The T is redundant. — flannel jesus

I think you've missed my point - that is T truth, as far as we could possibly conceive. I dont understand why we would say anything else.. I do think jettisoning truth works better on paper, but it certainly wouldn't be helpful for the general use.

But once we begin forming concepts, things become imprecise—and I agree with that. However, I don’t think it’s enough to rely solely on experience, because it doesn’t allow us to sufficiently anticipate how the world is to be understood. Only by digitizing the world into concepts can we make predictions about things not yet encountered. We can’t think the world 1:1 in all its atoms, nor perceive it that way in everyday or scientific practice. I hope I’ve captured the core of your thought. — DasGegenmittel

When we think of imprecision we still have the idea of knowledge as a representation of reality, that is to say, as similarity. But I take a different approach to the matter, since the idea of representation entails problems like the one you have pointed out.

However, we can think in another way. We can think of our relation to the world as the relation of a translator to a different language. Translation is never a representation but a transcription. It is a matter of places and times that are structured in the language of arrival from the times, places, distances, tempos, etc. of the language of departure. The source language is the world. Each translation does not try to reflect something of what is translated but imposes its own structure.

Consequently, it is no longer a question of the clock surpassing us and surpassing our concepts, but rather that our concepts irremediably, like any translation, do not represent anything other than converting it into something, hence the usefulness of the notion of transcription. We transcribe what the clock says, but this transcription is a completely different world. But fluid and changing, just like our clock. Our concepts are also fluid and changing because they are transcriptions such that if we could watch the time to the rhythm of the clock our thinking would change ceaselessly along with the clock.

We must ask ourselves if there is something as fixed and stable knowledge that is not changing as a "real time" transcription changes. So imprecision is not something proper and essential to the concept, but something relative like our physical impossibility to follow the clock in real time. But our knowledge is indeed something changeable like our clock, only that it differs in tempo, as a transcription can be made in real time or in delayed time. Thus the difference is not between being and becoming, but difference of becomings.

the T is implicit in the J. Idk what you mean by jettisoning truth, we're just getting rid of it as a criteria for what we call knowledge. We know a belief when it's reached a particular threshold of justification.

This post is not in response to anything specific discussed so far in this thread, but I just came across this discussion of Robert Boyle's ideas about knowledge in "The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Science" by E.A. Burtt and I thought it was interesting, by which I mean I am sympathetic to it's point of view. This is a quote from Boyle, an Irish physicist living in the 1600s. "Verulam" refers to Francis Bacon, Baron Verulam.

“Our great Verulam attempted with more skill and industry (and not without some indignation) to restore the more modest and useful way practised by the ancients, of inquiry into particular bodies without hastening to make systems, into the request it formerly had; wherein the admirable industry of two of our London physicians, Gilbert and Harvey, had not a little assisted him. And I need not tell you that since him Descartes, Gassendi, and others, having taken in the application of geometrical theorems for the explanation of physical problems; he and they, and other restorers of natural philosophy, have brought the experimental and mathematical way of inquiry into nature, into at least as high and growing an esteem, as it ever possessed when it was most in vogue among the naturalists that preceded Aristotle.” — Robert Boyle

And here's Burtt's comment:

If your ultimate aim is to know, deductions from the atomical or Cartesian principles are likely to give you most satisfaction; if your aim is control of nature in the interest of particular ends, you can often discover the necessary relations between qualities immediately experienced, without ascending to the top in the series of causes. — E.A. Burtt

I have questions :

- You propose transcription as an alternative to representation – but how can a transcription be true or false if it explicitly rejects the notion of representing something external? (In representational terms, something is true if it matches reality, and false if it doesn’t. Truth means accurate correspondence between thought or language and the world.)

- If a transcription doesn’t mirror reality but instead "imposes its own structure" or creates "an entirely different world," then how do you determine whether a transcription is epistemically successful or not?

- Could you give a concrete example of what a transcription looks like – in everyday life, science, or philosophy – and how one would judge whether it is better or worse than another?

- And what does transcription look like linguistically? Since any form of language already implies differentiation, structure, and thus representation, how can transcription escape this? Isn’t every linguistic expression already a form of representation?

@T Clark
Aww, that’s amazing. :) It fits perfectly with the themes we discussed earlier here. If I had more time, I would study Bacon in greater depth.

I don't see how it could be, given it's stated separately? Justification is the reason for believing. Not it's veridicality. Also, that is jettisoning Truth from the concept. Not sure what was missed there, tbh. Truth has no use if your takes are to be the way of things. It's a pointless, senseless concept with no referent.

Justification is the reason for believing. Not it's veridicality. Also, that is jettisoning Truth from the concept. Not sure what was missed there, tbh. Truth has no use if your takes are to be the way of things. It's a pointless, senseless concept with no referent. — AmadeusD

We know a belief when it's reached a particular threshold of justification. — flannel jesus

This exchange made me think of this quote from Stephen J Gould.

In science, 'fact' can only mean 'confirmed to such a degree that it would be perverse to withhold provisional assent. — Stephen J Gould

A good quote! And unless we're giving credence to religious revelation, I can't see another avenue for use of Truth.

All the same, why justify any belief whatsoever if not to best evidence that the belief is in fact true (i.e., that the belief in fact does conform to that which is real)?

If no cogent answer can be here given, then, while in no way being infallible, declarative knowledge can only be "a belief which one can justify as being in fact true". Hence, JTB in the sense just mentioned.

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p.s.: Tacit knowledge, by its very properties, doesn't get justified by us, not until it becomes declared (if it can so be to begin with), at which juncture it becomes declarative knowledge as per the above - but this only if we are then able to so justify it as being true. For example, we all tacitly know ourselves to be human Earthlings (rather than Martians or some other extraterrestrial) - such as, for example, when reading a sci-fi novel about extraterrestrials - but we will not consciously find any need to provide justification for this tacit knowledge-that (which is different from tacit know-how; e.g. knowing how to riding a bicycle) until the moment it gets brought up into explicit conscious awareness as a concept and becomes in any way affirmed or upheld (i.e., declared) by us as conscious beings. That said, other forms of tacit knowledge - such as, as one universal example, our tacit knowledge of the wisdom, or it's degree, with which we are endowed - will not so easily become declarative knowledge on account of our inability to properly justify the position - this even when made explicit in consciousness. For, in the latter case, we do not commonly hold declarative knowledge of what wisdom is to begin with - this other than its rather vague dictionary definitions. .

it's funny that we both took that quote to be supporting our respective sides.

My side is saying, "belief" already means "I think it's true", and justified means "justified in thinking it's true", so to me, knowledge is just a belief that we're sufficiently justified in - that's what the quote is saying to me. So we don't call a belief knowledge when it's JTB, we call a belief knowledge when it's JB and the J is strong enough. T is the aim of the justification, we and the aim of knowledge, rather than an element inside of it.

While I get what you’re saying, here fully utilizing the definitions of “belief” and “justification” you’ve provided, I yet believe that the truth component to declarative knowledge will in one way or another still be an important component. This for reasons such as the following (here trying my best to present a good and easy to understand example):

A blatantly given lie – say, that one is currently at the North Pole - will be a declared belief a) which the liar in question knows full well to be false and b) which the liar in question will nevertheless attempt to justify to the best of his/her ability so as to convince others of its truth.

Here, then, one has a rather commonplace example of what can be termed a Justified False Belief.

Is the known to be false belief which the liar upholds via justification then of itself the liar’s declarative knowledge of what in fact is the case? It will, after all, be a Justified Belief – but it will not be a belief that is both justified and true.

It seems obvious to me that, while the liar in question can well declaratively know that it is a JFB, the JB in question will nevertheless not be what the liar in question in fact knows to be the case.

Yes, one might start questioning the interpretation of the words "belief" and "justification" in the above example, yet lies do occur among humans often enough - and, imo, ought to be both taken into account and properly accounted for. In this case, as they pertain to knowledge.

why justify any belief whatsoever if not to best evidence that the belief is in fact true (i.e., that the belief in fact does conform to that which is real)? — javra

Belief that it is true doesn't rise to knowledge. Justifying that belief seems to be doing the work, and actual Truth not attainable. So, I return to comments about hte uselessness of 'Truth' in that conception. We don't have Truth in any meaningful sense, if any of the discussions of same are to be taken seriously. Claiming that something is true is far, far beyond what JTB does. A 'true' belief, is one which is justified. Gettier cases are the prime example of why the T cannot do the job you want it to.

My side is saying, "belief" already means "I think it's true", and justified means "justified in thinking it's true" — flannel jesus

Nowhere is this is Truth actually present. Just belief in it. So, we're in the same position, epistemically, as a JFB.

So, I return to comments about hte uselessness of 'Truth' in that conception. — AmadeusD

You'll notice I did not write nor specify "Truth" with a capital "T" - which I think we both interpret to be some sort of absolute or complete truth. I did define truth as conformity to what is real.

Are you then maintaining that "conformity to what is real" is useless?

Your notion of "change" is untenable. I'm reminded of Heraclites' river.

Change is irrelevant to JTB. At time t1(insert well-grounded true claim here) and viola!

A good quote! And unless we're giving credence to religious revelation, I can't see another avenue for use of Truth. — AmadeusD

As the quote indicates, Gould was specifically writing about scientific knowledge, not knowledge in general. He was an atheist, but I don't think what he wrote was intended to address religious revelation.

it's funny that we both took that quote to be supporting our respective sides.

My side is saying, "belief" already means "I think it's true", and justified means "justified in thinking it's true", so to me, knowledge is just a belief that we're sufficiently justified in - that's what the quote is saying to me. So we don't call a belief knowledge when it's JTB, we call a belief knowledge when it's JB and the J is strong enough. T is the aim of the justification, we and the aim of knowledge, rather than an element inside of it. — flannel jesus

As I understand it, what you've written here is consistent with what Gould wrote and with my understanding of what knowledge is, but, I think we agree, it is not justified true belief as it is usually formulated. You write "knowledge is just a belief that we're sufficiently justified in." I write "knowledge is adequately justified belief based on the consequences of failure." I think we're saying the same thing.

Indexing or timestamping can document this shift, but they do not prevent it. — DasGegenmittel

Timestamping is not used to prevent change, whether that be changes in the way things are or our knowledge about them.

I suppose I'm not seeing the need for lengthy complicated explanations replete with the coinage of new concepts/notions/kinds of knowledge to help explain what's going on in Gettier cases.

The problem is belief, not justification. <-----That needs to be better put. The problem is that the accounting practice in use when setting out S's belief is a malpractice. Correcting the clear unambiguous misattribution of belief to S completely dissolves the purported problem.

All the same, why justify any belief whatsoever if not to best evidence that the belief is in fact true (i.e., that the belief in fact does conform to that which is real)?

If no cogent answer can be here given, then, while in no way being infallible, declarative knowledge can only be "a belief which one can justify as being in fact true". Hence, JTB in the sense just mentioned. — javra

As I understand justified true belief as it is usually discussed, it does not mean justified to best evidence that it is true. It means really, actually, for real true, which, of course, nothing ever is. That's why JTB is such a bonehead definition.

It means really, actually, for real true, which, of course, nothing ever is. That's why JTB is such a bonehead definition. — T Clark

Replace "true" with "conforming to that which is real". Is nothing ever conformant to what is real?

As to the traditional JTB interpretation, I agree that the interpretations could use adjustments.

Are you then maintaining that "conformity to what is real" is useless? — javra

I'm with T Clark here. Nothing meets the criteria you're using, without plain supposition. Therefore, for what the word truth is mean to entail, it is useless as a criteria for belief in these terms, imo. I understand the distinction you're making, but the description is what Truth would be, if ascertainable.

You propose transcription as an alternative to representation – but how can a transcription be true or false if it explicitly rejects the notion of representing something external? — DasGegenmittel

And what does transcription look like linguistically? Since any form of language already implies differentiation, structure, and thus representation, how can transcription escape this? Isn’t every linguistic expression already a form of representation? — DasGegenmittel

It is like when the phenomenon of translation occurs. It simply works and does its job [to make us understand each other] here the transcription is given by the relationship between two sign systems, places, distances, times and tempos are assigned between the signs in such a way that both languages become the version of the other transformed, transcribed.

Another example is communication. When a person communicates something to a second person he is actually causing an effect on this second person by structuring his language in such a way that understanding takes place. But there is no representation, there are only causes and effects. To communicate something to someone is to cause an effect in another person. It is no longer a matter of representing to ourselves what the other thinks, but of determining ourselves as the other, thinking as the other, to the extent that our language is configured and determined by the words of another person.

The word transcription is a host of genetic transcription, but I generalize it to ontology.

Nothing meets the criteria you're using, without plain supposition. Therefore, for what the word truth is mean to entail, it is useless as a criteria for belief in these terms, imo. I understand the distinction you're making, but the description is what Truth would be, if ascertainable. — AmadeusD

Ok, thanks for you answer. I disagree. I guess I could ask for justification of what you affirm in fact conforming to the actual state of affairs regarded, i.e. justification for it in fact being true. But that would nullify your system of thought.

Would it then be fair to suppose that you live in a world, an umwelt, devoid of truth?

It means really, actually, for real true, which, of course, nothing ever is. That's why JTB is such a bonehead definition. — T Clark

Nothing is true? The irony. The name-calling doubles the icing.

Nothing is true? — creativesoul

As Descartes told us, there is only one thing we know is really, actually, for real true.

Is nothing ever conformant to what is real? — javra

We can never be certain any particular thing is true except that, perhaps, we exist.

We can never be certain any particular thing is true except that, perhaps, we exist. — T Clark

Man, I'm a diehard fallibilist. To me the cogito is fallible as well. And I fallibly maintain that we can never be infallibly certain of anything, period - not even that we exist. That said, yes I'm (fallibilistically) certain of this. And a whole lot more. Including that we're now communicating in the English language. To not even mention things such as that the sun will once again rise tomorrow.

The type of "truth" you're here implicitly addressing would be an intrinsic aspect of what the OP terms 'static knowledge". But, while epistemic truths can only be fallible to different degrees and extents, this in no way takes away form the fallible certainty that there does occur such a thing as ontic reality. To which all epistemic truths need to conform.

We can never be certain any particular thing is true except that, perhaps, we exist. — T Clark

I can be certain of far more than that. I think your conflating truth with certainty/confidence.

All sorts of claims are true, regardless of whether or not I am certain, regardless of whether or not we can check and see.

Would it then be fair to suppose that you live in a world, an umwelt, devoid of truth? — javra

Well, that isn't really my position. My position is that the way you are using 'truth' results in this state of affairs. Nothing rises to the required level, so there is no Truth.

Taking part of your above response to Clark, I would say that you're on the right track there as far as my views go.

there does occur such a thing as ontic reality. To which all epistemic truths need to conform. — javra

I agree. But we can never know if such is the case. It is just hte strongest possibly supposition we must have to do or care about anything. If all was genuinely in flux, we wouldn't care a lick from moment to moment, i'd think.

but I don't think what he wrote was intended to address religious revelation. — T Clark

Neither was mine. I was excluding it, as religious revelation would surpass the level of certainty he indicates.

Gould was specifically writing about scientific knowledge — T Clark

Are you suggesting there is some other type of knowledge that approximates truth? Or is the breadth of 'scientific knowledge' peculiarly narrow here?

Change is irrelevant to JTB. At time t1(insert well-grounded true claim here) and viola! — creativesoul

Nope. Every (pseudo-)“knowledge” claim in the real world is problematic. Gettier cases are a direct counterexample to this thesis: the boss’s decision can change, and the clock might be accidentally broken. (Epistemic) luck is inherently defined by change—it’s a temporal category. There is no luck in a deterministic system. Every so-called “well-grounded claim” in non-static environments rests on credence and is therefore never absolutely certain. JTB can't handle this truth.

Present a counterexample:
Show me one dynamic scenario in which a belief is justified and true at (epistemic)time t₁, and remains a clear case of knowledge over all possible points in time—despite contextual change, shifting information, or epistemic instability. Enjoy.