Wouldn't this then make the notion of an absolute frame altogether meaningless under a thin presentism? — substantivalism

The "absolute frame" is known as "absolute time", and this is quite different from presentism.

The "absolute frame" is known as "absolute time", and this is quite different from presentism. — Metaphysician Undercover

An absolute frame of reference is typically conjoined with a form of presentism or at least its implied to be so. Then ascribed the purpose of yielding an absolute standard of motion and technically they also may ascribe it as supplying an absolute metric for time as well.

However, rigid presentism of the sort that would entirely deny the existence of any future or past states makes it neigh impossible to actually explain how such an 'absolute frame' can in fact supply those standards independent of our mind. As nature doesn't seem to possess them in any capacity nor the tools to do so from a presentism view point.

You can have absolute quantities in regards to spacetime structure and not be a presentist yet most presentists will probably have some absolute frame linked to the core part of that doctrine. The present that is.

An absolute frame of reference is typically conjoined with a form of presentism or at least its implied to be so. — substantivalism

I don't think so. A frame of reference uses temporal extension to model motion. Presentism denies the possibility of temporal extension by assuming an incompatibility between the present (real) and the past and future (fictional).

The "absolute frame of reference" represents an assumed true, absolute rest frame. When the geocentric model of the universe was proven to be false, human beings realized that they have no access to any "absolute rest frame". So relativity theory removed the need for one.

Presentism is a philosophical position which really has no bearing on physical models of motion. All physics uses past observations to extend predictions into the future, thereby ignoring the present. So all forms of models made in physics are non-presentist.

Presentism in the most intuitive but thin variety does not allow for this so the notion of motion itself becomes illusory. Only things exist in the paper thin present. — substantivalism

I don't think this is the most intuitive form of presentism at all. The intuitive form of presentism, it seems to me, is one that acknowledges that the present that exists NOW will soon change into a new present. Motion is, of course, a type of change. Any form of presentism that disregards change seems remarkably intuitive to me.

I don't think so. A frame of reference uses temporal extension to model motion. — Metaphysician Undercover

Even better then, makes my job easier, the notion of a frame of reference makes use of something presentism doesn't have in its ontology to begin with. Temporal extension.

The "absolute frame of reference" represents an assumed true, absolute rest frame. When the geocentric model of the universe was proven to be false, human beings realized that they have no access to any "absolute rest frame". So relativity theory removed the need for one. — Metaphysician Undercover

Then what are anti-relativists both current and past as in the case of Lorentz Aether theory even coherently talking about?

There is the implication that to truly hold to SR you have to accept a form of spacetime realism of sorts and therefore also a form of eternalism. Fine. . . but the opposing position doesn't have to resort to postulating the existence of future/past states by supposing a universal Aether frame that can be seen as an objective present or a 'physical' absolute simultaneity marker.

If they are postulating an absolute present. . . I.E. a way of giving an absolute simultaneity. . . then aren't they a presentist? Or are they just holding to a slightly different block theory of time than SR? Does that make presentism actually inconsistent with traditional Lorentz Aether theory?

If you answer in the affirmative I'll find that fairly peculiar because the point of a establishing an absolute present by many such individuals is NOT have the conclusion that the future or the past are just as real as the present.

Presentism is a philosophical position which really has no bearing on physical models of motion. All physics uses past observations to extend predictions into the future, thereby ignoring the present. So all forms of models made in physics are non-presentist. — Metaphysician Undercover

You mean it's all fictitious and abstract modal talk. The hard presentist here thinks the same and finds it a quick jump from the nonexistence of any true statements about the past/future to adopting some form of indeterminism that he ties into quantum mechanics.

I don't think this is the most intuitive form of presentism at all. The intuitive form of presentism, it seems to me, is one that acknowledges that the present that exists NOW will soon change into a new present. Motion is, of course, a type of change. Any form of presentism that disregards change seems remarkably intuitive to me. — flannel jesus

Yes. . . that is what this person does in what he calls hard presentism.

There is the present and an objective passage. Nothing more!

However, as that person and all other presentist have made clear ad nauseam is that to truly talk about motion especially into the more distant past retroactively or predictively into the future that requires the usage of truth-makers. Which pushes you in the direction of rather more esoteric versions of presentism that either postulate truth of statements arbitrarily without reference or in some cases references to purely abstract entities rapidly ballooning ones ontology. The only other approach then would be a pragmatic anti-realism about past or future statements.

but the opposing position doesn't have to resort to this by supposing a universal Aether frame that can be seen as an objective present or a 'physical' absolute simultaneity marker. — substantivalism

Why don't they?

Why don't they? — flannel jesus

. . . because they are saying that nature can demarcate objectively between what is real and not real merely by virtue of whether it's in the supposed Aether frame or its not. Just as presentist's can say the defining element of what it means to be existent. . . is to be present. . . and to not exist. . . is to not be present.

If you want to you can substitute absolute simultaneity in place of the present.

I thought you said they don't have to resort to supposing a universal Aether frame. Your answer to why they do't have to suppose that, is because... idk what you're saying. It sounds directly contradictory. It sounds like you're saying they don't have to suppose it, but it's required for their stance to be true.

I thought you said they don't have to resort to supposing a universal Aether frame. Your answer to why they do't have to suppose that, is because... idk what you're saying. — flannel jesus

In context, I was saying they don't have to resort to postulating the existence of all future and past states of the universe because they have a physical structure that serves the presentist role.

THEY DON'T HAVE TO RESORT TO BEING AN ETERNALIST because their physics allows for the opposite position. . . does that make it clear.

They can establish an absolute present so they don't have to make said present relative and hold all moment both future or past on equal grounding. That is what a person holding to certain forms of SR would have to do.

They have the tools to be presentist and not an eternalist. . . so they are a presentist.

Oh, okay, so they DO posit a universal aether reference frame, got it. Yeah I agree. Presentism would require there to be a singularly true reference frame.

Yes. . . and that makes them a presentist unless they are some Newtonian eternalist which is possible. It would just be a form of eternalism or spacetime structure of Newtonian or Neo-newtonian (Galilean) spacetime.

. . . but follow my line of thinking which has sort of troubled me with individuals who hold to this and it makes me think they are unwilling hypocrites.

If presentism of the hard sort described in a previous link does not allow for one to make objective as a part of the furniture of the world 'states of motion' as future or past states don't exist then any motion is to be seen as fictitious. It's inferred and highly fictional language from memories or psychological inferences but nature wouldn't 'know' that a thing has any motion in the typical sense of the word.

This applies to all motion INCLUDING ABSOLUTE MOTION so despite what some might desire a Lorentz Aether frame for. . . which is to supply absolute simultaneity and also a standard for absolute motion. . . might actually be mutually exclusive theses.

That is, unless they adopted either eternalism or some strange form of presentism that allows for it such as thick presentism. However, the adoption of either would seem to conflict with the primary intuition that drives people to be presentist Lorentz aether proponents in the first place because the future or the past seem intuitively nonexistent.

So if you accept a presentism that implies absolute simultaneity it doesn't actually imply that they have an absolute standard of motion as it's neigh impossible to even express such a notion in presentist lingo.

There is the implication that to truly hold to SR you have to accept a form of spacetime realism of sorts and therefore also a form of eternalism. Fine. . . but the opposing position doesn't have to resort to postulating the existence of future/past states by supposing a universal Aether frame that can be seen as an objective present or a 'physical' absolute simultaneity marker. — substantivalism

I don't think that the universal aether theory proposed by Lorentz was capable of providing for absolute simultaneity. I think that's why it was rejected in favour of special relativity. It provided the same type of principles as relativity, but not as versatile.

If they are postulating an absolute present. . . I.E. a way of giving an absolute simultaneity. . . then aren't they a presentist? — substantivalism

No, I don't think that is the case. Presentism, by most accounts is something different from claiming an absolute present. These two are distinct principles, by my understanding.

Or are they just holding to a slightly different block theory of time than SR? Does that make presentism actually inconsistent with traditional Lorentz Aether theory? — substantivalism

Yes, I think Lorentz aether theory provides for a slightly different block theory of time from that of special relativity, but both are inconsistent with presentism. That is my opinion.

I don't think that the universal aether theory proposed by Lorentz was capable of providing for absolute simultaneity. — Metaphysician Undercover

Not unless you inevitable added in action at a distance in some form. You have to as that is the end result of many forms of spatial anti-realism, relationism, and any talk about instantaneous spaces.

Whether its some aether that does this or the interaction is more mysterious in origin doesn't really matter. Only that its snuck in the back door as required to make sense of instantaneous spaces.

Yes, I think Lorentz aether theory provides for a slightly different block theory of time from that of special relativity, but both are inconsistent with presentism. That is my opinion. — Metaphysician Undercover

Then how is it that some espouse it while being presentists and others such as William Lane Craig famously seemed to be in favor of it but with a growing block theory of time?

That may be your opinion but its most definitely not the opinion of most dissidents, philosophers, and physicists who have spilled ink on this topic usually using Lorentz aether theory as a vehicle for their intuitive presentist viewpoints. Even such people are fearful of action at distance to a point that it's better to propose something with peculiar properties than to propose nothing at all and say it's just distant disembodied action. Course, then the distant connections would be causal in nature through this 'aether' but instantaneous and truly symmetrical, reflexive, as well as transitive.

Most find the notion of eternalism and its postulation of future states or past states as unnecessary expansion of ones ontology at best while at worst they see it as poetic nonsense. Trying to distract use from the 'real' matter in front of you 'now'.

The "absolute frame" is known as "absolute time", and this is quite different from presentism. — Metaphysician Undercover

Different yes, but not so different. Presentism requires absolutism, else simultaneity would not work. But absolutism doesn't require presentism of any form. An absolute frame can be 3D space or a block.

Remember too that LET and SR are both special models that do not model the universe, so any absolute frame in the real universe cannot be an inertial frame since such a frame cannot describe the universe. It took over a century to generalize the absolutist premises, but it has been done, The theory denies things predicted by relativity such as black holes and the big bang.


Straight up presentism is 3D, but other forms like growing block and moving spotlight are 4D models. All are absolute.

Only things exist in the paper thin present. — substantivalism

This seems to presume a 4D model, with time being extended, but only one moment in time being the present. Sounds like a moving spotlight model.

If they are postulating an absolute present. . . I.E. a way of giving an absolute simultaneity. . . then aren't they a presentist? — substantivalism

If they posit a present, then obviously they're a presentist. But if they merely posit absolutism (LET for instance), that come with absolute simultaneity, but does not necessarily imply a preferred moment in time.

Presentism, by most accounts is something different from claiming an absolute present. — Metaphysician Undercover

You seem to differ. How are these two distinct? Can you give an example?

I don't think that the universal aether theory proposed by Lorentz was capable of providing for absolute simultaneity. — Metaphysician Undercover

Of course it requires absolute simultaneity. That comes with any absolutist theory.

Not unless you inevitable added in action at a distance in some form. — substantivalism

What does action at a distance have to do with any of this? It seems to be a quantum concept, not an interpretation of time issue.

quote="substantivalism;981431"]... William Lane Craig famously seemed to be in favor of it but with a growing block theory of time?[/quote]
Not sure why he wants growing block. What purpose is served by an existing past? Evidence? Not needed by anything. Why nonexistent future? That probably feeds his notion of free will, despite the posited onmiscience serving the exact same role as an existing future.

Mind you. Craig is not known for putting together valid arguments. They just have to sound good enough to confirm the biases of his paying audiences.

Straight up presentism is 3D, but other forms like growing block and moving spotlight are 4D models. — noAxioms

"moving spotlight" may have a 4d view of the universe as a whole, but still a 3d view of the present moment, just like presentism, right?

I consider 'moving spotlight' to be a form of presentism - maybe you could call it "weak presentism", because instead of it saying "the present is the only thing that exists", it's saying "every time 'exists' in some sense, but the present ESPECIALLY exists, exists in some unique elevated way".

"moving spotlight" may have a 4d view of the universe as a whole, but still a 3d view of the present moment, just like presentism, right? — flannel jesus

The present is 3D in all forms. I have heard of 2-state presentism where the prior state exists until the subsequent state fully exists. A simulation is this form of presentism. Moving spotlight says all events exist, but the spotlight determines which of these are at the present. Interestingly, the spotlight can move in either direction, and even jump around. Growing block logically seems to forbid that.

You can even have 4D spacetime with very limited temporal extension, say 12 hours each side of the 3D present. So the immediate past and future exist, but the more distant past and future do not.
$5 says you cannot name who/where that is suggested.

I consider 'moving spotlight' to be a form of presentism - maybe you could call it "weak presentism", because instead of it saying "the present is the only thing that exists", it's saying "every time 'exists' in some sense, but the present ESPECIALLY exists, exists in some unique elevated way".

It very much is presentism, but I agree that it gets you two (three?) kinds of existence. The model works really quite well for epiphenomenalism sort of like watching a first-person movie. You (the experiencer external to the universe) can jump in anywhere you want, experience a life, rewind, fast-forward at will, but with no volition to change the plot of the story. The whole movie reel exists, but the one discreet frame under the projector light exists harder.

Time travel makes a little sense with personal moving spotlight. Not so much with the others.

This seems to presume a 4D model, with time being extended, but only one moment in time being the present. Sounds like a moving spotlight model. — noAxioms

Except that's just the language used. This is the problem when discussing this as is the case in every branch of philosophy that the language used has to be indicative of the ontology one holds to.

It's just spatialized metaphor to talk about time. It doesn't have to imply anything about the position one holds to and should probably be seen as only a mere tool through which to give the concept you are talking about greater meaningful content.

Course, I'm still somewhat unsure what an un-spatalized language or series of metaphors for time would actually look like. Usually when people approach doing so it turns into rather poetic prose so the rationally minded sort of hand wave it away because it seems like philosophical nonsense.

What does action at a distance have to do with any of this? It seems to be a quantum concept, not an interpretation of time issue. — noAxioms

Well. . . how does one make sense of the present? What is its nature besides mere postulation? How can I MAKE that thing over there PRESENT to me?

If you are say, a relationist, who only allows for physical relations to give meaning to both 'being simultaneous with' or 'spatial separation' then in either case if you want to say two things exist in the same moment is tantamount to saying they casually interact with each other neigh instantaneously. I feel like this extends nicely to substantivalism just replace physical interaction with spacetime connection.

If you are fine with espousing some doctrine of the vacuum or void of nothing residing between atoms then the only way you can 'link' two distinct objects as pegs on the same board is if they are interacting with each other at a distance.

This is if you espouse or hold to some eleatic principle of sorts. I.E. to exist is to be able to or actively be interacted with. Which holds a fair bit of intuitive appeal as much as presentism apparently possess. Why else wouldn't it? Something that doesn't interact with anything else and never will nor ever has is tantamount to espousing a non-existent thing in the minds of certain physicists or rational empiricist. Occam's razor would demand we strip it from our ontology until such time as we can say in what way it actually does interact with at least some other part of our universe (. . . anything within it that is).

SR even seems to espouse this core principle as some celebrate its strong emphasis on casual interactions to give temporal assertions operational meaning.

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I think the concept of the void sort of helps me conceptualize the distinctions. You can think of it like some black canvas that doesn't do anything. It's just the beg board you put things on. There are rules as to how you do so as well as how you interpret what it means to be off the board, on it, and whether you have a string attached to another peg.

Not sure why he wants growing block. What purpose is served by an existing past? Evidence? Not needed by anything. Why nonexistent future? That probably feeds his notion of free will, despite the posited onmiscience serving the exact same role as an existing future.

Mind you. Craig is not known for putting together valid arguments. They just have to sound good enough to confirm the biases of his paying audiences. — noAxioms

It's because of his belief in God and his philosophical attempts to bolster it. He is pretty transparent on that.

Then how is it that some espouse it while being presentists and others such as William Lane Craig famously seemed to be in favor of it but with a growing block theory of time? — substantivalism

As I explained in my first post, presentism is not well suited for any physics, or universal cosmology. It's more suited to solipsism, though some may try to adapt it, like the example you provide.

That may be your opinion but its most definitely not the opinion of most dissidents, philosophers, and physicists who have spilled ink on this topic usually using Lorentz aether theory as a vehicle for their intuitive presentist viewpoints. Even such people are fearful of action at distance to a point that it's better to propose something with peculiar properties than to propose nothing at all and say it's just distant disembodied action. Course, then the distant connections would be causal in nature through this 'aether' but instantaneous and truly symmetrical, reflexive, as well as transitive. — substantivalism

Again, these are attempts to adapt presentism, twist it and transform it in an attempt to make it fit with observed reality. But as you imply, it doesn't really work, producing unsolvable problems.

Presentism requires absolutism, else simultaneity would not work. — noAxioms

Are you sure about this? Is there any presentist precept which dictates that my present must be the same as your present? I think not, and this is why presentism is sometimes described as a form of solipsism. Presentism allows that things (present) change over time, so why wouldn't things (present) change over space as well? Why would a thing here have the same present as a thing over there?

The fundamental problem of presentism is that it cannot support any type of simultaneity, because it is based in the subjective experience of the present, which is inherently unshared. If, for example, I assume to be able to speak to you, I must allow that the present in which I speak the words is distinct from the present in which you hear the words, unless we get caught up in the instantaneous action at a distance which substantivalism mentions. But then each one of us is trapped within one's own present, being unable to say that another shares the same present. Special relativity demonstrates to us that we have no measurement technique which can put us in the same present.

Presentism requires absolutism, else simultaneity would not work. — noAxioms
Are you sure about this? — Metaphysician Undercover

No actually. I can think of an exception: A solipsistic view would use its past light cone as the hypersurface delimiting past, present and future. It means nothing exists except what you see. Addition of a second observer makes this not work.

Relativity divides events into 3 categories relative to a given event: Past (including the light cone), future, and other (any events space-like separated from said given event. Relativity of simultaneity is valid only within this space-like region.

Is there any presentist precept which dictates that my present must be the same as your present?

A non-solipsistic attempt. Given a block and a moving spotlight for each person, defining not a hypersurface of simultaneity, but simply a worldline, you could indeed have multiple spotlights that are time-like separated, but then all the events would have to be real (no growing block), so the spotlights would be epiphenomenal minds, sort of like a movie film being run through multiple projectors in different rooms rather than having multiple copies of the film. I wonder if any theater has ever tried that.

Why would a thing here have the same present as a thing over there?

First of all, what model are we talking? Growing block? Just 3D universe? Spotlights on a 4D universe? The idea you propose works with some of those and not others.

The fundamental problem of presentism is that it cannot support any type of simultaneity, because it is based in the subjective experience of the present, which is inherently unshared.

I don't see why one present cannot be shared. There is one 3D state, and everybody experiences their spatial location in it. Why doesn't that work? (Not that I support presentism, but I've not seen a falsification of it)

If, for example, I assume to be able to speak to you, I must allow that the present in which I speak the words is distinct from the present in which you hear the words

The time of speaking and time of hearing are different, yes, but both those times are 'the present' when they occur, for everybody.

It's just spatialized metaphor to talk about time. — substantivalism

It may be metaphor, or it may be actual extension, measured in meters and everything. That's apparently a difference between realism and instrumentalism.

Well. . . how does one make sense of the present? What is its nature besides mere postulation? How can I MAKE that thing over there PRESENT to me?

OK, you seem to be talking about instant causality rather than spooky action. Nobody posits that. It is quickly falsified.

If you are say, a relationist, who only allows for physical relations to give meaning to both 'being simultaneous with' or 'spatial separation' then in either case if you want to say two things exist in the same moment is tantamount to saying they casually interact with each other neigh instantaneously.

No, it is not tantamount to that at all. Causality (per locality at least) moves at light speed at best. I cannot talk instantly to somebody on Mars. Takes a long time. Phone calls don't work. Not sure why you're proposing otherwise.

If you are fine with espousing some doctrine of the vacuum or void of nothing residing between atoms then the only way you can 'link' two distinct objects as pegs on the same board is if they are interacting with each other at a distance.

Nobody suggests that except you apparently.

... I.E. to exist is to be able to or actively be interacted with.

Actively interacted with, sure, but not instantly. Interaction takes time.



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It's because of [W.L.Craig's] belief in God and his philosophical attempts to bolster it. He is pretty transparent on that. — substantivalism

I don't think Craig believes in God any more than does Trump. He's paid a lot to say otherwise, but I think Craig would strive for more valid arguments if there was belief since he's very smart and cannot fool himself with his own fallacies. The guy simply knows how to separate sheep from their money.

I'm surprised mr Craig's opionion matters at all to anybody in this thread. Who cares what some random religious apologist thinks about time? I wouldn't consider him to be a relevant expert.

The time of speaking and time of hearing are different, yes, but both those times are 'the present' when they occur, for everybody. — noAxioms

How do you draw that conclusion of "the present for everybody"? That's an unsupported assumption. My present is the time of speaking. Your present is the time of hearing. Where do you derive "the present for everybody"? You speak about light cones, and a worldline, but these are the tools of relativity which deny that assumption of an absolute simultaneity of "the present for everybody", and the worldline is arbitrary.

As I explained in my first post, presentism is not well suited for any physics, or universal cosmology. It's more suited to solipsism, though some may try to adapt it, like the example you provide. — Metaphysician Undercover

Then make it suited! There are individuals such as Barbour and Bertotti who motivated a modified Lagrangian to roughly replicate in a proper global distribution to local environment a Classical Newtonian gravitation. Using only inter-particle distances and there repective derivatives. So, as long as there is no global rotation and these asymmetrical machian effects are neglectable, it can accord locally with observations.

As its presented in John Earman's book in world enough and space-time I don't think that is wholly successful. It also isn't extended to SR or GR. However, it is a proof in principle that it is possible to create interesting alternative theories from these metaphysical worries. For relationists it's usually whether there is some way to establish dynamical forces as present monadic properties (the skylar maneuver or something similar to Leibniz absolute force) or do without them entirely saying they are mere result of scale. That and they avoid any spacetime structure which allows for absolute rotation or forces to be involved. That is an intriguing spacetime structure or symmetry to enforce on any future proposed Lagrangian. People talk about Lorentz invariance and Galilean invariance but what about weaker Classical spacetimes?

Hell, did you know even that a curved mathematical equivalent of Newtonian Gravity called Newton Cartan gravity actually showcases that there are wider symmetries beyond the Galilean transformation that it is invariant across? Depending on the distribution it could be the case that the 'inertial frames' possible can be extended to any linearly accelerated trajectory.

Further, as that 'hard presentist' seemed to motivate as well, if you ACTUALLY TAKE SERIOUSLY the metaphysics you choose to hold to then this should motivate conceptual changes in not just the language but also the MODELS used. Especially if you aren't just trying to adopt the current held models, re-interpret them, and then use them as cheap instrumentalist rips offs which are wholly uninteresting. I.E. if you motivate 'hard presentism' seriously then you almost have to generate some probabilistic version of physics at its core for future prediction or past retrodiction.

Again, these are attempts to adapt presentism, twist it and transform it in an attempt to make it fit with observed reality. But as you imply, it doesn't really work, producing unsolvable problems. — Metaphysician Undercover

Hasn't Eternalism also given itself numerous other unsolvable problems? I don't hear them trying to interestingly solve the problem of the temporal consciousness in an unchanging spacetime anytime soon.

Usually any attempt to do so either ends in paradoxically regarding it as illusory or making use of the same conceptual tools we use to talk about our experience which are not supposed to be present in this block spacetime. Like appealing to a moving spotlight view. Moving with respect to what?

First of all, what model are we talking? Growing block? Just 3D universe? Spotlights on a 4D universe? The idea you propose works with some of those and not others. — noAxioms

Well, it depends on what you call the objective existence linking relation.

In presentism it has a unique purpose to demarcate and make clear what is existent/present so anything not linked by it are non-real/not-present.

In Eternalism of ANY other variety it's the relation that allows all of this block spacetime to actually be connected in a singular sense at all. To exist physically is to be in this spacetime and not to be is to. . . not exist. That relation (or grounding) is something you don't have to call a physical causal relation but rather a special spacetime connection but it seems like semantics to me.

In either situation you have things which exist, tons of things, and you need to somehow link them together on the same playing ground (tenselessly or not).

OK, you seem to be talking about instant causality rather than spooky action. Nobody posits that. It is quickly falsified. — noAxioms

There has to be some grounding even in Eternalism that makes all these things exist even if that is a tenseless relation. It's still a relation that demands specification even if that ends up in moorean ends.

No, it is not tantamount to that at all. Causality (per locality at least) moves at light speed at best. I cannot talk instantly to somebody on Mars. Takes a long time. Phone calls don't work. Not sure why you're proposing otherwise. — noAxioms

That is the conclusion one has to come to as a presentist and an Eternalist. There has to be some grounding relation to link distinct existent things together even if you don't want it to be a species of causation or not. Even if that relation, as in Eternalism, can't be used to demarcate out a distinct or unique present.

Nobody suggests that except you apparently. — noAxioms

Except, a good number of philosophers both dead and living. What's outside spacetime? Nothing. . . the void. . . good we are still in business.

Further, any proposal of separate physical objects interacting has to either make use of action-at-a-distance or some contiguous physical interaction. Even if it's some strange physical entity such as spacetime. Then it's spacetime rather than some aether which serves the role of 'instantaneously' linking/interacting with/grounding these two separate things.

I guess that is why Einstein couldn't get it out of his head later as to it being an aether of merely a peculiar sort. He is not wrong, it's proposed as a part of the furniture of the world and therefore retains status as the originator of physical interactions or other such grounding relations that still might not be physically observable.

Actively interacted with, sure, but not instantly. Interaction takes time. — noAxioms

So how does reality keep track of it still being there when not interacted with? What grounds it?

It's possible that while that interaction takes place that the other thing could cease to exist or change in such a manner as to not be identical with it. That knowledge or casual interaction I have tells me nothing about whether it has or hasn't changed at all. It's silent on that.

Reality shouldn't be silent on that as that would imply reality doesn't know what things actually exist or not. Whether this is regarded as tenseless or not the actual world is mind-independent, objective, and demands no vagueness.

In Eternalism of ANY other variety — substantivalism

Eternalism has varieties? It seems to have but one: The lack of the premise of a preferred moment in time. All events share the same ontology. I was unaware of variants of that.

To exist physically is to be in this spacetime and not to be is to. . . not exist. That relation (or grounding) is something you don't have to call a physical causal relation but rather a special spacetime connection but it seems like semantics to me.

I'm good with the definition, but it isn't objective. It's a relation to our spacetime. Under presentism, it usually means being grounded in the present: To exist physically is to be currently in this space. There are variants of this, such as asserting that some (or all) of the other events exist, but are in some way not preferred.

In either situation you have things which exist, tons of things, and you need to somehow link them together on the same playing ground (tenselessly or not).

They're linked by existing simultaneously.

There has to be some grounding even in Eternalism that makes all these things exist even if that is a tenseless relation.

You grounded this existence by having a location in spacetime. That's enough. That wording carries no requirement for causality at all.

What's outside spacetime?

You make it sound like a location, like spacetime is bounded, has an edge beyond which is something else, even if a void. That model doesn't work.

Further, any proposal of separate physical objects interacting has to either make use of action-at-a-distance

That they do. I make a phone call. You pick up, a reaction to my action. Hard to deny action at a distance. But it taking time is also hard to deny.

So how does reality keep track of it still being there when not interacted with? What grounds it?

What not being there? Nothing vanishes in either model. Under presentism, my dialing of the phone no longer exists at the time that your phone is ringing. Is that your issue? That's is as it should be since your phone ringing while I'm still typing in the number would constitute retrocausality.

It's possible that while that interaction takes place that the other thing could cease to exist or change in such a manner as to not be identical with it.

Yes. I can get smote by a meteor, and your phone will continue to ring. Life is harsh.

You don't seem to have any examples of necessity of instant causality over a distance.

My present is the time of speaking. Your present is the time of hearing. — Metaphysician Undercover

You make it sound like you're stuck in a moment, and never experience the later time when I am 'listening'. I think your idealism is getting in the way of what is an interpretation of a non-idealistic model.

What not being there? Nothing vanishes in either model. Under presentism, my dialing of the phone no longer exists at the time that your phone is ringing. Is that your issue? That's is as it should be since your phone ringing while I'm still typing in the number would constitute retrocausality. — noAxioms

Yes, nothing vanishes in either model. . . so to make them a consistent holistic whole they need to ALWAYS be aware of each other. Nature abhors a delay as regards existence as it's either some tenseless existence relation (eternalism) or a similar presentist existence relation which establishes there existence. Existence CANNOT wait to be decided. . . it either is or isn't. However, WE may disagree on what goes in the bucket or under the existential quantifier's range.

Just as you complained to the other commentator about his idealism then we cannot just say that nature doesn't know what things there are until the time when you do observe it. Before it's observed, during, and after nature should always give an answer on this if we demand its objectivity.

In either case, regardless of delays due to physical limitations nature 'knows' instantaneously what things exist and what things don't WITHOUT delay. Nature doesn't have to wait for you to get light from andromeda to say whether it exists in a tenseless manner as when the light is emitted. . . when it travels. . . and when it finally gets to your eyes. . . IT ALWAYS STILL EXISTED. . . in a tenseless sense. In presentism whether andromeda does still exist or not. . . while light is emitted. . . travels. . . and gets to your eyes is also objectively answered.

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It doesn't really make much sense to ask nature what things exist and then have nature say, "Wait for a moment while I figure that out. Let me send a signal out and. . ." It doesn't go out searching. It already is the case or it isn't.

We may go out searching but that is a given.

@noAxioms Call it the 'being a part of the same reality' relation. Given I don't have a better name for it. Or the 'co-existence' relation to distinguish it from mere existence.

There can be lots of things that exist but only some of them are physically interact-able with and others there might not even be physical connections we can hold to them.

What defines and makes a reality consistently interconnected to allow for any interactions to take place when needed?

Hasn't Eternalism also given itself numerous other unsolvable problems? — substantivalism

Yes both eternalism and presentism have problems. I find neither to be acceptable.

You make it sound like you're stuck in a moment, and never experience the later time when I am 'listening'. — noAxioms

That's right, I do not experience you listening. And to determine what I am experiencing at the same time (simultaneously) as you listening requires principles of measurement. And here we run into the problems exposed by special relativity, and we are moved to accept the relativity of simultaneity. That is why presentism, which assumes the present of experience, does not necessarily lead to the assumption of an absolute present. Absolute present is a distinct principle, an assumption not supported by presentism.

Existence CANNOT wait to be decided. — substantivalism

In a classical universe, this sort of thing might work, but our universe is not classical, and the vast majority of interpretations of physics do not have things/states existing until after measurement. Photons for instance seem to only exist in the past. Interesting problem for the presentists, but they get around it.

Look up 'principle of counterfactual definiteness' (which says pretty much what you just said) and then note how very few quantum interpretations accept this principle. Bohmian mechanics is the only well known one that does.

we cannot just say that nature doesn't know what things there are until the time when you do observe it. Before it's observed, during, and after nature should always give an answer on this if we demand its objectivity.

This is trivially falsified. I cannot demand of nature to tell me the state of some event that has 'happened' but is further away that light could travel in the elapsed time.

... nature 'knows' instantaneously what things exist and what things don't WITHOUT delay.

Anthropomorphising nature, and per the first paragraph above, no it doesn't.

Nature doesn't have to wait for you to get light from andromeda to say whether it exists

That's because its presence in the past has been measured, and it's kind of a big thing to somehow have vanished in that small time, so its existence now is highly probable.

... when the light is emitted. . . when it travels. . . and when it finally gets to your eyes. . . IT ALWAYS STILL EXISTED.

Yes. Light has classical existence, but the universe is not classical. Photons do not have classical existence. The one is a probability thing, just like 'Andromeda is probably still there, as is the moon.

. while light is emitted. . . travels. . . and gets to your eyes is also objectively answered.

Subjectively actually. Empirical data yields subjective existence, not objective. The former is a relation, as in your 'being a part of the same reality' relation.

Hasn't Eternalism also given itself numerous other unsolvable problems? — substantivalism

Can you name some? Can you name some for presentism? Neither works for M-U because he's an idealist and both are real interpretations of time. Eternalism not being compatible with it isn't a falsification of eternalism any more than the validity of eternalism being a falsification of idealism.

That's right, I do not experience you listening. — Metaphysician Undercover

I cannot think of any view that suggests that you would. I may have suggested that you experience the time during which I was listening instead of being stuck experiencing only the time that you are talking.

And to determine what I am experiencing at the same time (simultaneously) as you listening requires principles of measurement.

You misunderstand. I am not asking for a determination of when that time is, only that you must inevitably be simultaneous with it at some point, unless you are skipping over swaths of time
Let's say you are on Earth an I am on Mars, 15-light minutes away. You speak a short message. I get it anywhere from almost instantly to a half hour later. Unless you doze off during that half hour, you're going to experience the time during which I am listening to the message.

Oddly enough, under presentism, that half hours is a proper half hour, not an actual one. There is no way to know how long it takes for an actual hour to pass since one does not experience the actual flow of time, but rather one experiences proper time, same as what clocks measure.

This is trivially falsified. I cannot demand of nature to tell me the state of some event that has 'happened' but is further away that light could travel in the elapsed time. — noAxioms

I anthropomorphized nature but nature is objective EVEN if you can never figure that out.

Just classical existence realism. If we deny that then we might as well just become idealists.

Anthropomorphising nature, and per the first paragraph above, no it doesn't. — noAxioms

Realism. I'm to assume most people irrespective of the strangeness of their physics aren't solipsists or rabid berkeley idealists.

No matter how strong the arguments for anti-realism are we always seem to demand a realism of some sort for the external world.

That's because its presence in the past has been measured, and it's kind of a big thing to somehow have vanished in that small time, so its existence now is highly probable. — noAxioms

Not because it has a presence in the past but its always already been a part of the furniture of the world. Block spacetime, remember.

Talk of probabilities only counts for interpretations of presentism. As what may be the future or may have been in the past have to have us weigh probabilistic distributions of rational choices of different possible outcomes. As there is not definite future or past. . . THEY DON'T EXIST under presentism remember.

Either it has always (tenseless manner) already been a part of the furniture of the world or never will be in Eternalism, however.

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You keep confusing our fallible empirical access with the objective external features the world possess as laid out by a particular metaphysics. Which may be within our reach or. . . never will be. Metaphysics isn't meant to be concerned with that but then again most realists also aren't convinced by any number of skeptical arguments that they are really a brain in a vat. Even if the realists can't bring an argument to the table that the shrewd skeptic couldn't easily counter out of spite.

I could also claim that any interpretation which brings such high indeterminism to the external world is merely a projection our ignorance both bridgeable and un-bridgeable.

I cannot think of any view that suggests that you would. I may have suggested that you experience the time during which I was listening instead of being stuck experiencing only the time that you are talking. — noAxioms

I've experienced a lot of things in my life, but I really can't say that I know what it's like to experience time.

You misunderstand. I am not asking for a determination of when that time is, only that you must inevitably be simultaneous with it at some point, unless you are skipping over swaths of time — noAxioms

We don't know how time passes. If it exists as discrete quanta, then it's quite possible that the swaths which I experience are not the same as the swaths which you experience, and so there is no such simultaneity. We can't experience the same space at the same time, so why think that we could even experience the same time? Doesn't relativity indicate that the time experienced is unique to the spatial conditions of the individual?

There is no way to know how long it takes for an actual hour to pass since one does not experience the actual flow of time, but rather one experiences proper time, same as what clocks measure. — noAxioms

I think that's an unsupported assumption about what "one experiences".