https://www.georgewrisley.com/blog/?p=47

In this post I will argue that libertarianism cannot actually explain or make rational why an agent chooses one course of action over another. I will do this by arguing that though libertarianism seems to be able to explain why an agent acts the way she does at some given moment in time, even though the action is not causally determined, libertarianism cannot explain why the agent does that action instead of some other action. I find this troubling, since I believe humans have free will and I believe that compatibilism is not a tenable position on free will because it collapses into hard determinism.

The main issue in the free will debate is whether or not and in what sense humans have free will. That is, are human choices or actions free, and if so, in what sense are they free? Both the hard and soft determinists endorse determinism, which is the view that all events (including human choices) are causally determined (necessitated) by antecedent conditions. Humans do what they do, make the choices they do, according to both these views because of factors outside of the agent’s control, e.g., upbringing, physiology, and interactions with others. On both views, if time were rolled back any amount and allowed to play forward again, the exact same events would occur. The hard determinist takes this to imply that there is no free no; the soft determinist says that free will is compatible with determinism. The libertarian position, on the other hand, denies that determinism applies to the realm of human agency. A person’s will is causally undetermined. According to libertarianism, if the clock were rolled back, then radically different things could happen than what happened the first time. This is because humans could choose differently the next time around even though all antecedent conditions including beliefs and desires remained the same.

One objection that libertarianism faces is that if our wills are causally undetermined, then how can we make sense of the choices that a person makes? The hard and soft determinists both make sense of human choice in relation to the desires and beliefs of an agent. Bob desires to read a book and he believes there are books on the bookshelf; so he goes over to the bookshelf. On both determinist views Bob’s desires and beliefs cause him to go to the bookshelf; the same goes for all of his other choices. But the libertarian denies that Bob’s will is causally determined by anything; so how do we explain why Bob chose to go the bookshelf? For we want to maintain that Bob’s choices and actions are rational—they don’t occur for no reason or randomly or arbitrarily.

The libertarian response is to say that Bob’s actions are explicable in terms of his reasons. Here the libertarian makes a distinction between reasons as causes and reasons as goal directed intentions. We can ask for the reason the rock fell off the cliff and we expect a causal explanation. But we can also speak of a person’s reasons for acting in terms of her goals. Bob goes to the book shelf in order to fulfill the purpose or goal of getting a book to read. Nevertheless, Bob could have also chosen to ignore the goal of getting a book to read.

However, the above response does not really save libertarianism. Imagine two parallel worlds: W1 and W2. At time T1 both worlds are exactly the same in all respects, e.g., same histories, same people, objects, etc. Bob exists in both worlds; so we have Bob1 and Bob2. Assume libertarianism is true. At time T2 Bob1 goes to the bookshelf and gets a book. We explain that choice by saying that Bob1 had the goal of reading a book and believed books were on the bookshelf. At time T2, Bob2 goes to the kitchen and gets a glass of water. We explain that choice by saying that Bob2 had the goal of quenching his thirst and believed water was available in the kitchen. So Bob1’s and Bob2’s actions are seemingly explainable under libertarianism, despite the fact that they aren’t causally explainable, since the actions were not causally determined.

Despite the above appearance of libertarianism being able to adequately explain a person’s actions, there is the following problem for libertarianism. We cannot make sense of why Bob1 went to the bookshelf at time T2 and not the kitchen, and Bob2 went to the kitchen at time T2 and not the bookshelf. At time T1 both Bobs have the same exact set of beliefs, desires, emotions, etc. Now we can appeal to Bob1’s goal of reading a book to explain why he went to the bookshelf and Bob2’s goal of quenching his thirst to explain why he went to the kitchen. However, given the details of the example, Bob1 must also have the goal to quench his thirst at time T1 and Bob2 must also have the goal to read a book at time T1. According to libertarianism, each Bob is free to choose which goal to try to achieve. However, since Bob1 and Bob2 have all of the same goals, beliefs, etc., there is nothing different between them to which we can appeal to explain why Bob1 chose to go the bookshelf at time T2 and Bob2 chose to go the kitchen at time T2. Their individual actions are explainable, but libertarianism cannot explain why one choice is made instead of another.

The libertarian might say that Bob2 decided that quenching his thirst was more important than reading a book, and vice versa for Bob1. But in virtue of what did Bob2 make that decision? And the same question applies to Bob1? Their beliefs, goals, desires, etc., are all the same. So, neither Bob can appeal to beliefs, desires, etc., that the other does not have in order to explain the different weight given to the goals chosen, goals which are meant to explain their actions. So under libertarianism, the decision to do one action over the other ends up being arbitrary after all. Thus, libertarianism cannot actually explain or make rational why an agent chooses one course of action over another.

I'd argue that determinism only makes sense if chance is eliminated. Chance is never eliminated, thus determinism reduces to mere, sometimes lurid, observations about possibilities. A red flag (for me) in the argument is cause-and-effect, at very best not a simple idea viewed up close, and in most cases a convenient fiction and no more. Not, then, a weight-bearing leg for any argument. And in-so-far as determinism is fictive, so too free will.

Given these conclusions, it remains to ask just what, exactly, anyone means when they "argue" either free-will or determinism. It seems to me these cannot even be approached until and unless a lot of nonsense is cleared away.

I'd argue that determinism only makes sense if chance is eliminated. — tim wood

Determinism isn't really the alternative here.

The two alternatives at play, as far as I can tell, are "libertarian free will makes sense" and "libertarian free will doesn't make sense". The reasoning in the linked article is why I believe libertarian free will doesn't make sense - even if we live in an indeterministic world.

I think neither determinism nor randomness have anyrhing to do with free will; they are both equally conducive or non-conducive to it. The concept of free will in its prima facie conception makes absolutely no sense when you try to place it in the framework of any kind of scientific framework. The only kind of "free will" that makes sense is something that is kind of trivial like the psychological experience of agency or choice-making under regular psychological conditions.

So under libertarianism, the decision to do one action over the other ends up being arbitrary after all. Thus, libertarianism cannot actually explain or make rational why an agent chooses one course of action over another.

Then neither does determinism. It would seem both are incomplete models. But to draw a conclusion is to commit the fallacy of knowing because you do not know. And it could be that having Bob1 and Bob2 as identical in all respects is just plain not possible - indeed, how could it be?

In this post I will argue that libertarianism cannot actually explain or make rational why an agent chooses one course of action over another. — George Wrisley

I used to always have tea at breakfast, but I have changed my habit and nowadays I always have coffee. Not being able to explain such things is integral to the freedom one has.I changed my mind. And that, I would suggest, is a freedom that one always has, but does not always exercise.

But I would say that it is not by an act of will that one exercises one's freedom, that is rather a contradiction, 'will' being a determining factor in the sense that to be strong willed is to be determined.

Can anyone else change their mind, or are you all determined to be determined? A determined mind is a programmed mind, and freedom is what allows the mind to be responsive. To a determinist, the mind is a mere epiphenomenon, because it has no known cause or effect.

You haven't engaged with the reasoning presented in the article.

You haven't engaged with the reasoning presented in the article. — flannel jesus

That's true. I have presented another position, with other reasoning.

In short, I agree that 'free-will' is incoherent; that is the extent of my engagement. I then propose that 'freedom' is not incoherent.

Then neither does determinism. It would seem both are incomplete models. — tim wood

They're not models, and they're not incomplete. They're categories. For any system that evolves in time, you can categorise that system as deterministic, or if it's not deterministic you can categorise it as indeterministic.

For people who believe in libertarian free will, they would say that if you can categorise the system that is Our Universe as deterministic, we can't have free will - libertarian free will believers posit that we have free will, and that we must live in an indeterministic universe in order to have that.

But the problem that the article points out is, if you drill in to any individual indeterministic choice - which is to say, a choice that has a non 0 percent chance of happening differently under the exact same conditions, and an ontologically real chance, not just a chance based on ignorance - then if we do watch it play out differently, that different result can't be attributed to the agent.

Determinism doesn't have that struggle because determinists don't say "we only have free will if we can ontologically, really do a different thing even under the exact same circumstances".

And it could be that having Bob1 and Bob2 as identical in all respects is just plain not possible - indeed, how could it be? — tim wood

just fyi, literally nobody is talking about it being actually possible for us to set this up in real life. Nobody thinks we can -actually- do that. The entire post you're reading is a thought experiment, and it can never be more than a thought experiment. He's thinking through the consequences of indeterminism, as a thought experiment.

The entire post you're reading is a thought experiment, and it can never be more than a thought experiment. He's thinking through the consequences of indeterminism, as a thought experiment. — flannel jesus

And the output depends on the input. Impossible in, useless out. Categories are either/or constructs. Aristotle certainly developed ideas about them, but he also adduced the alternative notion of neither/nor.

And that leaves a question:

then if we do watch it play out differently, that different result can't be attributed to the agent. — flannel jesus

Proof - without resorting to impossible conditions?

I don't know what you're trying to say.

I don't know what you're trying to say. — flannel jesus

The argument you cite in your OP seems categorical in its conclusion, but that conclusion seeming based on what-if reasoning. Thus the conclusion based on what-if land, and you can't get here from there.

Or more explicitly, the right expression of the conclusion should be: if or given an initial condition, then a certain conclusion follows. We agree the initial condition is impossible, and thus the conclusion is conjectural and not categorical.

The argument you cite in your OP seems categorical in its conclusion, but that conclusion seeming based on what-if reasoning. — tim wood

Yup, the history of philosophy and science is full of people doing thought experiments without the ability to immediately conduct those experiments in reality. I'm comfortable with thinking about ideas, even if I can't physically test them.

If you don't like thinking about ideas you can't physically test, perhaps this post won't appeal to you much. That's okay.

Yup, the history of philosophy and science is full of people doing thought experiments without the ability to immediately conduct those experiments in reality. I'm comfortable with thinking about ideas, even if I can't physically test them. — flannel jesus

Amen. Just some care is needed in affirming them and how they're affirmed. And recognizing what can and cannot be tested.

Amen. Just some care is needed in affirming them and how they're affirmed. And recognizing what can and cannot be tested. — tim wood

Ok, so now that you know it's a thought experiment, and not a real experiment, and nobody thinks it's a real experiment and nobody is suggesting we conduct it in physical reality, you're invited to actually think about the ideas he presented, in regards to Bob1 and Bob2, or... not. You may just wholesale decline the invitation.

But the problem that the article points out is, if you drill in to any individual indeterministic choice - which is to say, a choice that has a non 0 percent chance of happening differently under the exact same conditions, and an ontologically real chance, not just a chance based on ignorance - then if we do watch it play out differently, that different result can't be attributed to the agent. — flannel jesus

In short, if the outcome is random no libertarian free will' if the outcome is causally determined again no libertarian free will. The article (and I grant I haven't taken my time in reading it) completely forsakes teleological reasoning and teleological determinacy (actions determined not by efficient causes but by the telos intended).

Indeterminacy comes in many different varieties, basically solely signifying not-causally-deterministic-in-full.

Furthermore, in lived experience (and not inferential guesswork) we only make choices in times of psychological uncertainty and never when we hold full psychological certainty as to what is to be done. In certain ontologies, this very psychological uncertainty as to which one of two or more alternatives are best can then overlap with ontological uncertainty in regard to future possible realities.

To make this somewhat more concrete, suppose you intend to go to the store to get some food. You thereby get into your car and start driving on the most direct streets toward the store - getting there with minimal waste of time being the telos which determines that you so drive (rather than taking a leisurely walk, for example). At the first stop-sign, though, there's an unexpected car accident that prevents you from following your initially planed course. At this juncture only, you will then have alternatives to choose between: say, going back home and purchasing supplies later, going left toward the store rather than straight ahead, or going right toward the same destination. Now suppose you take time to conceiously deliberate (weigh the pros and cons of each alternative). You don't have full psychological certainty of which alternative best satisfies your more distant telos: that of not being hungry. In this deliberation, you figure that because going right will lead you the fastest to the store on the available streets despite likely heavier traffic, and so you turn right. This decision, choice, is then that of a libertarian free will, for as far as you know going left, despite taking longer to drive on streets, might have been the fastest path on account of far lesser traffic. The choice was ultimately (under libertarian free will) yours as an agent. It was neither random nor fully determined by efficient causes. And you could have chosen differently under the same exact circumstances (both external and internal: beliefs, thoughts, etc. in a time of psychological uncertainty as to which alternative best satisfies one's telos). Responsibility for what happens then is yours as an agent.

This isn't meant as any kind of logical proof for libertarian free will, but it is intended to at least illustrate its possibility.

In short, if the outcome is random no libertarian free will' if the outcome is causally determined again no libertarian free will. — javra

yup

The article (and I grant I haven't taken my time in reading it) completely forsakes teleological reasoning and teleological determinacy — javra

Thank god for that

This decision, choice, is then that of a libertarian free will, for as far as you know going left, despite taking longer to drive on streets, might have been the fastest path on account of far lesser traffic. The choice was ultimately (under libertarian free will) yours as an agent. It was neither random nor fully determined by efficient causes. And you could have chosen differently under the same exact circumstances — javra

And why is that fact - that the choice could be different if everything were the same - relevant? Would you still have made a free choice even if, in that moment, you were guaranteed by the facts of the circumstance to make that choice, no matter how many times we replay that scenario?

And why is that fact - that the choice could be different if everything were the same - relevant? Would you still have made a free choice even if, in that moment, you were guaranteed by the facts of the circumstance to make that choice, no matter how many times we replay that scenario? — flannel jesus

As to the second question: Some previously made choices in my life, most certainly not - not due to what I know of their outcomes but due to changes in character with which the choice was made to begin with. Other choices, most likely yes.

As to significance, because that's what librarian agential free will signifies.

As to the second question: Some previously made choices in my life, most certainly not - not due to what I know of their outcomes but due to changes in character with which the choice was made to begin with. Other choices, most likely yes. — javra

I don't understand what you mean by this. Most certainly not what - can you be explicit please? Are you saying the choice would be free even if it was guaranteed by the circumstances and the state of your mind?

Yes, I've currently got my mind in two places at once, so to speak. And need to take off soon enough. Misread the quote to read something along the lines of "would you have chosen differently than you did in the past given the same exact contexts". My bad, obviously, for having misread, but it is to that misreading that I replied.

"would you have chosen differently than you did in the past given the same exact contexts". My bad, obviously, for having misread, but it is to that misreading that I replied. — javra

I see, I thought your repsonse sounded like that kind of tthing.

No, we can all agree that if you're in a similar circumstance at a completely different point in life, that you're likely to make a different decision. That's not part of the debate.

That's part of wha tI like about the article that I posted - it's very clear about that. Before the choice bob1 and bob2 are *exactly* the same and in the *exact* same situation. That's what the conversation revolves around. Because again, everyone agrees that you'd make a different choice if you're no longer exactly the same person as you were the first time you made that choice.

Yes, but again, you are presuming a forced choice between randomness and causal determinacy - with a "thank god" attitude for not entertaining teleological reasoning of intentions.

Why doesn't 1 + X = 2 irrespective of whether one equates X to 0 or to 2? Because it cant.

I'm off for now.

Yes, but again, you are presuming a forced choice between randomness and causal determinacy - — javra

It's my understanding that they're mutually exclusive and mutually exhaustive. I've never been given a coherent reason to think otherwise, and I don't currently think there is a coherent reason to believe otherwise. I'm actually inclined to think it's basically tautologically true that, for any given evolution of a closed system from one state into another state, either that evolution is deterministic or it involves some randomness.

The argument in the OP, though, doesn't invoke randomness. We don't even have to bring up that word in this context.

Have fun doing whatever you're up to.

Have fun doing whatever you're up to. — flannel jesus

Visited my father's gravesite with other to commemorate his death. Not exactly what I take ought to be fun. But thanks anyway.

It's my understanding that they're mutually exclusive and mutually exhaustive. I've never been given a coherent reason to think otherwise, and I don't currently think there is a coherent reason to believe otherwise. I'm actually inclined to think it's basically tautologically true that, for any given evolution of a closed system from one state into another state, either that evolution is deterministic or it involves some randomness. — flannel jesus

On what grounds do you justify this rather stringent opinion?

As I previously alluded to, I disagree with it on grounds that I take the teleological reasoning of intentioning to be ontically occurrent and hence real. And it can neither be efficient causation nor randomness.

At any rate, glad you're aware enough of your own convictions.

But, to be honest, I'm mainly replying due to not then understanding what you intend by the word "will" other than something which lacks an ontological referent, as in this sentence:

... well, maybe something different might happen, but you can't attribute that difference to your will. — flannel jesus

To be clearer, if will, volition - be it conscious or unconscious - has nothing to do with intentioning and hence with teleology (succinctly, the movement toward ends such that the not yet actualized ends pursued to some measure determine the actions taken in the present), then what is "the will" to you?

To be clearer, if will, volition - be it conscious or unconscious - has nothing to do with intentioning and hence with teleology (succinctly, the movement toward ends such that the not yet actualized ends pursued to some measure determine the actions taken in the present), then what is "the will" to you? — javra

None of that looks to me like it has anything to do with what I said. I never said any of those things at all, I don't think.

None of that looks to me like it has anything to do with what I said. I never said any of those things at all, I don't think. — flannel jesus

It's based on best interpretations of this comment:

The article (and I grant I haven't taken my time in reading it) completely forsakes teleological reasoning and teleological determinacy — javra


Thank god for that — flannel jesus

How else ought this comment of yours be interpreted, especially when taken into context of what I was expressing about intentioning's teleological reasoning and determinacy?

I thought you said "theological" lol.

I thought you said "theological" lol. — flannel jesus

Oh. OK

the "thank god" was meant to be a joke