What is the point in laying out moral edicts that are so abstract and impractical when the layman already has a fairly solid intuitive grasp of how to act ethically based off sheer compassion and, for want of a better term, "common sense"? — Dorrian

I am not sure, but are you suggesting we all have compassion and basically the same life experience, manifesting a shared "common sense"?

I am thinking of people who, by their own account, were pretty unpleasant people. One such person believes his radical change into a compassionate and gentle person was a miracle he experienced when he was baptized and became a Christian. He praises God for this miracle.

I forget the experience that another man believes changed his life, but I remember he explained as a fascist, he enjoyed being brutally cruel. The cruelest of the group had the most status within the group. Then one day, he had an experience that totally turned his life around. He now attempts to turn others around.

I don't think we should trust the layman's "common sense". These people can become fascist and agree to do very cruel things to others, such as the KKK and the terrorism it practiced in the persecution of people of color. Nice Christian ladies were very much a part of the persecution of people of color as they united and intentionally spread a culture built on the history of slavery. In Germany, this was expressed in the persecution of Jews and mass murder. We are still dealing with these problems, so your belief in "common sense" may be in error.

I think of this sort of knowledge as an 'act of faith', ultimately. To say that we can define human nature seems impossible to me, given that our understanding of what that means is inevitably evolving. — Jeremy Murray

I would say human nature comes from the evolution of our species. We are naked apes (without hair covering us). Anthropology is one path of studying human nature.

Anthropology is the study of humanity, encompassing its biological, cultural, and social aspects, both past and present. It aims to understand the human experience, including our origins, diversity, and social structures across time and geographic regions AI

Right now, we are learning a lot through brain imaging. We can actually see different areas of the brain light up when they are stimulated. This is a far better way of understanding our nature than reading the Bible.

The journal "Brain Imaging and Behavior" has an impact factor of 3.2 (2022). The journal also has a 5-year impact factor of 3.6 (2022). The journal's research focuses on the interface between functional brain imaging and human behavior, publishing research on mechanisms, diagnosis, treatment, and prevention of disorders of higher brain function. AI

I also love comparing religions. We are what we believe we should be, and basically, there is much religious agreement, but the mythology is different. Hinduism and Buddhism have different mythologies compared to Judaism, Islam, and Christianity, which share the same mythology from the perspective of different cultures. Christianity seems to be a combination of many religions that were popular back in the day, with the story of Jesus being familiar in other religions.

History has to be included as an interesting way to study humans, along with sociology. psychology, and related sciences. I think we can be confident in science and the collection of facts to understand humans, and then practice self-government through a democratic republic.

Glad you liked it. It's a good book. One thing to bear in mind is that in most pre-modern ethics "good" is predicated of something as respects some end, i.e., does an act lead toward/attain its end? Yet ends themselves can also be said to be "good" as respects some other end (e.g. I study medicine in order to be able to provide medical care (end 1) so that I can help promote health in myself and others (end 2); end 1 is ordered to end 2). Hence, when trying to order ethics, we are looking for a good that is "sought for its own sake, not on account of anything else" and a "highest good" by which all other goods/ends can be ordered.

This is why pre-modern Christians, far things being good or bad themselves, we have an analysis of use towards different ends: "Nothing created by God is evil. It is not food that is evil but gluttony, not the begetting of children but unchastity, not material things but avarice, not glory but vainglory. It is only the misuse of things that is evil, not the things themselves . (St. Maximus the Confessor). This is also why St. Augustine breaks his analysis down into "things sought to be used" and "things sought as a final end" (a distinction Plato and Aristotle make as well).

"Practical reason" is reasoning about what is good (and thus action), as opposed to "theoretical reason" which targets truth. A key thing to note here is that ethics is not the architectonic science of practical reason. That is politics. Ethics is about how we live good lives, are good people, develop excellence, etc. A good human life involves common goods, and "spiritual goods" (i.e. those goods that do not diminish when shared). But, the promotion of the good of all properly relates to the science of the common good, to the polis. This is just like how the art of bridal-making must be ordered to horseback riding, or shipbuilding to sailing. A problem that MacIntyre doesn't make particularly clear is that contemporary ethics tends to collapse politics and ethics, or to conflate the two. This is why contemporary ethics has such a hard time refuting the "rational egoist," Homo oeconomicus; first because it often has a poor conception of common and spiritual goods (not always true though), and second because it has collapsed the distinction between the good of the polis and the good of its members. These are deeply related, but not the same thing.

As Aquinas helpfully distinguishes in the commentary on Aristotle's Ethics: "moral philosophy is divided into three parts. The first of these, which is called individual (monastic) ethics, considers an individual’s operations as ordered to an end. The second, called domestic ethics, considers the operations of the domestic group. The third, called political science, considers the operations of the civic group." Collapsing these into one amorphous soup is not helpful, particularly for kids as respects education.

↪Tom Storm I'm unsure, as it's never been particularly attractive to me, but it sounds that way.
A person steeped in Wahabi teachings couldn't be "virtuous" as compared to a Catholic vicar. Or, for that matter, a physicist. LOL.

What "virtue ethics" are you referring to? In general, people of any background or vocation are capable of virtue. The four cardinal virtues have nothing explicitly to do with religion; indeed they are distinguished from the three "theological virtues." That's certainly the case in the mainstream Thomistic virtue ethics that is popular in Catholic philosophy. Dante, for instance, has Pagans and Muslims spared from torment due to their virtue in Limbo, while most of Hell is populated by Christians.

One need not have any particular profession nor profess any particular religion to possess fortitude, justice, temperance, and prudence. Rather, the idea is that the pursuit of the spiritual life aids in/is essential to the perfection of these, but by no means their mere possession. But "progress in the spiritual life" is also in no way equivalent with "professing faith" (again, with Dante, we see a lot of high-ranking clergy in Hell).



In Aristotle, yes, this is true to some extent. I think this comes out even stronger in the Chinese tradition, although I am less familiar with it. It's negated in Christian and Buddhist virtue ethics though, and even in the later Pagan virtue-ethics to a large extent. Epictetus notes that some slaves are able to attain to freedom while most masters are slaves to their vices for instance. Aristotle's elitism can also be moderated by the idea that the ideal polis works more to make "every man a king," as opposed to "every king a commoner." This is true for Plato as well to a lesser extent as well. To the question: "who should be the philosopher kings," it would seem the answer is probably "as many as possible." Plato's ideal city is complicated by the fact that it is:

A. Really meant to be an analogy of the soul, and there are difficulties in looking at it purely politically; and
B. To the extent it is based on real cities, one has to understand that in Plato's time most people had to spend most of their time working on agriculture or else everyone starves, and defense also had to be a major focus.

There is a weird sort of relationship between modern culture and elitism, particularly on the left. There is an obsession with access to elite institutions, particularly universities and prep schools, but then this is paired with a denial that having received this sort of elite cultivation actually makes the elite any more suited to leadership. This is sort of contradictory though. If going to an elite prep school and Yale didn't better prepare one for leadership, or career/political success, then there would be no reason to expend so much effort trying to make sure that different people had access to these things. They would be hollow, ineffective status symbols. People could get ahead by ignoring them.

IDK, this to me suggests a deeper internal contradiction vis-a-vis the heavy focus on "meritocracy" (a meritocracy that currently seems to be reducing social mobility). Meritocracy is not conducive to equality. A lot of liberal theory (e.g. Mill) is very much focused on empowering the "exceptional individual." The post-Marxist left is very much on board with this sort of thinking it would seem, but then this leads to an obsession with "fair access" to becoming an "exceptional individual" through "merit," and thus an obsession with merit itself.

Yet you cannot have a system designed to ruthlessly sort winners from losers and equality and dignity for all. The system is very much based on the idea that there are "winners." The "head" is considered more noble than the rest of the body, more essential, and more free, which inevitably leads towards a no-holds bared race to "get a-head." We are a far way from de Tocqueville's America (or perhaps rather, we are where he saw it heading in the long run, a mix of anarchy and an omnipresent bureaucracy that recreates the old-world authoritarian state; the worst of both worlds.)

I don't think you've understood what I've said, at all.

Everything you've said applies what I am noting, and exactly what makes it unattractive to me.

My understanding of hte way virtue ethics work is that its a non-religious moral system that allows someone to say "The type of person i ought to be is *insert religious ideal*" and so work toward that, under the guise of non-religious development. — AmadeusD

Hey man!

I reject your framing.

I don't really know the history of people who advance this premise philosophically.

I just know that most people today seem to frame moral issues as either utilitarian (left) or deontological (right).

I celebrated McIntyre's argument because it aligned with my personal experiences - that expecting people to be able to do utilitarian math is stupid, since it is not possible.

and as an avowed atheist - not a default atheist - i reject deontology.

the only moral system that resonates with me is the aspirational moral system.

I don't care that values meant different things when Aristotle described them.

none of the alternatives require work.

for sure, it seems elitist, to argue that some people are better equipped to make moral decisions for others.

but then again, some people are better equipped to make moral decisions than others.

There is a weird sort of relationship between modern culture and elitism, particularly on the left. There is an obsession with access to elite institutions, particularly universities and prep schools, but then this is paired with a denial that having received this sort of elite cultivation actually makes the elite any more suited to leadership. This is sort of contradictory though. If going to an elite prep school and Yale didn't better prepare one for leadership, or career/political success, then there would be no reason to expend so much effort trying to make sure that different people had access to these things. They would be hollow, ineffective status symbols. People could get ahead by ignoring them. — Count Timothy von Icarus

It is odd. In my experince, here, it's the left that is often elitist - in terms of culture and it's the right who are generally the low brow. I guess it all depends upon how one frames elite. Are we talking who owns the means of production, or who owns some Penguin classics?

I am reminded of art critic Robert Hughes' stance from his autobiography - "I am completely an elitist in the cultural but emphatically not the social sense. I prefer the good to the bad, the articulate to the mumbling, the aesthetically developed to the merely primitive, and full to partial consciousness. I love the spectacle of skill, whether it's an expert gardener at work or a good carpenter chopping dovetails. I don't think stupid or ill-read people are as good to be with as wise and fully literate ones."

One thing to bear in mind is that in most pre-modern ethics "good" is predicated of something as respects some end — Count Timothy von Icarus

right. but, from a modern perspective, does that matter? I know the premise was that historical ethical systems are embedded in modern ones, but the fact that aristotelean ethics were embedded earlier means that they are inevitably fundamental today?

me, personally, I'm just looking for a belief system as an atheist. virtue ethics might be considered the best system, even if flawed? that sure felt like McIntyre's conclusion.

I assume the most positive human thing possible is to aspire to betterment. 'betterment' is historically contingent.

to me, as a default, virtue ethics is superior given the fact that equips someone to make 'moral' decisions in the moment, whereas both utilitarianism and deontology seem to imply that there is a 'correct' answer to arrive at, rather than the 'best' answer of virtue ethics?

I don't really know the history of people who advance this premise philosophically. — Jeremy Murray

here you go :)

aspirational moral system — Jeremy Murray

Virtue Ethics, then. This is what I am critiquing. It allows for whatever 'aspirations' one can coherently generate to be followed. Not really the boundaries I would prefer, at any rate.

some people are better equipped to make moral decisions than others. — Jeremy Murray

I'm unsure this makes sense in a aspirational system. Your aspirations wont match the person's who you are making decisions for. On it's face, I feel as if this is true, though.

the point isn't what's 'right' or 'wrong', since both are unknowable, the point is being better positioned to answer and act when it matters.

I don't care that my aspirations don't match others, or are not obviously right or wrong.

I believe that I am better positioned to make ethical decisions if i practice morality. I practice morality by aspiring to virtues. as do others who disagree with me on virtue considerations. the virtues are debatable, the premise is debatable.

But what seems more 'true' to me in terms of virtue ethics is that virtue requires work.

my teaching colleagues happy to tell our boys that they are 'toxic' are not doing work. they are just repeating whatever is the dominant belief system.

I can still forgive them, work with them, do better for kids, in that we all believe we are pursuing virtue.

utilitarianism and deontology would prevent that, no?

so, if not, what then?

I believe that I am better positioned to make ethical decisions if i practice morality. I practice morality by aspiring to virtues. as do others who disagree with me on virtue considerations. the virtues are debatable, the premise is debatable. — Jeremy Murray

Yep. And that makes me extremely uncomfortable. Not that its 'wrong'. Can't quite see what's being got at here..

they are just repeating whatever is the dominant belief system. — Jeremy Murray

This is exactly hte pitfall I am decrying (though, i used a religious basis to illustrate it).

utilitarianism and deontology would prevent that, no? — Jeremy Murray

Sort of. But I am not partial to any of the three systems hereabouts noted.

The formal systems of so-called morality you discuss are more about how someone thinks other people should behave. As I see it, that's not morality at all, it's social control — T Clark

The older I get the and the more permissive society has become a little bit of agreed social control would be good thing.

I have thousands of unwritten rules for all occasions and these change as circumstances change. Are they morals? I don't think they are but I like when I recently thought about why I think and act how I do, it was quite amusing think of the actions consciously. We all do it but the structure of my thousands of rules come from a fairly consistent framework. Many people have a terrible framework for making decisions and how they act. Is that a lack of morals or just bad coping strategies for how they've been raised?

The older I get the and the more permissive society has become a little bit of agreed social control would be good thing. — Malcolm Parry

I wasn’t speaking against social control, it’s needed. I was only making the distinction between that and morality. But when you take out the idea of morality, social control loses much of its authority. And that’s probably a good thing. They’re doing it because they want to control my behavior, not because I did anything wrong.

I wasn’t speaking against social control, it’s needed. I was only making the distinction between that and morality. But when you take out the idea of morality, social control loses much of its authority. And that’s probably a good thing. They’re doing it because they want to control my behavior, not because I did anything wrong. — T Clark

I think society needs controlling without any need for recourse to morality. It shouldn’t be a “they” it should be a “we”
We need a framework for social interactions that don’t need to be linked with morality. A few social expectations of behaviour and dress would be a nice start.

I think society needs controlling without any need for recourse to morality. It shouldn’t be a “they” it should be a “we”
We need a framework for social interactions that don’t need to be linked with morality. A few social expectations of behaviour and dress would be a nice start. — Malcolm Parry

You write as if there is not such a system in place already. There is, but perhaps it is not being done in accordance with your preferences. There is often no consensus on who is we and who is they.

You write as if there is not such a system in place already. There is, but perhaps it is not being done in accordance with your preferences. There is often no consensus on who is we and who is they. — T Clark

Yes that is correct. It definitely isn’t being done as I think it should.

It definitely isn’t being done as I think it should. — Malcolm Parry

Without knowing for certain, I’m guessing how you think it should be done is significantly different from how I think it should be done.

Without knowing for certain, I’m guessing how you think it should be done is significantly different from how I think it should be done. — T Clark

Guess away. I’m a slightly left of centre liberal who expects people to step up in life. Do whatever they wish in private as long as it doesn’t affect the people around them too much.

I believe that I am better positioned to make ethical decisions if i practice morality. I practice morality by aspiring to virtues. as do others who disagree with me on virtue considerations. the virtues are debatable, the premise is debatable. — Jeremy Murray

Yep. And that makes me extremely uncomfortable — AmadeusD

Why?

I don't claim anything based on that premise for myself. I guess the problem with my position is that I haven't defined 'virtues' or how to pursue them? I don't think we have to limit ourselves to religious virtues. The book "After Virtue" that Count Tim recommended to me harkens back to Homer and virtues that seem more grounded in citizenship than anything?

I just think that people who practice things are more likely to be better at them. I don't see in utilitarianism or deontology any requirement to 'improve' as human beings in order to improve their moral judgement, and I do in virtue ethics.

That's why I keep harping on aspirational, although that might not be the best word. We aspire to improve and we leave the possibility of being 'correct' to the realm of always aspiring, whereas utilitarianism and deontology seem premised on 'knowable' objective truths?

That necessity to work at being good really contrasts with the political extremes right now, in which 'goodness' is simply a matter of holding the right beliefs.

I see a kind of moral laziness in relativism, or at least, relativism-by-default. It is very easy to just dismiss moral considerations as lame or uncomfortable, for harshing the vibe. And thus people are happy to skip the question and defer to moral 'experts' without developing their own moral muscles. I see that happening a lot on the left - people who would view themselves as moral, who others would view that way, but who are actually amoral relativists who simply think what those around them do.

This sense of morality being 'thinking the right things' seems dangerously omnipresent at the moment.

I am not partial to any of the three systems hereabouts noted. — AmadeusD

Again, I'm not formally trained, but aren't these three moral systems the primary moral systems, generally speaking? What system, if any, would you endorse?

expects people to step up in life. — Malcolm Parry

This brings to mind something from the Tao Te Ching - from Verse 38, Gia-Fu Fengs translation.

When a truly kind man does something, he leaves nothing undone.
When a just man does something, he leaves a great deal to be done.
When a disciplinarian does something and no one responds,
He rolls up his sleeves in an attempt to enforce order. — Lao Tzu

This brings to mind something from the Tao Te Ching - from Verse 38, Gia-Fu Fengs translation.

When a truly kind man does something, he leaves nothing undone.
When a just man does something, he leaves a great deal to be done.
When a disciplinarian does something and no one responds,
He rolls up his sleeves in an attempt to enforce order. — T Clark

Why does it bring to mind that?

It's important for building up a coherent ethics and moving to a "metaphysics of goodness." From a practical perspective, I don't think it's necessary to go that deep (indeed, most people will find it annoying or impossible). That's sort of the great thing about it, it's useful even if you don't want to go all the way into the Doctrine of Transcendentals and the ultimate grounding of value.

But prima facie it's quite hard to attack virtue ethics as at least a solid set of principles for self-development and moral action. To provide a strong rebuttal of virtue ethics requires demonstrating that, ceteris paribus (and not just in bizarre counter examples), it isn't more desirable to be courageous instead of cowardly or rash, that prudence isn't better on average than being impulsive or indecisive, that having fortitude isn't better than being weak willed, etc.




One of MacIntyre's points is that any notion of "just desert" or human excellence requires some notion of man's telos. Otherwise, there is no standard by which to judge excellence.

Contemporary liberal political theory tends to focus on rights instead of just rewards/punishments. It doesn't turn to just desert because liberalism makes man's telos a "private," individual question. This is at odds with politicians and citizens in liberal states (on the left and right), as well as most lay philosophers here. They constantly appeal to just desert and excellence. It's very hard not to. Even fatalists do this. Denying excellence and any human telos seems to be almost as difficult a feat to carry off as radical skepticism.

Anyhow, even if we are skeptical of our knowledge of man's "natural ends," it will still be the case that at least some virtues will be a prerequisite for even discovering these ends (or discovering that no such ends exist). Hence, we can at least say that: "the virtues important to the good life of man are those virtues necessary for discovering the good life of man" (a catch phrase of MacIntyre's). Here is a paper sort of walking through this step by step. Plato's "being ruled by the rational part of the soul," turns out to be a fairly ideal metavirtue (a virtue required for the attainment of any other virtues, regardless of what they turn out to be). Also, because moral virtue is also epistemic virtue, even the relativist cannot simply write it off. They will also need some virtues in order to become confirmed in their relativism or anti-realism.

Hi CT.

I enjoyed your response, plenty to look up. Can I ask you why you are drawn to medieval philosophy? Not an area I know much about. Feel free to recommend any 'essential' texts, I got a lot out of reading your last one!

Prior to reading "After Virtue", I don't think I could have defined 'telos'. How does one land on the premise of a human telos, today? Is it simply moral pragmatism? Is 'excellence' fundamental to the premise of telos?

I resonate with the idea that their is something universal about being human. I am drawn to moral philosophy, as a layman, because I fear that the majority of decision-makers are either utilitarian or deontological, and that those positions are not able to respond in a timely fashion to the unprecedented changes of our globalized, neo-virtual world? Virtue ethics seems superior in terms of making decisions where the moral math, or the universal truth, is unclear?

One of my frustrations with 'wokeness' is that it seems to deny any sense of universal humanity. Wokeness seems a deontological morality, one often compared to religion, but it feels as if it fails, as moral deontology and as a substitute for religion, in its denial of anything that is 'essentially human'?

because moral virtue is also epistemic virtue, even the relativist cannot simply write it off. They will also need some virtues in order to become confirmed in their relativism or anti-realism. — Count Timothy von Icarus

This might be a dumb question, but how is it a given that moral virtue is an epistemic virtue?

And I was under the impression that relativists write everything off anyway. Say a pomo relativist that rejects all 'master narratives'? I gather you are talking about philosophical relativists who have landed on that position after serious reflection?

Which differentiates them, to me, from the WEIRD majority, who seem to be relativistic by default?

Sorry for all the questions, I hope you take them as a compliment!

I enjoyed your response, plenty to look up. Can I ask you why you are drawn to medieval philosophy? Not an area I know much about. Feel free to recommend any 'essential' texts, I got a lot out of reading your last one!

Totally by accident. I started with Nietzsche, the existentialists, and post-modern thinkers. I read a decent amount, but wasn't a huge student of philosophy. What got my into philosophy was studying the natural sciences, particularly biology and physics and the role of information theory, complexity studies, and computation in those fields. Most of my early threads on that sort of thing. I was of the opinion that useful philosophy stayed close to the contemporary sciences.

It was through studying information theory and semiotics that I got introduced to Aristotle and the Scholastics. I came to discover that, not only were their ideas applicable to "natural philosophy/science," but they also tied it together with metaphysics, ethics, politics, etc. I had sort of written those other disciplines off as interminable, adopting the popular liberal skepticism towards them (liberalism is very much justified through skepticism and a fear of "fanaticism.")

Unfortunately, medieval thought tends to be quite complex. I don't know if philosophy got to that level of specialization again until the mid-20th century (for better or worse, the printing press really "democratized" and deprofessionalized philosophy of a while). I have become a great admirer of Thomas Aquinas, but it's hard to say where to start with him because it takes a very long time to "get" it and see how it is relevant and applies broadly. I find a lot of the Patristics more accessible, but they tend to be more spiritual, theological, and practical (big focus on asceticism, meditation, and contemplation), and less straightforwardly philosophical and systematic.

One book I really like is Robert M. Wallace's Philosophical Mysticism in Plato, Hegel, and the Present because I think he explains the relationship between reason, self-determination, freedom, happiness, and "being like God," very well. Once one understands that, one can see how Aristotle turned these deep psychological insights into even deeper metaphysical insights. I don't know a great introduction to Aristotle though, although Sachs' commentary on the Physics is very good.

Another one I like is Fr. Robert Sokolowski's The Phenomenology of the Human Person, which does a lot with Husserl, modern philosophy of language, and modern cognitive science, but is grounded in Aristotle and St. Thomas. Jensen's The Human Person: A Beginner's Thomistic Psychology is pretty good too, but still feels a bit "historical." Fr. W. Norris Clarke's The One and the Many: A Contemporary Thomistic Metaphysics is good too, I just feel like I didn't totally get it on the first pass. I got the ideas, but not their power or applicability.

Or, from another direction, Fr. William Harmless has a really good book called Mystics that delves into medieval mystical thought, and he also wrote probably my favorite introduction to the Augustinian corpus Augustine in His Own Words. Pretty sure hard copies are out of print for the former unfortunately though, although you can probably find it online somewhere.

Or, for a third direction, you could start with Dante (which is more fun!). Both the Great Courses and the Modern Scholar have excellent lectures on them (on Audible and elsewhere). Mahfood's commentary is good too, as is Teodolinda Barolini's commentary.. I feel like a close read of the Commedia gets you pretty far into the ethical, political, historical, and even some of the metaphysical dimensions of medieval thought, because Dante was a great synthesizer and weaves it into his narrative. Granted, given its subject matter, it also tends to be heavy on theology.

This might be a dumb question, but how is it a given that moral virtue is an epistemic virtue?

I think the following covers this pretty well. The "rule of reason," in at least some form, is required for good faith inquiry. A person can just write off good faith inquiry from the beginning, but they certainly won't have any good reasons for doing so. The end of the paper I mentioned talks about the anti-realist and their particular objections. Their problem is that they end up like Protagoras, unable to say why philosophy is worthwhile or why anyone should listen to them if they don't already like what they hear.

Knowledge plays an essential role in ethics. It seems obvious that human beings often fail to act morally. Yet just as importantly, we often disagree about moral issues, or are uncertain about what we ought to do. As Plato puts it: “[we have] a hunch that the good is something, but [are] puzzled and cannot adequately grasp just what it is or acquire… stable belief about it.”1 In light of this, it seems clear that we cannot simply assume that whatever we happen to do will be good. At the very least, we cannot know if we are acting morally unless we have some knowledge of what moral action consists in. Indeed, we cannot act with any semblance of rational intent unless we have some way of deciding which acts are choiceworthy.2 Thus, knowledge of the Good seems to be an essential element of living a moral life, regardless of what the Good ultimately reveals itself to be.

Yet consider the sorts of answers we would get if we were to ask a random sample of people “what makes someone a good person?” or “what makes an action just or good?” Likely, we would encounter a great deal of disagreement on these issues. Some would probably even argue that these terms cannot be meaningly defined, or that our question cannot be given anything like an “objective answer.”

Now consider what would happen if instead we asked: “what makes someone a good doctor?” “ a good teacher?” or “ a good scientist?” Here, we are likely to find far more agreement. In part, this has to do with normative measure, the standard by which some technê (art or skill) is judged vis-à-vis an established practice.3 However, the existence of normative measure is not the only factor that makes these questions easier to answer. Being a good doctor, teacher, or scientist requires epistemic virtues, habits or tendencies that enable us to learn and discover the truth. The doctor must learn what is causing an ailment and how it can be treated. The teacher must understand what they are teaching and be able to discover why their students fail to grasp it. For the scientist, her entire career revolves around coming to know the causes of various phenomena—how and why they occur.

When it comes to epistemic virtues, it seems like it is easier for people to agree. What allows someone to uncover the truth? What will be true of all “good learners?” A few things seem obvious. They must have an honest desire to know the truth. Otherwise, they will be satisfied with falsehoods whenever embracing falsehood will allow them to achieve another good that they hold in higher esteem than truth.i For Plato, the person ruled over by reason loves and has an overriding passion for truth.1 Learning also requires that we be able to step back from our current beliefs, examine them with some level of objectivity, and be willing to consider that we might be wrong. Here, the transcendence of rationality is key. It is reason that allows us to transcend current belief and desire, reaching out for what is truly good. As we shall see, this transcendent aspect of reason will also have serious implications for how reason relates to freedom.

Learning and the discovery of truth is often a social endeavor. All scholars build on the work of past thinkers; arts are easier to learn when one has a teacher. We benefit from other’s advice and teaching. Yet, as Plato points out in his sketch of “the tyrannical man” in Book IX of the Republic, a person ruled over by the “lower parts of the soul,” is likely to disregard advice that they find disagreeable, since they are not motivated by a desire for truth.1 Good learners can cooperate, something that generally requires not being ruled over by appetites and emotions. They take time to understand others’ opinions and can consider them without undue bias.

By contrast, consider the doctor who ignores the good advice of a nurse because the nurse lacks his credentials. The doctor is allowing honor — the prerogative of the spirited part of the soul — to get in the way of discovering the truth. Likewise, consider the scientist who falsifies her data in order to support her thesis. She cares more about the honor of being seen to be right than actuallybeing right, or perhaps she is more motivated by book sales, which allow her to satisfy her appetites, than she is in producing good scholarship. It is not enough that reason is merely engaged in learning. Engagement is certainly necessary, as the rational part of the soul is the part responsible for all learning and the employment of knowledge. Yet the rational part of the soul must also rule over the other parts, blocking out inclinations that would hinder the the search for truth.

Prior to reading "After Virtue", I don't think I could have defined 'telos'. How does one land on the premise of a human telos, today? Is it simply moral pragmatism? Is 'excellence' fundamental to the premise of telos?

It could be, but it's normally grounded in the philosophy of nature and metaphysics.

Thanks for another interesting response Count T.

I started with Nietzsche, the existentialists, and post-modern thinkers. I read a decent amount, but wasn't a huge student of philosophy. What got my into philosophy was studying the natural sciences, particularly biology and physics and the role of information theory, complexity studies, and computation in those fields. Most of my early threads on that sort of thing. I was of the opinion that useful philosophy stayed close to the contemporary sciences. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Interesting. It was Nietzsche and Sartre who inspired me to explore philosophy more deeply. I was immersed in post-modernity at university given my age and areas of study. The humanities in the 90s were flooded with these ideas.

Do you see post-modernism as inherently relativistic, morally? I loved the postmodern art I was encountering, Angela Carter, the Simpsons, the musician Beck, but I started to feel queasy as I encountered the moral relativism - I still remember clearly a prof telling us that we had no right to judge the practice of female genital mutilation - and I see that moral relativism everywhere today.

It was through studying information theory and semiotics that I got introduced to Aristotle and the Scholastics. I came to discover that, not only were their ideas applicable to "natural philosophy/science," but they also tied it together with metaphysics, ethics, politics, etc — Count Timothy von Icarus

I used to tell my philosophy students that the ancient Greek philosophers were the scientists of their era. I posit that many of our modern problems result from moving away from this generality into academic silos. I've just read Jesse Singal's "The Quick Fix" on the problems with social psychology, and he points out repeatedly how often some of the replication failures in this field could have been avoided if the social scientists in question had considered any evidence from other disciplines.

Philosophical Mysticism in Plato, Hegel, and the Present — Count Timothy von Icarus

$212 Canadian dollars on Amazon.ca . That seems high. I will look for it in the library.

Or, for a third direction, you could start with Dante (which is more fun!) — Count Timothy von Icarus

That is a fun suggestion! I have yet to read Dante beyond excerpts in lit 101.

it also tends to be heavy on theology. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I do not get why so many people think philosophy and theology are mutually exclusive. Ignore this if it is an overly personal question, but how important to you are your religious / spiritual beliefs in terms of the philosophy you are drawn to?

I consider myself a fairly staunch atheist. Having had more than my share of bad luck, the problem of evil (and why me?) is too large an obstacle, despite how appealing I find the idea of belief. I think this best explains my interest in virtue ethics. But we both seem drawn to similar ideas?

Regardless, I like theology. I had too many students who I cared for who were religious, and too many loved ones, to dismiss it. Yes, there are strong reasons to question some of the institutions and individual actors. But I find it hard to imagine any sort of moral system today without religion.

When it comes to epistemic virtues, it seems like it is easier for people to agree

I actually 'hmm'ed out loud when I read this.

consider the scientist who falsifies her data in order to support her thesis. She cares more about the honor of being seen to be right than actually being right, or perhaps she is more motivated by book sales, which allow her to satisfy her appetites, than she is in producing good scholarship

Half a dozen examples of this spring to mind from Singal's book alone.

how is it a given that moral virtue is an epistemic virtue?

Quoting myself seems silly, but yes, you totally answered my question.

Sorry for the long response. I have too much time on my hands ...

I enjoy your responses and your writing here in general. I inherited a box of philosophy books from my brother when he passed away. I'm now inspired to dig it out and look for some of the classics I'd considered beyond me. My brother and I thank you for that!

for sure, it seems elitist, to argue that some people are better equipped to make moral decisions for others. — Jeremy Murray

Why is that elitist? For sure, someone who has been through med school will be a better doctor than someone who doesn't even know the anatomy of our bodies.

I think life experience makes some people better at determining moral behavior than others. If the most important people in someone's life are drug-dealing gang members, this person's moral judgement will not be the same as mainstream society's moral judgement.

Science makes some people better at determining the moral care for the planet, and also can make a person better at judging human morality.

Interesting. It was Nietzsche and Sartre who inspired me to explore philosophy more deeply. I was immersed in post-modernity at university given my age and areas of study. The humanities in the 90s were flooded with these ideas. — Jeremy Murray

And look at us today. I think fascism is more popular today than it was in the 1930s. It appears to me that we have pretty much replaced the Greek philosophers with German philosophers.