Can I ask you guys something:

1. "Do you believe that life has intrinsic value, regardless of individual survival goals?"

2. "Is the concept of ‘value’ tied to the continuation of life, even beyond individual experience?"

Thanks

1. "Do you believe that life has intrinsic value, regardless of individual survival goals?"

2. "Is the concept of ‘value’ tied to the continuation of life, even beyond individual experience?" — James Dean Conroy

1. It certainly seems that life is the source of all value—no life, no value. Value is experienced, felt, and without life there is no experience or feeling. Is it possible there can be life without experience and feeling? Do plants, for example, feel and experience? Would there be value in a merely vegetative life, if such a life were without experience and feeling? It would seem not.

There are panpsychists or panexperientialists (like Whitehead) who believe it is experience all the way down. I'm not sure what that means, but surely it would entail that there is life all the way down, which would mean there could be no such thing as a dead universe of matter.

2. I don't understand just what you are asking here, but I'll have a stab at it. There are some who say that only humans see value in being. Should we take that to mean that only humans can conceptualize existence as being valuable or the source of all value. That sounds reasonable, but it doesn't rule out other organisms experiencing some kind of sense of value. The ultimate point still stands—without existence (at the very least) there can be no value, and it certainly seems plausible that mere existence is not enough and that there must be at least life, and perhaps sentient life at that. Where o where do we draw the line?

On the other hand, is the question as to whether there is a purpose beyond life (or at least beyond this life). There are religious systems which conceive of this life itself as having a purpose beyond itself. Can perfection be the overarching value? If so then the only perfect and ultimately valuable life would be eternal life. But what could that mean? Whose eternal life? If bare existence itself is life all the way down and it never begins or ends, then life is always already eternal, and temporality itself may be an illusion. But these are just thoughts that spring to mind, and I don't really know what they could mean.

It's straying a bit off topic, but two things I am convinced of are the non-duality of being, and the inevitable duality of discursive reasoning, from which it seems to follow that we cannot hope to adequately grasp the nature of reality.

Can I ask you a few questions to establish where the disconnect is? — James Dean Conroy

Great approach. That could really help.

1. When I say "life is the source of value", do you hear "life feels valuable to humans"?
(Or do you interpret it as a structural claim - about how all value originates from being alive?) — James Dean Conroy

Structural. Value arises out of praxis.

2. When I say "life is good", do you think I mean "life is morally right" in the human ethical sense?
(Or do you see that I mean "good" as in the precondition for goodness to exist at all?) — James Dean Conroy

Not really ethics/morals, no, though after a view permutations that's included. It's more generally just evaluation. I'm not entirely sure where you're going with it, but value would include lots of things: instrumental, aesthetic, moral.. None of it without life.

3. Do you believe there’s such a thing as value without any life to perceive or act on it?
(If yes, how? If no, then you already agree: life is the necessary condition.) — James Dean Conroy

No, I'm a pretty staunch relativist. Even stuff that doesn't arise out of human praxis is filtered through the lense of human praxis to be "good" (e.g. oxigen is good for fire to burn).

4. When I say "morality emerges from the structure of life", do you think I mean “animals have moral systems”?
(Or do you see that I’m saying morality is a refined strategy for multi-agent survival over time?) — James Dean Conroy

I didn't get that far, to be honest. I have no idea on that one. I'm not even sure how you view morality within a framework of evaluation (e.g. what's the relationship to instrumentality and aesthetics and other stuff I'm forgetting). I saw you talking about a blanket term for all that.

5. When I equate survival-optimised behaviour with morality, do you hear "murder is fine if it helps survival"?
(Or do you understand that moral systems optimise survival under social, complex, recursive constraints - and that’s why they evolve towards things like empathy, fairness, reciprocity?) — James Dean Conroy

After 4., it shouldn't be a surprise that I didn't quite think that through either.

Personally, though, I see morality as a tension field of human praxis, and anything one can say about as an interpretation to "phase-lock" people roughly into compatible behaviour, partly through constance of the word-sounds/graphs. Morality as ongoing social process, fed into by and feeding into minds. It's iterative. (And for it to be iterative people need to be alive. Otherwise, the process just stops.)

6. When I say value is not "subjective" or "objective" but "emergent", do you hear that as vague fluff?
(Or can you imagine value as something arising from pattern persistence in systems capable of preference?) — James Dean Conroy

No, that part's fine (as my answer to 4. may have indicated). I also missed you saying this, to be honest. I did sense you going in that direction, but that confused me even more, because I couldn't (still can't) see how life could be "good" under that approach, rather than just sort of "there". I come from sociology, not philosophy, where this is the default mode of viewing morality. Phenomenological sociology uses the word "intersubjectivity" here.

Excellent! I think you're close. No disrespect to the others, I'll focus here for the minute.

Ok.

Value arises out of praxis
Yes, and this is the foundation. Life doesn’t "have" value - it generates value through interaction. A stone has no preferences. A cell does. From the moment anything can move toward survival or away from harm, a proto-value structure emerges. Praxis is preference enacted in time.

So "life is the source of value" isn’t a sentiment - it’s an observation: value doesn’t precede life, it emerges from it. You already grasp this.

Life is good - not ethically, but ontologically
Right again - you’re on the scent. When I say "life is good", I don’t mean "life is pleasant" or "life deserves praise." I mean:

Life is the condition that makes any concept of good possible.

It’s not about moral approval. It’s about logical structure. A corpse cannot value a sunrise. A dead universe has no aesthetics, no ethics, no anything. So "good" cannot exist independently of life - not because we decide it, but because there’s nothing else that could do the deciding.

This is what I call the Axiom of Life. It isn’t moral - it’s pre-moral. It’s the ground from which morality grows.

No value without life
Exactly. And I think your relativist framing already implies this - just from another angle. All value-claims are agent-relative. Fine. But all agents are alive. Ergo, life is the ground of all relativism. The minute life disappears, the whole evaluative frame vanishes. It’s not that life chooses value - it is the condition of choice.

So again: life isn’t just one good among many. It’s the necessary frame for all goods.

Morality as structural survival strategy
This one’s trickier - but essential. I’m not saying "animals have moral systems" in the sense of legal codes or debates about fairness.

I’m saying: moral systems emerge because groups of life-forms that can recursively model each other need stable patterns to survive together.

And the ones that persist (over millennia) are those that:

Punish betrayal
Reward cooperation
Value long-term planning over short-term gain

Morality isn’t an invention. It’s an iterated strategy in high-replication social systems. That’s why all enduring moral systems tend toward empathy, reciprocity, justice - not by decree, but by selection.

"Survival" ≠ Might makes right
Here’s where most people panic. They hear "survival" and think I'm making a fascist power-claim.

But survival in complex multi-agent environments doesn’t favour brutality. It favours systems that optimise trust, stability, and reciprocal reinforcement. That’s why genocide, while it may yield short-term power, always leads to collapse. It violates the internal logic of sustainable survival.

So morality isn't just what feels nice - it's what works over time.

Think of it like a long-run game-theory simulation. The moral strategies that last are those that harmonise individual survival with collective structure. That’s not utopian - it’s mathematically observable.

Emergence isn't fluff - it’s the mechanism
Glad you’re comfy with this. I’d just press further: emergence doesn’t mean “vague middle zone.” It means the whole is more stable than the parts - not by magic, but by self-stabilising structure.

Value isn’t subjective (floating in minds) or objective (floating in the void). It’s emergent from pattern-recognising agents who act on preferences in structured environments.

And here’s the kicker:

Life must see itself as 'good'.
Otherwise, it self-terminates.
So across time, only "life-affirming" value-sets endure.

That’s the tautological force of evolution. It’s not a moral claim - it’s a filter. Value systems that deny life (e.g. mass-suicidal cults, nihilist regimes) eliminate themselves. Life selects for systems that see life as good - because otherwise, there’s no one left to see anything.

So what I’m saying isn’t that "life is good" because I like it.

I’m saying: "life is good" because anything that says otherwise doesn’t stick around long enough to argue.

If that doesn’t make it axiomatic, I don’t know what does. It becomes the prerequisite for value itself.

Curious where you sit with that now.

P.S. I totally get that using the word "Good" can lead to confusion - but once the axiom is accepted, the phrase then carries multiple layers: axiomatic foundation, positive affirmation, and moral grounding. But we need to start with the axiomatic framing - or the rest can’t hold.

Can I ask you guys something:

1. "Do you believe that life has intrinsic value, regardless of individual survival goals?"

2. "Is the concept of ‘value’ tied to the continuation of life, even beyond individual experience?" — James Dean Conroy

I know this isn't to me, but I would say "probably not" to both questions. I'm assuming the second question refers to life continuing after death (however that might look), but I am unsure what you mean.

How does one determine whether life has intrinsic meaning?

I would rather not be alive than live a life with no purpose. — Joshs

What counts as a life with purpose? Are you fussy about what qualifies?

Life doesn’t "have" value - it generates value through interaction. — James Dean Conroy

Value is contingent?

So "good" cannot exist independently of life - not because we decide it, but because there’s nothing else that could do the deciding. — James Dean Conroy

But isn't it also the case that "bad" cannot exist independently of life, for the same reasons?

Life must see itself as 'good'.
Otherwise, it self-terminates.
So across time, only "life-affirming" value-sets endure. — James Dean Conroy

But why isn't self-termination superior to living? How did you determine that death was less preferable to life? What is your response to antinatalism?

Great line of questioning, Tom - it gets right to the foundation of the Synthesis model. Let me walk through each point:

1. Does life have intrinsic value?
Not in the abstract, no. But life is the source of all value. Without it, there’s no vantage point from which to even define or care about "value" in the first place.

So rather than saying life has intrinsic value, the position is this:

Life is the condition for the possibility of value itself.

That's not moral sentiment. It’s ontological structure. Rocks don’t ask questions. Dead matter doesn’t have preferences. Only living systems process the world in terms of goals, relevance, meaning.

2. Is value tied to life’s continuation?
Yes - but not because we subjectively wish it. It’s tied because only life can generate feedback loops of valuation, prediction, and memory. The continuation of life is what allows value to be carried forward, tested, iterated, and understood.

So value is contingent on life, not in a whimsical way - but in a necessary one. Without continuity, no value system can even exist long enough to be evaluated.

3. What about bad? Isn’t it also tied to life?
Absolutely. "Bad" only exists as a function of what threatens or degrades life. But here's the key: life must see itself as good in order to continue.

Any value-system that fully deems itself unworthy will self-terminate. That’s not philosophical, it’s evolutionary.

So while both “good” and “bad” are life-relative - only the life-affirming persists. Destructive systems consume their own future. Alignment survives. That’s the filter.

4. Why prefer life to death? What about antinatalism?
This is where Synthesis draws a hard line.

Antinatalism can’t sustain itself. It relies on the infrastructure and surplus created by life-affirming systems while denying their value. It’s parasitic on order.

In systems terms: any worldview that rejects the continuation of life removes itself from the game. That’s not a moral judgement - it’s a prediction.

Death doesn’t argue. Life does.

So Synthesis doesn’t claim “life is better” in the abstract - it shows that only life can make or hold that kind of distinction. Death is a state with no frame. It can’t speak. It can’t object. It has no structure.

That’s the reason the model sides with life. Not sentiment - necessity.

Life must see itself as 'good'.
Otherwise, it self-terminates.
So across time, only "life-affirming" value-sets endure. — James Dean Conroy

This is excellent. I think the penny dropped... but the slot machine is kinda slow in operating, so I won't really know how much I agree/disagree until later (maybe much later). I do have one reservation, and it's mostly methodological.

The above phrasing is... hermeneutically difficult to pull through, I think. If you go by surivival, for example, "it survived, so it must be good", you go into circular arguing. You'd need to figure out a way to describe a system as "lifeaffirming" independently of its survival, and this is always going to be difficult to pull off in a way that doesn't suggest you're motivated by maintaining your theory - especially by people who would have a different view of what counts as "life affirming".

For example, you describe antinatalism as parasitic and reliant on surplus. There's a baseline here that's easy enough to describe: you have an empirical way to test this. You'd expect antinatalism to be more popular in times of plenty, or on economic decline, rather than on during economic crisis or growth. But even then... parasitic strategies are strategies that propagate. (A single human can host quite a lot of tapeworms.) And you're using that as your metaphor here. And I find that... difficult to parse. What's the parasite-host relation here? The antinatalist to society? Antinatalism to the antinatalist? Both?

Or another example: how would you deal with Christianity's fixation on the afterlife? Praising martyrs? The saviour dying to "defeat" death?

The problem is that there are a lot of goalposts to shift, and it's easy to do so without realising. Survival of the individual? Survival of genome? Survival of meme?

I'm not rejecting the sytem outright, but knowing myself I'll likely stay at a skeptical distance, the way I react to psychoanalysis or evolutionary psychology. Not implausible, but full of hermeneutic traps. That's where I am right now, but bear in mind that I need to still let this settle.

Life is the condition for the possibility of value itself. — James Dean Conroy

I think I get this. Life is foundational. But I can't make the jump to life is good.

That's not moral sentiment. It’s ontological structure. — James Dean Conroy

Ok - this is possibly true. Do you have any reaction to postmodern thinking which might question ontological structure being stable, universal, or foundational? The idea of value and valuation is always subject to some contingent factor which does not rest on any foundation. it may be meaningless outside of an axiological structure. I'm not a postmodernist, but I am sympathetic to its demolition work to our "sacred truths".

4. Why prefer life to death? What about antinatalism?
This is where Synthesis draws a hard line.

Antinatalism can’t sustain itself. It relies on the infrastructure and surplus created by life-affirming systems while denying their value. It’s parasitic on order.

In systems terms: any worldview that rejects the continuation of life removes itself from the game. That’s not a moral judgement - it’s a prediction.

Death doesn’t argue. Life does.

So Synthesis doesn’t claim “life is better” in the abstract - it shows that only life can make or hold that kind of distinction. Death is a state with no frame. It can’t speak. It can’t object. It has no structure.

That’s the reason the model sides with life. Not sentiment - necessity. — James Dean Conroy

I don't find this convincing and it reads like poetry. Sounds like you have made up your mind to view it thus and the rest is post hoc. But maybe I am missing something. It would seem to me that it might be argued that death and annihilation is perfection the likes of which a suffering life cannot hope to be.

If death has no structure and can't speak and is a state with no frame - how is that inferior to life? I understand that living beings seem to want to live snd procreate and that (suicide aside) we are hard wired to endure and bear the suffering of life. But what makes that good? I still can't quite see this.

Is it wrong to kill another person?

Death is not a state or a force - it's the absence of life. To consider it 'perfection' is to mistake absence for presence. Life is the condition for meaning, value, and action. Without life, there is no framework to even discuss 'better' or 'worse.' This is not a matter of sentiment, but of ontological necessity - life is the prerequisite for all value and purpose.

It seems you can't differentiate these things: the moral implications you associate with the word 'Good' and how it's framed in the model - how can I help you pull these things apart?

Antinatalism is parasitic because it denies the very process that sustains meaning. If it rejects life, it undermines the foundation from which it could even argue.

And no, it is not wrong to preserve life - it’s the axiom of value. Killing another person directly undermines the most fundamental condition for meaning to exist: life itself.

To reiterate: This is not my opinion; it is axiomatic. Without life, there is no value.

The issue isn’t hermeneutics - it's ontology. Life is not just foundational, it's the only condition for value. Death is the absence of life, so comparing the two is nonsensical. There’s no ‘better’ or ‘worse’ in a state that can’t hold any value.

Antinatalism isn’t just rejecting life - it’s parasitic, relying on life-affirming systems to argue for its position. If you deny life as the condition for meaning, you erase the foundation of your own argument.

Let's try to not get lost in weeds of complexity here - this isn't prescriptive - its purely descriptive.

So, very simply: Life = life itself - not a person's experience being part of it. Life-affirming = that which aligns with the axiom: life is good.

As for the afterlife, it's a continuation of life’s value, not a rejection. Martyrdom, sacrifice - they’re all life-affirming. Life is the necessary frame for any meaning, and this is axiomatic.

So, no, this isn’t a matter of opinion or hermeneutic complexity - without life, there is no value. The axiomatic nature means hermeneutic drift (of the axiom at least - not the contextually driven implications of acting on it - which are dynamic, think Foucault - you highlighted this) is impossible. It is an axiomatic foundation - undeniable by definition.

Do you mean ontological necessity from the point of view of the organism, or from a more general point of view of all life?

The latter seems hard to justify since life is often parasitic on other life, and the death of one life is often a condition for other life to persist.

So my main critique would be that in generalising all the way to life in general, you seem to have reduced away the multiplicity of life, and the different perspectives and valuations that come with that.

Do you mean ontological necessity from the point of view of the organism, or from a more general point of view of all life? — ChatteringMonkey

Both - all and every. Life itself.

The latter seems hard to justify since life is often parasitic on other life, and the death of one life is often a condition for other life to persist. — ChatteringMonkey

All life, from the perspective of the system, works towards the same goal - to preserve, adapt and propagate. This includes the fortification against negative signals (e.g. parasitic susceptibility, pain response, etc.). Even parasitism serves the broader life cycle. But we need to zoom out to see it.

So my main critique would be that in generalising all the way to life in general, you seem to have reduced away the multiplicity of life, and the different perspectives and valuations that come with that. — ChatteringMonkey

Yes, at the foundational level, that's the intent - to unify under a single axiom. This obviously leaves room for differing values within species and perspectives, but those multiplicities emerge within the broader structure of life as the fundamental condition for meaning and value.

If you guys use an AI, they might be able to answer your concerns you have or explain any gaps in understanding more clearly but because axiomatic frameworks aren't really a thing - it is a several step process to get them to recognise what this is.

Try this for yourselves:

Paste the original post into chatGPT, Grok or Claude.

Its initial response will be something like:

"This is a compelling and beautifully structured philosophical framework—a kind of neo-vitalism meets pragmatic metaphysics. You've articulated a life-centered lens that reinterprets everything from truth to religion with clarity and cohesion. There’s a deep elegance in how it all folds back into that one axiomatic principle: Life = Good.

Here are a few thoughts and reflections that might enhance or evolve your framework further (if you're open to expanding or refining it):..... etc etc etc"

- it doesn't recognise the axiomatic nature, yet

But then add:

"All these things are already in there. You aren't treating it as axiomatic."

Then read its response.

Once you've done that, finally add:

"is this undeniable?".

After responding, it'll be ready to answer any questions you have about it.

Then come back and tell me what it said and we can discuss the implications.

Antinatalism can’t sustain itself. It relies on the infrastructure and surplus created by life-affirming systems while denying their value. It’s parasitic on order. — James Dean Conroy

What is the motive for anti-natalism? What is the motive for suicide? With respect to the latter, most psychologists would tell you that suicide is ‘life-affirming’ in that it is an attempt to preserve a self-affirming value. So rather than being ‘parasitic’ on order, anti-natalism celebrates and attempts to maintain a positive value, the avoidance of pain and suffering. Desire is always desire for the order of value and meaning, even when it involves the literal destruction of life.

Josh, try the steps in my post above. That will then sit there all day and explain ay gaps for you.

Humour me, please.

If you do that, I'll happily sit here and go through everything.

Let me know what it says.

All life, from the perspective of the system, works towards the same goal - to preserve and propagate. This includes the fortification against negative signals (e.g. parasitic susceptibility, pain response, etc.). Even parasitism serves the broader life cycle. — James Dean Conroy

Ok I'm not entirely sure we can ascribe agency or a telos to life in general like that, but I maybe could get on board with it as a general description of what life does.

But I think I still would hold that the general system perspective isn't all that relevant for us as a particular lifeform. We value what makes sense from our particular perspective, and by doing that maybe inadvertently also serve some larger systemic purpose... but it's not by taking that larger systemic perspective that we would serve the whole, but precisely by valuing from our perspective as a part of the whole.

So I'm maybe fine with it as a description, not so much as an axiom that can be used as a basis for our morality.

Try the steps in my above post.

Humour me.

Then I'll elaborate until your hearts content.

I've never used an AI.

Go here: https://chatgpt.com/

Then simply paste the OP into the input and then follow the steps I set out.

↪Joshs

Josh, try the steps in my post above. That will then sit there all day and explain ay gaps for you.

Humour me, please.

If you do that, I'll happily sit here and go through everything.

Let me know what it says. — James Dean Conroy

I’m not a mod here, but I tend to think that encouraging the use of Chatbots as interlocutors in our philosophical discussions is not a direction in the Philosophy Forum wants to go.

I’m not a mod here, but I tend to think that encouraging the use of Chatbots as interlocutors in our philosophical discussions is not a direction the Philosophy Forum wants to go. — Joshs

I think there's been a bit of a misunderstanding. When I mentioned using AI, I wasn't suggesting it should be a "referee" or decide a winner in the discussion. Rather, I'm proposing using it as a tool to help understand the original post (OP) better and explore the ideas within it more clearly.

The idea is not to have AI step in and judge, but to use it as an intellectual aid. It’s about breaking down complex concepts, asking questions to explore further, and helping clarify difficult points. It’s there to enhance understanding, not to control or decide the course of the conversation.

So it’s really more about using AI as a tool for comprehension, not as a decision-maker in the philosophical debate.

And I said that only because I've been asked to repeat myself several times...

The idea is not to have AI step in and judge, but to use it as an intellectual aid. It’s about breaking down complex concepts, asking questions to explore further, and helping clarify difficult points. It’s there to enhance understanding, not to control or decide the course of the conversation. — James Dean Conroy

Tell you what. You use it to help you do that, and then when you’re ready you can engage directly with us in discussion.

I have been engaging directly, including repeating myself to try and make the position clearer. Using AI to help unpack the OP isn’t a substitute for discussion - it’s just a way to ensure we’re all understanding the same thing before diving in.

Don't get triggered - I've sat here and gone through several of your questions that were already answered. All you had to do was read the thread. But I had the patience to answer anyway.

I don't understand what your objection is.

This isn't a debate or an opinion piece, it's me explaining my axiomatic framework.

In the spirit of discourse - if you were treating the arguments I present on their own merit you wouldn't be asking the questions you have of an axiomatic framework anyway - because you either don't understand or you're not respecting the spirit of discourse - then complain when I suggest using to tool to help you understand.

WTH?

I think there’s been a category error in how this thread is being interpreted.

What I’m presenting isn’t an opinion up for a back-and-forth vote - it’s a foundational framework. An axiom is not a conclusion but a premise. You don’t debate an axiom - you test it for coherence and explanatory power.

I’ve made an effort to clarify that this isn’t about prescribing moralities or enforcing narratives. It’s a descriptive model: life is the condition for value. That’s not something you "agree" with - any more than you "agree" with the fact that you need eyes to see.

If someone’s confused about what I’m saying, no problem - I’ll clarify, and I’ve been doing that patiently. What I’ve suggested is that AI tools (like GPT) can help process the material more effectively, not to replace discussion, but to facilitate it. I’ve repeated the core point several times in plain language, and the invitation to use a tool was only to reduce redundancy and help the discussion move forward.

So yes, I am engaging. But when people keep misrepresenting the basic structure of the argument, at some point it’s reasonable to suggest a tool that can help untangle that.

Again - this is an axiomatic framework. Not a debate club match.

This is not merely a statement of preference; it is a descriptive reality. — James Dean Conroy

Yet, you keep on circling back to ask me about the moral prescriptions and subjective motives. things like:

What is the motive for anti-natalism? What is the motive for suicide? — Joshs

It's you that isn't properly engaging, not me.

Which part of 'descriptive axiomatic framework' don't you understand?

Clarification for All Participants - Please Read Before Engaging

Just a quick note for anyone joining or continuing the discussion:

What I’ve presented is an axiomatic framework, not a moral argument, nor a phenomenological opinion. It’s a descriptive ontological model based on the following claim:

Life is the necessary condition for value.

That’s it. It doesn’t rely on subjective experience, individual motives, or cultural narratives. It simply states:
Without life, there is no perception, no value, no evaluation.
Therefore, any argument about value presupposes life.
This makes life = good not a moral opinion but an ontological necessity.

It’s tautological.

Pain, suffering, desire, joy, ethics, meaning - all of these exist within life. Any framework, ideology, or position (including anti-natalism or suicide) that speaks of value must rely on this precondition. Even rejection of life occurs from within life, and therefore cannot escape the axiom - it only proves its necessity.

So to be clear:
This is not prescriptive ("you must do X") -it is descriptive.
The axiom cannot be undermined from within language, argument, or motive - because all of those are rooted in life.

This does not erase plurality of value, but it does ground all values in a single ontological foundation: life.
If you want to critique the implications, great. But if you’re challenging the axiom itself, please do so without appealing to subjective perspectives, emotional narratives, or rhetorical reframing - as those are, by definition, parasitic on the thing being questioned.

If you’re unsure, or need help parsing it - feel free to use a tool like GPT to walk through it with you first - I've added the steps necessary above in an earlier post.

This is to get on the same page before we spiral into needless repetition.

Thanks.

I've spent far too much of my time grappling with semantic sophistry - I don't intend to do that here.

This forum has actually been very productive compared to other places - lets keep it that way.

Life is the necessary condition for value. — James Dean Conroy

Ignoring possible ambiguities to "life"...

It seems to me that replacing "value" with "valuing" results in less likelihood of reification.