I don't know if you know the paper where David Chalmers argues for a contemporary Fregeanism where 'sense' pretty much becomes 'intension'. — mcdoodle
Also Soames presents an awesome argument for why we can't dispense with propositions (a sort of netherworld object) without denying that there is such a thing as agreement. — Mongrel
But the question is, what are A and B making judgments about? — Srap Tasmaner
Propositions, as the meanings of the sorts of sentences that can be true or false are not objective on my view, because meaning isn't objective. — Terrapin Station
So how do people compare judgments? I judge Pme true, you judge Pyou true. We're not even talking about the same proposition. (In fact Frege argues that would actually be me judging Pme trueme and you judging Pyou trueyou.)
As I said, if you can establish that Pme and Pyou, if not instance of P simpliciter, are members of some equivalence class (which we could then define to be P if we wanted), then you would have a meaningful way of comparing my judgment of Pme and your judgment of Pyou.
Until you do that, it's just me saying my apple's red and you saying your banana's yellow. — Srap Tasmaner
It's like you saying your apple is red and me saying, no, you're apple is purple, where for all we can tell at least initially, we're both using the sound "apple" to "point at" the same objective thing, we're both using "red" and "purple" to "point at" the same objective things, etc. — Terrapin Station
Frege has a clear answer to that: the proposition, the thought, which is objective. — Srap Tasmaner
Could I make a suggestion here, which is that the term 'objective' is somewhat misleading in this context. — Wayfarer
I think overwhelmingly I use objective/subjective to mean something like public/private, just because of the contexts in which I'm making the distinction. — Srap Tasmaner
Among a particular community, we could identify the sense agreed upon. Yet that sense is a sense among many that are out there (and over time.) — Mongrel
Sometimes you're stuck with your theoretical entities. — Srap Tasmaner
I'd say the main thing is always explanatory power: does the theory make sense of our collective intuitions? does it clarify murky cases? does it include what it should and exclude what it should? The opposites of those (and whatever else goes in there) are bad. — Srap Tasmaner
Propositions, as the meanings of the sorts of sentences that can be true or false are not objective on my view, because meaning isn't objective. Of course Frege posited that they were objective, because Frege was anti-psychologism . . . which in my opinion was one of the dumbest moves that philosophy ever made. Not that that was only Frege's fault. I just mean the move away from psychologism in general. — Terrapin Station
There's the sentence I actually utter: "My apple is red."
There's the sentence you imagine uttering: "Your apple is red."
Do they have the same meaning? Express the same proposition? Are they equivalent in some other way? — Srap Tasmaner
Maybe if you clarified what you mean by "objective" and "subjective" -- I may have guessed wrong -- that might help. — Srap Tasmaner
But we assume that they're similar enough that they might as well be the same until there's a good reason to believe otherwise. — Terrapin Station
You can of course just plump for option 1 or 2 and accept the consequences: accepting option 1 entails accepting a third realm many find implausible; option 2 leaves you hanging out with the freshmen asking, "How do I know your blue is the same as my blue?" — Srap Tasmaner
There's nothing wrong with that as such, as long as we acknowledge that it's just a fiction that we're engaging in to make it easier to talk about the topics at hand. — Terrapin Station
Get involved in philosophical discussions about knowledge, truth, language, consciousness, science, politics, religion, logic and mathematics, art, history, and lots more. No ads, no clutter, and very little agreement — just fascinating conversations.