Late to the party again...

There seems to be a common intuition, but not a universal one, that the Principle of Sufficient Reason, if it were true, would imply Determinism is also true. — flannel jesus

PSR seems to be more of a classical principle, talking more about a sufficient reason why I chose chocolate today despite preferring vanilla, and not so much about sufficient reason for the nucleus to decay just then.

Still, certain wordings of PSR may correspond to certain wording of determinism, and in this way the one can be implied by the other. Other wording might be incompatible.

As for some of the other conversations:

Wouldn't we be able to ask "Why am I in universe 1 rather than universe 2?" — Moliere

That's the same as asking "why am I me and not you?" — flannel jesus

Pretty equivalent, yea. Makes no sense in either case. To suggest otherwise would be to say that X is Y when it clearly isn't.
Then again, I'm running under the presumption that there isn't a thing that got to be me (or got to be in this universe) like it was some kind of lottery or something.

I'm me and not you cuz there was a percentage chance I was you, and a percentage chance I was me -- and I just happened to flip heads. — Moliere

We apparently see things quite differently, you taking the 'thing playing a lottery' stance.

I'm struggling to see how many-worlds can be interpreted as deterministic, but again it seems like we're coming back to terminology in the first place. — Moliere

Easy. The whole thing says that for a closed system, the system (described by one wave function) evolves according to the Schrodinger equation, which is a fully deterministic equation.

Non-deterministic interpretations involve what Einstein apparently detested: the rolling of dice. A good deal of interpretations involve this.

"does the same thing every time" isn't what I said with respect to different kinds of events. — Moliere

Under determinism, yes, every time, given multiple systems with fully identical initial state.

So the question is, given determinism, can PSR still not apply? Given non-determinism, can PSR still be valid?

You may be able to, but I cannot understand why Many Worlds is deterministic for the reason I said -- why am I in the up-world and not the down-world? — Moliere

Depends on one's definition of 'I'. Given some definitions, you're in both. I don't like that definition since it seems to violate law of non-contradiction. Determinism is a separate issue from what 'you' are under MWI.

Easy. The whole thing says that for a closed system, the system (described by one wave function) evolves according to the Schrodinger equation, which is a fully deterministic equation.

Non-deterministic interpretations involve what Einstein apparently detested: the rolling of dice. A good deal of interpretations involve this. — noAxioms

Yes -- but maybe Einstein was wrong.

Is the whole universe rightly described as a closed system?

Does the Principle of Sufficient Reason imply determinism? — flannel jesus

If the PSR is interpreted to state that every event must have a cause, then it would seem that the PSR does imply determinism. Is that how you are interpreting it?

Yes -- but maybe Einstein was wrong. — Moliere

Indeed, maybe he was wrong.

Is the whole universe rightly described as a closed system?

I think any decent definition of 'universe' would involve it being a closed system. If not, it is at best part of some larger structure, just part of a universe.

Given such a definition, any 'multiverse' would be a collection of fairly disjoint things. Look at the observable universe. There are infinitely many of those, so it is a multiverse of sorts, but they are adjacent to each other and interact to a point. No 'visible universe' is a closed system, so it doesn't qualify as a bunch of separate universes by said 'decent definition' of 'universe'.

What I know is that you have to perform the experiment in order to find out the outcome -- much like a quarter. — Moliere

A physical coin flip (like Pachinko) should be a reasonably deterministic process. If all state is known to enough precision, the outcome is computable. Still, classical physics is not empirically deterministic, as illustrated by things like Norton's dome. This does not falsify ontic deterministic interpretations, which give cause to all events.

I think any decent definition of 'universe' would involve it being a closed system. If not, it is at best part of some larger structure, just part of a universe. — noAxioms

I think that begs the question.

Though to be fair to you -- to say the universe is a closed system is more or less to affirm the conservation laws are true and applicable to all that we can observe and make inferences about.

A physical coin flip (like Pachinko) should be a reasonably deterministic process. If all state is known to enough precision, the outcome is computable. Still, classical physics is not empirically deterministic, as illustrated by things like Norton's dome. This does not falsify ontic deterministic interpretations, which give cause to all events. — noAxioms

It doesn't falsify it, but I have to begin to wonder what this ontic determinism is -- if it's not empirically determined it can't be falsified.

So why believe it?

So why believe it? — Moliere

We live in a world of process, where all kinds of processes seem to invariantly give rise to other processes. We actually don't know of exceptions, so why not believe in it?

For my part the addition of uncertainty in classical mechanics is enough to warrant some kind of stochastic reasoning with respect to causality. It may be stupid, but determinism may also be reading into phenomena more than is warranted.

The determinism we witness in our macro-world may well be the result of stochastic processes at the quantum level, or what appears stochastic to us may appear so on account of our limited knowledge. Does it really matter?

Only in a thread claiming things about determinism and the PSR :D

Though I'd emphasize my viewpoint here: it's not the quantum level as much as there are natural stochastic processes, such as the pachinko machine, or the genes one is born with. At least empirically speaking.

Genes and the pachinko machine appear stochastic, as does the coin toss, but I think we have reason to believe they are not really stochastic, and merely appear so to us due to our inability to model all the conditions in play.

Actually the question in the OP was whether the idea of the PSR is inextricably bound to the idea of determinism . The OP specifically stated that the concern is not with the truth of the PSR and determinism.

Genes and the pachinko machine appear stochastic, as does the coin toss, but I think we have reason to believe they are not really stochastic, and merely appear so to us due to our inability to model all the conditions in play. — Janus

What reason?

Actually the question in the OP was whether the idea of the PSR is inextricably bound to the idea of determinism . The OP specifically stated that the concern is not with the truth of the PSR and determinism. — Janus

Yeah. I started there with

↪flannel jesus Wouldn't that just mean that insofar that determinism is true there is a/(some version of the) PSR must be true, namely, the one wherein reasons are causes and there are no other explanations worth considering with respect to the PSR, or something like that.

I think I'd be more inclined to accept the inference from determinism to the PSR than the inference from the PSR to determinism just because reasons and causes need not be one and the same, so it seems obvious to me that one can hold that everything has an explanation without everything having a cause. — Moliere

I'm still thinking that if we accept determinism then the PSR is easy to establish, but cuz of stochastic events the reverse does not hold cuz we can explain events stochastically.

What reason? — Moliere

The observed invariance of chemical and electrical processes, which are what constitute everything we observe.

I'm still thinking that if we accept determinism then the PSR is easy to establish, but cuz of stochastic events the reverse does not hold cuz we can explain events stochastically. — Moliere

We explain events causally not stochasitically.

We explain events causally not stochasitically. — Janus

I don't think those exclusive. There are necessary causes and stochastic causes, and others harder to define than these mathematical constructs.

The observed invariance of chemical and electrical processes, which are what constitute everything we observe. — Janus

Maybe it's a professional hazard, but "invariance" is not what I see in chemistry or electrical explanation.

Predictions have improved, but "invariance" seems wrong to me.

It changes, if at a slower rate, but does change.

Can you give an example of a stochastic cause?

Maybe it's a professional hazard, but "invariance" is not what I see in chemistry or electrical explanation. — Moliere

So chemical elements do not always combine in predictable ways? In the absence of understandable faults and unusual conditions electrical and electronic components don't always function as predicted?

So chemical elements do not always combine in predictable ways? In the absence of understandable faults and unusual conditions electrical and electronic components don't always function as predicted? — Janus

Yup!

Much of the time they do -- but not always always. That's why it's still a science. We get it wrong sometimes, in the details.

Can you give an example of a stochastic cause? — Janus

Theoretically I think of a stochastic cause as, using Hume's notion of a necessary connection between events, a set probability between events.

So if I flip a quarter then 50% Heads 50% Tails.

Much of the time they do -- but not always always. That's why it's still a science. We get it wrong sometimes, in the details. — Moliere

When they do not behave in the way we have predicted is it not due to unforeseen conditions which when discovered causally explain the anomaly?

So if I flip a quarter then 50% Heads 50% Tails. — Moliere

Over a very long series of throws we will tend to get a 50/50 distribution of outcomes, but i see that as an observation not a causal explanation. A causal explanation might tell us why we get that 50/50 distribution.

When they do not behave in the way we have predicted is it not due to unforeseen conditions which when discovered causally explain the anomaly? — Janus

Sometimes. And sometimes it's given "the shrug" -- "Idk, because there are too many possible causes"

Usually that's when you figure out it was a bad experiment after all, or you mess something up.

But every once and again they are discoveries, so unexpected consequences that teach us something.

Sometimes. And sometimes it's given "the shrug" -- "Idk, because there are too many possible causes" — Moliere

Right―too many possible causes. Don't anomalies that are not understood invite investigation in terms of causal thinking? I'm finding it hard to think of examples of such anomalies.

But every once and again they are discoveries, so unexpected consequences that teach us something. — Moliere

That seems right. So we investigate the causes of anomalies, and once they are understood they are no longer anomalies, and we go back to finding predictable results, until the next set of unforeseen unusual conditions comes along.

It seems that, except when it comes to human and some animal behavior, causation is the paradigmatic mode of thought. With animals and humans thinking in terms of causality may be supplanted by thinking in terms of intentionality.

The puzzle there is how intentions which are themselves understood to be the outcome of brain processes, and which are themselves outside of the animal or human ambit of awareness, can really be free of causation.

It seems that, except when it comes to human and some animal behavior, causation is the paradigmatic mode of thought. — Janus

And if Hume is right, while true that it's paradigmatic, it's also just a habit unjustified by logic.

The puzzle there is how intentions which are themselves understood to be the outcome of brain processes, and which are themselves outside of the animal or human ambit of awareness, can really be free of causation. — Janus

I'm more tempted to inverse this -- How can we believe in universal causation (determinism) when we know we are free and can't predict everything?

And if Hume is right, while true that it's paradigmatic, it's also just a habit unjustified by logic. — Moliere

Yes, not strictly justified by logic, since there is no logical necessity that events must have causes, or that particular causes or conditions must of logical necessity give rise to particular effects.

So, it's not a matter of pure reason supporting the idea of causation, but of practical reason giving us good reason (it almost always works) to think causally. In fact it seems arguable that there is no other way to understand physical phenomena. The whole of science is based on the idea of energy doing work, and causation is understood not merely as Humean "constant conjunction" but as 'energy exchange'.

I'm more tempted to inverse this -- How can we believe in universal causation (determinism) when we know we are free and can't predict everything? — Moliere

Sure you can invert it. I think we believe in universal causation because that seems to be what we observe everywhere, and we also have coherent understandings of why we think we are free (because we cannot be aware of all the forces acting on us, as Spinoza noted) and why we cannot predict everything (because very slight variations in initial conditions amplify to create great differences in outcomes when it comes to the complex systems whose behavior we are not so good at predicting).

I think we believe in universal causation because that seems to be what we observe everywhere, and we also have coherent understandings of why we think we are free (because we cannot be aware of all the forces acting on us, as Spinoza noted) and why we cannot predict everything (because very slight variations in initial conditions amplify to create great differences in outcomes when it comes to the complex systems whose behavior we are not so good at predicting). — Janus

To my mind that begins to look like a ghost -- we can explain it, but we can't say it's certainly the case.

For instance -- Spinoza has an explanation for determinism, but another explanation for thinking we are free is we're born free and so know it as well as we know our bodies, and we can't predict everything because some events are connected by chance rather than necessity.

To my mind that begins to look like a ghost -- we can explain it, but we can't say it's certainly the case.

For instance -- Spinoza has an explanation for determinism, but another explanation for thinking we are free is we're born free and so know it as well as we know our bodies, and we can't predict everything because some events are connected by chance rather than necessity. — Moliere

Insofar as we are able to understand them events on the macro-level do not seem to be connected by chance. Events on the micro-level may be or it m ay just be that we cannot grok them in our coarse-grained macro outlook.

To be sure we can't know whether one or the other explanation is certainly the case, but in the final analysis that seems to be the case with most everything in human life.

I'm not sure how else to put it, but I still see this as incorrect.

While I think determinism is impossible to determine empirically, I also don't believe it's true. There are patterns, but if some of those aren't predictable then to call them "determined" looks different from what I thought determinism to be claiming. Something like Dennet's claims about how that one particular event could not be different in the course of things.

I generally take probability as an empirical reality rather than a fudge-factor for our ignorance. Uncertainty figures into scientific thought so much that it seems reasonable to treat it as real as all the rest.

I see you are taking the epistemological actuality of our predictive limitations as a guide for your disbelief in determinism. I, on the other hand, take those limitations to be, given what we do think we know about things, inevitable.

But since the truth or falsity of determinism is epistemically unobtainable I prefer to reserve judgement, while noting that most things in the world of physical processes are very successfully modeled in deterministically causal terms. Which means I lean towards determinism, and tend to view the idea of libertarian freedom as a fantasy.

That said, disagreement is not a negative in my view, and I can understand why you think as you do, without feeling inclined to follow that path of thought myself.

So why believe it? — Moliere

Because it's beautiful (in a mathematical sense). There's something hideous about random spontaneous things with no ontological explanation just popping into existence.

I believe Einstein was hinting at that when he said God doesn't play dice.

He was - but don’t you think there’s something essential about spontaneity? Democritus had to introduce the famous ‘swerve’ to allow for the unpredictability of nature. C S Peirce had his ‘tychism’ which he thought of as the ‘sportive’ side of nature. And as I said, spontaneity is also bounded by constraints. But being constrained isn’t the same as being completely determined. There are ranges of possibility - another aspect of QM that Einstein didn’t like, but he was definitively proven incorrect by subsequent science

there are multiple deterministic interpretations of qm too so we can keep the beauty of determinism anyway.

I suppose I don't see the appeal, but for reasons already stated. I don't see it as beautiful, though I don't know if it's ugly either. Determinism appears to me to be entirely inconsequential to my way of thinking or being; a kind of metaphysical toy.

I think a surprising amount of physics is based on abstract, apparently-subjective judgements of physicists. What would be a beautiful way for the world to work? Look at how much talk there is of symmetries in modern physics.

I think there's an intuitional gulf between those that think that's a reasonable guiding principle and those that can't see why beauty should have anything to do with how reality operates. I personally can't justify why physics ought to be beautiful, but I feel in my bones that the success of physics ideas influenced by ideas of mathematical beauty are no mistake, no coincidence.

A deterministic world is ordered, logical, "everything in its right place" - indeterminism includes things that happen for no reason, which is inherently disordered and chaotic. It's just not very neat.

Oh, I have no qualms with utilizing "beauty" in our reasonings about the world -- it's the determinism bit that I don't find beautiful, but terms of elegance, simplicity, and so forth indicate a sort of aesthetic base for judgment in particular scientific fields.

But I wouldn't tie those to a universalizing program like causal determinism of a physical world, or something like that. They are ways of judgment.