It is an interesting article. Likely, the method employed by several renowned philosophical projects involved entertaining a form of radical epoché, a suspension or break in the ordinary flow of consciousness. Descartes's argumentation, which forms the foundation for the Cartesian cogito, exemplifies this approach. It entails the systematic suspension of natural perception and common sense. Descartes doubted the reliability of his sensory organs (no eyes, no ears), the existence of external objects or even his own body, as well as sensations beyond those directly necessary for his inquiry. He even doubted memory, and rejected the notion of extension, as both the earth and the sky as mere fictions created by the mind. However, contrary to your central claim that "At the center of this theory is the claim that phenomenal consciousness is accompanied by a breakdown of causal distinctiveness within a recursively interconnected network", Descartes did not appear to fall into a purely affective state. His meditations were clearly directed by a distinct and rigorous clarity in the pursuit of truth. But likely Descartes did not completely postponed the guidance of the pre-meditated foreknowledge of
his method. In general, I agree with your thesis that " a system experiences itself when it can no longer objectify its internal differences.
This "confusion" of the system with its own states creates the sense of self. Consciousness is then not an instance, but a process of constant self-confusion: a structural breakdown that feels itself." Yet, I believe this thesis could benefit from stronger phenomenological grounding.

when you agree with " a system experiences itself when it can no longer objectify its internal differences. The internal differences, differ between ? Physical-mental domain?

From both phylogenetic and ontogenetic perspectives, it is possible to identify a relatively brief but crucial stages of developmental crises. The transition from primates to early hominids likely involved the period of confusion in integrating emotional states, memories, and social interactions. Psychologist Lev Vygotsky identified five consecutive breaks during which a child loses the ability to clearly differentiate between her internal experiences and the external world. Over time, these periods of existential disorientation become embedded within the routine flow of consciousness. In addition, philosophically, Descartes' 'Meditations on First Philosophy' can be interpreted as an evidence of a self-inflicted existential crisis, where he is no longer certain of what is real, what is external, or even whether he exists as a physical being. The system (the thinking subject) can no longer clearly objectify the external world or its own body, establishing the foundational certainty of the self as a thinking being.

Your interpretation of immanence is naturally fitted by Chu Spaces , which can be used to model bidirectional causality that can either be interpreted as eliminating causality or as allowing the direction of the causal arrow to be relative to the perspective of an interacting observer. See Vaughan Pratt (2005) for his philosophical interpretation..

"Philosophy. Yet another subject amenable to this perspective is the mind
body problem. Descartes proposed in 1637 that the mind interacted with the
body. This proposal generated much literature all denying the causal interaction
of mind and body and explaining their apparent interaction via various forms of
deus ex machina (Malebranche, Spinoza, Leibniz), or denial of body (Berkeley)
or mind (Hobbes), or the assertion of their equivalence (Russell). Elsewhere
[Pra95a] we have applied Chu spaces to an implementation of Descartes’ pro
posal, by taking the causal interaction of mind and body as basic instead of
derived and obtaining as its consequences the basic interactions within each of
body and mind. We do not see how to obtain the other direction, mind-body
interaction from the separate behavior of mind and body, any better than did
Descartes’ contemporaries.
Viewed at the object level, Chu spaces formalize Russell’s solution mathe
matically by offering dual views of the same Chu space merely by transposition
of viewpoint. Viewed at the level of individual interactions within an object
however, the solution takes on a new and deeper meaning: mind-body inter
action turns out to be the only real interaction, body-body and mind-mind
interaction are secondary interactions, derivable by residuation, that can be
considered mere figments of our imagination as to how the universe interacts
with itself."

A notable difference between the Chu-space approach to yours (as i understood it), is that it doesn't assume the causal arrow to have an absolute and context-free objective direction. Indeed, neither the classical world nor the quantum world needs to assume a context-free arrow of causality, so any working definition of consciousness should not assume it.

As with any ontological proposal, the first person perspective cannot be explained by an ontology such as Chu-Spaces (or more generally, Dialectica Categories), but such ontologies have great promise for expressing the necessary logical conditions for the consistent reconciliation and integration of multiple causal perspectives. In particular, the Russellian third-personal concept of symmetric causality that is compatible with relativistic mechanics , can be reconciled with both first-personal concepts of causality (such as informal interpretations of the incomplete theory of QM), as well as interventionist notions of causality in terms of structural equation models as employed by the social sciences.

Other than that, I think you papers is heading in the right direction when it comes to addressing the functional concerns of a working definition of active perception.

so it could be said that the mind is so powerful that can recreate realities so believable that confuse our human experience in the world?

Yes, the mind has the ability to create realities that are so convincing they can distort our actual experience. However, more importantly, the objective structures within the broader techno-cyber milieu consistently shape our aesthetic experience and frame our perceptial field. The process of constant self-confusion refers not merely to occasional interventions of imagination or fantasy, but to the way time itself aligns with the immanent, fluid structure of our temporal experience—a phenomenon Deleuze describes as the 'crystals of time.' These 'crystals' point to the way time is not experienced as a linear progression, but as a series of overlapping, simultaneous moments where the real and the imaginary coexist, making their distinction difficult to attribute.
“The confusion of the real and the imaginary is not a simple error of fact. Their indiscernibility constitutes an objective illusion; it does not suppress the distinction between the two sides, but make them unattributable…There is the coalescence of the present and the past, of the actual and the virtual, of the real and the imaginary” (Deleuze, 'Cinema 2', p69)

Here is a theory of consciousness that I just published on Akademia: https://www.academia.edu/129143983/Consciousness_as_a_collapse_of_causality — Wolfgang

I haven't read the article, but the abstract*1 seems to make sense, from a peculiar perspective. For example, Nature only knows linear Cause & Effect or Input & Output. Yet the mind of homo sapiens adds an intermediate state of subjective self awareness. I wouldn't call that temporary side-track (recursion) a "collapse" of causation, but merely a way of making use of Energy-as-Information*2*3.

Physically, humans ingest food for their own material metabolism. Likewise, Metaphysically, they absorb patterns of perception (forms, action & behavior) and convert them into Ideas & Concepts to serve their personal mental metabolism : thinking, reasoning. That processing of flow-thru Information is what we call Consciousness. And when the flow is diverted inward (self-directed), it becomes Self-Consciousness. Energy is Causation, but digested*4 energy/information is Conception. :smile:


*1. Why do we feel something? Why is there not only motion, reaction and calculation in a part of the universe, but also experience, qualia, self-awareness? Classical physics knows only cause and effect, computer science only knows input and output. But in consciousness, both seem to blur. This essay is based on the thesis: Consciousness arises where a recursive causal system loses the distinction between cause and effect of its own states.
https://www.academia.edu/129143983/Consciousness_as_a_collapse_of_causality

*2. Energy :
Scientists define “energy” as the ability to do work, but don't know what energy is in essence. They assume it's an eternal causative force that existed prior to the Big Bang, along with mathematical laws. Energy is a positive or negative relationship between things, and physical Laws are limitations on the push & pull of those forces. So, all they know is what Energy does, which is to transform material objects in various ways. Energy itself is amorphous & immaterial. So if you reduce energy to its essence of information, it seems more akin to mind than matter.
https://blog-glossary.enformationism.info/page8.html

*3. Information is Energy :
Definition of a physically based concept of information
https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-3-658-40862-6

*4. To Digest :
to take information into your mind in a way that gives you the ability to use it.
https://dictionary.cambridge.org › dictionary › digest

You are seriously damaging your reputation. Causality is everywhere. Every human action is equal to a cause-effect relationship. Consciousness does arise in various moments, such as the moment of the choice. Every reasoning and every choice is equal to a cause-effect relationship. Human beings do gauge their choices by thinking about the consequences (thus the effects). You are the philosopher of blue-collars. The blue-collar worker is, often, the one working such an automaton. The "automaton-worker" certainly does lose awareness about causality. The more the individual is creative and has to make choices, the more he is one using causality. Causality is, more or less, consciousness and, more precisely, the perception of consciousness.

interesting, but I struggle to reason how does a coalescence of a discernable duality overlap. As they are uncommon

For Bergson, the actual refers to the reality we directly experience now. Differently, the virtual designates past experiences or memories that are not immediately present but exist in a latent state. Both are real. When we recall something, we do not pull up a fixed image from the past.
There is an active interplay between past experiences and their reactivation in the present.
The past becomes a part of the present, making it difficult to distinguish between a past event and its present recollection. This means that the boundary between the actual and the virtual is blurred.