• DasGegenmittel
    44
    TL;DR:
    In my essay The Gettier Grid, I propose a four-dimensional classification system for Gettier cases. It accounts for instability in justification, truth, temporal dynamics, and context. Using a simple example (“Student and Charlatan Teacher”), I illustrate how different perspectives can lead to radically different epistemic evaluations — from apparent knowledge to complete epistemic failure.

    In my new essay „The Gettier Grid: A Reflexive Heuristic for Epistemic Volatility“, I propose a structural framework for classifying and analyzing Gettier cases that moves toward a more systematic understanding of epistemic failure. The central idea is that knowledge doesn’t merely break down because of faulty justification or accidental truth, but because of what I call epistemic volatility — the inherent instability of epistemic states across time, changing contexts, and varying interpretive standpoints.

    To make this volatility analytically tractable, I introduce a four-dimensional coding system that classifies cases based on (1) the stability of justification, (2) the stability of truth, (3) temporal dynamics (whether a case evolves or gets reinterpreted over time), and (4) context (whether it is subjective and closed or opened up by external, objectifying factors). Each of these dimensions is coded in binary (1 = stable, 0 = unstable), yielding 16 possible structural profiles. The point of the model is not to impose rigid classifications, but to offer a reflexive and diagnostic tool that captures the layered, often perspectival nature of epistemic assessment.

    Consider the following illustrative case: A student believes that “2 + 2 = 4” simply because their teacher told them so. While the proposition is necessarily true, the justification rests entirely on trust in authority. Unbeknownst to the student, the teacher is generally incompetent and usually wrong about mathematics — in this case, they just happen to be correct. From the student’s internal perspective, the belief seems justified and true; there is no epistemic tension (coded as 1100). However, from the perspective of an external analyst, who knows the teacher’s reputation, the belief’s justification collapses while the truth remains stable — yielding a classic Gettier case (coded as 0101). Taking a normatively rigorous view — for instance, applying reliabilist or safety-based criteria — the belief may fail entirely as knowledge, since it is both unjustified and lacks epistemic control (0001).

    What this example shows is that knowledge is not a static or purely logical state, but one that is embedded in dynamic, perspectival, and contextual frameworks.
    Ultimately, the analysis suggests that knowledge is not a static possession but a dynamic, perspective-sensitive process — always vulnerable to revision, and never entirely immune to epistemic luck: See Justified True Crisis and my Post „Gettier‘s Gap“.

    The Gettier Grid helps make these frameworks explicit. It allows us to identify precisely where knowledge breaks down, how different perspectives yield divergent evaluations, and why some cases appear epistemically solid from within, but collapse when external factors come into play. More than a classificatory system, the model is a heuristic for epistemic reflexivity — for understanding that our judgments about knowledge are themselves situated, and that epistemic stability is not absolute in dynamic scenarios.

    The full essay is available here:
    https://www.researchgate.net/publication/390729212_The_Gettier_Grid_A_Reflexive_Heuristic_for_Epistemic_Volatility
  • Count Timothy von Icarus
    3.5k
    That's a neat typology. Sorry you didn't get any interest in this

    Ultimately, the analysis suggests that knowledge is not a static possession but a dynamic, perspective-sensitive process — always vulnerable to revision, and never entirely immune to epistemic luck

    I tend to see these sort of issues as indictive of the fact that "justified true belief" is simply a bad way to define knowledge. It's a definition that recommends itself by being analytically quite easy to work with; however this is a bit like the guy who lost his keys on the lawn and looks under the street light for them instead because "that's where he can see."

    If knowledge involves the adequacy of the intellect to being, then simply affirming true propositions with proper discursive justification is not all there is to knowledge. Truth is primarily a property of the intellect, and only analogically predicated of linguistic utterances (as signs of truth in the intellect). When someone thinks p is true for bad reasons, and p is true, there is an adequacy of the intellect to being insomuch as truth is properly affirmed, but this will not involve the fuller adequacy that comes with understanding (which we would tend to call "knowledge.")

    I think the empiricist tendencies in analytic thought tend to lead to a neglect of the role of understanding in knowledge. However, even if one dismisses any faculty of noesis/intellectus (which I wouldn't), I still think the phenomenology of knowledge suggests a big role for understanding (and this a relevant role for problems of vagueness). With vagueness, it seems we can have properly justified true belief and still lack "knowledge" in a strong sense. Knowledge is understanding and if "the truth is the whole," it is also in some sense inexhaustible. A "model" that tries to make truth primarily a binary property of propositions is going to miss this (and has other problems if truth/falsity represent contrary instead of contradictory opposition).

    Consider the following illustrative case: A student believes that “2 + 2 = 4” simply because their teacher told them so. While the proposition is necessarily true, the justification rests entirely on trust in authority. Unbeknownst to the student, the teacher is generally incompetent and usually wrong about mathematics — in this case, they just happen to be correct. From the student’s internal perspective, the belief seems justified and true; there is no epistemic tension (coded as 1100). However, from the perspective of an external analyst, who knows the teacher’s reputation, the belief’s justification collapses while the truth remains stable — yielding a classic Gettier case (coded as 0101). Taking a normatively rigorous view — for instance, applying reliabilist or safety-based criteria — the belief may fail entirely as knowledge, since it is both unjustified and lacks epistemic control (0001).

    Right, but 2+2=4 is a perfect example of a case where individual understanding becomes a factor.

    When we get to the "metaphysics of knowledge" I don't even know if it is appropriate to call knowledge (or at least what is most fully knowledge) a "belief." When we are sure that there are cars in the oncoming traffic lane and that we mustn't drive into them, I think this is not simply a case of sense data + ratio (computational reason) = propositional belief. The reason we find it quite impossible to ignore such knowledge lies, IMHO, more in the co-identity of knower and known in such cases (a union). People find it impossible to believe otherwise because their intellect is "informed" by truth in the senses (sense knowledge), or what we might call the communication of actuality.

    Older notions of knowledge also tend to have an ecstatic (ecstasis) and erotic (penetration) element that seems important for moral, aesthetic, and spiritual knowledge that gets bulldozed in the JTB formulation. Likewise for the ethical ideal of "knowing by becoming." But I doubt many analytic philosophers would be swayed to much by those concerns.
  • DasGegenmittel
    44
    Thanks for your reply and your appreciation. For many people, this is quite a boring topic—especially when discussed in such detail. ;D
    Those older notions are interesting, but they can be problematic since they’re open to perceptual errors—at least from the perspective of a monistic or absolute conception of knowledge.
    The typology at least provides a foundation for comparison, which opens up the possibility of recognizing perspectival and contextual differences.
    JTB is absolutely ridiculous in dynamic scenarios—it just doesn’t work. Counterexamples are everywhere.
    As I’ve shown in the thread “Gettier’s Gap” and my essay “Justified True Crisis”, I lean much more toward a dualistic approach.
    And yes, the analytic tradition is part of the problem, reminiscent of the paradox of safety: they try to make everything as safe and secure as possible, but in doing so, they risk losing everything—especially time and change. It’s absurd.
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