There’s an element of faith, but there are also signs and milestones. But I’m fully expecting you to declare ‘but we can never know that’, as you generally always do.

You are not answering the question. If the "signs and milestones" constitute evidence and are not mere handwaving you should be able to explain how they could be counted as evidence.

I checked out Cline's 1177. He does not claim that the Israelites were the Sea People. He associates the Sea People with the Philistines.

I agree. There isn't enough evidence to conclude that the Israelites were sea people.

The Sea Peoples were diverse. The Peleset are among those that we're pretty sure were sea peoples.

The simplest answer for the purposes of TPF is to simply say, "religious experience." At that point you will advert to your presupposition about religious experience, which has been widely criticized on TPF (for example). Your idea that there are no sound inferences from a religious experience to a propositional truth is something that you have consistently failed to defend throughout the last two years I have been here. We make inferences from experience all the time, and the idea that this is simply impossible when it comes to "religious" experience is question-begging.

I would interpret it this way: people are not interested in entire posts of AI-generated content. The only words of your own were, "All AI generated, btw."

AI will be the end of us. — Leontiskos

Such flagrant AI bigotry. What is the world coming to. :fear:

Anyway, my argument is basically that faith is unnecessary for genuine spiritual pursuits; it is religion that demands faith—not for the sake of salvation, but because religion is primarily concerned with forging strong, unified social bonds. Faith is necessary in religion because it is action that proves allegiance. Faith serves to filter out non-committed individuals and strengthen in-group loyalty. Faith in supernatural beliefs, especially when they’re costly or hard to fake, signals deep commitment to the group. And faith-based communities that required costly religious commitments (e.g., dietary restrictions, celibacy) have been show to be robust and long lived.

This is all based on a diverse group of thinkers, namely:

David Émile Durkheim - A French sociologist who formally established the academic discipline of sociology and is commonly cited as one of the principal architects of modern social science, along with both Karl Marx and Max Weber.

William James - An American philosopher and psychologist. The first educator to offer a psychology course in the United States, he is considered to be one of the leading thinkers of the late 19th century, one of the most influential philosophers and is often dubbed the "father of American psychology.

Peter Ludwig Berger - An Austrian-born American sociologist and Protestant theologian. Berger became known for his work in the sociology of knowledge, the sociology of religion, study of modernization, and contributions to sociological theory.

Scott Atran - An American-French cultural anthropologist who is Emeritus Director of Research in Anthropology at the Centre national de la recherche scientifique in Paris, Research Professor at the University of Michigan, and cofounder of ARTIS International and of the Centre for the Resolution of Intractable Conflict at Oxford University.

Richard Sosis - A James Barnett Professor of Humanistic Anthropology at the University of Connecticut. His work has focused on the evolution of religion and cooperation, with particular interests in ritual, magic, religious reproductive decision-making, the dynamics of religious systems, and related topics such as meaning systems and the anthropology of sport.

Please forgive the appeal to authority.

So now that AI can no longer be used as an excuse to ignore my point, do you agree with it? This is where I was going before, incidentally, when I repeatedly asked you about the value of faith.

I am not claiming there are no sound inferences from religious experiences to religious beliefs or metaphysical positions; I'm saying that I can't see how there could be and I'm asking for someone who believes there are to explain how such purportedly sound inferences are supported by something that could count as convincing evidence to the unbiased. I am yet to see such an explanation.

Some cryptic answers there! — Janus

Yes. You do well to ignore them.

On the other hand if you mean that they don't miss it precisely because they have it just as the religionist does, then I agree. — Janus

That's part of it, which the secularist has, just as much as the religionis. But Berkeley attributes more to the religionist than that.

.....hence, by proper inferences, to enlarge our notions of the grandeur, wisdom, and beneficence of the Creator; and lastly, to make the several parts of the creation, so far as in us lies, subservient to the ends they were designed for, God's glory, and the sustentation and comfort of ourselves and fellow-creatures. — "

The secularist will not do any of that. But won't miss it.

In the context of athiesm, it seems to me like there are two general modes of bigotry. The first is your (earlier) Sam Harris or Nietzsche type, which tends towards hostile "arguments from psychoanalysis" that paint anyone of faith as irrational, child-like, weak willed, etc. This sort of view is straightforwardly bigoted, and in the hands of many of the "New Athiest" it often gets paired with a fairly extensive ignorance of the topic they have decided to address.

I actually don't think this is the most pernicious sort of anti-religious bigotry, for the same reason that bigoted fundamentalists are themselves not as dangerous as their noxious views might suggest. In either case, the bigotry is so overt that everyone sees it, and of course plenty of atheists think the more aggressive of the New Athiest are just obnoxious.

The more pernicious sort of bigotry, to my mind, seems to be much more common in the upper classes, and tends to get practiced by people who are "accepting of religion" or even identify as from a certain faith (although it tends to be people for whom this is more of a cultural identity). In this view, religion is fine—provided it is not taken very seriously. It's ok to be a Baptist or a Catholic, so long as you're not one of those ones, the ones who take it to seriously, allowing it to expand beyond the realm of private taste.

And this means nodding along with sacrilege and blasphemy, preferably joining in. You're supposed to nod along when someone refers to the Eucharist as a "Jeez-It," etc. It's a bit like the old Roman sacrifices to the emperor. One must prove one's allegiance to the secular liberal order above all else—burning one's incense to Caesar—and then one is free to practice the local faith in private. This is a sort of tolerance of faith just so long as it is rendered meaningless, a mere matter of taste, and a taste that confirms to the dominant culture.

I've read plenty of African Americans describe a sort of similar phenomenon, although there the dominant culture has sort of come around on this sort of thing.

This comes out in two ways:

First, it's not uncommon to see comments directed at religious groups or ethnic/class groups that would be considered "beyond the pale" if they were directed at races or on the basis of sex. Liberalism has a particular focus of biological identity, precisely because people do not choose these things. Whereas, religion, ethnicity, and class are things that the upwardly mobile individual must shed upon attaining to the global "middle class" (which is really more of an economic elite comparatively speaking).

BTW, I also think this sentiment is why so much moral debate on homosexuality and trans-sexualism focuses on whether or not it is "natural," (whether people are "born this way," i.e. not a choice). I don't think this framing is helpful though. I would tend to think the bigotry and cruelty are unjust regardless of whether they are based on "naturalness," (that is, it is not necissarily just to oppress someone for their choices either). Whereas, at the same time, something's being "natural" hardly makes it acceptable. Rape is perhaps "natural," but we hardly want to defend that.

Second, religious beliefs are only allowed a sort of freedom from condemnation in as much as they accord with liberal norms. So, things like not ordaining female priests, viewing fornication as a form of sin (against the "Sexual Revolution"), more conservative positions on divorce (sacrament versus contract between individuals), get decried. This, of itself, is not a problem. Some religious beliefs might be bigoted, unjust, etc. The problem is that, because "religious belief" has become merely a matter of "private taste," disagreements on such issues simply get written off as always a sort of bigotry. Yet, it seems to me that there is a sort of rational argument to be had re fornication, pornography, gluttony, acquisitiveness, etc. that it is not helpful to dismiss in this way.

Nuh. Instead of worrying about meaning, worry about what folk do. I'm not asking folk to burn their book, just that they not to use it as an excuse for abominations. — Banno

BOOORRRRRINNNNNNNG! :D

Though I'm sympathetic here:

Do I discard the wisdom extracted over the millenia because you can show me it's not the perfect book? — Hanover

Reason can only go so far, after all. And I don't think @Hanover is using the book as an excuse for abominations, though I know many do.

Nuh. Instead of worrying about meaning, worry about what folk do. I'm not asking folk to burn their book, just that they not to use it as an excuse for abominations. — Banno

Nuh, instead of worrying about using a book as an excuse for abominations, worry about what folk do. I'm not asking folk to use anything as an excuse for abominations, just that they not commit abominations.

(Cleaned it up to avoid special pleading, so as to remove the suggestion that there's some rule particular to the Bible that doesn't apply universally).

Such flagrant AI bigotry. What is the world coming to. :fear: — praxis

Again, it's literally against the rules:

AI LLMs are not to be used to write posts either in full or in part (unless there is some obvious reason to do so, e.g. an LLM discussion thread where use is explicitly declared). Those suspected of breaking this rule will receive a warning and potentially a ban. — Baden

-

Anyway, my argument is basically that faith is unnecessary for genuine spiritual pursuits; it is religion that demands faith—not for the sake of salvation, but because religion is primarily concerned with forging strong, unified social bonds. Faith is necessary in religion because it is action that proves allegiance. Faith serves to filter out non-committed individuals and strengthen in-group loyalty. Faith in supernatural beliefs, especially when they’re costly or hard to fake, signals deep commitment to the group. And faith-based communities that required costly religious commitments (e.g., dietary restrictions, celibacy) have been show to be robust and long lived. — praxis

My response:

This hasn't been mentioned in the thread, but religious scholars will point out that faith is only central to revealed religion (i.e. revelation-based religion). In non-revealed religion faith is no more central than it is in other traditions or institutions. For example, I would argue that institutions like the military are much more faith-centric than non-revealed religion.

In the West we have a tendency to conflate religion with Christianity (or else Judeo-Christianity), and the notion that religions can be referred to as "faiths" is one symptom of that. This is yet another incentive to get clear on what is actually meant by 'faith'. — Leontiskos

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Please forgive the appeal to authority. — praxis

You are just name-dropping without providing any evidence that the authorities even agree with you.

This is a political question, but my answer would be no. Admittedly, my perspective is shaped by my theology, and I can understand how others might disagree. — BitconnectCarlos

Here's my question. If Abraham would have killed Isaac and burned him as an offering to God and that account was consistly interpreted as a prohibition against child sacrifice, resulting in the end of that practice for good, would it matter what other literal translations could have been made?

Meaning is use. And it's for that reason all this contemporary interpretation that decontextualizes the thousands of years preceding say nothing other than if we were the interpreters, we would have come up with pretty evil conclusions.

The interpreters did not do that. They looked for meaning, purpose, and morality. If someone wishes to say they shouldn't have falsely attributed their wisdom to a self-declared holy book in order to provide their wisdom divine status, then I wish that would just be said as opposed to explaining what the right way of interpreting should have been had the interpreters just have been better literalists.

Yes, and that's the issue that relates to the entire thread. The atheists here are arguing on the basis of de-contextualized interpretations that would be rejected by their interlocutors (and therefore they are relying on premises that their interlocutors would obviously reject, thus begging the question). This relates to "hostile translation":

Sider calls this "hostile translation." From the QV/Sider thread:

This is what Sider refers to as a "hostile translation" on page 14. It is interpreting or translating someone's utterance in a way that they themselves reject.
— Leontiskos

@fdrake wants to talk about "good counterexamples," and he relies on notions of "verbatim" or "taking someone exactly at their word" (even in a way that they themselves reject). The problem is that if these are still hostile translations then they haven't managed to do what they are supposed to be doing... — Leontiskos

If Abraham would have killed Isaac and burned him as an offering to God and that account was consistly interpreted as a prohibition against child sacrifice — Hanover

What are the grounds for such an interpretation? Did God step in and condemn it? Did something happen to Abraham? Interpretation isn't endlessly open. Some interpretations are plausible, others are not.

I'm not sure why you would disregard authorial intent. Try understanding the Levitical sacrifice from a modern lens. You can't do it. You need to try to examine things from the POV of the ancients. Of course, we could come up with flawed interpretations, but those interpretations would be subject to scrutiny throughout the process of biblical analysis.

I wish that would just be said as opposed to explaining what the right way of interpreting should have been had the interpreters just have been better literalists. — Hanover

Literal is only one mode of biblical interpretation. See PARDES. We can make a literal interpretation, but another could fit better.

The more pernicious sort of bigotry, to my mind, seems to be much more common in the upper classes, and tends to get practiced by people who are "accepting of religion" or even identify as from a certain faith (although it tends to be people for whom this is more of a cultural identity). In this view, religion is fine—provided it is not taken very seriously. It's ok to be a Baptist or a Catholic, so long as you're not one of those ones, the ones who take it to seriously, allowing it to expand beyond the realm of private taste. — Count Timothy von Icarus

You'd imagine this is fairly common today. Why do you find this more pernicious?

This is a sort of tolerance of faith just so long as it is rendered meaningless, a mere matter of taste, and a taste that confirms to the dominant culture. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Seems fairly benign to me if accurate, but it would be interesting to find out if this is how they saw it too. You're describing your take on it, but would they identify with this account? Or would they have interesting things to say about their privately held faith?

I would imagine that a significant percentage of self-described Christians are not particularly serious about their faith and perhaps find the social connection, community and the fact that their entire town attends a set of churches, compelling reasons to be part of it.

Second, religious beliefs are only allowed a sort of freedom from condemnation in as much as they accord with liberal norms. So, things like not ordaining female priests, viewing fornication as a form of sin (against the "Sexual Revolution"), more conservative positions on divorce (sacrament versus contract between individuals), get decried — Count Timothy von Icarus

An understandable reaction, I'd say.

quote="Count Timothy von Icarus;989335"]The problem is that, because "religious belief" has become merely a matter of "private taste," disagreements on such issues simply get written off as always a sort of bigotry. Yet, it seems to me that there is a sort of rational argument to be had re fornication, pornography, gluttony, acquisitiveness, etc. that it is not helpful to dismiss in this way.[/quote]

Generally, when I hear this kind of argument, it's framed around the idea that religions often promote outdated or 'backwards' worldviews, which some people follow dogmatically.

When it comes to bigotry, hearing Muslim men say that women are 'whores' if they're not chaperoned by male relatives, or that gay people should be jailed or killed, makes it hard to see such views as something that can be excused or explained away. Bigotry often exists on a continuum, ranging from subtle biases and stereotypes to overt hatred and violence. The latter would seem to be the most concerning.

The relgious bigotry toward atheism can be interesting too. It often involves dismissing atheism as illegitimate or lacking any meaningful foundation. The atheist is frequently characterized as morally bereft, intellectually deficient, dishonest and spiritually empty, as if disbelief in God equates to a deficiency in character or purpose - even a type of disability. This account undermines the atheist’s credibility from the outset; their views are rarely engaged with seriously, since they are presumed to rest on a fragile, incoherent worldview - one readily dismissed as a house of cards.

I'm not sure why you would disregard authorial intent. — BitconnectCarlos

We don't know who the author was. I look at the interpretation of those who've used the document. I'm not discarding historical analysis. I'm relying upon it heavily.

You'd imagine this is fairly common today. Why do you find this more pernicious?

First, because people end up offending others without realizing it and holding on to a sort of subtle bigotry.

But more importantly, I think it ties into a large problem in liberal, particularly Anglo-American culture, were nothing can be taken seriously and nothing can be held sacred. Deleuze and Guattari talk about this sort of "desacralization" that occurs under capitalism. I think it leads to a sort of emotional and spiritual constipation. Feeling deeply about anything (thymos), or especially being deeply intellectually invested in an ideal (Logos), as opposed to being properly "pragmatic" (which normally means a focus on safety and epithumia, sensible pleasures) is seen as a sort failing. This is born out of an all-consuming fear of "fanaticism" and "enthusiasm" (something Charles Taylor also documents).

Part of what made Donald Trump's campaign so transgressive was the return to a focus on thymos, whereas elites have long had a common habit of complaining that people were not "voting according to their economic interests" (which apparently ought to have been their aim vis-a-vis politics, the common good).

Today, even in politically radical circles, it seems everything must be covered in several layers of irony and unseriousness. Indeed, all pervasive irony is particularly a hallmark of the alt-right. To care about anything too deeply is to be vulnerable, potentially a "fanatic," or worse "a sucker."

This tendency can also lead towards a sort of elitism, which I think Deneen explains this well using Mill:

Custom may have once served a purpose, Mill acknowledges—in an earlier age, when “men of strong bodies or minds” might flout “the social principle,” it was necessary for “law and discipline, like the Popes struggling against the Emperors, [to] assert a power over the whole man, claiming to control all his life in order to control his character.”9 But custom had come to dominate too extensively; and that “which threatens human nature is not the excess, but the deficiency, of personal impulses and preferences.”10 The unleashing of spontaneous, creative, unpredictable, unconventional, often offensive forms of individuality was Mill’s goal. Extraordinary individuals—the most educated, the most creative, the most adventurous, even the most powerful—freed from the rule of custom, might transform society.

“Persons of genius,” Mill acknowledges, “are always likely to be a small minority”; yet such people, who are “more individual than any other people,” less capable of “fitting themselves, without hurtful compression, into any of the small number of moulds which society provides,” require “an atmosphere of freedom.”11 Society must be remade for the benefit of this small, but in Mill’s view vital, number. A society based on custom constrained individuality, and those who craved most to be liberated from its shackles were not “ordinary” people but people who thrived on breaking out of the customs that otherwise governed society. Mill called for a society premised around “experiments in living”: society as test tube for the sake of geniuses who are “more individual.”

We live today in the world Mill proposed. Everywhere, at every moment, we are to engage in experiments in living. Custom has been routed: much of what today passes for culture—with or without the adjective “popular”—consists of mocking sarcasm and irony. Late night television is the special sanctuary of this liturgy. Society has been transformed along Millian lines in which especially those regarded as judgmental are to be special objects of scorn, in the name of nonjudgmentalism. Mill understood better than contemporary Millians that this would require the “best” to dominate the “ordinary.” The rejection of custom demanded that society’s most “advanced” elements have greater political representation. For Mill, this would be achieved through an unequal distribution of voting rights...

Society today has been organized around the Millian principle that “everything is allowed,” at least so long as it does not result in measurable (mainly physical) harm. It is a society organized for the benefit of the strong, as Mill recognized. By contrast, a Burkean society is organized for the benefit of the ordinary—the majority who benefit from societal norms that the strong and the ordinary alike are expected to follow. A society can be shaped for the benefit of most people by emphasizing mainly informal norms and customs that secure the path to flourishing for most human beings; or it can be shaped for the benefit of the extraordinary and powerful by liberating all from the constraint of custom.

Deneen goes on to cite Burke's at least plausible response that it is actually "innovators" who have the greatest tendency to be tyrannical.

.....hence, by proper inferences, to enlarge our notions of the grandeur, wisdom, and beneficence of the Creator; and lastly, to make the several parts of the creation, so far as in us lies, subservient to the ends they were designed for, God's glory, and the sustentation and comfort of ourselves and fellow-creatures.
— "
The secularist will not do any of that. But won't miss it. — Ludwig V

The secularist may do the same thing with a different object of worship, though.

"Hence, by proper inferences, to enlarge our notions of the grandeur, wisdom and beneficence of Nature; and lastly, to make the several parts of the creation, so far as in us lies, appropriate to the ends they were designed for, Nature's glory, and the sustention and comfort of ourselves and fellow-creatures".

But more importantly, I think it ties into a large problem in liberal, particularly Anglo-American culture, were nothing can be taken seriously and nothing can be held sacred. — Count Timothy von Icarus

If true, why does this matter? Describe the problem to me. I'm not sure I see a lack of seriousness myself, but perhaps what you mean by this is many groups no longer read or follow traditional values.

On the one hand, conservative critics bemoan the Left’s excessive seriousness, it's humorless, puritanical enforcement of political and cultural "wokeness." On the other hand, they claim the Left doesn’t believe in anything.

Part of what made Donald Trump's campaign so transgressive was the return to a focus on thymos, — Count Timothy von Icarus

I'm sure one could argue any number of things about Trump's arrival that would seem to fit. Which one is true? Could it not also just be seen as a return to old school bigotries (anti modernist/anti woke) and white nationalism and a general rage that comes from several sources? That rage may well turn against Trump too, since it seems to me that politicians often just surf on community attitudes.

Today, even in politically radical circles, it seems everything must be covered in several layers of irony and unseriousness. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Isn't your take informed by a bias that values traditionalism and is suspicious, perhaps even hostile towards political radicalism (particularly of the Left)? Is your use of irony as Rorty uses it? Is 'unseriousness' how they would describe it, or is that your description for it? There's a further quesion in what counts as a politically radical circle?

This tendency can also lead towards a sort of elitism, which I think Deneen explains this well using Mill: — Count Timothy von Icarus

Custom has been routed: much of what today passes for culture—with or without the adjective “popular”—consists of mocking sarcasm and irony. Late night television is the special sanctuary of this liturgy.

I dislike the smugness of late-night talk shows as much as the next conservative, not for ideological reasons, but because they often feel like the enforced moments of group hate from 1984. But does it matter? Interestingly, one of those figures, Bill Maher is now celebrated by conservatives because of his anti-woke rants. So has he become an approved dispenser of mocking sarcasm and irony—but with a heart?

Trump and co are the elite. It is a mistake to think that there is just one type of elite (not that you are arguing this). Looks like in America they've swapped one elite for another. This latest one seem less concerned about freedom, but let's not get into that can of worms. Politics is a filthy business no matter what side.

So it sounds like, from this and other posts, that you're presenting an anti-modernist position. Like many others, you seem to hold that secularism and scientism are problems and that we need to return to classical ideas and values for the sake of 'civilisation'. Perhaps you could finesse this position for me if I have misread you. I find this sort of discussion quite fascinating. And perhaps this isn't the thread.

BOOORRRRRINNNNNNNG! :D — Moliere

Well, you can ask folk to burn there books, which would make your life more interesting.

Yep.

Well, you can ask folk to burn there books, which would make your life more interesting. — Banno

Heh. I wouldn't do such a thing, I just couldn't resist the dumb joke.

I like dumb jokes. Sometimes.

Seems we have broad agreement.

I am not claiming there are no sound inferences from religious experiences to religious beliefs or metaphysical positions; I'm saying that I can't see how there could be and I'm asking for someone who believes there are to explain how — Janus

This is yet another iteration of your, "I don't have the burden of proof. They do." If you don't believe there are no sound inferences then you would not say, "I can't see how there could be." People who can't see how X could be possible do not think X is possible, and they have reasons why.

We make inferences from experience all the time, and the idea that this is simply impossible when it comes to "religious" experience is question-begging. — Leontiskos

religious beliefs are only allowed a sort of freedom from condemnation in as much as they accord with liberal norms. — Count Timothy von Icarus

And the liberal version of tolerance towards the religious or other disfavored ones, doesn’t seem to involve any actual respect. As long as the religious keep their thoughts and practices to themselves, libs will tolerate them.

a large problem in liberal, particularly Anglo-American culture, [is] nothing can be taken seriously and nothing can be held sacred. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Certainly not in the public square.

You are making me question my own sarcastic sense of humor.

Feeling deeply about anything (thymos), or especially being deeply intellectually invested in an ideal (Logos), as opposed to being properly "pragmatic" (which normally means a focus on safety and epithumia, sensible pleasures) is seen as a sort failing. This is born out of an all-consuming fear of "fanaticism" and "enthusiasm" — Count Timothy von Icarus

To care about anything too deeply is to be vulnerable, potentially a "fanatic," or worse "a sucker." — Count Timothy von Icarus

Another thoughtful and considered analysis, clearly written. Good stuff.

today…Everywhere, at every moment, we are to engage in experiments in living.

It is automatically an idea worth trying, regardless of how many people it affects, if the idea has never been tried before, and it comes from the left.

Just to be sure, the Binding of Issac is understood as an exhortation to faith, especially in adversity.

A quick search on ChatGPT:

The Binding of Isaac (Genesis 22), or the Akedah, has often been interpreted as a test of faith, with emphasis on maintaining belief and trust in God despite extreme adversity or incomprehensible demands. Below are several examples across traditions and thinkers where the story is understood as a call to maintain faith despite adversity:

1. Classical Jewish Interpretation – Rashi and Medieval Commentators
Rashi, the medieval Jewish commentator, frames the Akedah as a test not only of Abraham’s obedience but of his steadfast faith in God's justice and promises (e.g., the promise of descendants through Isaac).
The adversity here is internal conflict: Abraham must reconcile God's command to kill Isaac with the divine promise that Isaac will carry on his line. Despite this apparent contradiction, Abraham continues in faith.
This sets a precedent in Jewish tradition that faith includes trust in God's plan even when it seems paradoxical or painful.

2. The Epistle to the Hebrews (New Testament)
Hebrews 11:17-19 in the New Testament explicitly praises Abraham’s faith:
"By faith Abraham, when he was tested, offered up Isaac… He considered that God was able even to raise him from the dead..."
The focus is on Abraham's unwavering belief in God's goodness and power, even when commanded to sacrifice his son.
In Christian thought, this is a call for believers to maintain faith in God's promises even when circumstances are dire or absurd.

3. Søren Kierkegaard – Fear and Trembling
Kierkegaard's Abraham is the “knight of faith”, a figure who obeys the absurd with full trust in God.
The “adversity” is radical: Abraham must sacrifice what he loves most, yet believes by virtue of the absurd that he will still receive Isaac back.
For Kierkegaard, the Akedah dramatizes the leap of faith, where reason fails and faith endures without justification.

4. Maimonides – Guide for the Perplexed
Maimonides sees the Akedah as the highest form of prophetic obedience, representing the ultimate test of trust in divine wisdom.
The adversity is ethical and emotional—being asked to violate moral norms.
Abraham is praised for not letting moral confusion or emotional pain shake his trust in God's will.

5. Modern Jewish Thought – Rabbi Joseph Soloveitchik
In his existential reading, Soloveitchik sees Abraham’s test as a crisis of religious identity, where one must affirm faith not in comfort, but in the face of horror or paradox.
He uses it to frame the experience of Jews through suffering (e.g., the Holocaust), where the Akedah is seen as a metaphor for holding faith in the shadow of death.

6. Liturgical Use – Rosh Hashanah Readings
The Akedah is read on Rosh Hashanah, the Jewish New Year, when God's judgment is central.
It's understood liturgically as an invocation of Abraham’s example: just as Abraham stayed faithful under trial, so too should Israel—and they ask to be judged mercifully in that light. — ChatGPT

It's not as if this were an uncommon interpretation. Indeed, I had not heard the "Admonition against human sacrifice" interpretation until you presented it in these fora.

Leon calling this a "hostile" interpretation is plainly absurd - it is an interpretation used by theists.

If you don't believe there are no sound inferences then you would not say, "I can't see how there could be." People who can't see how X would be possible do not think X would be possible, and they have reasons why. — Leontiskos

Give a blind guy sight, take him for a walk on water, raise his brother from the dead, and he can still say “yeah, but how did you really do it?”

Well put.

Is the argument being presented here now that in a philosophy forum, when asked specifically about faith, we should not entertain or discuss the negative aspects of faith for fear of offending the faithful?

Keep in mind that they do not have to be here.

we should not entertain or discuss the negative aspects of faith — Banno

Not at all. Are there any other aspects of faith to talk about Banno?