This is sort of an interesting thread. I can see how it intersects with your interests, @J. Note that I am arriving from the citation in .

But I’ll cut to the chase and say that I think the argument as a whole can be defeated simply by denying the characterization of what a stance voluntarist does. Pincock’s language includes phrases such as “no reason that obliges them,” “not adopt[ing] their realist stance on the basis of any reasons that reflect the truth,” “no connection to the truth,” and “not appropriately connected to the truth.” These all-or-nothing characterizations can only hold water if we accept Pincock’s idea that a theoretical reason must result in rational obligation. (I should point out that the first phrase, “no reason that obliges them,” would be conceded by Chakravartty. But he would not concede that there are no theoretical reasons that could have a bearing, or influence the decision – merely that they don’t result in rational obligation, and that others could have different reasons for their stances, or weight them differently.)

As we know, Pincock maintains that the stance voluntarist has no theoretical reasons of any sort for their adoption of a stance. For Pincock, only “desires and values” can form the basis for (voluntarily) adopting a stance. Once again, if we look back at Chakravartty’s description of how he understands an epistemic stance, this seems to be a misreading: — J

Let's construe Pincock's argument as saying that, "Chakravartty has no reason to adopt one stance rather than another, when choosing among the subset of stances which are rational." This looks to be the most charitable interpretation, and it precludes the response that, "Choosing one stance involves 'rational choice' because one can produce reasons in favor of that stance."

Suppose all possible stances are represented by the set {A, B, C, ..., X, Y, Z}. And suppose that Chakravartty's set of "rationally permissible" stances is {A, B, C, D} (and therefore 4/26 stances are rationally permissible). Given this, my construal of Pincock's argument pertains to "choosing among the subset of stances which are rational," i.e. {A, B, C, D}. Chakravartty can say that he has a reason to adopt C rather than F, and that he has a reason to adopt C simpliciter, but he apparently cannot say that he has a reason to adopt C rather than D (which is what he needs to say if he is to properly answer Pincock).

This way of construing Pincock's argument has much to recommend it, given that it is in line with what is traditionally understood as "voluntarism." Namely, voluntarism posits that the choice in question is traced to the will rather than the intellect, such that one might explain their choice by saying, "I did it because I wanted to, not because I was rationally guided to do so." *

I think Chakravartty tries and fails to address this difficulty in section 3. We can boil it down with the dichotomy, "Either you have a reason for your choice or you don't" (where the voluntaristic answer that "I wanted to" does not count as a reason). Does Chakravartty have a principled (all-things-considered) reason to choose C and reject D? Apparently he can't have a principled reason, because if he did then D would not be "rationally permissible" (for him). The whole rationale for voluntarism—including stance voluntarism—is that the subset of rationally permissible stances ({A, B, C, D}) are equally rational, and are therefore immune to rational predilection. Voluntarism entails that a decision between C and D is not rationally adjudicable.

This constitutes an internal problem for Chakravartty, because at the end of his paper he assumes he is still entitled to the general idea that we should "encourage others... to see things our way":

To add to this dialogue the assurance that “I, not you, possess a uniquely rational epistemic stance” adds nothing of rhetorical or persuasive power. In contrast, to endeavor to elaborate, to explain, to scrutinize, and to understand the nature of opposing stances (to engage in what I call “collaborative epistemology”)—and to encourage others, when our own stances appear to pass the tests of consistency and coherence, to see things our way, upon reflection—is to do our best. There is no insight into epistemic rationality to be gained by demanding more than this. — Chakravartty, 1314

This is a nice moral sentiment, but it isn't rationally coherent. If the voluntarist claims that the subset of rationally permissible stances are not rationally adjudicable, then he is not rationally permitted to "encourage others" to drop their D and adopt his C, given that there are, by definition, no compelling reasons to choose C over D. He must restrict his stance-disagreements to those interlocutors who hold to one of the 22 stances which are not rationally permissible.

If Chakravartty wants to coherently "encourage others to see things his way," then he must reject his own voluntarism. He doesn't need to be an ass about it, but he must hold that, "My epistemic stance is more rational than yours." If he doesn't hold that then he has no grounds to try to convince his interlocutor to reject D and adopt C. If he is a true voluntarist then he would not argue against the stance of someone who holds to one of the four rationally permissible stances.


* Note that voluntarism signifies choice or will, but if the "values" that Pincock characterizes are inherited rather than chosen then everything I say here still follows. Any non-rational predilection for C will result in the same problem, whether that predilection is based on will, inheritance, or anything else. As long as Chakravartty cannot hold to A, B, C, and D all at the same time, he will be forced to possess one rationally permissible stance rather than another, yet without having a reason that counts as a worthy reason to choose among that subset of stances. Thus Pincock's point about the realist will also apply to Chakravartty himself, who sees himself to hold C rather than A, B, or D, for no good reason at all. This creates a deep incoherence between the non-rational stance and the "rational" effects that flow out of it. @fdrake is correct to note that the stance cannot be cordoned off in this way. In real life when someone notices that they have no good reasons to hold C, they simply stop holding it and end up trying to hold to the four rationally permissible stances equally.


(For the record, I find both authors to be rather confused, especially Pincock. So I'm not throwing in with Pincock. Pincock is using "rational obligation" in a softer sense than Chakravartty recognizes, but given that Pincock is clear about his usage the misunderstanding is on Chakravartty (unless the draft Chakravartty read was substantially different than the published paper). If Chakravartty thinks he possesses some coherent distinction between 'rational choice' and 'rational obligation', then the onus is certainly on him to make that distinction clear. It seems to me that he relies heavily on ambiguous and undefined terms, including "rational obligation.")

and thus undermine a stance's construal as "upstream" from facts and matters of ontology. — fdrake

Good post. The vagueness of a "stance" strikes me as a big problem, and this point about cordoning stances off from their downstream "effects" is a good example of that.

I would prefer Aristotle's Rhetoric or Newman's Grammar of Assent. In the Rhetoric Aristotle talks about "enthymeme," by which he means a "shooting from the hip" sort of argument (as one would be likely to hear when a politician tries to make a point given a very short bit of time). That sort of argument can hit or miss depending on the background conditions of one's hearers. Even Pincock's abductive reasoning would be a form of "enthymeme" for Aristotle.

The trouble with "enthymeme" is that it is a kind of per accidens argument. It is like tossing a hand grenade into the fray and hoping you hit someone. For this reason the phenomena surrounding that sort of argument isn't scientifically precise or predictable. Chakravartty can only pretend that a study of that sort of argumentation is scientific by talking about "stances" and pretending that he has some relatively precise notion of what he means by a "stance." He almost certainly does not. This tends to make his thesis vacuous, like the certitude that neither Alice nor Bob are irrational in their preferred sample size.

The issue from that other thread is catalogued and addressed more completely in . An excerpt:

Suppose all possible stances are represented by the set {A, B, C, ..., X, Y, Z}. And suppose that Chakravartty's set of "rationally permissible" stances is {A, B, C, D} (and therefore 4/26 stances are rationally permissible). Given this, my construal of Pincock's argument pertains to "choosing among the subset of stances which are rational," i.e. {A, B, C, D}. Chakravartty can say that he has a reason to adopt C rather than F, and that he has a reason to adopt C simpliciter, but he apparently cannot say that he has a reason to adopt C rather than D (which is what he needs to say if he is to properly answer Pincock). — Leontiskos

Chakravartty is claiming that we should "encourage others... to see things our way" even if we both hold to one of the four non-adjudicable, rationally permissible stances. He says that if I claim that my stance is better than yours, this "adds nothing of rhetorical or persuasive power." Obviously he is wrong, given that moving from <my stance is better than yours> to <my stance is not better than yours> impacts the persuasive force, not to mention the whole foundation for a reason to discuss the matter in the first place.

Chakravartty's work is helpful insofar as it codifies the incoherence of "pluralism" into a clearer position. Pincock's opposition is lackluster at times, and Chakravartty misrepresents him on things like "rational obligation," but I think Chakravartty's attempt makes it easier to see the incoherence of "pluralism." He is trying to give the clear position which no one on TPF is willing to offer. Once we steelman Pincock the rest is easy enough:

Let's construe Pincock's argument as saying that, "Chakravartty has no reason to adopt one stance rather than another, when choosing among the subset of stances which are rational." This looks to be the most charitable interpretation, and it precludes the response that, "Choosing one stance involves 'rational choice' because one can produce reasons in favor of that stance." — Leontiskos

The moral of the story is that if someone takes up Chakravartty's stance voluntarism, then they must give up their ability to "encourage others... to see things our way." By definition, the stance voluntarist has no reasons for why someone should "see things his way." More advanced ages could see this fact in the blink of an eye.