I think the realist position (and not just the direct realist position) is that there would still be the world (quantum definition of the word), relative to something measuring it (a rock say), but yea, all that synthesis that the human mind does is absent, so it would be far more 'the world in itself' and not as we think of it. Time for instance would not be something that flows. Rocks have no need to create that fabrication. — noAxioms

:100: The universe that most believe would be there in the absence of any observer would not have any form, as form is discovered by the mind (per Charles Pinter, Mind and the Cosmic Order). The world 'in itself' is formless and therefore meaningless. We mistake the form discovered by the mind as something that is there anyway, not seeing that the mind is the source of it. Kant 101, as I understand him.

Pick something you believe doesn't exist. Why do you believe it doesn't exist? What is your criteria for deciding one way or the other? I ask because the criteria specified is most often based on observation, making it observer dependent. — noAxioms

Its irrelevant why I believe something does not exist. Its relevant if I know that something doesn't exist. Belief is a feeling. Knowledge is an objective determination.

There is often a confusion between "What we know" and "What is".
Almost everything is 'what we believe'. Much of what claim to be known is just beliefs. I'm fine with that. I'm not asking if we know reality is mind dependent. I'm seeing if the beliefs are really what they claim to be. — noAxioms

The only way to know if a belief is valid is if you have done the diligence to turn it into knowledge. There is a way to measure inductions by a hierarchy of types, but you need to know what knowledge is first.

That is a fantastic example of a belief. Plenty of self-consistent views deny this. I personally would say that a world external to myself is perceived. That much makes it relation with an observer. It does not imply that said world exists, unless 'exist' is defined as that relation (which is often how I use the word). — noAxioms

No, its basic knowledge. There was a time you did not exist, now you do. Do you think you spontaneously created and are the only person in existence? Why do you need to breathe? Go ahead, hold your breath for as long as you can. Don't eat for a month. Stop drinking water. Don't make the mistake of getting so caught up in word games that you ignore the basic reality that will kill you no matter how much you don't want it to.

And yes, you perceive the outside world. its 'outside'. How else are you supposed to experience it? Why does the fact that you perceive means it can't exist apart from yourself? You even know you can misperceive it. Try jumping 10 feet down and believe that you'll float. Doesn't work does it? The outside world will happily grab a two by four and smack you over the head again and again. Those who don't learn end up crippled or dead.

If you're interested in a knowledge theory that results in a hierarchy of induction (a rational way of managing beliefs), read my knowledge theory. https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/14044/knowledge-and-induction-within-your-self-context/p1 There's a summary from the first poster if you want the cliff notes.

What we know is clear: There is a world independent of our own minds.
That is a fantastic example of a belief. Plenty of self-consistent views deny this. — noAxioms

Self consistent, and oftentimes with low correspondence to reality. Perhaps, something to watch out for.

I'm sorry this has taken so long. I hope this is not a disappointment to you. All these quotations come from the original post for the thread "The Mind-Created World". I read your essay, with profit. But I think the major issues are reasonably clearly identified here.

It’s rather that, whatever judgements are made about the world, the mind provides the framework within which such judgements are meaningful.

I can accept that. It doesn't mean that the objects that we make judgements about are mind-dependent. That would be confusing the framework with its contents.

What their existence might be outside of any perspective is meaningless and unintelligible, as a matter of both fact and principle.

Yes.

Reality has an inextricably mental aspect, which itself is never revealed in empirical analysis.

I suppose so. Mind you, I'm not happy with the term "Reality". It seems as if it means "Everything that's real". But some things can be unreal under one description and real under another. So reality and unreality are inextricably entwined, which make "Reality" a rather unhelpful term.
Similarly, the binary idea that things are either mind-dependent or not seems quite wrong to me. If one considers something like, say, a thermostat, we can see that it is mind-dependent in one way, but since it is made of raw materials that are mind-independent, it is hard to classify. Thermostats, unicorns and transfinite numbers are all mind-dependent, and mind-independent in different ways.

By ‘creating reality’, I’m referring to the way the brain receives, organises and integrates cognitive data, along with memory and expectation, so as to generate the unified world–picture within which we situate and orient ourselves.

Well, yes. It's an exciting time in neurology, no doubt about it. But let's not go overboard.
I wouldn't assume that we have a single unified world-picture. We might be working with several such pictures of different parts or aspects of the world. But does anyone think that creating a world-picture makes the objects in the picture mind-dependent? On the whole, the object of a picture does not depend on being in the picture for its existence. There are exceptions, but they are exceptional.
It is really quite extraordinary how the processes that reveal the world to us are represented by philosophers as concealing the world from us. What you are forgetting is that the world actually exists. Our "world-picture" is actually a picture of something. So, although it is not exactly wrong to say that our brain generates a picture, it is crucially important to remember that it is not conjured up from nothing but is the result of removing noise from the signals that we get from the world. (That's not a perfect way of describing what is going on, but it is better than thinking that the brain presents us with a fantasy.)
You had a video on your web-site. I watched it. A collection of scientists told me that I did not know reality accurately. Which is probably true. But they also told me that it was science that had revealed this truth to them. This was a case of what I think of as scientific exceptionalism. The idea that scientists are immune from the failings of ordinary human beings. Rubbish! Science gets things wrong, too.
Let's allow that we are presented with a world-picture by our brains. This world-picture is not perfect. Fortunately, we have a critical faculty and a feed-back system, so our brains are perfectly capable of identifying errors and recticying them. That applies to scientists and non-scientists alike.

But what we know of its existence is inextricably bound by and to the mind we have, and so, in that sense, reality is not straightforwardly objective.

Well, yes. What we know is "bound by and to the mind we have (are?)". It wouldn't be our knowledge if it were not so. But that doesn't show that the object of our knowledge is "inextricably bound by and to the mind". Indeed, one of the things we know is that many things are not bound to our minds at all.

The idea that things ‘go out of existence’ when not perceived, is simply their ‘imagined non-existence’. In reality, the supposed ‘unperceived object’ neither exists nor does not exist. Nothing whatever can be said about it.

... except, of course, that nothing can be said (or known) about it. But that's an annoying argument, so I won't press it. I think I understand what you mean about the idea that things go out of existence. "Neither exists nor does not exist" must be based on "What their existence might be outside of any perspective is meaningless and unintelligible" (?) There is indeed a certain puzzle about saying whether something that we do not know of at all exists or doesn't. The catch is that has literally nothing to do with the question whether it did or not.
Take an actual example. It does seem clear to me that in the centuries before Neptune was discovered, a) no-one knew of its existence, b) no-one knew that they didn't know of its existence and c) it existed. How do I know that? By working back from its discovery. Mind you, that does not mean that Herschel knew everything that was to know about Uranus; indeed, when he first saw it, he thought it was a comet, not a planet. So we could say he did not discover Uranus in March 1781, My sources don't tell me exactly when the new body was recognized as a planet, but it was a bit later, after detailed measurements had been collected; people other than Herschel were involved. Discovery is not necessarily a single event, and discovery of existence is not separate from discovery of information about the discovery. Bare existence is not something to be discovered or revealed - (i.e. existence is not a predicate). Perhaps that's what you are getting at?

We designate it as truly existent, irrespective of and outside any knowledge of it. This gives rise to a kind of cognitive disorientation which underlies many current philosophical conundrums.

Disorientation is a good way of characterizing philosophical problems. But I don't experience that here. Can you tell me more about it?

TWe mistake the form discovered by the mind as something that is there anyway, not seeing that the mind is the source of it. Kant 101, as I understand him. — Wayfarer

I can't comment on either Kant or Pinter. But it all depends what you mean by "form". I could be wrong, but I am under the impression that Aristotle and many others were quite happy to posit forms as existent in things whether or not anyone knew about it. Even Plato allowed that existing things "participated" in the relevant forms.

I'm sorry this has taken so long. I hope this is not a disappointment to you. — Ludwig V

Not at all! I very much appreciate the careful and constructive comments on The Mind-Created World. They show genuine engagement, and I welcome the thoughtful critiques. However, I've posted my response in that thread.

An you do have the opportunity to act otherwise. Brains were evolved to make better choices, which wouldn't work at all if there were to choices available. Determinism shouldn't be confused with compulsion as it often is in these discussions. — noAxioms

Quite so. No-one except Nietzsche seems to have spotted the distinction between compulsion and determinism.

It isn't wild guessing since the rule needs to be consistent with what we do observe, and the opinions of most people don't meet that criteria, per the OP. — noAxioms

There's something we agree on. I'm offering you some observations that suggest, at tleast to me, that the question of mind-dependence is much more complicated than you seem prepared to recognize. What's wrong with that?
As to the OP, I'll have to get back to you.

The unicorn, as a specific case, should of course be 'I don't know'. So an educated estimate might be in order, which is not wild guess. — noAxioms

If unicorn-like creatures exist anywhere in the universe, their similarity to the unicorns we know and love is entirely coincidental and proves nothing. That argument is a side-issue. That pattern of argument can be used to prove the existence of anything that you can imagine. It makes the idea of distinguishing between what does and doesn't exist meaningless.

How about a 4 dimensional rock? That's not going to be part of 'the universe', so either you pick a rule that says it doesn't exist, or pick one that doesn't confine existence to 'the universe', or perhaps, 'the universe now'. Once we have a rule, we analyze it for mind dependence, and per my argument, anything that mentions 'the universe' is probably going to be mind dependent, unless one defines universe far more broadly with 'all that exists', in which case one is left wondering if we're part of that. — noAxioms

Three dimensions for space plus one for time, makes four dimensions. So all rocks are 4-dimensional. Perhaps you mean 5 dimensional? In which case, you'll have to ask someone else.
You have what, to me, is a very peculiar idea of what the universe is. For me, naively no doubt, the universe is everything that exists. I realize there's another definition around, but since I don't understand it, it would be foolish of me to use the word in that sense. Don't ask me for a definition of the world. If the world is not everything that exists, I have no idea what it is supposed to be. The world of fishing or chess - or the lived or phenomenal worlds - make a kind of sense to me. But none of those are whole worlds.

2 is 'part of the universe'. You probably put the moon and thermostat in the universe. I consider the universe to be sufficiently large to leave little probability of the absence of a unicorn anywhere. Hence same classification. 3 is trickier since it needs to relate to me, so perhaps the unicorn isn't close enough to do that. — noAxioms

I do put the moon and the thermostat in the universe. I'm less sure about unicorns. They are mythical creatures, so exist in our universe. But since they are mythical, they do not exist. It's complicated - either answer is justifiable.

As for mind-dependence, we call our universe 'the universe', making it privileged because we see it. That makes it a pretty observer dependent definition of existence. 3 is not observer dependent, but depends on causal relationships. Existence is thus only meaningful within structures that have them. — noAxioms

You may be suffering from delusions of grandeur. Mt. Everest's existence was not caused by the people who climb it or by the people who worship it and mathematical objects like numbers, it would seem, do not exist at all.

OK, so you don't have a physics background. Makes it harder to discuss relativity and quantum implications to this topic. — noAxioms

Indeed. If there are any. It seems to me that very little is agreed in those fields, so perhaps it is premature to think that any secure conclusions can be derived yet.
But it does seem fairly well established that making observations at quantum level does have a causal impact on what happens and both theories seem to have adopted Berkeley more or less wholesale.
Yet the observers live in the ordinary world. It's a conundrum.

….cognitive disorientation….
—Wayfarer

Disorientation is a good way of characterizing philosophical problems. But I don't experience that here. — Ludwig V

Cognitive disorientation: the empirical kind, a posteriori, and properly reduced, occurs when we say we know what a thing is but we don’t realize it is not the thing but always and only the representation of it, to which such knowledge expression relates. So yes, you, and everyone else, is a victim of it, but it isn’t an experience, as such. It is the mistake of conflating the occurrence of a cognitive method with the post hoc ergo propter hoc expression of its functional terminations.

Some folks like to quip….the universe doesn’t care what the human thinks about it, it is what it is. Compounded categorical errors aside, it is at least consistent to quip that human thought doesn’t care what the universe is. It remains the case that the universe, or, with respect to empirical knowledge, the objects contained in it, can never be comprehended as anything but that of which the human mode of intellectual determinations prescribes. Why these should be considered incompatible with each other, is beyond reason itself.

Tell me. It not being mathematical is also great because it challenges something like MUH. And there's no falsification test for the random/determined issue either. — noAxioms

Well, unless you can show me a mathematical model that can predict (deterministically or not) choices, I don't think you have shown that everything can be described mathematically.

Roger Penrose for instance has argued that our reasoning isn't algorithmic. Certainly, this goes against the 'computable universe hypothesis', according to which all phenomena are computable.

In any case, it is quite speculative to say that everything can be described mathematically.

Which is why BiV, superdeterminism, and say Boltzmann Brains all need to be kept in mind, but are not in any way theories, lacking any evidence whatsoever. — noAxioms

Yes. Interestingly, I made a similar objection to the 'block universe', where all events past, present and future have the same ontological status. If we can be so wrong in our experience, how can empirical knowledge (which is needed to falsify/verify scientific theories) be trusted?

So some societies operate, but such societies are quite capable of rendering such judgement using deterministic methods. And yes, I think morals are relative to a specific society. A person by himself cannot be immoral except perhaps to his own arbitrary standards. — noAxioms

I think that it depends on how one understands morality. If one understand it simply as a social contract, then sure. But if one adopts a kind of 'virtue ethics', then, one can be moral or immoral even when alone.

An you do have the opportunity to act otherwise. Brains were evolved to make better choices, which wouldn't work at all if there were to choices available. Determinism shouldn't be confused with compulsion as it often is in these discussions. — noAxioms

How so? Yes, you can argue that a human that is compelled to act in a certain way isn't 'acting properly'. But if all actions are determined by the initial conditions and deterministic laws, how can we say that we have an opportunity to 'act otherwise'? And if we do not have it, how can we attribute responsibility to someone in a non-trivial way (a 'trivial way' would be something like: the 'lightning' is responsible for the destruction of the tree)?

I don't think there's any relevance at all, so the question is moot to me. — noAxioms

Yes, probabilism is no better. We need something else.

I think the realist position (and not just the direct realist position) is that there would still be the world (quantum definition of the word), relative to something measuring it (a rock say), but yea, all that synthesis that the human mind does is absent, so it would be far more 'the world in itself' and not as we think of it. Time for instance would not be something that flows. Rocks have no need to create that fabrication. — noAxioms

:100: The universe that most believe would be there in the absence of any observer would not have any form, as form is discovered by the mind (per Charles Pinter, Mind and the Cosmic Order). The world 'in itself' is formless and therefore meaningless. We mistake the form discovered by the mind as something that is there anyway, not seeing that the mind is the source of it. Kant 101, as I understand him. — Wayfarer

Interestingly, there is the 'many-mind' interpretation (MMI). In this view, the physical universe evolves in the same way as is described by MWI. In MMI, however, the 'emergence' of a classical universe is, in fact, due to 'mind'. That is, the definite outcomes in which the wavefunction 'splits' are observed by different minds.

….one can be moral or immoral even when alone. — boundless

One is moral or immoral only if he is alone. Otherwise, he is possibly criminal, or merely unethical, which stand as objects of moral dispositions, but says nothing regarding the determinations of them.

Caveat: this under the assumption morality, in and of itself, is an intrinsic human condition, and if so, can only be represented in himself, by himself, because of himself. Criminality and ethics presupposes a community in which a member can be alone within; morality itself, does not, and indeed, such communal presupposition negates the validity of intrinsic condition.

Two cents…

Caveat: this under the assumption morality, in and of itself, is an intrinsic human condition, and if so, can only be represented in himself, by himself, because of himself — Mww

Human beings are also essentially relational. I don't think that a human being is conceivable in total isolation (at least in potency). So, I would say that morality also is about how one relates to others.

Interesting that you distinguish ethics and morality in that way.

I would say that morality also is about how one relates to others. — boundless

To get to the bottom, though, it might be closer, to say morality is that by which one decides what his relation to others ought to be, irrespective of the particular incident for which a morally predicated act is required. What I mean is, how one relates to others, or, the manner by which the relation manifests, requires some relevant act, but something else must be the ground for determining what the act ought to be.

Another two cents, and an entirely different philosophical doctrine, then merely supporting the mind-independence of reality.

Cognitive disorientation: the empirical kind, a posteriori, and properly reduced, occurs when we say we know what a thing is but we don’t realize it is not the thing but always and only the representation of it, to which such knowledge expression relates. So yes, you, and everyone else, is a victim of it, but it isn’t an experience, as such. It is the mistake of conflating the occurrence of a cognitive method with the post hoc ergo propter hoc expression of its functional terminations.

Some folks like to quip….the universe doesn’t care what the human thinks about it, it is what it is. Compounded categorical errors aside, it is at least consistent to quip that human thought doesn’t care what the universe is. It remains the case that the universe, or, with respect to empirical knowledge, the objects contained in it, can never be comprehended as anything but that of which the human mode of intellectual determinations prescribes. Why these should be considered incompatible with each other, is beyond reason itself. — Mww

I'm a bit confused. Are you saying that the methods by which we come to know what something is aren't methods at all? That seems odd. How did you come to know that?

More seriously, thinking of what enables us to know what a thing is as a veil between us and what we seek to know is, for me, seriously disorienting. Why our methods of coming to know should be considered incompatible with knowing may well beyond reason as you say; but it is certainly beyond me.

I think what may lie at the bottom of this confusion is a binary approach, which cannot recognize that we can come to know something about things, but we never (or seldom) come to know everything about anything. The answer to one question usually generates another question. That's why we know that things are not entirely dependent on our minds.

Are you saying that the methods by which we come to know what something is aren't methods at all? — Ludwig V

Of course not; that’s self-contradictory. I’m saying the method by which things in particular are known, re: the system, in whichever form it may have, is very far from talking about the things possible to know, re: reality in general.

….thinking of what enables us to know what a thing is as a veil between us and what we seek to know — Ludwig V

I dunno, man; what enables us to know is a system of cognition; thinking of what enables us to know is philosophizing about a system of cognition. Those don’t fit the conceptual “veil”. On the other hand, the representation, not being the thing, but necessarily that of which our knowledge consists, is a better fit for the conceptual “veil”, but to think of what enables us to know, the system itself, is not to think of representations, which are mere parts of the system. For a whole boatload of -isms reflecting the confusion this nonsense brings, see the SEP article.
————-

Riddle me this: do we seek to know a thing, or do we seek to know the cause of a sensation?

Pretty silly, methinks. I know what a basketball is, but trust me when I say there isn’t and never was any such thing in my head. Why should both of those judgements be so apodeitically yet trivially true, but some folks still want to make some sort of veil out of it? And….spoiler alert…therein lay the answer to the riddle.

That's why we know that things are not entirely dependent on our minds. — Ludwig V

Ehhhhh….on the other side of a very large coin, why we know things are not entirely dependent on our minds, is because it is not things we know, from which follows nothing of a thing is dependent on our minds. A simple re-stating of the thread title.

Havin’ fun yet?

For a whole boatload of -isms reflecting the confusion this nonsense brings, see the SEP article. — Mww

That sounds like my cup of tea. But which article exactly.

Riddle me this: do we seek to know a thing, or do we seek to know the cause of a sensation? — Mww

What if a thing is the cause of a sensation?

I know what a basketball is, but trust me when I say there isn’t and never was any such thing in my head. — Mww

I'm very glad to hear it.

on the other side of a very large coin, why we know things are not entirely dependent on our minds, is because it is not things we know, from which follows nothing of a thing is dependent on our minds. — Mww

It all depends on what you mean by "know".
Would that be a large coin in the sense of a coin worth a large sum of money?
In the old days, the largest coin in the UK was a penny. There were 240 pennies in one pound, so it made a sort of idiot sense.

Havin’ fun yet? — Mww

Well, most philosophy is fun, but some philosophy is more fun than the rest. Unless you are a professional. For a professional, the question is which philosophy gets you paid.

The world 'in itself' is formless and therefore meaningless. — Wayfarer

It's still a world. Nothing names it that, lacking information processing to give meaning, but that property (worldness) seems to be an example a feature of the thing in itself.

We mistake the form discovered by the mind as something that is there anyway, not seeing that the mind is the source of it. Kant 101, as I understand him.

I agree that form interpreted (not discovered) by mind is often mistaken thus.

Interestingly, there is the 'many-mind' interpretation (MMI). In this view, the physical universe evolves in the same way as is described by MWI. In MMI, however, the 'emergence' of a classical universe is, in fact, due to 'mind'. That is, the definite outcomes in which the wavefunction 'splits' are observed by different minds. — boundless

I never got that interpretation since it being different definite outcomes is relative to anything, not just information processors. I suppose I'd need to delve into it more to critique it more informatively.

If unicorn-like creatures exist anywhere in the universe, their similarity to the unicorns we know and love is entirely coincidental and proves nothing. — Ludwig V

What would you want to prove? How does your assessment differ from anything else that's in the universe but unobserved? Whether or not humans would classify/name it as a unicorn or not has no bearing on it being there.

That pattern of argument can be used to prove the existence of anything that you can imagine.

Then imagine something more exotic like that 4-spatial dimension 'rock'. That can't exist in the universe, but is hardly impossible in another. That thing can't exist if 'the universe' is the only privileged one. So how does our chosen policy deal with that?

[/quote] In which case, you'll have to ask someone else.[/quote]You abstain, which is much what the topic title is about. Few hold a consistent enough view to deal with these outlier cases. What I see exists. What I don't, well, I don't care. That sounds awfully observer dependent even if you assert that it would exist without people to see it. Too late. It's already been observed. Can't unsee it by pretending we were never there.

You have what, to me, is a very peculiar idea of what the universe is.

No actually. I can think of half a dozen definitions, but 'everything that exists' makes 'existence' definition 2 circular. You don't know if we're part of that set, and thus if we exist.

I tend to put 'universe' as 'all that came from our big bang', but even that is ambiguous. It at least allows one to posit more, and make words like 'multiverse' meaningful, which it isn't if 'universe' is all that exists.

I do put the moon and the thermostat in the universe.

Why? I know, it sounds like a stupid question, but given your fairly objective definition, how specifically do you justify that statement? I use a different definition, and yea, would put the moon and theormostat in my 'world', which is confined to my past light cone. I relate to the things in my world, and those things exist (def 3) relative to me, but not in any objective sense. That definition is nicely mind independent, but you may differ.

I'm less sure about unicorns. They are mythical creatures

Not talking about the myth or the concept, but actual unicorns. Keep that in mind. Sure, the myth exists, in stories. Not what's being asked.

You may be suffering from delusions of grandeur.

Here I thought I was humble by being quite unsure of even my own existence (by any definition).

But it does seem fairly well established that making observations at quantum level does have a causal impact on what happens

Not true. Most realist interpretations deny any causal impact from observation. No wavefunction collapse. The transactional interpretation seems to be an exception to that statement, but I know little about it.

Well, unless you can show me a mathematical model that can predict (deterministically or not) choices — boundless

Inability to express something complex as a function of trivial operations doesn't mean that it isn't a function of trivial operations, but of course it also isn't proof that it is such.

Interestingly, I made a similar objection to the 'block universe', where all events past, present and future have the same ontological status. If we can be so wrong in our experience, how can empirical knowledge (which is needed to falsify/verify scientific theories) be trusted?

Empirical knowledge is exactly how we correct our initial guesses, which are often based on intuition.

I think that it depends on how one understands morality.

Yes, quite. I understand it as a contract (written or not) with a society. Many would define it differently. My assertion about the isolated person works with my definition, and not with some others.

Determinism shouldn't be confused with compulsion as it often is in these discussions. — noAxioms
How so?

Compulsion is when you make one choice, but are incapable of enacting it. Cumpulsion is not the inability to do two different things, which is what 'could have done otherwise' boils down to.

Its irrelevant why I believe something does not exist. — Philosophim

Then this topic is not for you since it is all about the limits of what we feel exists, and what doesn't meet that criteria.

Its relevant if I know that something doesn't exist.

Nope. This topic is not an epistemic one. I'm not asking how you know something exists or not. I am looking for a belief system that is consistent with mind independence, and where the limits are placed is critical to that.

Knowledge is an objective determination.

Subjective actually, almost all of it anyway. I doubt you'd figure out 2+2=4 without subjective input, even if it is arguably objective knowledge.

The only way to know if a belief is valid is if you have done the diligence to turn it into knowledge.

No, that's how you know the belief is sound. What I'm talking about cannot be knowledge, so logic must be used to validate it. Nobody seems particularly inclined to expose their own beliefs to this analysis.

Self consistent, and oftentimes with low correspondence to reality. — wonderer1

Only if they're wrong, and you don't know if they're wrong.

It's still a world. Nothing names it that, lacking information processing to give meaning, but that property (worldness) seems to be an example a feature of the thing in itself. — noAxioms

Nope. I dispute that. To say what it is, to name it, you have to bring it to mind. If you are considering what it would be, sans any observer, you're still bringing it to mind. And as soon as you say 'seems to be', already you're talking of what appears to be the case.

To get to the bottom, though, it might be closer, to say morality is that by which one decides what his relation to others ought to be, irrespective of the particular incident for which a morally predicated act is required. What I mean is, how one relates to others, or, the manner by which the relation manifests, requires some relevant act, but something else must be the ground for determining what the act ought to be. — Mww

OK, interesting. I would also add: how is that by which one decides what his relation to himself is.

I never got that interpretation since it being different definite outcomes is relative to anything, not just information processors. I suppose I'd need to delve into it more to critique it more informatively. — noAxioms

Ok. I admit that I am also not that familiar with that interpretation. Also it doesn't make completely sense to me. I mean: I have one body in a superposition of states and a myriad of minds for each? Still, I do think that it is an interesting 'take' of MWI. For instance, MWI supporters generally claim that decoherence is enought to have 'classicality'. But IIRC, interference isn't eliminated. The terms relative to interference become very, very small but not zero - so apparently MMI supporters claim that to have true classicality you need minds.

Inability to express something complex as a function of trivial operations doesn't mean that it isn't a function of trivial operations, but of course it also isn't proof that it is such. — noAxioms

Agreed. Both positions are possible until one gives enough evidence for one of them. I think that it is not unreasonable to hold both of them.

Empirical knowledge is exactly how we correct our initial guesses, which are often based on intuition. — noAxioms

I agree. I just think that the block universe takes things too far. Fortunately for me, GR is not the whole story.

Yes, quite. I understand it as a contract (written or not) with a society. Many would define it differently. My assertion about the isolated person works with my definition, and not with some others. — noAxioms

Agreed.

Compulsion is when you make one choice, but are incapable of enacting it. Cumpulsion is not the inability to do two different things, which is what 'could have done otherwise' boils down to. — noAxioms

I would say that compulsion is when our deliberative power is coherced to act in a certain bway by internal (e.g. severe mental illnesses) or external constraints. I disagree with compatibilists that excluding these factors is enough to retain accountability.

For instance, MWI supporters generally claim that decoherence is enought to have 'classicality'. But IIRC, interference isn't eliminated. The terms relative to interference become very, very small but not zero — boundless

That doesn't seem like a downside to me. Who says interference at classical scales needs to be anything other than very very small?

After all, we've put relatively large objects in superposition...

Yes that what MWI supporters point out. If interference is very, very small it is reasonable to say that it is negligible after all. You don't need a 'perfect classicality' when you have a classicality FAPP ('for all practical purposes' to borrow a phrase of John Bell used in a different context).

Note however that our experience does seem about definite outcomes without any interference, i.e. our experience suggests to us that there is no interference, period. Of course, it can be wrong.

Honestly, I think that it is one of those situations where you get a stalemate between two positions.

Interestingly, you find a similar problem in epistemic interpretations different from QBism vs QBism. Here, probabilities that have a value of 0 and 1 do not represent probabilities, rather they represent the situation when you get a certain knowledge. And from here you get the speculations about a supposed role of observations to bring 'into being' definite outcomes from an indeterminate state. In QBism, probabilities with a value of 0 and 1 still represent a 'degree of belief' like all other probabilities.

Note however that our experience does seem about definite outcomes without any interference, i.e. our experience suggests to us that there is no interference, period. Of course, it can be wrong. — boundless

Do you have a solid concept of what the experience of interference would be like? What kinds of experiences would you be expecting, if there were interference?

Do you have a solid concept of what the experience of interference would be like? What kinds of experiences would you be expecting, if there were interference? — flannel jesus

I have no idea. That's might be taken as a suggestion that there is no interference in the world we experience. Hence, decoherence is not enough. In fact, I do agree with this.

Conversely, MWI supporters would say that our experience is not precise, has been proven wrong before and, therefore, should not be trusted here.

That's might be taken as a suggestion that there is no interference in the world we experience — boundless

I take it as a suggestion that maybe you experience the consequences of interference constantly, as a matter of course, but they're just... normal. They don't look particularly different from anything else you experience.

We live in a quantum world. Quantum IS normal. Everything normal you experience is the consequence of many quantum interactions. So maybe... interference is just happening all the time, and you experience it all the time, and it's just a normal part of this quantum world we're in.

Yet, QM taken literally tells us that we should perceive an interference of mutually exclusive states. For instance both states of the cat in Schroedinger's (in)famous experiment. In order to avoid that conclusion, decoherence is taken as an explanation of the appearance of 'definiteness'.

Any interpreter of QM must give an account of why we do not experience mutually contradictory states.

Also there is the preferred basis problem. Basically, in MWI the branching is explained by saying that there is a superposition of definite states. Yet, there seems no reason from 'first principles' that tells us that the branching should be between definite states. In fact, it seems an a posteriori assumption that is made in MWI. This is not a fatal objection to MWI but, if I am not mistaken, the fact that the branching happens in the way that is consistent to our experience is a ad hoc assumption that we need to add to MWI.
This problem is found in all interpretations that claim to not add any additional structure to the quantum state of the universe. This objection doesn't apply to de Broglie-Bohm due to the presence of particles and to Copenaghen-like views due to the presence of observers. Also perhaps MMI escapes this problem via the 'minds'.

See on this this paper: "Nothing happens in the Universe of the Everett Interpretation" by physicist J. Schwindt.

@noAxioms

….which article…. — Ludwig V

https://www.bing.com/search?q=veil+of+perception&form=APIPA1&PC=APPD
————

….do we seek to know a thing, or do we seek to know the cause of a sensation?
— Mww

What if a thing is the cause of a sensation? — Ludwig V

That’s given; there’s no knowledge in a given, arguments from Plato and Russell aside. Next in timeline from the given thing that causes a sensation, is the sensation itself, and it is there that the system is triggered, booted, if you will, into function.

What do I care that you have the cutest damn kid ever, if I’ve never seen it?
————

It all depends on what you mean by "know". — Ludwig V

What I mean is, to know is to end a systematic cognitive method in a possible experience, given a particular sensation. Logically, that reduces to simply…..knowledge is experience, and from which follows the fundamental justification for affirming mind-independent reality.

What about you? What do you mean by “know”?

…how is that by which one decides what his relation to himself is. — boundless

From a purely speculative metaphysical perspective, bottom line is, one’s decision on his relation to himself follows necessarily from whether or not the volitions of his will justify his worthiness of being happy. Clear conscience on steroids, so to speak.

Nope. This topic is not an epistemic one. I'm not asking how you know something exists or not. I am looking for a belief system that is consistent with mind independence, and where the limits are placed is critical to that. — noAxioms

What you are looking for is a way to find rational or cogent inductions. Read my paper, it answers that. I'll post the answer here but you probably won't understand it until you do. Once you understand what applicable knowledge is, (A definition that you test deductively against reality for contradictions), the next step is being reasonable about situations in which you cannot test deductively against reality. The most reasonable thing is to create an induction that has the least steps removed from what is applicably known. While an induction can never be certain by definition, it can be reasonable, and thus a hierarchy of inductions can be created.

Probability, possibility, plausibility, and irrational are the hierarchies of induction. Probability is the belief that what is applicably known can happen again, and applicable knowledge of its limits. Possibility is taking what has been applicably known and believing it can happen again. Plausibility is distinctive knowledge, or a creation of an idea in the mind that seems logical, but has yet to be tested against reality. Finally an irrational belief is holding that distinctive knowledge which has been shown to be contradicted by reality, is believed to be known or induced as being viable in reality.

While none of the inductions are certain, in a competing set of beliefs, it is most rational to take the higher order of induction over the lower. For example: Its possible to win the lottery, but improbable. As probability is a higher order of induction, the most rational belief to hold is that it is massively unlikely that you will win the lottery and not bother purchasing a ticket. If someone comes up to you and says, "It's plausible a unicorn that cannot be sensed by any means exists, we should base our actions as if one exists" you can counter, "Yes, but we've never applicably known one. Therefore its possibility of existence is 0, and we do not have to rationally consider that it exists in our decisions going forward."

So, I went through your OP carefully. I’m afraid that I do not come away with a general criterion for mind-independence. So I won’t be able to meet your challenge. A lot more could be said, so I don’t pretend that I’ve made a conclusive case here. All quotations are from your OP.

To say 'the universe exists' is actually to say 'this universe exists' and not the others. Why? Because we observe it.

I’m not clear what this means. Presumably, you mean that to say “the universe exists” is to say that the universe exists, but not to say that any of the others exist. Fair enough. I don’t see any implications for mind-dependence or not.

The word 'exists' has its origins to mean 'stands out' which often implies that there is something to which it stands out. Hence it stands out to humans of course, making the world all that is particularly relevant to humans. That makes any asserted existence seemingly pretty mind dependent.

Your etymology is not wrong. But arguments based on etymology are very weak because words can change their meaning over time. I don’t think “exists” any longer means “stands out” in any sense that is relevant to questions about mind-dependence or not.
For me, "exists" just means "There is/are.." as in "There is a moon" or "There are elephants".

I'm just noting that human biases tend to slap on the 'real' label to that which is perceived, and resists slapping that label on other things, making it dependent on that perception.

Well, it is true that if we perceive something, that something usually exists. That’s part of the meaning of “perceive”. But most often that something exists quite independently of the label and quite independently of the perception. So there is nothing to the point here. (When we think we see things that do not exist, we use different language – concepts like mistake, hallucination, delusion and illusion.)
Thinking of the word/concept “real” as like a label that you can slap on things can be a bit misleading. In many cases, you will find that something that is not real under one description is perfectly real under another description. The traditional example here is that a decoy duck is not a real duck, but it is a real decoy duck, a fake Rolex watch is a real fake Rolex watch, a mirage of trees and water is not real trees and water, but is a real mirage, and so on. That complicates the question of mind-independence considerably.

"Principle 1 (The Eleatic Principle) An entity is to be counted as real if and only if it is capable of participating in causal processes" This wording of the principle is almost mind independent except for the 'counted as' part, and I've seen it worded without that.

In principle, this is an interesting criterion, which could work, at least in standard scientific contexts. The original formulation in Plato’s Sophist) goes something like “Anything that exists is capable of affecting other things, and capable of being affected by other things.” But it works in favour of mind-independence of anything that it applies to. Your argument to adapt it to show the opposite is very weak, because you admit that there are different ways to formulate it. I;m afraid that in any case, phrases like “counted as” do not imply mind-dependence, at least as I understand it.

Colyvan quotes Keith Campbell in his paper, who notes a similar thing:
"This search for a criterion for the real must be understood as a search for a criterion for us to count something as real ...*

A criterion does not normally affect the independence or otherwise of what it is a criterion for. When they changed the criterion for a planet so that Pluto was no longer a planet, Pluto was totally unaffected.

There need not be, and probably cannot be, any critical mark of the real itself; the real is what is, period."

I agree with that. But that’s because philosophers use the word in a very peculiar way which generates all sorts of fake puzzles. Normal people know perfectly well what the critical marks are of real coins, real diamonds, etc. What philosophers seem unable to stomach is the fact that the criterion for “real” depends on what you are talking about.

Quantum mechanics also contributed to the demise of a nice neat singular classical reality. A third principle to consider is one that QM definitely brings into question.

For my money, the “neat singular classical reality” was always an illusion. Quantum Mechanics, in this respect, was knocking at an open door. But I don’t see anything that clarifies mind-dependence or not.
I’m afraid I must have missed something. I don’t find any third principle here. The question seems to get lost in a maze of interpretations and dramatically strange ideas. Maybe things will get sorted out in a few years. What is clear is that quantum mechanics is a huge raspberry to anyone who thinks that our thinking makes the world what it is.

It's still a world. Nothing names it that, lacking information processing to give meaning, but that property (worldness) seems to be an example a feature of the thing in itself. — noAxioms
Nope. I dispute that. To say what it is, to name it, you have to bring it to mind. — Wayfarer

Sure, but in a mind-independent view, you bringing it to mind has zero effect on the thing itself. It's ontology in particular is not a function of somebody's musings.

So, I went through your OP carefully. I’m afraid that I do not come away with a general criterion for mind-independence. — Ludwig V

If you're looking for me to evangelize one, I tried not to.

To say 'the universe exists' is actually to say 'this universe exists' and not the others. Why? Because we observe it."

I’m not clear what this means.

I am pointing out the distinction between 'a universe' (this being one of many) vs 'the universe', which implies there's just one, and we're looking at it. The preferred way things are has plot holes that I point out, and declaring only this one to exist is a mind-dependent act.

For that statement, 'the universe' refers to all of our spacetime, even the parts not measurable, but not other type II universes such as ones with 4 spatial dimensions, just to name a simple difference.

I'm harping mostly on 'the' vs 'a', and not so much on the problems with asserting that it exists.

I'm harping mostly on 'the' vs 'a', and not so much on the problems with asserting that it exists.

I don’t see any implications for mind-dependence or not.

It out of gazillions of potential universes, only this preferred one exists, it is probably special because it is observed and the others are not. Sounds pretty observer dependent to me.

The word 'exists' has its origins to mean 'stands out' which often implies that there is something to which it stands out.

Yes! The origin of the word is a relation, and yet over time it gets thought of as a property. Elephants existing to me slowly becomes elephants existing period.
That which stands out to an observer seems observer dependent. So I'm looking for a definition where yea, it stands out, but not necessarily to anything observing or caring about it. Still a relation though. Hence definition 3 (relational) of 'exists', which has nothing to do with perception or knowing about the related thing.

For me, "exists" just means "There is/are.." as in "There is a moon" or "There are elephants".

That sounds pretty objective. A thing either is or it isn't, a property that is true or false. But then how does an existing elephant differ from the nonexisting elephant, in any way that matters to it? That's a hard question since most dismiss the question before thinking about it.

Well, it is true that if we perceive something, that something usually exists.

Well, it stands out to us, so it exists as a relation. There doesn't seem to be a test for the existence as a property. That's the problem with the word slowly changing meaning from its original definition.

The traditional example here is that a decoy duck is not a real duck

Again, this topic is about ontology, not a completely different definition of the word that means genuine vs, counterfeit.

"Principle 1 (The Eleatic Principle) An entity is to be counted as real if and only if it is capable of participating in causal processes" This wording of the principle is almost mind independent except for the 'counted as' part, and I've seen it worded without that.

In principle, this is an interesting criterion, which could work, at least in standard scientific contexts. The original formulation in Plato’s Sophist) goes something like “Anything that exists is capable of affecting other things, and capable of being affected by other things.” But it works in favour of mind-independence of anything that it applies to. Your argument to adapt it to show the opposite is very weak, because you admit that there are different ways to formulate it. I;m afraid that in any case, phrases like “counted as” do not imply mind-dependence, at least as I understand it.

Agree. I said that to show that it seems to be a valid mind-independent definition of existence, and an objective one this time, one that provides a test to pass or not.

I would say that compulsion is when our deliberative power is coherced to act in a certain bway by internal (e.g. severe mental illnesses) or external constraints. — boundless

Say an epileptic fit.

Bottom line for me: I don't think we have anything that qualifies as free will, and despite the positive sounding term, I wouldn't want it any more than I'd want a heaven where you can't be in pain. I all sounds good until you think about it.

For instance, MWI supporters generally claim that decoherence is enought to have 'classicality'. But IIRC, interference isn't eliminated. — boundless

Of course not. That would violate theory. The moon exhibits classicality without requiring minds.
Discussion elsewhere noted that if I enter ALDI double doors at high enough speed (multiple times), my cumulative demise will form an interference pattern on the far wall. The wall would have to be incredibly far away from the doors to notice it. They've not done it in the lab with anything larger than a bucky ball, but they have put eye-visible classical objects in superposition for really short times.

I just think that the block universe takes things too far.

Where I find it far simpler and elegant, and less filled with unanswerable implications such as what was the first cause.

I take it as a suggestion that maybe you experience the consequences of interference constantly, as a matter of course, but they're just... normal. They don't look particularly different from anything else you experience. — flannel jesus

Yes, exactly

Yet, QM taken literally tells us that we should perceive an interference of mutually exclusive states. — boundless

You'd have to show where QM says anything like that. QM does not contradict empirical experience.

For instance both states of the cat in Schroedinger's (in)famous experiment.

Right. There's no cat experiencing superposition or being both dead and alive. There's (from the lab PoV) a superposition of the cat experiencing living, and of experiencing dying by poison. A superposition of those two experiences is very different than the cat experiencing both outcomes. Each experience is utterly unaware of the other.

Also there is the preferred basis problem. Basically, in MWI the branching is explained by saying that there is a superposition of definite states.

'Definite states' sounds awfully classical to me. MWI is not a counterfactual interpretation, so is seems wrong to talk about such things.

See on this this paper: "Nothing happens in the Universe of the Everett Interpretation" by physicist J. Schwindt. — boundless

Hard to read, lacking the background required, but it seems to say that there are no 'worlds' from any objective description of say the universal wave function. It has no 'system states', something with which I agree. There are no discreet worlds, which again, sounds like a counterfactual. I think the paper is arguing against not so much the original Everett paper, but against the DeWitt interpretation that dubbed the term 'worlds' and MWI and such. I could be wrong.