I understand you disagree and can find alternative explanations to a single neuron learning. One could do the same for ameba is one wants to play devil's advocate. — javra

I don't understand how in the case of Ameba they could possibly interact and learn collectively.

If you're willing, what are the "serious objections" that you have to the possibility that individual neurons can learn from experience? — javra

I try to be minimalistic all the time when I try to explain complex phenomena. The behavior of an electron is lawful and deterministic to me. The same applies to larger entities such as atoms and molecules. I try to be minimalistic even in the case of a neuron unless I face a phenomenon that cannot be explained. If I find myself in a troublesome situation where I cannot explain a phenomenon, then I try to dig from top to bottom questioning the assumption that I made trying to see where is the fault assumption. I would even question the assumption that I made for electrons as well if it is necessary.

In regards to the subject of this thread, the existence of options in a deterministic world, I found there is a simple explanation for the phenomenon once I consider a set of neurons each being a simple entity and deterministic.

I read about plant intelligence a long time ago and I was amazed. They cannot only recognize between up and down, etc. they also are capable of communicating with each other. I can find those articles and share them with you if you are interested. — MoK

I'm relatively well aware of this. Thank you. :up: It gets even more interesting in considering that, from what we know, subterranean communication between plants seems to require their communal symbiosis with fungi species. In a very metaphorical sense, their brains are underground, and communicate via a potentially wide web connections.

To me what you call the unconscious mind (what I call the subconscious mind) is conscious. — MoK

I in many ways agree. I would instead state that the unconscious mind - which I construe to not always be fully unified in its agencies - is instead "aware and volition-endowed". So, in this sense, it could be stated to be in its own way conscious (here to my mind keeping things simple and not addressing the plurality of agencies that could therein occur), but we as conscious agents are yet unconscious of most of its awareness and doings. This being why I yet term it the unconscious mind: we as conscious beings are, again, typically not conscious of its awareness and doings.

So once one entertains the sentience of neurons, one here thereby addresses the constituents of one's living body, rather than of one's own mind per se. — javra

I cannot follow what you are trying to say here. — MoK

I basically wanted to express that, if one allows the neurons being sentient, their own sentience is part and parcel of our living brain's total physiology, this as aspects of our living bodies. Whereas we as mind-endowed conscious beings of our own, our own sentience is not intertwined with that pertaining to individual neurons of our CNS. Rather, they do their thing within the CNS for the benefit of their own individual selves relative to their community of fellow neurons, which in turn results in certain neural-web firings within our brain, which in turn results in the most basic aspects of our own unconscious mind supervening on these neural-web firings, with these most basic aspects of our unconscious mind then in one way or another ultimately combining to form the non-manifold unity of the conscious human being. A consciousness which on occasion interacts with various aspects of its unconscious mind, such as when thinking about (questioning, judging the value of, etc.) concepts and ideas - as you've mentioned.

Hope that makes what I previously said clearer.

I understand you disagree and can find alternative explanations to a single neuron learning. One could do the same for ameba is one wants to play devil's advocate. — javra

I don't understand how in the case of Ameba they could possibly interact and learn collectively. — MoK

I haven't claimed that amebas can act collectively. Here, I was claiming that the so-called "problem of other minds" can be readily applied to the presumed sentience of amebas. This in the sense that just because it looks and sounds like a duck doesn't necessitate that it so be. Hence, just because an ameba looks and acts as thought it is sentient, were one to insist on it, one could argue that the ameba might nevertheless be perfectly insentient all the same. This as you seem to currently maintain for individual neurons. But this gets heavy into issues of epistemology and into what might constitute warranted vs. unwarranted doubts. (If it looks and sounds like a duck, it most likely is.)

In regards to the subject of this thread, the existence of options in a deterministic world, I found there is a simple explanation for the phenomenon once I consider a set of neurons each being a simple entity and deterministic. — MoK

No worries there. But why would allowing for neurons holding some form of sentience then disrupt this general outlook regarding the existence of options? The brain would still do what it does - this irrespective of how one explains the (human) mind-brain relationship. Or so I so far find.

I'm relatively well aware of this. Thank you. :up: It gets even more interesting in considering that, from what we know, subterranean communication between plants seems to require their communal symbiosis with fungi species. In a very metaphorical sense, their brains are underground, and communicate via a potentially wide web connections. — javra

Cool! :wink:

I in many ways agree. I would instead state that the unconscious mind - which I construe to not always be fully unified in its agencies - is instead "aware and volition-endowed". So, in this sense, it could be stated to be in its own way conscious (here to my mind keeping things simple and not addressing the plurality of agencies that could therein occur), but we as conscious agents are yet unconscious of most of its awareness and doings. This being why I yet term it the unconscious mind: we as conscious beings are, again, typically not conscious of its awareness and doings. — javra

Correct.

I basically wanted to express that, if one allows the neurons being sentient, their own sentience is part and parcel of our living brain's total physiology, this as aspects of our living bodies. Whereas we as mind-endowed conscious beings of our own, our own sentience is not intertwined with that pertaining to individual neurons of our CNS. Rather, they do their thing within the CNS for the benefit of their own individual selves relative to their community of fellow neurons, which in turn results in certain neural-web firings within our brain, which in turn results in the most basic aspects of our own unconscious mind supervening on these neural-web firings, with these most basic aspects of our unconscious mind then in one way or another ultimately combining to form the non-manifold unity of the conscious human being. A consciousness which on occasion interacts with various aspects of its unconscious mind, such as when thinking about (questioning, judging the value of, etc.) concepts and ideas - as you've mentioned. — javra

A neuron is a living cell. Whether it is sentient and can learn things is a subject of discussion. I believe a neuron could become sentient if this provided an advantage for the organism. This is however very costly since it requires the neuron to be a complex entity. Such a neuron, not only needs more food but also a sort of training before it can function properly within the brain where all neurons are complex entities. So, let's say that you have a single neuron, let's call it X, which can perform a function, let's call it Z, learning for example. Now let's assume a collection of neurons, let's call them Y, which can do the same function as Z but each neuron is not capable of performing Z. The question is whether it is economical for the organism, to have X or Y. That is a very hard question. It is possible to find an organism that does not have many neurons and each neuron can perform Z. That however does not mean that we can generalize such an ability to neurons of other organisms that have plenty of neurons. The former organism may due to evolution gain such a capacity where such a capacity is not necessary and economical for the latter organism.

Hope that makes what I previously said clearer. — javra

Thanks for the elaboration.

I haven't claimed that amebas can act collectively. — javra

I said that for amebas to learn collectively, such as neurons, they need to interact.

Here, I was claiming that the so-called "problem of other minds" can be readily applied to the presumed sentience of amebas. This in the sense that just because it looks and sounds like a duck doesn't necessitate that it so be. Hence, just because an ameba looks and acts as thought it is sentient, were one to insist on it, one could argue that the ameba might nevertheless be perfectly insentient all the same. This as you seem to currently maintain for individual neurons. But this gets heavy into issues of epistemology and into what might constitute warranted vs. unwarranted doubts. (If it looks and sounds like a duck, it most likely is.) — javra

I agree.

No worries there. But why would allowing for neurons holding some form of sentience then disrupt this general outlook regarding the existence of options? The brain would still do what it does - this irrespective of how one explains the (human) mind-brain relationship. Or so I so far find. — javra

I agree that considering neurons to be sentient and can learn may not disrupt the function of the brain but I think that it might become very costly for the organism when a small set of simpler neurons can perform the same function, learning for example.

A neuron is a living cell. Whether it is sentient and can learn things is a subject of discussion. I believe a neuron could become sentient if this provided an advantage for the organism. This is however very costly since it requires the neuron to be a complex entity. Such a neuron, not only needs more food but also a sort of training before it can function properly within the brain where all neurons are complex entities. So, let's say that you have a single neuron, let's call it X, which can perform a function, let's call it Z, learning for example. Now let's assume a collection of neurons, let's call them Y, which can do the same function as Z but each neuron is not capable of performing Z. The question is whether it is economical for the organism, to have X or Y. That is a very hard question. It is possible to find an organism that does not have many neurons and each neuron can perform Z. That however does not mean that we can generalize such an ability to neurons of other organisms that have plenty of neurons. The former organism may due to evolution gain such a capacity where such a capacity is not necessary and economical for the latter organism. — MoK

Alright. While I still disagree with neurons being insentient, I can now better understand your reasoning. Thanks. If its worth saying, neurons do in fact require a lot of energy to live, and learning can very well be a largely innate faculty of at least certain lifeforms. But for my part, I'll leave things as they are. It was good talking with you!

It was very nice chatting with you too! :wink:

@javra @Pierre-Normand By the way, I found a simple neural network that can perform a simple sum.



The weights are all 1 and the inputs are 0 or 1. I thought that you might be interested so I shared it with you.

By the way, I found a simple neural network that can perform a simple sum. — MoK

Thank you, but the image isn't displayed. You may need to link it differently.

Accordingly, every mind requires a minimum of two thinking elements:
•​A sensor that responds to its environment
•​A doer that acts upon its environment — Ogas and Gaddam

They talk about the amoeba, which has the required elements.

Obviously, these definitions of mind and thinking are as basic as can be. But it's where it all starts.

Can a neuron be said to have a mind, to think, by these definitions?
— Patterner

I don't see why not.

The sensor aspect of thought so defined: the neuron via its dendrites senses in its environment of fellow neurons their axonal firings (axons of other neurons to which the dendrites of the particular neuron are connected via synapses) and responds to its environment of fellow neurons by firing its own axon so as to stimulate other neurons via their own dendrites.

The doer aspect of thought so defined: the neuron's growth of dendrites and axon (which is requisite for neural plasticity) occurs with the, at least apparent, purpose of finding, or else creating, new synaptic connections via which to be stimulated and stimulate - this being a neuron's doing in which the neuron acts upon its environment in novel ways.

To me, it seems to fit the definitions of mind offered just fine. — javra

I have a tough time seeing it your way. I think an autonomous entity has - is - a mind. Archaea, bacteria, and amoeba live on their own. Neurons do not. I think neurons are part of a mind; part of the chain connecting the sensor and doer. In the archaea, being single celled, that chain is made of molecules. We couldn't (at least I couldn't) say any of the molecules are minds. And I think the neurons in a hydra are more complex links in the hydra's chain, rather than each being a mind within the mind of the hydra.

However, Ogas and Gaddam seem to agree with you:

There are sensor neurons and doer neurons, which play the same roles as sensors and doers in molecule minds. Each neuron is composed of molecular thinking elements, including molecular doers (which release neurotransmitters into a synapse, for instance) and molecular sensors (which detect the voltage on the neuron membrane, for instance). Functionally, every neuron is a self-contained molecule mind. — Ogas and Gaddam

The italics are theirs, and the phrase is a link to a quote from The Computational Brain, by Patricia Churchland and Terrence Sejnowski:

Research on the properties of neurons shows that they are much more complex processing devices than previously imagined. For example, dendrites of neurons are themselves highly specialized, and some parts can probably act as independent processing units. — Churchland and Sejnowski

I think my difficulty lies in the fact that I haven't been at any of this for very long. I always took mind and consciousness to be pretty much the same thing. Intellectuality, I see a difference. But my feeling that they are the same still intrudes at times. I'm working on it. :grin:

I have a tough time seeing it your way. I think an autonomous entity has - is - a mind. Archaea, bacteria, and amoeba live on their own. Neurons do not. I think neurons are part of a mind; part of the chain connecting the sensor and doer. In the archaea, being single celled, that chain is made of molecules. We couldn't (at least I couldn't) say any of the molecules are minds. And I think the neurons in a hydra are more complex links in the hydra's chain, rather than each being a mind within the mind of the hydra. — Patterner

I feel like I get it. Thanks for the explanation.

Maybe this is worth expressing as a follow-up. Especially when considering the dire need humans have for nurture in the formative years after birth - without which we either perish or at best become insane and then perish on our own - humans too require a community of fellow humans in order to live. This, though, doesn’t take away from the individuality of human minds. In certain respects only, the same roundabout situation could be potentially claimed of neurons.

In terms of molecules and minds, I certainly wouldn’t claim that individual organic molecules are minds either. Going by the notion of “autopoiesis” which I’ve previously pointed out indirectly, the very life of any single-celled lifeform (to include metabolism, awareness, and sentient doings) in a sense supervenes on the structure and functioning of the single-celled lifeform’s organic molecules. Take away one lipid from an ameba and the ameba will continue living and doing what it does just fine. However, take enough individual lipids away from an ameba and the ameba will cease living. As an ameba’s life supervenes on the organization and functioning of this bundle of organic molecules, so too then will the ameba’s mind so supervene. The same could then be potentially claimed of a neuron’s sentience.

As to hydras, they’re weird, in no small part due to being virtually immortal as far as we know – this of course barring environmental mishaps – with extreme regenerative abilities (including the ability to regenerate their heads). Yet even here, I presume that the activities of their nervous system – though far, far less complex than that of a mammal’s (having a few thousand neurons tops) – will be that upon which the hydra’s mind supervenes. Such that the hydra’s mind will not of itself be conjoined with the sentience of the hydra’s individual neurons – but will instead supervene upon the totality of its nervous system’s doings (if not a totality resulting from other somatic cells as well).

But yea, this perspective maintaining that neurons are not insentient is by no means common staple in today’s world. So I get why I can be very hard to entertain.

I think my difficulty lies in the fact that I haven't been at any of this for very long. I always took mind and consciousness to be pretty much the same thing. Intellectuality, I see a difference. But my feeling that they are the same still intrudes at times. I'm working on it. :grin: — Patterner

Yea, its common practice around these parts to address mind and consciousness as though they were the same thing. I'm thinking maybe it's in part because one sense of "consciousness" is that of "awareness" and all aspects of mind, the unconscious very much included, are aware in one way or another. But, yes, if (at least our human understanding of) consciousness is contrasted to a co-occurring unconscious mind upon which consciousness is dependent, then consciousness can't be equivalent to a mind in total - for it excludes the far larger portion of mind which we are not conscious of. Whereas I don't find reason to believe that something like an ameba (or a neuron :wink: ) has any such dichotomy of mind to speak of.

By the way, I found a simple neural network that can perform a simple sum. — MoK

I too am interested. The link or image however is still not displaying.

@javra @Pierre-Normand Unfortunately, after some thought, I realized that the suggested network does not work as I thought it should. Please disregard my previous post.

how can deterministic processes lead to the realization of options. — MoK

Maybe the "options" are illusion.

The determinism in neural processes seem obvious to us since science has constructed that Narrative and it is conventional; i.e., that synapses are triggered by xyz, and there is no moment of an agent choosing to take a certain path.

But the same could go for the so-called Mind, where the illusion of option exists. Even in a decision seeming so free as which road to take at a fork, was ultimately the last domino to fall in a series of autonomously structured triggers. To oversimplify, a thought emerges, "the heart is on the left,"--like I said, over simplified--all the way to "ini mini miny moe", structures and structures signifiers of constructed meaning snap like dominoes until you move. The positive feeling in the body that is triggered by the "settlement," or what we think of as "belief", we also call a choice.

For each individual mind the result is different, but not owing to a free agent making a choice out of options, but by the conditioned process of signifier structuring at each specific locus in History where these triggers are built. Some might not think of the left as superior but the right because it is the hand that's raised. All of these pieces of data stored at various loci in History act in accordance with a highly evolved system of conditioning. If not, find the moment of choice that did not involve a thought, image, language, a final trigger which is silent. That could just be that feeling in the body, designed to end the dialectic; also a conditioned response. And if you deliberately "choose" to defy the triggers, and go the opposite, it was just those antithetical triggers that got you there, triggered by something daring you to defy it, releasing a positive feeling because your locus is conditioned by History that way. And so on.

Ultimately that suggests, if so called decisions are autonomous movements of stimulus and conditioned response, the self has no free will. But actually further, there is no self. Body is an organic process, Mind is a process functioning with images.

Maybe the "options" are illusion. — ENOAH

Options cannot be an illusion. If I show you two balls that look similar, you will realize that there are two balls and that they look identical. There are even artificial neural networks that can count similar objects.

The determinism in neural processes seem obvious to us since science has constructed that Narrative and it is conventional; i.e., that synapses are triggered by xyz, and there is no moment of an agent choosing to take a certain path. — ENOAH

I am not talking about decisions in this thread.

The existence of possibilities is that which follows from the fact that any course of action is not given in advance. That is, that in a sense the world is always in play. No matter how well our expectations or predictions are fulfilled there is always something not given in becoming. We can foresee that the sun will die in X years, but nevertheless it is not given. To the extent that there is something not given, thought is able to think of possibilities, there is always something left over that escapes prediction.

The determinist has to explain how the future is given. But that is something that cannot be done, since predictions are always possibilities and are representations of becoming. How does a prediction turn out to be true? Even if it turns out to be true, it is still a representation of becoming and not becoming itself. That is why we cannot say that things are determined, because they are only determined in the representation but not in becoming itself.

The existence of possibilities is that which follows from the fact that any course of action is not given in advance. That is, that in a sense the world is always in play. No matter how well our expectations or predictions are fulfilled there is always something not given in becoming. We can foresee that the sun will die in X years, but nevertheless it is not given. To the extent that there is something not given, thought is able to think of possibilities, there is always something left over that escapes prediction. — JuanZu

The standard model was confirmed experimentally and it is a deterministic model. The experiment is performed very carefully so we are sure about how particles interact with each other. That is however true that when it comes to a system we cannot know the exact location of its parts so we cannot for sure predict the future state of the system but that is not what I am talking about. I am mostly interested in understanding how we could realize options given the fact that any physical system, for example the brain, is a deterministic entity. I am sure that the realization of options is due to the existence of neurons in the brain but it is still unclear to me how neural processes in the brain can lead to the realization of the options.

The determinist has to explain how the future is given. But that is something that cannot be done, since predictions are always possibilities and are representations of becoming. How does a prediction turn out to be true? Even if it turns out to be true, it is still a representation of becoming and not becoming itself. That is why we cannot say that things are determined, because they are only determined in the representation but not in becoming itself. — JuanZu

We can for sure say that the physical systems are deterministic since physicists closely examine the motion and interaction of elementary particles. Anyway, the purpose of this thread was not to discuss determinism but to understand how we can realize options given the fact that we have a brain.

I think you have missed my point. If you tell me that there is a deterministic system that will end up in X state you are making a prediction. But if the system is not in its state X the system prediction cannot be confused with reality. That is, the prediction is a representation not reality itself. The prediction is one possibility among others, even if it is confirmed. And this is due to the non-givenness of becoming. We could only be absolute determinists if all the processes of reality were already given. But that is not the case. No matter how many experiments you do, predictions will always be imagined representations of what will happen, i.e. possibilities among others. And reality will always be in a state of not-given. Basically This is the problem of inducción.

I think you have missed my point. If you tell me that there is a deterministic system that will end up in X state you are making a prediction. — JuanZu

I am saying that given the system in the state of X and the laws of nature, one always predicts and finds the system in the state of Y later.

But if the system is not in its state X the system prediction cannot be confused with reality. — JuanZu

I don't understand why you assume the system is not in the state of X. The system cannot be in another state but X which was predicted.

That is, the prediction is a representation not reality itself. — JuanZu

The prediction is about what is going to happen in reality and the system always ends up in Y given X in a deterministic system.

The prediction is one possibility among others, even if it is confirmed. — JuanZu

The is no other possibility in a reality. The determinism is tested to great accuracy.

And this is due to the non-givenness of becoming. We could only be absolute determinists if all the processes of reality were already given. — JuanZu

We don't need to test all processes of reality to make sure that reality is deterministic and that is not possible too.

No matter how many experiments you do, predictions will always be imagined representations of what will happen, i.e. possibilities among others. — JuanZu

We couldn't possibly do any science if this statement was true. For example, the computer you are using right now always works in a certain way. It doesn't work in one way one day and in another way another day.

Scientific work also works with possibilities, but the scientist believes that what is represented in the imagination is going to happen. This implies that one thinks in possibilities precisely because the becoming is not given. The fact that the becoming is not given is the opportunity to be right or wrong in predictions. But a prediction is never a given. They are ontologically different things.


We would have to say the opposite of what You say (ad consecuentiam btw) that the fact that becoming is not given is that which obliges us to do science with the difference that we must believe in the uniformity of nature, but this is a belief that can never be confirmed universally, because becoming is never given. No matter how many experiments we do, the possibility of failure is always there. It is a possibility, like that of succeeding in our predictions.