What you can do instead is to check if your interlocutor formulates their reasons to believe via logic implications and go from there to review your interlocutors’ claims.
But even in this case we should not confuse reasons to believe with logic implications. — neomac

Why not? Do you have any valid arguments for this thesis? You say:

Indeed, one can use logic implications to convey the idea of a dependency between claims (and that is what you seem to be trying to do with your highlighting). But that doesn’t mean that our reasons to believe are all “claims” over how things are. Experiences are not claims over how things are. Concepts are not claims over how things are. Logic and arithmetic functions are not claims over how things are. Yet experiences, concepts, arithmetic and logic functions are very much part of the reasons why we believe certain things. For example, I believe true that if x is a celibate, then x is not married. What makes it true? The semantics of “celibate”, but “celibate” is a concept not a claim over how things are. — neomac

Suppose I ask someone why they believe P. They answer, "Because I hold to S and S implies P," where S is a "way of life."

What is your objection? Apparently it is that S is an "experience," and, "experiences are not claims over how things are."

So while I would say to them, "If P is truth-apt then S must also be truth-apt," you would say to them, "S is an experience, not an assertion, and therefore it cannot imply P." They would probably just tell you that they hold to S because they believe it is true, or else that they hold to it because it is good and what is good is true. S is not merely an experience; it involves a volitional and normative choice.

The reason I find this conversation so bizarre is because you are basically denying empirical facts. People do justify propositions on the basis of ways of life, including religions. It seems like you are committed to denying this fact. In Western countries with a right to religious freedom it is commonplace in law for someone to justify a belief or an action on the basis of a religious "way of life."

I thank you for your patience during our debate. I have learnt quite a lot from it, especially that I need to think through more carefully what I have been trying to say.

But I'm afraid I cannot continue any longer.

Thanks, that seems fair to me. Sorry if I was impatient - I did not appreciate that you were thinking through some of this for the first time.

As an endnote I just want to note that there is a parallel to the point I am making. The parallel is this: if something "undecidable" bears on something which is decidable, then the former thing is decidable (via the latter). For example, something that cannot be directly decided (Jesus' resurrection) can often be indirectly decided (via, for example, historical arguments, even if these arguments are limited to probabilistic reasoning).

These sorts of points are really the crux of why someone like @Janus is mistaken. We can take it a step further by noting that whenever someone believes something, they have a reason for believing, and that reason will (almost) always be falsifiable. Ergo, given that the psychological PSR holds, there is no such thing as an unfalsifiable belief. The notion of an "unfalsifiable belief" turns on prescinding from the psychological manner in which beliefs are formed.

So for example, if someone believes in Russell's teapot, then on my theory the belief is not unfalsifiable. This means that we can falsify the belief even if we cannot falsify the proposition. So instead of independently investigating whether there is a teapot between Earth and Mars, we would ask the person holding the belief why they believe it, and by falsifying their reasons or inferences for belief we would have undermined the belief. So perhaps it would be better to say that the belief can be shown to have insufficient grounds, rather than be falsified per se.

So perhaps it would be better to say that the belief can be shown to have insufficient grounds, rather than be falsified per se. — Leontiskos

Thus, running roughshod over most of the previous comments. Weird...

Did you have a point to make, or are you just gesturing without taking the risk of saying anything substantial?

Edit:

Thus, running roughshod over most of the previous comments. — AmadeusD

Ah presumably you are talking about the previous comments within my post, not the previous comments within the thread?

If the objection is that someone holding such a belief is immune from counter-argument, then my post is coherent. If the objection is that someone holding such a belief is amenable to counter-argument even though the proposition itself, considered independently of their belief, is unfalsifiable, then my post is contradictory. But obviously I take the former view, and I think that view correctly captures this thread at large. The complaint/crux has been that the belief is irrefutable, not that the proposition upon which it bears is unfalsifiable. If the objector were to see that an unfalsifiable proposition is refutable qua belief then presumably they would be satisfied, and that is what my post endeavors to argue. The unfalsifiable/irrefutable equivocation is not uncommon. Indeed, it is arguable whether, upon convincing someone that their belief is not true, we should have "falsified" their belief. If they move from "true" to "not true" without going all the way to "false," has falsification occurred?

Did you have a point to make, or are you just gesturing without taking the risk of saying anything substantial — Leontiskos

Both - but our most recent exchange has jaded me on the latter. No hard feelings - just an explanation.

Ah presumably — Leontiskos

.. yes, and with some jest. I should've made that clearer!

The complaint/crux has been that the belief is irrefutable, not that the proposition upon which it bears is unfalsifiable. — Leontiskos

Yeah - i found that discussion helpful and pretty decent as it's something I've not thought too much about. But hte conclusion seems to say something other than the discussion concludes with. I think beliefs (even ones where the state of affairs can be confirmed) can be shown to have shoddy grounding. Gettierrrrrrrrrrr (with some bells and whistles).

Suppose I ask someone why they believe P. They answer, "Because I hold to S and S implies P," where S is a "way of life."

What is your objection? Apparently it is that S is an "experience," and, "experiences are not claims over how things are."

So while I would say to them, "If P is truth-apt then S must also be truth-apt," you would say to them, "S is an experience, not an assertion, and therefore it cannot imply P." They would probably just tell you that they hold to S because they believe it is true, or else that they hold to it because it is good and what is good is true. S is not merely an experience; it involves a volitional and normative choice.

The reason I find this conversation so bizarre is because you are basically denying empirical facts — Leontiskos

First, as I clarified in my first post, I’m talking about logic implications. but I do not exclude that there are more equivocal ways of using the word “implication” in common usage.
Second, logic implications are functions in the domain of truth values and we use it to construe complex descriptions which can be true or false from simpler descriptions of how things are. Reasons to believe could be any source of information (including empirical facts, of course) that gets in the actual and fallible (I’d also add “conscious”) process of forming a belief. A sharp knife dirty with blood found hidden in X’s house can be claimed by a detective to be a reason to believe that X is the murderer of his/her neighbour. But a sharp knife dirty with blood itself is not a claim over how things are.
Third, logic implications are used in explanations (also in causal explanations) to express a truth-functional dependency between certain described conditions. Both descriptions and explanations are fallible. They can also fail for conceptual reasons: as I clarified in my first post, "If P is truth-apt then S must also be truth-apt" doesn’t make any sense if we are talking about logic implications for the conceptual reasons I already pointed out. The truth-aptness of S can not be implied from the truth-aptness of P since logic implications can apply only to truth value bearers like descriptions. It’s the semantics of “logic implication” that requires the truth-aptness of all its arguments, we do not discover the truth-aptness of one argument from the hypothetical truth-aptness of the other argument AFTER applying a logic implication. One can't meaningfully apply "logic implication" to arguments which aren't already truth-apt.

People do justify propositions on the basis of ways of life, including religions. It seems like you are committed to denying this fact. In Western countries with a right to religious freedom it is commonplace in law for someone to justify a belief or an action on the basis of a religious "way of life." — Leontiskos

As I said, reasons to believe “could be any source of information (including empirical facts, of course) that gets in the actual and fallible (I’d also add ‘conscious’) process of forming a belief” . The categorical mistake you are committing is to believe that a truth-apt description of a certain reason to believe something makes the reason itself truth-apt. I can believe certain things for conceptual reasons, factual reasons, causal reasons, logic or arithmetic reasons, emotional reasons, moral reasons, etc. that doesn’t make those reasons themselves truth-apt, at least not in the same sense descriptions are.

Both - but our most recent exchange has jaded me on the latter. No hard feelings - just an explanation. — AmadeusD

Well that makes two of us.

Yeah - i found that discussion helpful and pretty decent as it's something I've not thought too much about. — AmadeusD

Okay - good to hear.

But hte conclusion seems to say something other than the discussion concludes with. — AmadeusD

Well how do you answer this question?

Indeed, it is arguable whether, upon convincing someone that their belief is not true, we should have "falsified" their belief. If they move from "true" to "not true" without going all the way to "false," has falsification occurred? — Leontiskos

My intuitive answer would be this is incoherent.

If the belief is 'not true' then the belief is false. Even if there's some way to jigger the state of affairs to not yet be 'false'. It's just an error in terms (would be my answer).

Remember that are talking about refuting someone's reason(s) (R) for belief (P). They begin:

• R → P
• R
• ∴ P

Our refutation is a refutation of R:

• R → P
• ~R
• ∴ ?

Solve for '?' Are you saying that the conclusion is, "∴ ~P" ?

The result is that P does not follow, i.e. "P is not (necessarily) true." They have moved from, "P is true," to, "P is not true," without going all the way to, "P is false." Ergo:

Indeed, it is arguable whether, upon convincing someone that their belief is not true, we should have "falsified" their belief. If they move from "true" to "not true" without going all the way to "false," has falsification occurred? — Leontiskos

I really don't know what you're getting at here. I've said its an error in terms. More specifically:

"P is not true," without going all the way to, "P is false." — Leontiskos

These are the same claims (the two in quotes). P is false. The "solve" you want isn't apt, as far as I'm concerned. P is false at "~R".

The error being that a failure to support one's belief doesn't entail the state of affairs being false. It does, however, directly entail that your belief in the state of affairs is false. Hence "Gettierrrrr (with bells and whistles)".

Wouldn't that form be a sort of "debunking argument?"

It does, however, directly entail that your belief in the state of affairs is false.

A debunking argument will claim to show that the cause of your belief that p is not caused by p (or something that entails p). It is stronger if it also shows you now lack good warrant to believe p, but it can also just show that the relationship isn't direct. In this case, the warrant is undermined, not the conclusion.

There are problems with that sort of argument though. When they proceed from underdetermination, they seem to show that virtually all beliefs are unwarranted, which is obviously far too strong. Using underdetermination, we can cast doubt on the idea that the sun will rise tomorrow, or that mating cats to cats produces cats and not frogs, or that the universe wasn't created seconds ago, etc., but this seems a tad much. The trick is really finding out what goes wrong in the extreme cases (or for some philosophers, it's rebuilding all of philosophy on radical skepticism due to underdetermination...)

But it's also obvious that they are sometimes appropriate.

Wouldn't that form be a sort of "debunking argument?"

Reminds me of the heady days of the Jref forum.

These are the same claims (the two in quotes). P is false. The "solve" you want isn't apt, as far as I'm concerned. P is false at "~R".

The error being that a failure to support one's belief doesn't entail the state of affairs being false. It does, however, directly entail that your belief in the state of affairs is false. — AmadeusD

Why isn't this just the fallacy of denying the antecedent?

Wouldn't that form be a sort of "debunking argument?"

...

A debunking argument will claim to show that the cause of your belief that p is not caused by p (or something that entails p). It is stronger if it also shows you now lack good warrant to believe p, but it can also just show that the relationship isn't direct. In this case, the warrant is undermined, not the conclusion. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I don't think this is what I am talking about. When I said, "They begin [...] Our refutation [...]," I am envisioning a dialogue. The idea is that you convince the person who had held to R that R is false.

The broader idea is this. Let's suppose there is some unfalsifiable proposition UF, and that John holds to UF. Is John's belief therefore irrefutable? Certainly not, for he holds to UF for a reason. If one were to convince John that his reasons do not hold, then he would stop believing UF, even though UF is unfalsifiable. In response to @AmadeusD's ideas, I would say that what is unfalsifiable cannot be falsified, and therefore we lack grounds for deeming it false. Nevertheless, we need not deem it true.

(Even if we say that some of his reasons are unconscious, they are presumably still able to be addressed. Unconscious reasons do not generate irrefutability unless we are unable to affect such unconscious reasons. Granted, at this point we may be talking about something other than "refutation.")

We could think of a very simple example.

"Trump dyed his hair brown!"
"Why do you say that?"
"Because I saw it on the news, from *this video*."
"That video is a deepfake."
"Oh, okay. I guess _____"

Here are two options for the blank ("_____"):

A. Trump did not dye his hair brown
B. I have no good reason to believe that Trump dyed his hair brown

Why isn't this just the fallacy of denying the antecedent? — Leontiskos

Because it isn't. Not sure what else you could want in response to that. It's my pointing out there you're confusing two separate conclusions which rely on separate reasoning within the example.

Perfect. In your example the state of affairs isn't false (jury is out, as it were, as described) but the belief is clearly false.

The state of affairs, and the belief in it, are not the same thing and are not falsified the same way. Any belief can be falsified without looking at the state of affairs, as I see it. I will simply repeat what you've quoted to round out:

The error being that a failure to support one's belief doesn't entail the state of affairs being false. It does, however, directly entail that your belief in the state of affairs is false. — AmadeusD

I do not understand how, after the above, the argument you're making can be made. You could tell me this conception is wrong and we can talk about that, but your reasoning simply isn't apt anymore. Perhaps the above makes this more explicit..

Because it isn't. Not sure what else you could want in response to that. — AmadeusD

Really? "Because it isn't," is probably not going to be satisfactory to anyone, anywhere. What everyone, everywhere, will want is a reason why.

Perfect. In your example the state of affairs isn't false (jury is out, as it were, as described) but the belief is clearly false. — AmadeusD

Can you delineate what you mean by "the state of affairs," and what you mean by, "the belief"?

The fellow believes Trump dyed his hair. Is his belief false?

In a logical sense what we say is that his argument for the conclusion that Trump dyed his hair is unsound, but that this does not entail that the conclusion is false. I don't think it is correct to distinguish belief from proposition in that way and say that the belief is false but the proposition is not.

There are three propositions and three beliefs:

1. If *this video* is reliable then Trump dyed his hair
2. *This video* is reliable
3. Therefore, Trump dyed his hair

Belief/proposition (1) is true; belief/proposition (2) is false, and belief/proposition (3) does not follow from (1) and (2) because (2) is false. The belief/proposition, "Trump dyed his hair," is therefore neither known to be true nor known to be false. I don't see what grounds we have to say that the belief in question ("Trump dyed his hair") is false.