There is a great disagreement between the naturalist(-materialist)-atheists and theists about free will. The naturalist would go to lengths to argue for the evolutionary chain and deny free-will as life is caused deterministically. The materialist would deny any immaterial consciousness and lead again to the denial of free-will, in support of determinism.

The (Christian) theist does not have to deal with any of this, as both problems can be supposedly solved if the problem is pushed back onto an external omnipotent being. God.

The existence of an external deity not only grants us as conscious beings, but explains evolution as a purposeful process. Arguably, the former becomes a necessary prerequisite of the latter, as to be purposeful, we must first be conscious and be evolved into rational beings to trust any rational argument that we make. Rationality requires a rational consciousness, and a conscious mind has the capacity to choose good and evil.

Let’s break this argument down. We have a chain of evolutions directed towards a purpose. A single purpose because of which we are rational. Without this purposeful directing of our reason, we would not have a reasonable mind. Now, if there could have been multiple forms of this ‘reason’ that we as a species might have evolved into, there is no purposeful direction. At the least, it violates the necessity of a God. Simply consider the possibility of us being irrational. If there is a possibility of that, we were not purposefully directed. If there isn’t, we were purposefully directed towards rationality.

Put simply: free-will is only real if we have both the option to be rational and to be irrational. If we are rational because we were purposefully directed, then we simply could not have had the capacity to be irrational. Following this, one may concede to the argument that we do in fact have the capacity to be irrational despite being directed towards rationality. That raises another problem. If we are rational, we must know the clear distinction between right and wrong. If we do know how to discern between them, the next question would be: why do we do wrong at all? The natural response: clearly, we have free-will and have the capacity to commit wrong. At a first glance, the proposition seems true: we are capable of irrationality.

Let us examine this more closely: In the case of a divine moral law above the human law which is considered objective, if we are conscious and rational so we can make both good and evil choices and at the same time trust our rationality, then we should never mix the two at all. Conclusively, anyone who appeals to the divine law must commit deeds knowing they are good or evil as one is conscious (having the freedom to choose good and evil deeds) and rational (having clear rational distinction between good and evil). If one commits an evil deed but calls it good, then clearly their rationality is clouded and they do not have access to this divine law. One may point out us as imperfect creatures with free-will, and as such not having access to the divine law as we may fall into temptation or sin. There may be an introduction of an ambiguous aspect. Perhaps, there is a divine purpose but it has not been realized completely: but would we really be rational then?

To conclude, while one may expect a (objective) divine moral law, the expectation of intelligence-led evolution towards rationality that precedes it does not sit well with our experiential understanding of self-justified evils.

Note: This is a response to using the teleological argument as an appeal that we should always be able to trust our rationality.

What is your take on this topic?