one example, as the surrealists of a century past more or less maintained.

These instances, when sensations influence the dream, would be cases of the brain receiving, and dealing with sense information, in a way which is totally inconsistent with the awake (what I called "rational" way). This implies that the brain actually has different ways of processing sense input. — Metaphysician Undercover

Most definitely. The visual appearance of an imagined or daydreamed house, for example. Imaginings and daydreams are typically under the full sway of conscious volition, but in cases of hallucination, for a different example, a person can see a hallucinated house - difference from the former being that here the unconscious mind controls the imagining without any sway from consciousness's volition. Such that in more extreme mental disorders the consciousness will presume the hallucination to in fact be an integral aspect of the external world. And everthing just stated can readily apply to sensory experiences other than that of vision (smell, taste, touch, or sounds (such as that of hearing voices)).

We can ask, then, what is creating these imaginary scenarios. It is a sort of "self", which knows little if any bounds of rational thought. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm thinking that what I've so far stated by in large addresses this question. Its not a self so much as a commonwealth of sometimes disperse agencies of one's unconscious mind conveying information to one as a somnio-consciousness via imaginary - and I take it most likely metaphorical - means.

---------

To add to this muddle of views and information - and as much as materialists will snide and scoff at this - there also are notions such as that of Jung's collective unconscious. When entertaining such notions, not only can one obtain things such as meaningful synchronicities, but it can also allow for the possibility that at least some dreams in at least some people are influenced by the collective unconscious.

Anecdotal but true: one of my grandmas repeatedly had premonitions via her vivid dreams. Hard to explain even one of them in succinct manners, but the point is she would inform us of what will be, and it would then occur as she predicted from her interpretation of here dreams. One can question or deny the verity of this, but for me, who grew up with her, to claim that all her dreams and predictions were mere coincidence would verge on absurdity.

Maybe this is too far off topic. But I did want to draw attention to the possibility that some dreams might be more than merely the 'irrational activities of one's own physical and fully autonomous brain,' or some such.

To conjoin this with what I was previously mentioning, my own interpretation is that dreaming is a form of sheer imagining, only that in dreams the unconscious mind agentially determines most of what is being imagined, this rather than the conscious mind's volition as is typically the case when we are awake and willfully imagine things (things which in common speech are said to be seen by us with the mind's eye). When we willfully imagine a house while awake, we do it with a conscious intention. I personally believe that in dreams the somio-conscious "I" is constituted of a lesser quantity of yet unconscious awareness-endowed agencies, a sleeping "I" which then interacts with fully unconscious agencies via imaginary phenomena that are mostly intended by these unconscious agencies of mind. In contrast, a typical awake "I" would then be a non-manifold unity of agential awareness which is itself constituted from far more otherwise unconscious agencies of mind. It gets difficult in succinctly explain but it does coherently tie in with the view I presented to Patterner here - this regarding how the conscious mind is a convergence of certain aspects of the otherwise unconscious mind. — javra

What occurs to me, is that you have effectively divided the mind into two distinct sources of agency, the conscious I and the unconscious I. I take this as two distinct I's. And this is compatible with Plato's mind/body dualism, if the unconscious I is the source of bodily desires. Plato describes a thirsty man as being driven by the bodily (unconscious) desire to drink, but the rational (conscious) mind overrules this desire, knowing that the water is not fit for consumption. So there are two competing I's, as described by the op, the bodily I which is fully active in sleep, and the conscious I which is active when awake.

Plato posits a medium between the body (unconscious) and the mind (conscious), which he describes as passion, spirit, or emotion. In his description, in waking life, the ill-tempered person has the bodily (unconscious) desires to rule over the rational (conscious) mind through the means of the passions, while the virtuous person uses the rational (conscious) mind to rule over the bodily (unconscious) desires through the means of the passions. I assume that what you call "agencies of mind" is analogous with Plato's medium, the "passions". These are the emotive forces which produce what the mind creates. Notice that in Plato's description these so-called agencies are the same agencies operating in two different directions. This is the commonly made distinction between top-down and bottom-up.

Maybe tangential, but to me it also accounts for the how and why of the waking "I" dissolving into non-occurrence when falling asleep and then re-manifesting as a somnio-consciousness when we dream: Basically, the waking "I" dissolves, or if one prefers fragments, into its constituent unconscious agencies which are otherwise unified, and thereby transiently vanishes; then, in dreams, the sleeping "I" reemerges but in what most often is a qualitatively lesser form; upon awakening, the waking "I" then is reunited from its constituent unconscious aspects. Because of this the waking "I" can sometimes remember what the sleeping "I" experienced during dreams, but the sleeping "I" most always doesn't have memories of waking "I"'s experiences. — javra

I really think that we must look at these as two distinct I's. These are both sources of agency, each with its own sense of self, or "I", and also very much incompatible and inconsistent with each other. So, the question is what happens to the conscious I when you say that it "dissolves", when the person falls asleep. All the agencies remain, yet they are no longer united and directed by the conscious self, they are released into the power of the subconscious I.

This implies that the conscious I is not the real I. It dissolves, and disappears for extended periods of time. That presents a further, very perplexing problem. What is the purpose of the conscious I? The conscious I must itself be a creation of the unconscious I, yet the conscious I is opposed to, and resists the inclinations of the unconscious I, designating the imaginary dreaming activities of the unconscious as not real, when in reality the entire conscious I is itself not the real I. Why has the true (unconscious) I created an elaborate consciousness which understands itself as "I", and actually deceives itself into believing itself to be the real I, thereby suppressing the true (unconscious) I and only allowing it to reign at night? It's as if the true (unconscious) I knows itself to be deficient in its capacity to act, so much so that it creates a false (conscious) I, which lives in an illusory world, its own dream, which is supposed to be the real world, where it has causal power to exercise free will, when it's really only the true (unconscious) I which has an power to exercise free will in the world. And, the unconscious I recognizes that power to be extremely deficient.

Want to draw attention to this typically being so only upon our awakening. When we are experiencing the dream first hand, we don't typically at that juncture hold an awareness of the dream being irrational. It merely is; and we find ourselves doing what we do in it.

It could be the case that the reasoning of most dreams is fully metaphorical with meanings understood by at least certain aspects of our unconscious mind but not by our awakened state of rationality. This, for one example, as the surrealists of a century past more or less maintained. — javra

Now we have to question directly, the rationality of the awakened self. The awakened self self-designates itself as the real self, with the real experience, when the sleeping, unconscious self is actually the true self. The awakened self justifies this self-designation through reference to rationality, but its entire logical structure is, at its base, a creation of the unconscious self, and it is essentially a self-deceiving structure created by the unconscious, designed specifically to create a false illusory self. Since the entire conscious self is a self-deceiving structure, created by the true unconscious self, for that very purpose of self-deception, then the validity of all its logic and so-called rationality is called into question as part of that elaborate scheme of self-deception.

Most definitely. The visual appearance of an imagined or daydreamed house, for example. Imaginings and daydreams are typically under the full sway of conscious volition, but in cases of hallucination, for a different example, a person can see a hallucinated house - difference from the former being that here the unconscious mind controls the imagining without any sway from consciousness's volition. Such that in more extreme mental disorders the consciousness will presume the hallucination to in fact be an integral aspect of the external world. And everthing just stated can readily apply to sensory experiences other than that of vision (smell, taste, touch, or sounds (such as that of hearing voices)). — javra

We can look at hallucinations as a breaking down of the self-deception. Notice, that the structure of self-deception which creates the conscious I, is so elaborate, and delicately balanced, that just a slight chemical imbalance, either from drugs or mental illness destabilizes it. These situations undermine that self-deception which constitutes the conscious I, and the person is thrust back toward supporting oneself on the real I, the unconscious, which is totally inconsistent with the created self-deceptive conscious I.

To add to this muddle of views and information - and as much as materialists will snide and scoff at this - there also are notions such as that of Jung's collective unconscious. When entertaining such notions, not only can one obtain things such as meaningful synchronicities, but it can also allow for the possibility that at least some dreams in at least some people are influenced by the collective unconscious.

Anecdotal but true: one of my grandmas repeatedly had premonitions via her vivid dreams. Hard to explain even one of them in succinct manners, but the point is she would inform us of what will be, and it would then occur as she predicted from her interpretation of here dreams. One can question or deny the verity of this, but for me, who grew up with her, to claim that all her dreams and predictions were mere coincidence would verge on absurdity.

Maybe this is too far off topic. But I did want to draw attention to the possibility that some dreams might be more than merely the 'irrational activities of one's own physical and fully autonomous brain,' or some such. — javra

I believe, that once we break down the entire conscious experience as an exercise in self-deception, we have almost nothing to start on as a solid, concrete foundation for rationality. This allows for virtually any possibility as the true reality. I would think that the only true approach to reality is to determine the fundamental elements out of which the illusion of the conscious self is produced. This would be found in the activity of dreaming. The entire conscious I, and the supposed reality of being awake, is like an elaborate dream, which has produced its own rules of coherency allowing for its persistence.

What occurs to me, is that you have effectively divided the mind into two distinct sources of agency, the conscious I and the unconscious I. I take this as two distinct I's. — Metaphysician Undercover

I take from having read your post that by "I"s you intend to specify selfhoods of agential awareness. As I previously mentioned, what i myself intended as reference to the term "I" was simply a "first-person point of view". An individual plant is certainly a selfhood of agential awareness (plants are known to be minimally aware of sunlight and gravity, and will grow their leaves toward the light and their roots toward gravity, thereby exhibiting agency; this in conjunction with an ability to act and react to otherness as a selfhood), but I find it highly non-credible that a plant will have a first-person point of view, aka an "I", as vertebrates, at minimum humans, are known to have: i.e., that which we term conscious awareness.

Thus interpreted, for various reasons (some of which I'll try to specify), I don't interpret the unconscious mind as having its own non-manifold unity of a first-person point of view; in other words, its own "I". For starters, in dreams wherein one interacts with multiple others, each other can very well be inferred to have its own, transiently occurring, dream-state first-person point of view, its own "I" - and these in some dreams more than others can conflict not only with oneself but with themselves as others relative to one's somnio-conscious self. Each with its own perspectives and volition.

Notice that I'm not claiming it metaphysically impossible for certain aspects of one's unconscious to unify in what could be inferred as a secondary agency-endowed conscious awareness. I take it that in certain mental disorders, such as that of alien hand syndrome, this in fact occurs to some extent. But I don't find reason to uphold that the unconscious mind is in and of itself a unified conscious awareness, an "I", of which we are unconscious of.

I assume that what you call "agencies of mind" is analogous with Plato's medium, the "passions". These are the emotive forces which produce what the mind creates. Notice that in Plato's description these so-called agencies are the same agencies operating in two different directions. This is the commonly made distinction between top-down and bottom-up. — Metaphysician Undercover

Though I approach the subject matter differently and make use of different terminology, I can very much relate to this, yes. What we experience as pangs of emotion - say pangs of envy which we denounce as improper, or else pangs of attraction toward another which we want to not occur, etc. - are certainly not of themselves the conscious "I" which is antagonistic in its views and volition to these "passions". Yet each such emotion shall be aware of the contextual realities we are consciouslly aware of; they will each try to pushwardly drive us toward certain actions via their own volitions; and they typically can only be dispelled via the passions of the conscious "I" per se to so dispel them. All this unless one willfully converges with the pang of envy to then, and only then, become oneself envious. Or else with the pang of attraction; etc. At such junctures, I take it that the conscious "I" converges into a novel non-manifold unity with what formerly was the pang of emotion.

It gets to be a very complex topic though.

This implies that the conscious I is not the real I. It dissolves, and disappears for extended periods of time. — Metaphysician Undercover

Interesting. I take it that here and what follows you found what is real based on that which is permanent rather than transient. But then I don't find reason to presume that the agencies of awareness of the unconscious mind are themselves in any way permanent either. Although its one of multiple possible perspectives, this is where I find the Buddhist notion of no-self can quite validly fit it: there is no permanent self anywhere at any time, eternally so or otherwise.

Having stated that, I find that the ontic reality of the first-person point of view is as real as anything real can get. That "I as a first-person point of view am (occur) when in any way aware" - although maybe not technically impossible to be wrong - is certainly incontrovertible.

That presents a further, very perplexing problem. What is the purpose of the conscious I? — Metaphysician Undercover

There's different ways of addressing this question. When one strictly focuses on physicality and maybe ponders why consciousness evolved (say among animals, with living sponges being amongst the simplest lifeforms in the animal kingdom / domain - and certainly lacking a conscious mind), I can't find any discernible reason whatsoever. There can be, however, metaphysical explanations for this - which, obviously, will be contingent on the metaphysics in question. I'll use Platinus as an example. If the One ontically is a fixed and unmovalbe end of being, and tf the grand telos to being is therefore to eventually become one with the One, then the evolution of consciousness will be derived from this premise to be a stepping stone toward this very finale. Of course things could get far more complex, but, in short, consciousness can be viewed as a manifestation of a cosmic will toward unity of being. And it's only in this latter type of perspective that I can find any meaningful explanation for consciousness's occurrence and purpose.

Why has the true (unconscious) I created an elaborate consciousness which understands itself as "I", and actually deceives itself into believing itself to be the real I, thereby suppressing the true (unconscious) I and only allowing it to reign at night? — Metaphysician Undercover

So, again, as previously expressed, I don't view things in this way. But in terms of consciousness's functioning and interactions with the unconscious mind given that consciousness currently is: most of what we intentionally, voluntarily do will be done without any deliberation on our part between possible alternatives. In all such instances we are consciously in fully accord with our unconscious processes of mind - we in essence become fully unified volitionally with the whole of our unconscious mind. In the best of times, we term it being in the zone, or else having flow. There are times, however, when our unconscious presents to us two or more alternative courses of action or of thought. Sometimes we choose not to choose between them (thereby allowing our unconscious to make the decision for us) and sometimes the choices we are aware of are peripheral to that we give primary attention to (here can can sense ourselves to make the choice while it remains quite conceivable that the determination was in fact made by aspects of our unconscious mind into which we willfully inhere volitionally). Still, there can be distinct moments in life were we find ourselves at a crossroad of alternatives between which we pupusfully deliberate, and the choice we consciously made is then pursued by the totality of our mind (and body). Only in the latter can we possibly deem ourselves to have metaphysically viable free will in that which is chosen as conscious beings.

OK, that all briefly outlined, we as consciousnesses do not create the alternatives which we as consciousnesses are aware of. These competing alternatives for what will be are all (at least typically) brought about by our unconscious portions of mind. My further interpretation is that our unconscious mind comes to an uncertainty as to how to travel onward and, so, presents to us as a conscious awareness these alternative courses. In essence, our unconscious volition is no longer unified but fragments into different volitions regarding what should be done - each alternative being in effect what a fragment of the unconscious believes to be the optimal path. We as conscious awareness then vote on which path to take, and our unconscious (typically) then accepts our vote as a determination of which alternative is to be pursued at expense of all others which then become denied. This is (or at least nicely conforms with) the terminology of Romanian Christian Orthodoxy wherein free will is termed "liber arbitru", the free arbiter - such that we as conscious awareness, as the "I", are the free arbiter.

At any rate, whenever we choose between alternatives, this with or without free will, we necessarily interact with the disparate volitions of our unconscious mind so as to resolved disagreements therein. (Yes, sometimes ultimatums and the like are presented to us from without, but even then we only become aware of, ultimately, what our own unconscious mind makes available to us.)

So this is certainly one reason for there to be a consciousness embedded within a total mind.

Now we have to question directly, the rationality of the awakened self. — Metaphysician Undercover

:smile: Getting into the metaphysics of rationality can be a very complicated issue. And I've already written my fair share for one post. But I'll say that - to here lean on Nietzsche's terminology for a bit - though in sometimes utterly different ways, the coherent and thereby orderly reasoning of Apollonian thought is of equally value for us as is the creative trial and error approaches of the Dionysian mindset.

I believe, that once we break down the entire conscious experience as an exercise in self-deception, we have almost nothing to start on as a solid, concrete foundation for rationality. This allows for virtually any possibility as the true reality. — Metaphysician Undercover

To my mind it could be rationally enough explainable in an Apollonian sense, but it requires a metaphysics drastically different from that of materialism. Contrast, for example, the Jungian notion of a cosmically collective unconscious with the ancient Stoic notion of an anima mundi. Terms (and their detailed implications) aside, it's pretty much the same thing to me.

Thus interpreted, for various reasons (some of which I'll try to specify), I don't interpret the unconscious mind as having its own non-manifold unity of a first-person point of view; in other words, its own "I". — javra

Well, I guess I misunderstood you then. But you did say:

I personally believe that in dreams the somio-conscious "I" is constituted of a lesser quantity of yet unconscious awareness-endowed agencies, a sleeping "I" which then interacts with fully unconscious agencies via imaginary phenomena that are mostly intended by these unconscious agencies of mind. — javra

That is what led me to think you were proposing a duality of I's.

I take it that here and what follows you found what is real based on that which is permanent rather than transient. But then I don't find reason to presume that the agencies of awareness of the unconscious mind are themselves in any way permanent either — javra

The unconscious agent can be known to be permanent, because it is there all the time, as the cause of dreams in sleep, and as the cause of the pangs you talked about, along with other emotions, when the person is awake.

If the One ontically is a fixed and unmovalbe end of being, and tf the grand telos to being is therefore to eventually become one with the One, then the evolution of consciousness will be derived from this premise to be a stepping stone toward this very finale. Of course things could get far more complex, but, in short, consciousness can be viewed as a manifestation of a cosmic will toward unity of being. And it's only in this latter type of perspective that I can find any meaningful explanation for consciousness's occurrence and purpose. — javra

I don't think we can draw this conclusion validly. Evolution, and life in general consists of a lot of trial and error. The errors are a sort of dead end process which is not consistent with success. So if we assume that there is an ultimate goal or purpose, we cannot automatically conclude that the way of being which is current is necessarily conducive to the ultimate end. It could be an erroneous 'dead end' way. This lack of necessity, which is involved with teleological relations in general, makes teleology very difficult.

OK, that all briefly outlined, we as consciousnesses do not create the alternatives which we as consciousnesses are aware of. These competing alternatives for what will be are all (at least typically) brought about by our unconscious portions of mind. My further interpretation is that our unconscious mind comes to an uncertainty as to how to travel onward and, so, presents to us as a conscious awareness these alternative courses. In essence, our unconscious volition is no longer unified but fragments into different volitions regarding what should be done - each alternative being in effect what a fragment of the unconscious believes to be the optimal path. We as conscious awareness then vote on which path to take, and our unconscious (typically) then accepts our vote as a determination of which alternative is to be pursued at expense of all others which then become denied. This is (or at least nicely conforms with) the terminology of Romanian Christian Orthodoxy wherein free will is termed "liber arbitru", the free arbiter - such that we as conscious awareness, as the "I", are the free arbiter. — javra

I think, perhaps that the unconscious has actually created the consciousness (through evolution), to help it deal with this uncertainty which you say that it experiences. I think that the conscious I is like a second I, a completely different perspective which the unconscious has created in order to give it another way of looking at things. The essence of this way of looking at things is "the point of view" which you described.

The point of view is the observer, the conscious mind is primarily an observer. The true agent of creativity, and activity in general, is the unconscious. However, the mode of agency of the unconscious is principally trial and error. And, without an observational perspective there is no way to discern failure from success in any particular activities. The point of view is required for judgement. The observational perspective is based in a complex memory capable of taking in all sorts of happenings internal and external. This observational perspective, point of view, or consciousness, has been created to provide what is required to make judgements concerning failure and success.

At any rate, whenever we choose between alternatives, this with or without free will, we necessarily interact with the disparate volitions of our unconscious mind so as to resolved disagreements therein. (Yes, sometimes ultimatums and the like are presented to us from without, but even then we only become aware of, ultimately, what our own unconscious mind makes available to us.) — javra

This supports my proposal that the conscious mind is an observer only. It does not even provide options for judgement, it only observes them, memorizes them, etc.. What actually resolves disagreement within oneself? The conscious mind provides all sorts of information, to facilitate judgement, but what part of the person is actually responsible for judgement?

For example, I awaken from a dream, and after a brief moment of reflection I make the judgement, that was just a dream. Prior to this the dream was judged (in some way) as reality. So my conscious mind has created a sort of narrative, a history, and as soon as I awaken I reflect briefly on these memories, and assure myself it was just a dream. I suggest that it is not the conscious mind which makes this judgement, because it doesn't even need that judgement. The conscious mind was never a part of the dream, and when I wake up not from a dream I have no question of whether this is reality or not. The conscious does not judge whether what it experiences is reality. So in actuality, the unconscious was in the dream, and it gets reassured by the consciousness that it was just a dream, and it makes the judgement that it was just a dream.

I personally believe that in dreams the somio-conscious "I" is constituted of a lesser quantity of yet unconscious awareness-endowed agencies, a sleeping "I" which then interacts with fully unconscious agencies via imaginary phenomena that are mostly intended by these unconscious agencies of mind. — javra


That is what led me to think you were proposing a duality of I's. — Metaphysician Undercover

OK. I did however clearly express "the somnio-conscious 'I'". I don't find how consciousness and somnio-consciousness can co-occur to thereby present a duality of I's. I, for example, can still vividly recall certain dreams and nightmares I've had decades ago: to me, I am the same I I was in these dreams and nightmares as a first-person point of view (with differences in my empirical ego, contexts, etc., of course): same first-person perspective regarding otherness, same affinities and aversions, etc. Hence, to me, a continuity rather than a duality of I-ness.

The unconscious agent can be known to be permanent, because it is there all the time, [...] — Metaphysician Undercover

I can see what you mean, but I myself don't subscribe to the unconscious mind being an agent (a unified agency). Again, I find reason to believe that the unconscious mind is constituted of a plurality of sometimes discordant agencies, themselves always changing. As one example, when awake and experiencing a pang of envy one can at the same time likewise experience one's conscience influencing one against becoming envious oneself: here there will then be two distinct agencies that are antagonistic to each other, each emerging from one's unconsciousness, each attempting to influence one's future course of action or of personal being. This as one example of how the unconscious mind can well consist of a plurality of discordant agencies.

I don't think we can draw this conclusion validly. Evolution, and life in general consists of a lot of trial and error. The errors are a sort of dead end process which is not consistent with success. So if we assume that there is an ultimate goal or purpose, we cannot automatically conclude that the way of being which is current is necessarily conducive to the ultimate end. It could be an erroneous 'dead end' way. This lack of necessity, which is involved with teleological relations in general, makes teleology very difficult. — Metaphysician Undercover

Of course. I did say that it can get very complex. If free will is to be upheld, for example, there's always choices between, for one example, further sustaining and growing one's (dualistic) ego at the expense of others' well-being and becoming more selfless in one's mindset and doings. Assuming that selflessness as an ideal is good and that selfishness as an ideal is bad, many will willfully chose the latter - this even if something like absolutely selfless being (which can conform to many a neoplatonist notion of the One) were to be the ultimate telos of being. But all this is simplified examples regarding the complexity I had in mind.

This supports my proposal that the conscious mind is an observer only. It does not even provide options for judgement, it only observes them, memorizes them, etc.. What actually resolves disagreement within oneself? The conscious mind provides all sorts of information, to facilitate judgement, but what part of the person is actually responsible for judgement? — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm not intending to engage in debates about this. What you here say indeed reminds me well enough of many a Hindu interpretation of atman, "witness consciousness". Yet, myself, I'll heavily lean toward this same consciousness being that which actively judges which alternative is optimally beneficial and should be manifested - this at expense of all other alternatives, i.e. of all other possible courses of action or of manifestation which then become rejected - and thereby chooses. In my own understanding, then, the agent (the conscious mind) always holds responsibility for the choices it itself makes, this in accord to its own judgments.

Yet, again, in this I don't intend to insinuate a division, else a duality, of mind. As per the iceberg metaphor, to me its the same total thing; only that some aspects of it as a commonwealth of agencies converge into consciousness and others don't.

For example, I awaken from a dream, and after a brief moment of reflection I make the judgement, that was just a dream. Prior to this the dream was judged (in some way) as reality. So my conscious mind has created a sort of narrative, a history, and as soon as I awaken I reflect briefly on these memories, and assure myself it was just a dream. I suggest that it is not the conscious mind which makes this judgement, because it doesn't even need that judgement. The conscious mind was never a part of the dream, and when I wake up not from a dream I have no question of whether this is reality or not. The conscious does not judge whether what it experiences is reality. So in actuality, the unconscious was in the dream, and it gets reassured by the consciousness that it was just a dream, and it makes the judgement that it was just a dream. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't know. Doubtless that the unconscious mind influences consciousness in many a way. But, at the same time, I find that the conscious mind can via its judgments choose to believe in many a weird thing. To my shock, having partaken of this forum (and the previous one) for some years, I've learned that some conscious minds will for example choose to believe in solipsism - such that what we know to be our waking states of being they interpret as also being a dream produced by their individual mind (sometimes reduced to their individual brain). For starters, it's a rather egotistic, selfish, else self-centered means of interpreting the world at large, but all the same it can happen.

OK. I did however clearly express "the somnio-conscious 'I'". I don't find how consciousness and somnio-consciousness can co-occur to thereby present a duality of I's. I, for example, can still vividly recall certain dreams and nightmares I've had decades ago: to me, I am the same I I was in these dreams and nightmares as a first-person point of view (with differences in my empirical ego, contexts, etc., of course): same first-person perspective regarding otherness, same affinities and aversions, etc. Hence, to me, a continuity rather than a duality of I-ness. — javra

The issue of duality is not a matter of how the conscious I relates to its conscious experience, and how the conscious I remembers a dream. Those ar both part of the wakened experience. It is a duality between the way that the conscious I remembers the dream, and the way that the somnio-conscious I exists, as itself, in the dream.

If we insist that the only true "I" is the conscious I, then we need to account for the appearance of a somnio-conscious I in the dreamworld. We might say that the I in the dream is just an illusion, as we say about the entire dream itself, but as I explained in the other post, it's more logical to designate the I in the dream as the true I, and the conscious I as really the illusion. This is because we cannot maintain two completely distinct I's, and we must designate the I which underlies all our experience, both sleeping and awake, as the true I. As a result, we need to conclude that the conscious I which separates itself from the somnio-conscious I, with thoughts like "that was just a dream", is actually producing an illusion that it is the true I, when in reality the deeper I which is the somnio-conscious I is the true I.

I can see what you mean, but I myself don't subscribe to the unconscious mind being an agent (a unified agency). Again, I find reason to believe that the unconscious mind is constituted of a plurality of sometimes discordant agencies, themselves always changing. As one example, when awake and experiencing a pang of envy one can at the same time likewise experience one's conscience influencing one against becoming envious oneself: here there will then be two distinct agencies that are antagonistic to each other, each emerging from one's unconsciousness, each attempting to influence one's future course of action or of personal being. This as one example of how the unconscious mind can well consist of a plurality of discordant agencies. — javra

Don't you consider the living being itself, as a unified body, with all the organs, heart, lungs, brain, etc., working together in a unified way, to be itself "an agent". If all the parts of the body act together in a unified way, and the body itself acts in a way which can be said to be the act of an agent, shouldn't we conclude that even if the acts of that body are unconscious acts (dreaming for example) they are the acts of "an agent", referring to unified agency.

That the unconscious can consist of discordant agencies does not need to be argued, it is clearly evident from the fact that the consciousness sets itself apart from the unconscious, and claims itself to be the true I, thereby suppressing the feelings and images (dreams) of the unconscious, designating them as not rational and not real. Therefore features of discordance are very real, and we do not adequately understand the reasons for them. The argument which Plato mounted against the theory that the soul is a harmony deals with this issue. If the soul is a harmony then any degree of discordance would negate the harmony leaving the being lifeless. The conclusion was that the soul is more like the cause of harmony, and discordance accounts for illness, as the soul is less than perfect in its attempts to create and maintain the harmony which are the organized parts.

I'm not intending to engage in debates about this. What you here say indeed reminds me well enough of many a Hindu interpretation of atman, "witness consciousness". Yet, myself, I'll heavily lean toward this same consciousness being that which actively judges which alternative is optimally beneficial and should be manifested - this at expense of all other alternatives, i.e. of all other possible courses of action or of manifestation which then become rejected - and thereby chooses. In my own understanding, then, the agent (the conscious mind) always holds responsibility for the choices it itself makes, this in accord to its own judgments. — javra

This leads directly toward the complexity you mentioned. I agree that the conscious mind looks at evidence, ideas, principles, and actually makes judgements. And this, the act of making a judgement, is a sort of act. There is a problem of complexity though, which Plato brought up in his arguments against sophistry, a problem which Augustine much more thoroughly analyzed. In his attack on the sophistic principle that virtue is knowledge, consequently the idea that virtue can be taught, as some sophists claimed, Plato demonstrated that a person can make a rational knowledgeable judgement as to what is good, yet still act in a contrary way. This indicates that the rational conscious mind does not have "the final say". The rational judgement of the conscious mind is not the actual cause of an individual's actions, as is demonstrated by a propensity of some people to act contrary to their conscious judgements.

This is partly the reason why Augustine divided the mind into three parts, memory, reason, and will. And as Aquinas later pointed out, "will" must ultimately be designated as free, even from reasoned judgement, to account for this reality that people act contrary to their better judgement. This is consist with what I present above, that the conscious rational I is not the true "I" of agency. The conscious I deceives itself into believing itself to be the true I by not properly understanding the real evidence and truth that it is just an illusory I created by the true underlying unconscious I. That the conscious I moves toward contradicting the true I, and negating it as unreal, is an indication of discordance, illness.

The issue of duality is not a matter of how the conscious I relates to its conscious experience, and how the conscious I remembers a dream. Those ar both part of the wakened experience. It is a duality between the way that the conscious I remembers the dream, and the way that the somnio-conscious I exists, as itself, in the dream.

If we insist that the only true "I" is the conscious I, then we need to account for the appearance of a somnio-conscious I in the dreamworld. — Metaphysician Undercover

Having read your entire post, do you then find it fair for me to characterize the duality you are addressing as a duality between an illusory conscious I-ness and a real somnio-conscious I-ness? And if it is a fair interpretation, that you then interpret the real somio-conscious I-ness to occur while the waking conscious I-ness is also occurring – only that the former is unconsciously occurring relative to the latter? Or is this not quite right? If it’s not correct, then I still don’t quite understand what do you intend to express by “duality” of I-ness.

Maybe my addressing the notion of agency might better illustrate my current best understanding.

Don't you consider the living being itself, as a unified body, with all the organs, heart, lungs, brain, etc., working together in a unified way, to be itself "an agent". If all the parts of the body act together in a unified way, and the body itself acts in a way which can be said to be the act of an agent, shouldn't we conclude that even if the acts of that body are unconscious acts (dreaming for example) they are the acts of "an agent", referring to unified agency. — Metaphysician Undercover

The notion of “agent” is to me not at all simple, such that that referred to as the (first-person) agent can readily change within different contexts of contemplation, but I do find the notion coherent despite these complexities.

To first define “agent”, to me it is any (at least relatively unified) identity which holds agency. In turn, also in keeping with common place notions, “agency” to me is the ability to accomplish (more explicitly to accomplish some end) and hence to do or undergo something - thereby meaning “the capacity, condition, or state of exerting power (“power” here in the strict sense of “ability to do or undergo something”) and, therefore, the capacity, condition, or state of engaging in actions (i.e. in this context, of intentionally doing things)”.

One could differ as to the definition of “agency” and thereby of “agent” (i.e., that which holds agency) – and if so, I’d very much like to know how – but for now granting this definition of “agent”:

Yes, a total self (to include both its physical and psychical/mental aspects), else a total organism thus understood, can well be construed to be an agent per se in many a context. Yet in other contexts – such as those philosophical contexts that seek to address the possibility of libertarian free will – the total organism cannot possibility be the agent in question – for one example, because the alternatives between which it as agent chooses can very well completely be aspects of its own total self's discordant agencies of (unconscious) mind. In these latter contexts, then, the addressed agent is what William James terms the pure ego (the knower of one’s own total self) – rather than the empirical ego (the total self which is known).

I-ness, in turn, can likewise address the total self (e.g., I am tall, hence tallness as a constituent aspect of my very I-ness, this being contingent on the physiology one as a pure ego knows oneself to be as an empirical ego) – which, maybe importantly, of itself as total self pivots on the occurrence of the pure ego which is so aware of its empirical ego. Else, I-ness can strictly address the pure ego per se (e.g., that I-ness which can validly affirm “I am aware of my body or thoughts”; else: I am joyful rather than sad, I am psychologically at ease rather than upset, etc.; else: I choose X rather than Y or Z; all these here then being either activities which the pure ego of itself engages in or states of being pertaining to the pure ego of itself). I find that this subject can indeed get very complex. But when I expressed I-ness as “a first-person point of view” I thereby intended to address the pure ego as agent – this rather than the empirical ego, i.e. the total self of which the pure ego is aware of, as agent.

Having roughly addressed what I reference by the term “agent” (again, that which holds agency as previously defined), I’ll again affirm that I interpret a total human (or else relatively developed; e.g. birds, mammals, etc.) mind to be an almost literal commonwealth of agencies – which are sometimes partly discordant and sometimes fully unified in at the very least that which they intend as agencies. It most certainly won’t sound right due to the connotations which we’ve been habituated to understand by the term “agent” (this being one reason why I find the need for new terminology to address this in my own philosophical endeavors) but, when looking at the definition of “agent” that I previously provided, one could then appraise each and every distinct agency of a total mind to be a distinct – though transiently occurring – agent, replete with its own pure ego of sorts that apprehends and reacts to at least certain phenomena.

So construed as a commonwealth of agencies, I again take it that some such then converge in the non-manifold unity of the conscious I as pure ego – this in waking states of being. And that when asleep and dreaming, the same convergence of certain agencies of the commonwealth of total mind occurs so as to produce the non-manifold unity of the somnio-conscious I as pure ego.

Just as the conscious I as pure ego dissolves upon falling asleep, so too does (I take it) the somnio-conscious I as pure ego dissolve into the various agencies of the total mind in-between periods of REM sleep – such that it is reunified as a dreaming pure ego in each period of REM sleep. Upon awakening, the unified pure ego of dreaming states can then become further unified with other agencies of a total mind such that it once again remembers waking states of former being while also (sometimes more than other times) remembering some aspects of what the sleeping pure ego experienced during the dreams of the night.

In so construing, I then interpret a continuity in the pure ego as agent– both in the pure ego of waking states from one day to the next and in the pure ego which occurs during dreams in between awakened states. I’d don’t find reason to believe that the pure ego of dreams continues to occur unconsciously while the pure ego of awakened states occurs. This such that I find the conscious I as pure ego to be no more real or else illusory than the somnio-conscious I as pure ego, and vice versa. It's just that the conscious I as pure ego interacts with the world whereas the somnio-conscious I as pure ego interacts with various unconscious agencies of its own total mind.

Also, because I look upon a total human mind as a total commonwealth of agencies, I don’t find reason to presume that there is a division between the conscious pure ego as one agent which interacts with its unconscious mind as a then separate agent in total. There can occasionally be found certain interactions between the conscious mind (the conscious pure ego as I-ness) and certain aspects of its unconscious mind (with one such example being consciousness's interaction with its conscience), but I don't find evidence for the unconscious mind being of itself a unified, and hence singular, agent in some way divided from the conscious mind as agent.

I could continue, but I’ve written a bunch as it is – and I don’t know the extent, if any, to which you’d find significant disagreement with what I’ve so far expressed.

In short, though, yes, the total person as a total self can well be considered an agent, but that is not the agent I was referencing when addressing the “I” as a first-person point of view (the latter instead being what William James termed the pure ego).

This leads directly toward the complexity you mentioned. I agree that the conscious mind looks at evidence, ideas, principles, and actually makes judgements. And this, the act of making a judgement, is a sort of act. There is a problem of complexity though, [...] — Metaphysician Undercover

Aye, it can indeed get very complex, agreed. To my mind at least, consciousness and unconsciousness are at all times interconnected, hence never in any way divided, and perpetually influence each other via top-down processes (formal causation in Aristotelian terms) and bottom-up processes (material causation in Aristotelian terms (which is not to be confused with what we today construe to be “mater”, as I so far believe you very well know [Aristotle, for example, gives the example of letters being the material cause of syllables (for syllable are made up of letters) or else the example of parts (say the ideas from which a paradigm is constituted) being the material cause of the whole (here, the paradigm of, say, biological evolution itself]).

This indicates that the rational conscious mind does not have "the final say". The rational judgement of the conscious mind is not the actual cause of an individual's actions, as is demonstrated by a propensity of some people to act contrary to their conscious judgements. — Metaphysician Undercover

I’d say that while conscious decisions will typically have a final sway (rather than "say", here in the sense of dictatorial authority) over what the unconscious mind proceeds to do, it can often enough be the case that the unconscious mind vetoes the consciously made decisions – with a good, and relatively extreme, example of this being a heroin addict who consciously chooses to no longer take heroin no matter what but (even when construing this choice to be that of libertarian free will on the part of the conscious pure ego) then is compelled in extreme manners by the unconscious mind in any number of ways to continue so taking despite the conscious choice made.

Notwithstanding, the only chance a heroin addict has of no longer so being is to repeatedly make the same conscious choice to no longer so be - this until the consciously made choice at last has the ability (the power) to convince the majority of the unconscious mind to so no longer take in heroin despite the transient unpleasant consequences of not so taking. Which is to say that, to me, consciousness still has a significant role to play as agency relative to the total mind's doings.

Having read your entire post, do you then find it fair for me to characterize the duality you are addressing as a duality between an illusory conscious I-ness and a real somnio-conscious I-ness? And if it is a fair interpretation, that you then interpret the real somio-conscious I-ness to occur while the waking conscious I-ness is also occurring – only that the former is unconsciously occurring relative to the latter? Or is this not quite right? If it’s not correct, then I still don’t quite understand what do you intend to express by “duality” of I-ness. — javra

I think that this is exactly what I meant to express, so you understand well.

To first define “agent”, to me it is any (at least relatively unified) identity which holds agency. In turn, also in keeping with common place notions, “agency” to me is the ability to accomplish (more explicitly to accomplish some end) and hence to do or undergo something - thereby meaning “the capacity, condition, or state of exerting power (“power” here in the strict sense of “ability to do or undergo something”) and, therefore, the capacity, condition, or state of engaging in actions (i.e. in this context, of intentionally doing things)”. — javra

I believe that the qualification of "to accomplish some end" is too restrictive to make a proper definition of "agent" or "agency". It implies that the agent must have some knowledge of what it is doing, before it acts, and acts toward accomplishing something. This would exclude the possibility of an agent which simply does random acts. Further, when something exerts power, in an agential way, I don't believe it is necessary that the thing exerting power must be "intentionally doing things", in the common sense of "intentionally".

I can exemplify this problem in the following way. When a human being, as an agent, acts, we commonly distinguish between effects which are intentional, and effects which are unintentional, the latter being commonly known as accidents. And, I think it is conceivable that there could be an agent which acts, in a trial and error sort of way, a way which we could say is completely accidental, without having any intentional end.

This way of looking at things requires an analysis of the separation between the means and the end. The end is commonly known as "the thing intended", and the means is "the act itself", which is intended to bring about the end. I think we need to consider the possibility of an agent which has as its intention, simply to act. This would mean that in this case the means and the end are one and the same, but there is absolutely no specificity to restrict the act (the intent is to act freely). The agent simply has as its intention, to act, and this allows that the agent acts randomly.

This is why I talk about the separation between the observer and the agent, because this perspective allows for a true model of trial and error, where "the thing intended" is unknown to the agent acting. The agent then acts randomly, without any knowledge of what the effects of its acts might be, and the observer notes the effects. But this produces a very pronounced problem, and that concerns the nature of judgement. If the agent acts, and the observer observes, and we are modeling trial and error, then we need a judge to pass judgement as to success or failure. The need to pass judgement is the reason why we always include "the thing intended", "the end" in our models of agency.

But as Plato explains in "The Republic", the good, as the thing intended, cannot be said to be a feature of knowledge. "The good" itself always escapes the epistemic constraints as to what constitutes "knowledge". This puts the judge in a very difficult position. The judge must assume that there is an end, speculate as to its nature, and pass judgement on the act, based on a comparison between observation and an assumed end which does not obtain the status of known as the end.

In these latter contexts, then, the addressed agent is what William James terms the pure ego (the knower of one’s own total self) – rather than the empirical ego (the total self which is known). — javra

So these two roughly correspond with what I described as the agent, (pure ego), and the observer (empirical ego). My representation has the empirical ego as the knower, and the pure ego as the random acter. The issue is the unity of the two, which is the existence of knowledge, judgement. In my representation, the pure ego would have no knowledge inherent to it, the empirical ego has knowledge in the form of observational memory, but no real principles by which the unity, "the total self" is actually known. This is due to a lack of understanding as to why (the end, or good for which) the pure ego acts. So from the perspective of the empirical ego, the knowing self, the pure ego may just as well be acting in a completely random way, because the good, or end for which it acts is completely hidden.

Having roughly addressed what I reference by the term “agent” (again, that which holds agency as previously defined), I’ll again affirm that I interpret a total human (or else relatively developed; e.g. birds, mammals, etc.) mind to be an almost literal commonwealth of agencies – which are sometimes partly discordant and sometimes fully unified in at the very least that which they intend as agencies. It most certainly won’t sound right due to the connotations which we’ve been habituated to understand by the term “agent” (this being one reason why I find the need for new terminology to address this in my own philosophical endeavors) but, when looking at the definition of “agent” that I previously provided, one could then appraise each and every distinct agency of a total mind to be a distinct – though transiently occurring – agent, replete with its own pure ego of sorts that apprehends and reacts to at least certain phenomena. — javra

You're right, that doesn't seem right to me. You break down the animal, or creature into a multitude of "agencies". By your definition of "agent", an agent works to accomplish something. This means it must have a goal, or end in mind which it is tasking toward. So we cannot divide the animal into distinct agencies because the distinct parts don't really work toward accomplishing anything specific, and known to them. They just act in a way which we describe as purposeful, and we say that they have a function. But that's just us, projecting our perspective on to them, and we cannot really say that there is any specific thing intended, as the goal or end, by those distinct agencies.

This is the difficulty which arises from your definition, which I explained above. To say that a thing has a purpose or function is to place its activity into a larger context, the activity as means, is related to the end, which is a distinctly larger context, a sort of whole. So when a bunch of agents act together toward a common end, we set the end as a property of the collective, making the collective a whole by virtue of having that common end. However, the parts, the individual and distinct agents, may or may not have an individual goal or end which they apprehend as a unique and specific goal which one works toward.

In a collective of people for example, each works toward one's own end apprehended by that person, without necessarily knowing the larger whole of the collective. Then in the group of agencies within a living body, we assign a purpose or function to each part, though the part does not know its own purpose and act toward accomplishing it. And, we do not necessarily know the purpose of the whole by which we assign purpose to the parts, as this may be speculative. That is because we would then have to put the individual living being into the context of a larger whole, the human community, or life in general, to be able to assign to it a specific purpose. But when we take this larger context we lose track of exactly what the individual part's purpose might be, and the person's actions start to look more and more like random choices.

Aye, it can indeed get very complex, agreed. To my mind at least, consciousness and unconsciousness are at all times interconnected, hence never in any way divided, and perpetually influence each other via top-down processes (formal causation in Aristotelian terms) and bottom-up processes (material causation in Aristotelian terms (which is not to be confused with what we today construe to be “mater”, as I so far believe you very well know [Aristotle, for example, gives the example of letters being the material cause of syllables (for syllable are made up of letters) or else the example of parts (say the ideas from which a paradigm is constituted) being the material cause of the whole (here, the paradigm of, say, biological evolution itself]). — javra

So this relates back to the way we make judgements. We can look at bottom-up causation as unconscious, random acts, because we do not fit them into a larger whole, or we can look at them as having a purpose within a larger whole, assume the larger whole to be the conscious whole, and claim that this perspective is top-down. Of course we see purpose in the acts, so we are inclined to judge the the top-down perspective. However, as explained above, the larger purpose remains elusive, and cannot be identified in this way.

This forces a second look at the situation. What I am arguing, is that when we take a good, true look, we see that the conscious is just a small part of the larger whole living being, which includes the unconscious. And, the unconscious is really a much larger part, and more representative of the larger whole. This forces us to invert our perspective. The true top-down causation is from the unconscious to the conscious, while the causation of the conscious, as a small part of the larger whole, is actually a bottom up causation, the small part relative to the larger whole.

Your post clarifies your views for me some. We do hold a lot of disagreements when we get into the details.

You maintain that agency will not always be purposeful due to it sometimes being random, giving trial and error processes as an example. And you introduce the reality of accidental doings to this same effect.

As to accidental doings – say, accidentally knocking over a vase in contrast to intentionally so doing – this to us will always be relative to what the conscious agent as pure ego intended. So, for example, if I as a conscious mind intended to knock over your vase to peeve you off, you will hold me accountable for the doing, and take action accordingly. But if you presume or else know that my knocking over your vase was not what I as a conscious mind, as a pure ego, intended, then you might find reason to not hold me responsible for the loss of your vase.

Accidental doings can themselves occur for different potential (end-driven) reasons: it could have been unconsciously intended even if not consciously intended (with slips of the tongue as one example of this); else, just as the outcome of a basketball game can be deemed relatively random prior to the game's commencement despite all agents involved playing with clear intentions to have their own team win, so too can an accidental doing conceivably be the outcome of a multitude of discordant agencies within the same total mind. Neither of these, however, refute the purposiveness of each individual agency of a total mind concerned.

As to trial and error processes, I can so far only disagree with such being purposeless. On one hand, to engage in trial and error processes without an end pursued would potentially incur sometimes maybe grave costs despite not holding any benefits of which any agency might be aware of. So doing would then be evolutionarily unfit. And so it would not then be as common an activity in lifeforms as it currently is. On the other hand, whenever we as conscious humans engage in trial and error processes it is (as far as I know) always with a purpose in mind. Example: a person want’s to get rich, this being the end pursued, so they might engage in trial and error processes of finding gold in different geological locations. I venture I could find, or at least validly infer, an end pursued for any particular trial and error process example you might provide – this granting that it pertains to the activities of life.

While I grant that our unconscious doings might at times seem random to us, I can so far find no reason to entertain that any intention-devoid agency can occur. I acknowledge the possible reality of randomness in relation to agency at large, but will deem it to be the outcome of discordant agencies, each intention-endowed, whose interactions results in outcomes unintended by any. This be the agencies individual humans or else the individual agencies of a singular total human mind.

Maybe we are at a standstill at this point? Our perspective do seem to hinge on this issue regarding the possibility of “random (else, intention-devoid) agency.”

Neither of these, however, refute the purposiveness of each individual agency of a total mind concerned. — javra

The point was not to refute the purposefulness of individual agencies, but to question how we identify and locate the purpose or intention. If there is a group of agencies which work together, in a united way, it is not necessary that any one of them knows "the thing intended" by its actions. The goal or end to the agent's actions might be something completely outside the actions of the agent. This is a matter of how we identify the purpose of an action, by placing the action within a larger context. What gives the action its purpose is the larger context, so that the purpose of an agent's actions are not necessarily something which is derived from the agent itself. Therefore we cannot accurately say that the agent is trying to accomplish something.

Accordingly, we cannot accurately describe acts of intentional agency as acts motivated toward accomplishing something. And, an agent may act in a completely accidental way, not intending to accomplish anything. This means that we cannot exclude the possibility that an act of agency may be fundamentally accidental.

As to trial and error processes, I can so far only disagree with such being purposeless. — javra

I agree that it is impossible for an act of trial and error to be purposeless, that would be contrary to the meaning, therefore self-contradictory. The point is that the purpose may be something completely independent of the agent making the trial and error act. If we assume that the observer in the trial and error act is separate from the acter, this becomes very evident.

Suppose I assign to you the task of turning over all the rocks in a specific area, because I am looking for something underneath one. You, the acter only know the specified act, without any knowledge of what constitutes success or failure, only I, the observer, knows. We can take what that analogy demonstrates, further, and assume an agent which has been endowed with the capacity to act "freely", in any way possible, instead of being assigned a specific task. This free agent simply acts randomly, without any goals or intentions, and like the example of you turning over rocks while I observe, it has no specific idea, of the "intention" of its acts, inherent within itself, but it is being observed, and its actions are being judged by the observer in relation to some principles of success and failure.

The trial and error actions of the agent in this scenario, are from the perspective of the observer, very purposeful. But from the perspective of the agent there is absolutely no purpose for its actions. If the agent allows any sort of purpose to direct its actions then it is not fulfilling its true purpose, as assigned by the observer, and the trial and error experiment would be corrupted.

What I propose, is that to have a truly objective trial and error process, the purpose must be separated from the agent in this way. If the agent grasps the intention in any way, this would contaminate the trial and error process by guiding the agent's actions in a subjective way.

So doing would then be evolutionarily unfit. And so it would not then be as common an activity in lifeforms as it currently is. On the other hand, whenever we as conscious humans engage in trial and error processes it is (as far as I know) always with a purpose in mind. — javra

This is a correct account of trial and error. However, there is another factor to consider. Since error is highly possible, and it could be injurious or even fatal to the acting agent, it is beneficial to the one proceeding in a trial and error process, to have someone else carry out the actions, and simply observe the other. So when we separate the agent from the observer in this way, trial and error takes on a completely different appearance. There is a fundamental form of deception which the observer must impose on the agent, to withhold information from the agent, concerning the intent of the agent's actions. True objective trial and error requires a separation between agent and observer such that the agent does not know the intentions of the observer.

While I grant that our unconscious doings might at times seem random to us, I can so far find no reason to entertain that any intention-devoid agency can occur. I acknowledge the possible reality of randomness in relation to agency at large, but will deem it to be the outcome of discordant agencies, each intention-endowed, whose interactions results in outcomes unintended by any. This be the agencies individual humans or else the individual agencies of a singular total human mind. — javra

What I am suggesting is that randomness is a necessary aspect of true trial and error. The higher the degree of randomness there is in the actions of the agent, the higher the quality of the trial and error process. This is due to the nature of the trial and error process. To be a true trial and error process, no foreknowledge (constituting prejudice) can be assumed. Since no foreknowledge can be assumed, then there can be no relevant guidance provided to the agent.

Further, this implies that "intention-endowed" actions are not necessarily guided in any particular way. That is due to the fundamental deception described above, which forms the basis for true objective trial and error. The separation between the observer and the agent, which allows for the occurrence of true trial and error, also implies that the agents act with no apprehension of the intention. And although the agents are "intention-endowed" they are not guided or directed in their action by that intention, being intentionally deprived of that information by the fundamental deception.

If we assume that the observer in the trial and error act is separate from the acter, this becomes very evident.

Suppose I assign to you the task of turning over all the rocks in a specific area, because I am looking for something underneath one. You, the acter only know the specified act, without any knowledge of what constitutes success or failure, only I, the observer, knows. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, we again don't see eye to eye on this. I for one don't find reason to assume the observer is separate from the actor (here specifically as pertains to the act of choice making). To me, the pure ego as observer (e.g., that which is aware of alternatives) and the pure ego as actor (e.g., that which chooses) are one and the same (this irrespective of the metaphysics one entertains for the choice between alternatives taken).

In the example you provide, on the other hand, I as the actor must for whatever (I uphold end-driven) reason first comply with your request if I am to at all act as you wish on your behalf. Once I so comply, then my actions will themselves all be end-driven - this not by your want to engage in trial and error actions whose end is unknown to me - but by my own then actively occurring want to successfully end up so "turning over all the rocks in a specific area". This in itself then being the end which teleologically drives, and thereby motivates, my actions.

So, at least in the example provided, I still find all activities to be end-driven and thereby purposeful.

Further, this implies that "intention-endowed" actions are not necessarily guided in any particular way. — Metaphysician Undercover

Are you then suggesting that intentioning can occur in the complete absence of any intent? Such that X can consciously intend some outcome Z despite not being motivated by any intent/end - an intent/end which thereby equates to Z's successful actualization at some future point in time?

No biggie if we end up disagreeing at this point. But, again, I don't find reason to entertain what you've so far suggested.

I for one don't find reason to assume the observer is separate from the actor (here specifically as pertains to the act of choice making). — javra

The reason to assume a separation between actor and observer is that this separation is purposeful. The purpose is as I explained, it provides for a more objective trial and error process, by separating the judge who holds the principles for judgement (good), from the agent. This removes prejudice from the agent's choice of actions allowing that the agent will explore all possibilities, thus enabling true objective trial and error.

Do you agree that trial and error forms a significant part of a living being's activities, and that the process we know as evolution demonstrates a large scale trial and error process?

In the example you provide, on the other hand, I as the actor must for whatever (I uphold end-driven) reason first comply with your request if I am to at all act as you wish on your behalf. Once I so comply, then my actions will themselves all be end-driven - this not by your want to engage in trial and error actions whose end is unknown to me - but by my own then actively occurring want to successfully end up so "turning over all the rocks in a specific area". This in itself then being the end which teleologically drives, and thereby motivates, my actions.

So, at least in the example provided, I still find all activities to be end-driven and thereby purposeful. — javra

This is a good point to consider, and I think that the example is applicable. In the way you explained the example, you simply have a desire to turn over all the rocks, and that itself is your end. From my perspective that so-called end is just the means to a further end, to look for something which is assumed to be under one of them. As Aristotle pointed out in his analysis of ends and means, each specific end can be viewed as the means to a further end, and this produces an infinite regress if we do not designate an ultimate, final end, which he named as happiness. So this activity of turning over rocks is like your "happiness", you are fulfilling what you perceive as your ultimate end, you apprehend no reason for this act, or even doubt the possibility that there might be a further reason which you are unaware of, therefore you are satisfied in your acts, and you are "happy" fulfilling your desire.

However, like I explained, true understanding of "purpose" requires that we put the activity of the part into a larger context, and this means into a relation to other parts and the whole. So, in this respect, your understanding of your goal, the end which motivates you, is actually very deficient and incomplete. Your actions of turning over rocks, though this makes you very happy appearing to be the only thing desired, are completely meaningless, unless we put those actions into the context of the observer, and the judge who is judging them in relation to a further end. This larger context gives your actions meaning.

Now, the issue we need to consider is this relationship between you and I in the example. In this example, I am somehow able to set you about, in your motivated actions, which are actually carried out for the purpose of my goals, without you knowing that you are doing this for me, therefore a further end. So, I somehow communicate to you, what you must do, and motivate you to do it, for my purposes, without you even being aware of my existence as an agent myself, with intention.

Then we can apply this to the dream/awake relationship. We commonly believe that the dreamer is set free to go about the random process of dreaming, so that the dreamer would be like you, randomly turning over rocks, except given a wider parameter of activity, to dream up virtually anything. And, in this understanding, the dreamer is unaware of the conscious observer, who has set the dreamer to this task, so the dreamer does not realize that this is actually being done to facilitate a further end of the conscious mind.

So here's the key point. In my description, of the relationship between conscious awareness, and the dreaming unconscious, I've revealed that the common understanding is really a misunderstand, and we need to invert this relationship to understand what is actually the case. In reality, the unconscious is the true observer, who sets the consciousness to the task of performing random acts. And in sleep, the unconsciousness is processing the observations, allowing the conscious only glimpses of this process through dreams. This provides the consciousness a glimpse of the reality of the unconscious, but not enough for the consciousness to understand why it behaves as it does, and the true meaning in its activities.

As demonstrated by the example, there must be some relationship between the unconscious observer/judge, who sets the agent to work, in order for the consciousness to receive its marching orders from the unconscious, but this relation is kept to a minimum to maximize the objectivity of the trial and error process. So the consciousness receives different urges and motivations from the unconscious, having very little understanding of the true meaning of its actions, and why it is doing what it does.

Are you then suggesting that intentioning can occur in the complete absence of any intent? Such that X can consciously intend some outcome Z despite not being motivated by any intent/end - an intent/end which thereby equates to Z's successful actualization at some future point in time? — javra

I am suggesting that if we maintain a separation between means and end, i.e., the act and the desired result of the act, then X can consciously intend the act without being motivated by the end. Further, if we assume two distinct types of agency, one which communicates motivations to act, and the other which carries out the physical acts, then the agent which is motivated toward physical actions can consciously intend these actions without knowing the intended end of the actions. And this is not to say that there is no further end because in this scenario the agency which communicates the motivation to act is simply not revealing the further end, to the one which carries out the physical act.

But, again, I don't find reason to entertain what you've so far suggested. — javra

Do you agree that trial and error forms a significant part of the activity of life on earth, in a general way? If you agree that evolution is a process based in trial and error, then you might see the need to determine the nature of the trial and error process, and what principles are required to produce a true and objective trial and error process.

I’m having a hard time with your post. This in large part due to the quantity of disagreements I have with what you've written. I’ll do my best to reply, but if the quantity and severity of our disagreements persist, I’m intending to let things be as they are.

Do you agree that trial and error forms a significant part of a living being's activities, and that the process we know as evolution demonstrates a large scale trial and error process? — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes to the first portion, but I have the suspicion that the phrase “trial and error” means different things to us.

To me, trial and error is a method of problem-solving, such that the solving of the problem is its entailed end. It also, in all non-metaphorical senses and applications, strictly applies to sentience: it can only be sentience that tries and sentience that determines failure from success. Trial and error in no way overlaps with unintended, and hence accidental, discovery: if one, for example, accidentally discovers a valuable jewel underneath one’s sofa while cleaning one’s room, there was no trial and error involved in the process; on the other hand, trial and error, because it always seeks an end, is always purposeful, intentional, such that when the problem is solved by this approach, its so being solved is not an unintended accident. For emphasis, although when, if ever, the problem gets resolved via the trial and error processes will be uncertain up until the time of resolution, and although many forms of trial and error utilize haphazard heuristics in the trials toward this end of resolving a problem, the resolution to the problem will never be unintended, hence will never be an accidental discovery in the sense just specified (unless one engages in equivocations of what “accident” signifies). Lastly, neither can a sentient being’s engaging in trial and error processes be devoid of observation (for then one would not be able to discern success from error) nor can it be devoid of doing (for trial and error is itself an intentional doing seeking to resolve some problem) – such that the agent, here the sentient being, which so engages in trial and error must be both doer and observer (in no particular order) at the same time in order to so successfully engage in the activity.

As to evolution being a trial and error process, I then find this to be a fully metaphorical application of the phrasing. Evolution is not a sentient being; and thereby cannot as process of itself intentionally problem-solve anything, much including via any trial and error means. More bluntly, what problem might evolution be intending to solve? This is not to then claim that evolution is not in large part a teleological process, but evolution is not the type of teleological process which applies to the intentioning of individual agents (and only to the latter can trying and failing and then trying again, this with a set goal in mind, apply).

As Aristotle pointed out in his analysis of ends and means, each specific end can be viewed as the means to a further end, and this produces an infinite regress if we do not designate an ultimate, final end, which he named as happiness. So this activity of turning over rocks is like your "happiness", you are fulfilling what you perceive as your ultimate end, you apprehend no reason for this act, or even doubt the possibility that there might be a further reason which you are unaware of, therefore you are satisfied in your acts, and you are "happy" fulfilling your desire. — Metaphysician Undercover

In an Aristotelian model of things, “optimal eudemonia” (what you’ve termed “happiness”) is everybody’s ultimate end at all times – and not just for he who has agreed to uncover rocks for someone else. It will hence equally apply to he who wants the rocks uncovered for his own hidden purpose by the person who’s agreed to do so. And this Aristotelian conception of the ultimate end is only the most distal (distant) telos of an otherwise potentially innumerable quantity of teloi any person might be intending at any given time. And in so being, though one might get closer to it at certain times rather than others (when one is more at peace, or else joyful, for example), this ultimate telos of “optimal eudemonia which can only translate into a perfected eudemonia” is the most unreachable telos of all teloi out there. The most difficult, if at all possible, to actualize. It here drives, or else determines, all other teloi, this at all times, but it itself cannot be obtained for as long as any personal suffering occurs or is deemed to have the potential to occur. This includes some personal interpretation, granted, such as in what "suffering" signifies. But I still find it to be the only coherent way of understanding 'happiness as ultimate end'.

Secondly, why did the person who’s agreed to turn over rocks so agree in this first place? Teleological reasons can range from that of having a gun held to his head (with the person preferring to do so rather than die due to his ultimate end of optima eudemonia), to having been offered a fair sum of cash for so doing (with the person finding the cash worth the time and effort required to so turn over rocks), to simply wanting to make the person who so asks happy (harder to briefly explain but yet a teleological reason). So the person whose turning over rocks isn’t considering “all rocks having been turned” as his ultimate end. At the absolute least, he’s turning over rocks as a proximate end in order to satisfy the more distal end regarding the reason he’s agreed to turn over rocks to begin with – which all then being yet governed by the far more distal telos of “optimal, hence perfected, eudemonia”.

So of course there are (teleological) reasons galore for the act of turning over stones which do not end in the successful act of so turning over all stones in an area. Endlessly ask someone why they did X starting at some concrete doing and you will obtain an endless list of reasons for their doings, much including teleological reasons. (Sure, some such reason that some will give might be the incorrect reasons for their doings - reasons given for things done while hypnotized comes to mind as an example - but this yet presupposes that there are accurate reasons for that which we do, have done, and will do.)

To me, trial and error is a method of problem-solving, such that the solving of the problem is its entailed end. — javra

This would be one type of trial and error, to use it as a way of solving a specific problem. In the more general sense it is defined as "the process of experimenting with various methods of doing something until one finds the most successful". So it is a way of acting in which one is attempting to find "the most successful way", i.e. the best way. In this way, each attempt, each trial may solve the given problem, but we're looking for the best way to solve the problem.

Trial and error in no way overlaps with unintended, and hence accidental, discovery: if one, for example, accidentally discovers a valuable jewel underneath one’s sofa while cleaning one’s room, there was no trial and error involved in the process; on the other hand, trial and error, because it always seeks an end, is always purposeful, intentional, such that when the problem is solved by this approach, its so being solved is not an unintended accident. — javra

I see we really do disagree. Discovery by trial and error is an accidental discovery. That you can give an example of an accidental discovery which was not made by trial and error, does not indicate that trial and error does not produce accidental discoveries. If a person already knew what would qualify as the best way, they would not have to use trial and error. We cannot define what would constitute the best way, prior to the trial and error procedure, therefore the way which is found to be the best way, cannot be said to have been identified as the best way, prior to the procedure. So the thing found was not being looked for, and its discovery as "the best way", is accidental.

This is a matter of moving from the general to the particular. The general is "the best way". But the particular which is settled on, was not identified as the particular being looked for, only the general was being looked for. So that particular thing, as what fulfils "the best way", was found accidentally. In other words, we cannot go into a trial and error process with the idea that X constitutes success, because we do not know what will constitute success until we compare the trials. This is relevant to the point I made about how knowledge concerning the end prejudices a trial and error process, robbing it of objectivity.

on the other hand, trial and error, because it always seeks an end, is always purposeful, intentional, such that when the problem is solved by this approach, its so being solved is not an unintended accident. — javra

Of course the intention of the trial and error process is success, but that does not imply that when success is found, it was not found accidentally. The issue may be best illustrated this way. We can only try a finite number of ways. So if we try ways A,B,C,D, instead of ways W, X, Y, Z, and find that C is the best way, instead of finding that X is the best way, this difference is dependent on the random choice of the finite ways that we try, and it is therefore accidental. Any success found through a true trial and error process, is fundamentally an accidental success. This is due to the nature of choosing the trials. And if there is specific knowledge which prejudices the selection of trials, this is not a true trial and error process, but a process based in some prior knowledge about what constitutes the best way.

As to evolution being a trial and error process, I then find this to be a fully metaphorical application of the phrasing. Evolution is not a sentient being; and thereby cannot as process of itself intentionally problem-solve anything, much including via any trial and error means. More bluntly, what problem might evolution be intending to solve? This is not to then claim that evolution is not in large part a teleological process, but evolution is not the type of teleological process which applies to the intentioning of individual agents (and only to the latter can trying and failing and then trying again, this with a set goal in mind, apply). — javra

You are restricting your definition of "trial and error" to problem solving rather than allowing the more general sense of seeking the most successful way. If you allow the latter then you could consider the possibility that living beings are seeking the most successful way of living through the trial and error process we see as evolution.

In an Aristotelian model of things, “optimal eudemonia” (what you’ve termed “happiness”) is everybody’s ultimate end at all times – and not just for he who has agreed to uncover rocks for someone else. It will hence equally apply to he who wants the rocks uncovered for his own hidden purpose by the person who’s agreed to do so. And this Aristotelian conception of the ultimate end is only the most distal (distant) telos of an otherwise potentially innumerable quantity of teloi any person might be intending at any given time. And in so being, though one might get closer to it at certain times rather than others (when one is more at peace, or else joyful, for example), this ultimate telos of “optimal eudemonia which can only translate into a perfected eudemonia” is the most unreachable telos of all teloi out there. The most difficult, if at all possible, to actualize. It here drives, or else determines, all other teloi, this at all times, but it itself cannot be obtained for as long as any personal suffering occurs or is deemed to have the potential to occur. This includes some personal interpretation, granted, such as in what "suffering" signifies. But I still find it to be the only coherent way of understanding 'happiness as ultimate end'. — javra

It was your response to say that the person's end is to turn over the rocks. That would mean what the person wants and desires is to turn over rocks, so doing this would make the person happy. So clearly the person would be happy doing this, because doing anything else would interfere with what the person wants, and that is to turn over rocks. Therefore the person would be most happy turning over rocks.

Secondly, why did the person who’s agreed to turn over rocks so agree in this first place? — javra

That is the issue I got to later, about communication.