Does Popper's Paradox of Tolerance defend free speech or censorship?

NOS4A2

Karl Popper’s famous footnote from his Open Society and it’s Enemies describing the “paradox of intolerance” has generated much discussion. One can search for it among the missives of the internet and find that the paradox has inspired a spectrum of solutions from both philosophers and non-philosophers alike.

The paradox sometimes rears its head in discussions of free speech as a justification for censorship, “de-platforming”, and “cancel culture”. This shocked me when I first heard it used this way because I always understood Popper as suggesting that the censors fall into the class of “those who are intolerant”, that the censors needed to be suppressed and met with violence if necessary. But on another reading, I can understand how Popper’s solution might be confusing, especially for the bigot.

Here is the paragraph in question:

Less well known is the paradox of tolerance: unlimited tolerance must lead to the disappearance of tolerance. If we extend unlimited tolerance even to those who are intolerant, if we are not prepared to defend a tolerant society against the onslaught of the intolerant, then the tolerant will be destroyed, and tolerance with them.—In this formulation, I do not imply, for instance, that we should always suppress the utterance of intolerant philosophies; as long as we can counter them by rational argument and keep them in check by public opinion, suppression would certainly be most unwise. But we should claim the right to suppress them if necessary even by force; for it may easily turn out that they are not prepared to meet us on the level of rational argument, but begin by denouncing all argument; they may forbid their followers to listen to rational argument, because it is deceptive, and teach them to answer arguments by the use of their fists or pistols. We should therefore claim, in the the name of tolerance, the right not to tolerate the intolerant. We should claim that any movement preaching intolerance places itself outside the law, and we should consider incitement to intolerance and persecution as criminal, in the same way as we should consider incitement murder, or to kidnapping, or to the revival of the slave trade, as criminal.

– Open Society and Its Enemies Vol. 1, Chapter 7/Notes 5-6 p.226

Another quote later on in the book references the same footnote and I think it helps clarifies his position:

Rationalism is therefore bound up with the idea that the other fellow has a right to be heard, and to defend his argument. It thus implies the recognition of the claim to tolerance, at least of all those who are not intolerant themselves. One does not kill a man when one adopts the attitude of first listening to his arguments…Also the idea of impartiality leads to that of responsibility; we have not only to listen to arguments, but we have a duty to respond, to answer, where our actions affect others. Ultimately, in this way, rationalism is linked up with the recognition of the necessity of social institutions to protect freedom of criticism, freedom of thought, and thus the freedom of men.

– Open Society and Its Enemies Vol. 2, Chapter 24: The Revolt Against Reason p. 225

His view of speech toleration seems to align with the views of American first amendment jurisprudence, that “intolerant philosophies” ought not to be suppressed up until incitement to murder etc., and that we ought to include incitement to intolerance among such criminal acts.

Among the tolerant is the rationalist, who believes that “the other fellow has a right to be heard, and to defend his argument”. Much more is said on rationalism in the book.

I think it is quite clear that those who suggest censorship, de-platforming, the heckler’s veto, cancel culture, etc. are of the intolerant variety, and the tolerant ought not to tolerate their behaviors.

I would like to hear some opposing opinions, and why from reading the text one would reach their position.

[edited title to fit]

Richard B

I think it is quite clear that those who suggest censorship, de-platforming, the heckler’s veto, cancel culture, etc. are of the intolerant variety, and the tolerant ought not to tolerate their behaviors. — NOS4A2

I think the beauty of a society that has this freedom is the transparency it can offer. You know where your fellow citizen stands and they know where you stand. The risk I see is any attempt to eliminating the voice might send it into hiding, and this poises many dangers to society. So, if both parties are attempting to shut out each other’s voices, what is left? A society uncertain where folk stand or think, paralyze in fear, developing some sort of paranoid suspicion.

So let them have their voice, so at least you know who you have to stand up to.

NOS4A2

↪Richard B

Well said. Yes, there’s value to knowing what people really think even when it’s wrong, ugly, ill-mannered or offensive. I would even argue it would be better to encourage such speech and the tolerance of it, at least to know what people believe and to keep them public, rather than send them into hiding as you say.

↪NOS4A2

Yes. I was appreciating your OP all the way until you got to the part about not tolerating cancel culture etc. What, exactly, would we want to make illegal here? Saying that someone ought not to be given a platform? Trying to deny them one? Succeeding? Not only does this send the speaker into hiding, as @Richard B, says, but it really lowers the bar on what it means to be intolerant. Popper seems to have violent, anti-tolerant (not merely intolerant) rhetoric and behavior in mind, not refusing to screen Woody Allen movies.

We should also remember the distinction between a person and a government. I may want my government to tolerate all manner of crap that I personally wouldn't.

NOS4A2

↪J

Fair point and good objection. I think Popper was largely talking about reactionary violence, where they “answer arguments by the use of their fists or pistols”. Suppressing their intolerant philosophies would be “most unwise”, but one ought to fight back if violence occurs.

I assumed, perhaps wrongly, that “cancel culture” fell into that camp. I say this because speakers are often shouted down, or there are bomb threats, swatting, vandalism, even violence etc. though I may be mixing up my terms. I’m not even sure “cancel culture” is an actual phenomenon, to be honest.

Richard B

↪NOS4A2

To add a quote of a much forgotten book, Mill’s On Liberty, he analyzes in Chapter II Of the Liberty of Thought and Discussion, “We can never be sure that the opinion we are endeavoring to stifle is a false opinion; and if we were sure, stifling it would be an evil still.”

Quite an ideal to live up to!

I’m not even sure “cancel culture” is an actual phenomenon, to be honest. — NOS4A2

Thank you! It may be a shadow on the cave wall . . . one of those pictures our media friends like to show us.

↪Richard B

I'll ponder that Mill quote. Thinking about Germany's current policies on Nazi speech . . . perhaps there's such a thing as an entire nation suffering trauma, and being determined not to let it happen again. Anyway, we in the US try to live up to Mill's ideal, in theory. We're allowed to be stupid and wrong in public. Our free-speech problems lie elsewhere, I think: For whom is free speech free, once the legal protection is put in place?

NOS4A2

↪J

Believe it or not, the Weimar Republic had very advanced hate speech laws, and the Nazis were routinely suppressed and banned, many of them jailed.

In free speech literature, the notion that if only there were hate speech laws to counter the Nazis, the holocaust might not have happened, is a fallacy.It’s known as the Weimar Fallacy.

https://www.thefire.org/news/blogs/eternally-radical-idea/would-censorship-have-stopped-rise-nazis-part-16-answers

Chomsky makes a similar argument. He says that the reason there is no real threat of fascism in America is that there is free speech. While in Europe fascism and holocaust denial is taken seriously, and routinely banned, in America holocaust deniers are allowed to distribute their literature with little to no censorship, and as a result their ideas just aren’t taken seriously.

Leontiskos

Popper seems to have violent, anti-tolerant (not merely intolerant) rhetoric and behavior in mind, not refusing to screen Woody Allen movies. — J

Not at all. Cancel culture fits Popper's description of, "incitement to intolerance and persecution." What he is saying is that we should claim the right not to tolerate the intolerant, but that where the intolerant can be adequately met with rational argument they can be tolerated.

Can cancel culture be met with rational argument? No, not really, and therefore it is well within what Popper sees as beyond the pale. It is a form of mob violence, where reputational harm or vocational harm is intended alongside the physical harm. An attempt to force someone to lose their livelihood is obviously persecution.

but it really lowers the bar on what it means to be intolerant — J

"If you try to give your speech you will suffer the consequences," is not intolerance? You need to invest in a dictionary, J.

Leontiskos

I think it is quite clear that those who suggest censorship, de-platforming, the heckler’s veto, cancel culture, etc. are of the intolerant variety, and the tolerant ought not to tolerate their behaviors. — NOS4A2

Yeah, I think that's in alignment with what Popper is saying.

The paradox sometimes rears its head in discussions of free speech as a justification for censorship, “de-platforming”, and “cancel culture”. This shocked me when I first heard it used this way because I always understood Popper as suggesting that the censors fall into the class of “those who are intolerant”, that the censors needed to be suppressed and met with violence if necessary. But on another reading, I can understand how Popper’s solution might be confusing, especially for the bigot. — NOS4A2

Involved in the paradox is the idea that we should use censorship to censor censors, so to speak. Thus any act of intolerance, such as cancel culture, could be opposed or defended on the basis of Popper's reasoning.

The way out is to find a value, something which distinguishes proper intolerance from improper intolerance. Popper provides that value in the second quote you give, and it is something like free speech and inquiry. That is why things like cancel culture would be abhorrent to Popper: because they are opposed to his "Rationalism."

It may be that Popper's goal was to embolden those who felt that all forms of intolerance were impermissible, and who were therefore unable to properly defend the Western, "Rationalist" way of life. Things like cancel culture obviously threaten that way of life.

BitconnectCarlos

The way out is to find a value, something which distinguishes proper intolerance from improper intolerance. Popper provides that value in the second quote you give, and it is something like free speech and inquiry. That is why things like cancel culture would be abhorrent to Popper: because they are opposed to his "Rationalism." — Leontiskos

It's proper to allow free speech and inquiry, but Popper makes an interesting point when he says

I do not imply, for instance, that we should always suppress the utterance of intolerant philosophies; as long as we can counter them by rational argument and keep them in check by public opinion, suppression would certainly be most unwise.

It's really a matter of keeping them in check by public opinion, but if the number of intolerant/fanatical people/opinions starts creeping up, at what point do we take action? Presumably, the more prevalent the intolerant, the more swift and severe the response must be.

I have little faith in rational argument as a counterforce to those who are truly intolerant.

Leontiskos

↪BitconnectCarlos

My point was that when Popper says that, "we should [not] always suppress the utterance of intolerant philosophies," by "intolerant philosophies" what he means is anti-Rationalistic philosophies. The point is that both Popper and his opponents are proposing intolerance, and therefore there must be a distinction between proper and improper intolerance. Popper's solution to that problem seems to be favoring "Rationalism," which I read as free speech and inquiry. If someone is not opposing "Rationalism" then for Popper they are not being intolerant.

BitconnectCarlos

↪Leontiskos

Popper says:

I do not imply, for instance, that we should always suppress the utterance of intolerant philosophies

So, on Popper's view, we do let the intolerant fester for a bit, as long as they can be kept in check by the public (and rationality claims Popper, but in my view, mainly just the public).

Leontiskos

↪BitconnectCarlos

- Sure, but the point is that "intolerant philosophies" = anti-Rationalism. I should have included more context to the quote, but I am trying to illustrate precisely what Popper sees as the potential object of legitimate intolerance.

I see you edited your post, but part of the point is that Popper is not primarily concerned about ideological positions or disinformation.

NOS4A2

↪Leontiskos

Yeah, but I think it’s a fine line between censorship and self-defense. To me, I don’t think it’s censorship qua censorship to fight back against a censorial mob who only wish to stop you from speaking. I think that counts as opposing violence rather than censoring them. They wish to deny you of some fundamental freedoms, and at the same time deny freedoms to those who wish to hear you.

I’m not sure if Popper is libertarian or anarchist enough to believe in the principle of equal freedom, but to me, once that principle is violated, all bets are off. I think the paradox of tolerance presupposes such a principle.

But then again he was also writing around the time of world war 2.

Leontiskos

Yeah, but I think it’s a fine line between censorship and self-defense. To me, I don’t think it’s censorship qua censorship to fight back against a censorial mob who only wish to stop you from speaking. I think that counts as opposing violence rather than censoring them. — NOS4A2

I don't think that engaging in self-defense or opposing violence is incompatible with censorship. I mean, if there is a violent group and you impede their activities by squelching their speech, it seems that you are opposing violence via censorship, no? I just don't know of a reasonable definition of censorship where this sort of thing would not be censorship. At the very least, if we want to say that speech-restriction only counts as censorship when it is done for certain reasons, then we would be required to outline those reasons.

And again,

↪J

's petitio principii is not a correct interpretation of Popper. For Popper "intolerant philosophies" are forms of anti-Rationalism, not forms of violence. Popper would no doubt counsel violence or legal coercion to oppose intolerant philosophies, at least where those intolerant philosophies cannot be adequately met with rational argument. Presumably a form of anti-Rationalism which is not overtly violent and nevertheless cannot be adequately met with rational argument (e.g. many forms of cancel culture) would not be tolerated by Popper, such that the community ought to take legal action against that kind of anti-Rationalism.

EricH

↪NOS4A2

in America holocaust deniers are allowed to distribute their literature with little to no censorship, and as a result their ideas just aren’t taken seriously.

Unfortunately this is not accurate. https://forward.com/culture/705403/kanye-west-joe-rogan-darryl-cooper-elon-musk-antisemitism-bonanza/

Bob Ross

↪NOS4A2

:fire:

It is worth mentioning that one can be for free speech while being against tolerance:

Tolerance is the virtue of the man without convictions

-- Chesterton.

Just because one has to respect another's right to speak, it does not follow that one need do business with him or welcome him into their life.

NOS4A2

↪Bob Ross

Very true. It’s enough to know what another thinks, and then one can at least make an informed decision about whether to deal with them or not.

Does Popper's Paradox of Tolerance defend free speech or censorship?

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