What kind if argument could possibly show that such knowledge is possible, in fact not merely possible, but real for some? — Janus

The person who claims to have that sort of knowledge propounds theses that are not accessible to the current paradigm, and if those theses are verified then you have evidence for their knowledge. This is the same way any new paradigm establishes itself.

More simply: special abilities signify special knowledge or special faculties. All they have to do is demonstrate the abilities.

For example, think about the way that the FBI will leverage psychics in difficult cases, and the way in which they have certain psychics who have a good track record, and whom they trust to provide aid in their investigations. There is no intrinsic barrier to the FBI using a psychic to help in an investigation, even though the FBI agents are not themselves psychics and are not able to reproduce the psychic's method.

Someone who thinks the FBI couldn't possibly use psychics may well reflect J's theory:

There's a natural tendency to regard "science" as meaning "everything we know now, which is all there is to know." — J

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I don't know what led you to think I was suggesting that we have reached the "end of Science". We know what science consists in as it is practiced. — Janus

To say that we know what is and isn't science with some sort of perfect certainty implies that one thinks there can be no further scientific paradigm shifts. That mindset occurs in every age ...at least until the next scientific paradigm shift.

We aren't even in control of this construct, we are just given an emotional experience that we are, an illusion that isn't even experienced by an acting will, the illusion and the one experiencing it is one and the same. But that's a whole other topic. — Christoffer

That topic being ‘nihilism’ ;-)

I see your point about faux stoicism but it’s also a pretty cynical take. I don’t think you can paint everyone with the same brush, although that is something you tend to do. Besides, Stoicism was introduced to make a rhetorical point, that being the recognition of philosophical detachment, which is far from the Freudian 'suppression of libido' that you're depicting it as.

As to Buddhism and Shinto believing were ’cogs In a meaningless machine’ - couldn’t be further from the truth. That is the condition which the whole point of the essay seeks to ameliorate. That way of thinking was completely alien to them.

Being more versed in the classics, what do you think an example, the chronological forerunner, of the modern(-ish) principle of induction would be, which says there can be no empirical discovery of capital T truth? — Mww

I’m barely ‘versed in the classics’! I’m acutely aware of the sketchiness of my knowledge about them. But that question is distinctly Kantian, isn’t it? Kant crystallises a train of thought which had been developing in the centuries prior.

The deeper background idea behind this specific essay is the one we touched on briefly the other day - the idea of 'union of knower and known'. Please see this post in the thread that was spawned from this one, with the passage from Eric Perl's 'Thinking Being'. It ends with:

While this may seem a new and striking insight to those for whom philosophy begins with, say, Descartes, or who approach even ancient philosophy from a modern perspective, it is in fact largely a recovery of the classical vision, a recovery that would scarcely be needed had that vision not been lost in the first place.

What does "capital T truth" mean? — Leontiskos

The kind that is aspired to. Possesses a living quality, of the kind that imparts itself to the seer and the seeker. As in, 'you will know the truth, and the truth will set you free.'

Eckhart was a Dominican, not a monastic. — Leontiskos

So, a 'mendicant' rather than a 'monastic' - a differentiation I was insufficiently aware of. Thanks for the clarification.

The person who claims to have that sort of knowledge propounds theses that are not accessible to the current paradigm, and if those theses are verified then you have evidence for their knowledge. This is the same way any new paradigm establishes itself. — Leontiskos

If those "theses" cannot be confirmed by logical or emprical evidence, then how will they be confirmed? Have such theses been justified in the past? Can you give an example?

If those "theses" cannot be confirmed by logical or emprical evidence, then how will they be confirmed? — Janus

If someone claims to have special knowledge, and that knowledge is in no way confirmable by any other person, then their knowledge cannot be confirmed. But that case seems like it would be quite rare.

For example, if an ancient philosopher claimed to have knowledge of an eclipse, and the eclipse occurred when they said it would, then their knowledge was confirmable. All we have to do is check and see if the eclipse occurs at the predicted time. It's pretty straightforward, and if the current science holds that predicting eclipses is impossible, then the successful prediction counts as evidence against that scientific paradigm.

For example, if an ancient philosopher claims to have knowledge of an eclipse, and the eclipse occurs when they said it would, then their knowledge is confirmable. — Leontiskos

Yes, but that is empirical knowledge. We were discussing the confirmability of so-called "direct knowledge" or intellectual intuition I thought.

Yes, but that is empirical knowledge. We were discussing the confirmability so-called "direct knowledge" or intellectual intuition I thought. — Janus

Who's to say that he doesn't know it directly? I could have direct knowledge that some future event will occur, and this would in no way preclude the future occurrence from being verified. Direct knowledge and empirical confirmation are not mutually exclusive.

I'm not sure if you saw my edit above:

There is no intrinsic barrier to the FBI using a psychic to help in an investigation, even though the FBI agents are not themselves psychics and are not able to reproduce the psychic's method. — Leontiskos

The kind oif direct knowledge I have in mind is the supposed knowledge of the sage into the true nature of reality, not foreknowledge of temporal events. In any case how could it be shown that foreknowledge of some event like an eclipse, if not based on empirical observations and calculation was anything more than a lucky guess. I suppose if someone could demonstrate such foreknowledge constantly, then that might give us pause. I am not aware of any well-documented cases of such reliable "direct" foreknowledge.

The kind oif direct knowledge I have in mind is the supposed knowledge of the sage into the true nature of reality, not foreknowledge of temporal events. — Janus

My point is that the sage who has insight into the true nature of reality will be able to do verifiable things that most people cannot do. This is exactly what happened with ancient philosophers and eclipses. If you don't think that same thing can happen today, then it seems you do think we have reached the end of science. ...that if our scientific rules preclude some form of knowledge, then that form of knowledge is simply impossible because our scientific rules are final. Every scientific age ends when it is learned that the science was not as final as was believed.

So you believe that the ancient philosophers ability to predict eclipses was based, not on observation and calculation, but on some direct insight into what would happen in the future? If so, do you have any evidence that that is so?

- I am saying that if you were living in the ancient world you would be the guy claiming that no one has special knowledge and eclipses cannot be predicted, because the science does not allow for it.

I would not be saying that if it was demonstrated that someone was able to reliably predict eclipses. If they were using observation and calculation and I did not understand how that was possible I would probably have believed that they must have direct non-empirically derived knowledge. In ancient times it was commonly believed that people could be given direct knowledge by the gods. We moderns are of a much more critical mindset when it comes to believing things for which there is no empirical evidence or logical support. Do you think that is a bad thing?

I should add that I can't claim to have reached any plateau of serene detachment, although I do see the point. — Wayfarer

What's the point?

As described in the essay.

You don't really want to summarize. I get it.

Well, Frank, I did post it in four separate sections, allowing time for commentary on each section. But if you can't be bothered reading, then I can't be bothered explaining.

But if you can't be bothered reading, then I can't be bothered explaining. — Wayfarer

I don't blame you. You can't be bothered.

But that question is distinctly Kantian, isn’t it? — Wayfarer

Yeah, I suppose it is. Maybe more Hume-ian. I was just looking for some background the easy way, is all.

I was just looking for some background the easy way, — Mww

My big-picture view is somewhat like those historians of ideas who see the collective consciousness of h.sapiens evolving through, and associated with, distinct epochs. Accordingly different cultural forms have associated forms of consciousness, of which modernity is one. And one that is very hard to be aware of because we're so embedded within it.

One of the themes within this framework is the idea of the participatory cosmos and participatory knowing. That's why I called attention to that post by @Count Timothy von Icarus in the other thread. I'll quote a section of it here as it's relevant to the OP:

The key insight of phenomenology is that the modern interpretation of knowledge as a relation between consciousness as a self-contained ‘subject’ and reality as an ‘object’ extrinsic to it is incoherent. On the one hand, consciousness is always and essentially the awareness of something, and is thus always already together with being. On the other hand, if ‘being’ is to mean anything at all, it can only mean that which is phenomenal, that which is so to speak ‘there’ for awareness, and thus always already belongs to consciousness. ....

Consciousness is the grasping of being; being is what is grasped by consciousness. The phenomenological term for the first of these observations is ‘intentionality;’ for the second, ‘givenness.’ “The mind is a moment to the world and the things in it; the mind is essentially correlated with its objects. The mind is essentially intentional. There is no ‘problem of knowledge’ or ‘problem of the external world,’ there is no problem about how we get to ‘extramental’ reality, because the mind should never be separated from reality from the beginning. Mind and being are moments to each other; they are not pieces that can be segmented out of the whole to which they belong.” Intended as an exposition of Husserlian phenomenology, these words hold true for the entire classical tradition from Parmenides to Aquinas. While this may seem a new and striking insight to those for whom philosophy begins with, say, Descartes, or who approach even ancient philosophy from a modern perspective, it is in fact largely a recovery of the classical vision, a recovery that would scarcely be needed had that vision not been lost in the first place. — Thinking Being, Eric Perl, p 8-9

Emphasis added.

Many thanks for the commentary, but I must say, I’m no more a fan of phenomenology than I ever was. While I understand it was never your intention to convert anyone, but merely to present evidence for it, I don’t feel I’m missing much of significant import, especially with respect to that which “…held true for the entire classical tradition….”, of which I’m not a member.

Many thanks for the commentary, but I must say, I’m no more a fan of phenomenology than I ever was. — Mww

Would you mind saying a little about why?

I’m no more a fan of phenomenology than I ever was.
— Mww

Would you mind saying a little about why? — Tom Storm

Ehhhh….it’s just me; I never graduated from the continental German Enlightenment paradigm on the one hand, and never gave….never saw a reason to give….post-Kantian speculative metaphysics due diligence on the other.

To put a finer point on it, while admitting a somewhat incomplete grasp of phenomenology proper, that of it I do understand, has already been accounted for in Kant’s “objective unity of self-consciousness”.

While it may be perfectly valid in phenomenology that “….consciousness is the grasping of being…”, I prefer that the grasping of being should belong to understanding.

“….Consciousness as a self-contained ‘subject’….” seems better said with ego as the self-contained ‘subject’, ego representing the totality of all those representations of which the self-contained subject would be conscious.

I’m not in any position to deny the validity of phenomenology, while reserving the purely subjective right to ignore it.

If they were using observation and calculation and I did not understand how that was possible I would probably have believed that they must have direct non-empirically derived knowledge. — Janus

But you're begging the question of your own paradigm again. The question is whether you would think they have knowledge you don't understand if they could make accurate predictions, but you had no idea how. That means you do not understand them to be using "observation and calculation," which are the tools of your own scientific paradigm. Again, see my references to the FBI psychics above.

From above:

What kind if argument could possibly show that such knowledge is possible, in fact not merely possible, but real for some? — Janus

The effects of the knowledge show that it is possessed, in the way of a sign. If someone can make an accurate prediction then this is a sign that they had knowledge of the future. This holds even if you have no idea how they obtained such knowledge. Your idea that it is impossible to provide evidence for non-standard forms of knowledge is simply not true.

And, since the first step on the Eightfold Path is samma ditthi, ‘right view’, it turns out that ‘right view’ is no view, in the sense of not holding to opinions or arguing for philosophical positions. — Wayfarer

Now you may ask what this detachment is that is so noble in itself. You should know that true detachment is nothing else but a mind that stands unmoved by all accidents of joy or sorrow, honour, shame or disgrace, as a mountain of lead stands unmoved by a breath of wind. …

(the second being from an Eckhart quote and not your own words)

It so far seems to me that to have compassion for others and the world at large one must necessarily hold opinions of what is right and wrong, of what is just, etc., and, furthermore, that via compassion one must become moved - if not into action then at the very least into personal sorrow - by the injustice-resulting sorrows of others in the world.

Going back to what was previously mentioned in relation to detachment and compassion:

If detachment is taken to equate to a) a lack of views being the "right view' and b) immovability (be it regarding physical action or psychological sentiment) by joys and sorrows, etc., then how do you understand a detachment from the world to coincide with a compassion for the world (and, obviously, hence for those from which the world is constituted)?

(To be clear, here with an explicit understanding of “the world” as “the subjective human experience, regarded collectively”.)

If someone can make an accurate prediction then this is a sign that they had knowledge of the future. — Leontiskos

If someone could make, not just one or two accurate predictions, but could consistently make accurate predictions that were not based on observation and calculation, then we might assume they had some hidden way of knowing what will happen. I know of no such case, so it is just speculation, unless you can present a well-documented case.

And this talk about testable predictions is shifting the goalposts anyway, because the question is about purported direct knowledge of the nature and meaning of reality and being and of life, purported knowledge which has been claimed by different 'sages' and mystics in different cultures throughout history, and right up to the present. The claims they make are not testable predictions, and nor are they logically self-evident, so how are we to assess the veracity of what is claimed by them?

I was going to ask the same question as @Tom Storm but I see he beat me to it. Very well.

It so far seems to me that to have compassion for others and the world at large one must necessarily hold opinions of what is right and wrong, of what is just, etc., and, furthermore, that via compassion one must become moved - if not into action then at the very least into personal sorrow - by the injustice-resulting sorrows of others in the world. — javra

Going back to the sources of the 'writhings and thickets of views' quote, it is set forth in this text. It starts with:

...does Master Gotama hold the view: 'The cosmos is eternal: only this is true, anything otherwise is worthless'?"

"...no..."

"Then does Master Gotama hold the view: 'The cosmos is not eternal: only this is true, anything otherwise is worthless'?"

"...no..."

The questioner asks a series of similar questions, all of which concern what today would be called metaphysical questions, and each of which the Buddha declines to answer. Finally, the questioner asks:

Does Master Gotama have any position at all?"

"A 'position,' Vaccha, is something that a Tathagata has done away with. What a Tathagata sees is this: 'Such is form, such its origination, such its disappearance; such is feeling, such its origination, such its disappearance; such is perception...

This is related to the well-known 'poison arrow' simile, in which it is said that preoccupation with philosophical questions, such as those posed by the questioner, draw attention away from the real problem, which is pressing and urgent:

It's just as if a man were wounded with an arrow thickly smeared with poison. His friends & companions, kinsmen & relatives would provide him with a surgeon, and the man would say, 'I won't have this arrow removed until I know whether the man who wounded me was a noble warrior, a brahman, a merchant, or a worker.' He would say, 'I won't have this arrow removed until I know the given name & clan name of the man who wounded me... until I know whether he was tall, medium, or short... until I know whether he was dark, ruddy-brown, or golden-colored...

There's more, but this conveys the general meaning. So what comes across is that 'opinions' or 'views' about questions such as whether the universe is eternal or not, whether the soul is identical to the body or not, whether the Buddha continues to exist after death or not, are all put to one side, as it were. The pressing task is always to discern the causal chain of dependent origination which is at work in the body and mind, and that is not subject to opinion, it is operating quite impersonally whatever opinion one holds.

As for compassion - it might be recalled that part of the Buddhist mythos is that, after realising supreme enlightenment, the Buddha was inclined to retreat into anonymity and say nothing further about it, but for the intervention of Brahma, who begged him to teach 'out of compassion for the suffering of the world' - which the Buddha then agreed to do.

But it also might be added that later Buddhism put a greater emphasis on compassion, in that the aim of the Buddhist aspirant was not for his/her own liberation, but that of all others. I think it's also a generally understood fact that seeing through one's own illusions and self-centredness naturally gives rise to a greater sense of empathy which begins to spontaneously arise as a consequence.

The claims they make are not testable predictions, so how are we to assess the veracity of what is claimed by them? — Janus

There are themes and insights that are discernable in many different schools of philosophical and religious thought. When you say these are not 'testable', in fact, they are, insofar as generations of aspirants, students and scholars have endeavoured to practice them and live according to those lights, in the laboratory of life, so to speak. As for 'assessing the results of practice', there is an often-quoted Buddhist text on that question, the Kalama Sutta:

Don't go by reports, by legends, by traditions, by scripture, by logical conjecture, by inference, by analogies, by agreement through pondering views, by probability, or by the thought, "This contemplative is our teacher." When you know for yourselves that, "These qualities are unskillful; these qualities are blameworthy; these qualities are criticized by the wise; these qualities, when adopted & carried out, lead to harm & to suffering" — then you should abandon them.' Thus was it said. And in reference to this was it said.

"Now, Kalamas, don't go by reports, by legends, by traditions, by scripture, by logical conjecture, by inference, by analogies, by agreement through pondering views, by probability, or by the thought, 'This contemplative is our teacher.' When you know for yourselves that, 'These qualities are skillful; these qualities are blameless; these qualities are praised by the wise; these qualities, when adopted & carried out, lead to welfare & to happiness' — then you should enter & remain in them.

There are themes and insights that are discernable in many different schools of philosophical and religious thought. When you say these are not 'testable', in fact, they are, insofar as generations of aspirants, students and scholars have endeavoured to practice them and live according to those lights, in the laboratory of life, so to speak. As for 'assessing the results of practice', there is an often-quoted Buddhist text on that question, the Kalama Sutta: — Wayfarer

The claim that some techniques work to change consciousness is not in dispute. I know this from personal experience both with meditation, art practice and hallucinogens. I'm questioning the metaphysical ideas that often accompany such practices, the claims to know by direct insight the true nature of reality and the meaning of life.

We've been over this before.

Interesting answer. Thank you.

As for compassion - it might be recalled that part of the Buddhist mythos is that, after realising supreme enlightenment, the Buddha was inclined to retreat into anonymity and say nothing further about it, but for the intervention of Brahma, who begged him to teach 'out of compassion for the suffering of the world' - which the Buddha then agreed to do.

But it also might be added that later Buddhism put a greater emphasis on compassion, in that the aim of the Buddhist aspirant was not for his/her own liberation, but that of all others. I think it's also a generally understood fact that seeing through one's own illusions and self-centredness naturally gives rise to a greater sense of empathy which begins to spontaneously arise as a consequence. — Wayfarer

Ah, I see you've just added the last sentence, which does go toward answering my question regarding detachment from the world in conjunction with compassion toward it.

To comment, as to the particular mythos of the Buddha just quoted, it should be held in mind that all mythoi are known to us via mixture of oral tradition over generations (in which the mythos told can undergo a good deal of plasticity and change) and writings which were not the subject's (in this case the Buddha's) own. The authenticity of the mythos is hence authored more by the characters and dispositions of those who told it than it is by the original Buddha himself. I much prefer the current Dalai Lama's underlying tenet that Buddhism is a faith grounded in reason. This over a potentially unquestioning acceptance of what mythoi have to say (which, after all, often diverge and conflict when taken as a whole in regard to a particular subject). In keeping with this, one can find the Dalai Lama's thoughts expressing that "a biased mind (which fully equates to a lack of psychological objectivity or else lack of psychological impartiality) cannot grasp reality" - which, to my best understanding, then equates detachment to an unbiased mind, hence to psychological objectivity/impartiality (not to be confused with physicality or else physical objects). This rather than lack of any outlook - outlooks which, as your examples illustrate, the Buddha indeed had - or else lack of being moved by the sorrows or joys of others.

I'm not disagreeing on the benefits of mindful, compassion-infused detachment (else unbiased-ness), but do want to question the attributes of it which were previously mentioned in your post, maybe in haste (?).

That said, I find myself having a great affinity toward the view that a Buddhist's calling is not personal salvation from suffering - this with unconcern for others' well-being such that one is not moved by their sorrows/suffering or joys/happiness - so much as the liberation of all.

the claims to know by direct insight the true nature of reality and the meaning of life. — Janus

Aren't exploration of those sorts of questions fundamental to philosophy proper? I know the analytical-plain language types don't think so, but then, they didn't feature in the original post.

That passage from the Dalai Lama makes the same point! Not a matter of like and dislike, for and against. It's significant that he was talking at an Interfaith Dialogue.

That passage from the Dalai Lama makes the same point! — Wayfarer

Same point as?